This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

Stanford University Libraries
3 6105 025 666 806

~~C65~~ 192
B511a

BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY

THE WORKS OF GEORGE BERKELEY
VOL. III

GEORGE BELL & SONS

LONDON: YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN
NEW YORK: 66, FIFTH AVENUE, AND
BOMBAY: 53, ESPLANADE ROAD
CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.

THE WORKS OF
GEORGE BERKELEY, D.D.
BISHOP OF CLOYNE

EDITED BY
GEORGE SAMPSON

WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION BY
THE RT. HON. A. J. BALFOUR, M.P.

VOL. III

LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1898

LIBRARY OF THE
LELAND STANFORD JR UNIVERSITY.

a. 38244.

CHISWICK PRESS:—CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON

PREFACE.

AS in the preceding volumes of this edition, the text here given follows that of Berkeley's final revision, while the readings of the earlier issues are indicated in footnotes. Special interest can be claimed for this volume. It contains the first reprint of the "Querist" in its original parts; a slight but characteristic contribution to the "Dublin Journal," not included in any other edition; and an appendix of criticisms that may contain references of interest to many readers of Berkeley.

Professor Fraser—whose name no student of Berkeley can mention without gratitude—offered to read the proofs of Appendix C, and made several valuable additions. For this and for other kind help, the editor offers his sincere thanks. Acknowledgments are also due to Mr. J. J. Macsweeny, who, with Sir John Gilbert (now gone beyond the reach of thanks), gave every facility for research among the collections of the Royal Irish Academy. To him, readers are indebted in some measure for the reprint of the "Querist" and the curious title-page of the "Maxims."

Here, at the conclusion of an attempt to win for Berkeley readers who may have made no special study

of philosophy, the words of a great and wise Englishman can be quoted with special fitness. "One word," says Huxley, "by way of parting advice to the rising generation of English readers. . . . If . . . you are animated by the much rarer desire for real knowledge; if you want to get a clear conception of the deepest problems set before the intellect of man, there is no need, so far as I can see, for you to go beyond the limits of the English tongue. Indeed, if you are pressed for time, three English authors will suffice; namely, Berkeley, Hume and Hobbes. . . . And you will have had the further advantage of becoming familiar with the manner in which three of the greatest masters of the English language have handled that noble instrument of thought."

CONTENTS.

VOL. III.

	PAGE
THE ANALYST	1
DEFENCE OF FREETHINKING IN MATHEMATICS.	53
REASONS FOR NOT REPLYING TO MR. WALTON'S FULL ANSWER	97
THE QUERIST	111
DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO MAGISTRATES	169
SIRIS	198
TWO LETTERS ON THE REBELLION OF 1745	337
FOUR LETTERS ON TAR-WATER	343
A WORD TO THE WISE	383
MAXIMS CONCERNING PATRIOTISM	403
FARTHER THOUGHTS ON TAR-WATER	411
APPENDIX A: THE FIRST EDITION OF THE QUERIST	429
APPENDIX B: THE CONTENTS OF THE MISCELLANY OF 1752	503
APPENDIX C: A LIST OF PRINCIPAL EDITIONS AND CRITICISMS	509
INDEX	519

THE ANALYST.

[THE real interest of this tract has considerably diminished; but it has some historical importance. It is in some respects a continuation of "Alciphron," and seeks to demonstrate to free-thinking mathematicians that while they accuse Christians of making large and ridiculous assumptions in religion, in their turn they make assumptions of an equal sort in the exactest of the sciences. This Berkeley does by criticising Newton's doctrine of Fluxions as set forth in the "Principia" (1687). The "Analyst" was published in London in 1734, and was also issued in Dublin at the same time.]

THE

ANALYST;

OR, A

DISCOURSE

Addreſſed to an

Infidel MATHEMATICIAN.

WHEREIN

It is examined whether the Object, Principles, and Inferences of the modern Analyſis are more diſtinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced, than Religious Myſteries and Points of Faith.

By the Author of *The Minute Philoſopher*.

Firſt caſt out the beam out of thine own Eye; and then ſhalt thou ſee clearly to caſt out the mote out of thy brother's Eye.
S. Matt. c. vii. 5.

DUBLIN:

Printed by and for S. FULLER at the *Globe* in *Meath-ſtreet*, and J. LEATHLY Bookſeller in *Dames-ſtreet*. 1734.

CONTENTS.

1. Mathematicians presumed to be the great masters of reason. Hence an undue deference to their decisions where they have no right to decide. This one cause of infidelity.
2. Their principles and methods to be examined with the same freedom which they assume with regard to the principles and mysteries of religion. In what sense and how far geometry is to be allowed an improvement of the mind.
3. Fluxions the great object and employment of the profound geometricians in the present age. What these fluxions are.
4. Moments or nascent increments of flowing quantities difficult to conceive. Fluxions of different orders. Second and third fluxions obscure mysteries.
5. Differences, *i.e.* increments or decrements infinitely small, used by foreign mathematicians instead of fluxions or velocities of nascent and evanescent increments.
6. Differences of various orders, *i.e.* quantities infinitely less than quantities infinitely little; and infinitesimal parts of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c. without end or limit.
7. Mysteries in faith unjustly objected against by those who admit them in science.
8. Modern Analysts supposed by themselves to extend their views even beyond infinity: deluded by their own species or symbols.
9. Method for finding the fluxion of a rectangle of two indeterminate quantities, shewed to be illegitimate and false.
10. Implicit deference of mathematical men for the great author of fluxions. Their earnestness rather to go on fast and far, than to set out warily and see their way distinctly.
11. Momentums difficult to comprehend. No middle quantity to be admitted between a finite quantity and nothing, without admitting infinitesimals.
12. The fluxion of any power of a flowing quantity. Lemma premised in order to examine the method for finding such fluxion.
13. The rule for the fluxions of powers attained by unfair reasoning.
14. The aforesaid reasoning farther unfolded, and shewed to be illogical.
15. No true conclusion to be justly drawn by direct consequence from inconsistent suppositions. The same rules of right reason to be observed, whether men argue in symbols or in words.
16. An hypothesis being destroyed, no consequence of such hypothesis to be retained.

17. Hard to distinguish between evanescent increments and infinitesimal differences. Fluxions placed in various lights. The great author, it seems, not satisfied with his own notions.
18. Quantities infinitely small supposed and rejected by Leibnitz and his followers. No quantity, according to them, greater or smaller for the addition or subduction of its infinitesimal.
19. Conclusions to be proved by the principles, and not principles by the conclusions.
20. The geometrical Analyst considered as a logician; and his discoveries, not in themselves, but as derived from such principles and by such inferences.
21. A tangent drawn to the parabola according to the *calculus differentialis*. Truth shewn to be the result of error, and how.
22. By virtue of a twofold mistake Analysts arrive at truth, but not at science: ignorant how they come at their own conclusions.
23. The conclusion never evident or accurate, in virtue of obscure or inaccurate premises. Finite quantities might be rejected as well as infinitesimals.
24. The foregoing doctrine farther illustrated.
25. Sundry observations thereupon.
26. Ordinate found from the area by means of evanescent increments.
27. In the foregoing case, the supposed evanescent increment is really a finite quantity, destroyed by an equal quantity with an opposite sign.
28. The foregoing case put generally. Algebraical expressions compared with the geometrical quantities.
29. Correspondent quantities algebraical and geometrical equated. The analysis shewed not to obtain in infinitesimals, but it must also obtain in finite quantities.
30. The getting rid of quantities by the received principles, whether of fluxions or of differences, neither good geometry nor good logic. Fluxions or velocities, why introduced.
31. Velocities not to be abstracted from time and space: nor their proportions to be investigated or considered exclusively of time and space.
32. Difficult and obscure points constitute the principles of the modern Analysis, and are the foundation on which it is built.
33. The rational faculties whether improved by such obscure analytics.
34. By what inconceivable steps finite lines are found proportional to fluxions. Mathematical infidels strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.
35. Fluxions of infinitesimals not to be avoided on the received principles. Nice abstractions and geometrical metaphysics.
36. Velocities of nascent or evanescent quantities, whether in reality understood and signified by finite lines and species.
37. Signs or exponents obvious; but fluxions themselves not so.
38. Fluxions, whether the velocities with which infinitesimal differences are generated.
39. Fluxions of fluxions or second fluxions, whether to be conceived as velocities of velocities, or rather as velocities of the second nascent increments.

40. Fluxions considered, sometimes in one sense, sometimes in another; one while in themselves, another in their exponents: hence confusion and obscurity.
41. Isochronal increments, whether finite or nascent, proportional to their respective velocities.
42. Time supposed to be divided into moments: increments generated in those moments: and velocities proportional to those increments.
43. Fluxions, second, third, fourth, &c., what they are, how obtained, and how represented. What idea of velocity in a moment of time and point of space.
44. Fluxions of all orders inconceivable.
45. Signs or exponents confounded with the fluxions.
46. Series of expressions or of notes easily contrived. Whether a series of mere velocities, or of mere nascent increments corresponding thereunto, be as easily conceived.
47. Celerities dismissed, and instead thereof ordinates and areas introduced. Analogies and expressions useful in the modern quadratures, may yet be useless for enabling us to conceive fluxions. No right to apply the rules without knowledge of the principles.
48. Metaphysics of modern Analysts most incomprehensible.
49. Analysts employed about notional shadowy entities. Their logics as exceptionable as their metaphysics.
50. Occasion of this address. Conclusion. Queries.

THE ANALYST:

A DISCOURSE ADDRESSED TO AN INFIDEL MATHEMATICIAN.

1.

THOUGH I am a stranger to your person, yet I am not, Sir, a stranger to the reputation you have acquired in that branch of learning which hath been your peculiar study; nor to the authority that you therefore assume in things foreign to your profession; nor to the abuse that you, and too many more of the like character, are known to make of such undue authority, to the misleading of unwary persons in matters of the highest concernment, and whereof your mathematical knowledge can by no means qualify you to be a competent judge. Equity indeed and good sense would incline one to disregard the judgment of men, in points which they have not considered or examined. But several who make the loudest claim to those qualities do nevertheless the very thing they would seem to despise, clothing themselves in the livery of other men's opinions, and putting on a general deference for the judgment of you, Gentlemen, who are presumed to be of all men the greatest masters of reason, to be most conversant about distinct ideas, and never to take things upon trust, but always clearly to see your way, as men whose constant employment is the deducing truth by the justest inference from the most evident principles. With this bias on their minds, they submit to your decisions where you have no right to decide. And that this is one short way of making Infidels, I am credibly informed.

2. Whereas then it is supposed that you apprehend more

light you please, the clear conception of it will, if I mistake not, be found impossible; whether it be so or no I appeal to the trial of every thinking reader. And if a second fluxion be inconceivable, what are we to think of third, fourth, fifth fluxions, and so on without end?

5. The foreign mathematicians are supposed by some, even of our own, to proceed in a manner less accurate, perhaps, and geometrical, yet more intelligible. Instead of flowing quantities and their fluxions, they consider the variable finite quantities as increasing or diminishing by the continual addition or subduction of infinitely small quantities. Instead of the velocities wherewith increments are generated, they consider the increments or decrements themselves, which they call differences, and which are supposed to be infinitely small. The difference of a line is an infinitely little line; of a plane an infinitely little plane. They suppose finite quantities to consist of parts infinitely little, and curves to be polygons, whereof the sides are infinitely little, which by the angles they make one with another determine the curvity of the line. Now to conceive a quantity infinitely small, that is, infinitely less than any sensible or imaginable quantity, or any the least finite magnitude, is, I confess, above my capacity. But to conceive a part of such infinitely small quantity that shall be still infinitely less than it, and consequently though multiplied infinitely shall never equal the minutest finite quantity, is, I suspect, an infinite difficulty to any man whatsoever; and will be allowed such by those who candidly say what they think; provided they really think and reflect, and do not take things upon trust.

6. And yet in the *calculus differentialis*, which method serves to all the same intents and ends with that of fluxions, our modern analysts are not content to consider only the differences of finite quantities: they also consider the differences of those differences, and the differences of the differences of the first differences: and so on *ad infinitum*. That is, they consider quantities infinitely less than the least discernible quantity; and others infinitely less than those infinitely small ones; and still others infinitely less than the preceding infinitesimals, and so on without end or limit. Insomuch that we are to admit an infinite succession of infinitesimals, each infinitely less than the foregoing, and

infinitely greater than the following. As there are first, second, third, fourth, fifth, etc. fluxions, so there are differences, first, second, third, fourth, etc. in an infinite progression towards nothing, which you still approach and never arrive at. And (which is most strange) although you should take a million of millions of these infinitesimals, each whereof is supposed infinitely greater than some other real magnitude, and add them to the least given quantity, it shall never be the bigger. For this is one of the modest *postulata* of our modern mathematicians, and is a corner-stone or groundwork of their speculations.

7. All these points, I say, are supposed and believed by certain rigorous exactors of evidence in religion, men who pretend to believe no further than they can see. That men who have been conversant only about clear points should with difficulty admit obscure ones might not seem altogether unaccountable. But he who can digest a second or third fluxion, a second or third difference, need not, methinks, be squeamish about any point in Divinity. There is a natural presumption that men's faculties are made alike. It is on this supposition that they attempt to argue and convince one another. What therefore shall appear evidently impossible and repugnant to one may be presumed the same to another. But with what appearance of reason shall any man presume to say that mysteries may not be objects of faith, at the same time that he himself admits such obscure mysteries to be the object of science?

8. It must indeed be acknowledged the modern mathematicians do not consider these points as mysteries, but as clearly conceived and mastered by their comprehensive minds. They scruple not to say that by the help of these new analytics they can penetrate into infinity itself: that they can even extend their views beyond infinity: that their art comprehends not only infinite, but infinite of infinite (as they express it), or an infinity of infinites. But, notwithstanding all these assertions and pretensions, it may be justly questioned whether, as other men in other inquiries are often deceived by words or terms, so they likewise are not wonderfully deceived and deluded by their own peculiar signs, symbols, or species. Nothing is easier than to devise expressions

or notations for fluxions and infinitesimals of the first, second, third, fourth, and subsequent orders, proceeding in the same

. .. .·. ::

regular form without end or limit *x. x. x. x etc.*, or *dx. ddx. dddx. ddddx. etc.* These expressions, indeed, are clear and distinct, and the mind finds no difficulty in conceiving them to be continued beyond any assignable bounds. But if we remove the veil and look underneath, if, laying aside the expressions, we set ourselves attentively to consider the things themselves which are supposed to be expressed or marked thereby, we shall discover much emptiness, darkness, and confusion; nay, if I mistake not, direct impossibilities and contradictions. Whether this be the case or no, every thinking reader is entreated to examine and judge for himself.

9. Having considered the object, I proceed to consider the principles of this new analysis by momentums, fluxions, or infinitesimals; wherein if it shall appear that your capital points, upon which the rest are supposed to depend, include error and false reasoning; it will then follow that you, who are at a loss to conduct yourselves, cannot with any decency set up for guides to other men. The main point in the method of fluxions is to obtain the fluxion or momentum of the rectangle or product of two intermediate quantities. Inasmuch as from thence are derived rules for obtaining the fluxions of all other products and powers; be the coefficients or the indexes what they will, integers or fractions, rational or surd. Now, this fundamental point one would think should be very clearly made out, considering how much is built upon it, and that its influence extends throughout the whole analysis. But let the reader judge. This is given for demonstration.[1] Suppose the product or rectangle $A\,B$ increased by continual motion: and that the momentaneous increments of the sides A and B are a and b. When the sides A and B were deficient, or lesser by one half of their moments, the rectangle was $\overline{A-\frac{1}{2}a} \times \overline{B-\frac{1}{2}b}$, *i.e.*, $A\,B-\frac{1}{2}a\,B-\frac{1}{2}b\,A+\frac{1}{4}a\,b$. And as soon as the sides A and B are increased by the other two halves of their moments, the rectangle becomes $\overline{A+\frac{1}{2}a} \times \overline{B+\frac{1}{2}b}$ or $A\,B+\frac{1}{2}a\,B+$

[1] "Naturalis Philosophiæ Principia Mathematica," lib. ii., lem. 2.

$\frac{1}{2} b A + \frac{1}{4} a b$. From the latter rectangle subduct the former, and the remaining difference will be $a B + b A$. Therefore the increment of the rectangle generated by the entire increments a and b is $a B + b A$. *Q. E. D.* But it is plain that the direct and true method to obtain the moment or increment of the rectangle $A B$, is to take the sides as increased by their whole increments, and so multiply them together, $A + a$ by $B + b$, the product whereof $A B + a B + b A + a b$ is the augmented rectangle; whence, if we subduct $A B$ the remainder $a B + b A + a b$ will be the true increment of the rectangle, exceeding that which was obtained by the former illegitimate and indirect method by the quantity $a b$. And this holds universally be the quantities a and b what they will, big or little, finite or infinitesimal, increments, moments, or velocities. Nor will it avail to say that $a b$ is a quantity exceeding small: since we are told that *in rebus mathematicis errores quam minimi non sunt contemnendi.*

10. Such[2] reasoning as this for demonstration, nothing but the obscurity of the subject could have encouraged or induced the great author of the fluxionary method to put upon his followers, and nothing but an implicit deference to authority could move them to admit. The case indeed is difficult. There can be nothing done till you have got rid of the quantity $a b$. In order to this the notion of fluxions is shifted: it is placed in various lights: points which should be clear as first principles are puzzled; and terms which should be steadily used are ambiguous. But, notwithstanding all this address and skill, the point of getting rid of $a b$ cannot be obtained by legitimate reasoning. If a man, by methods not geometrical or demonstrative, shall have satisfied himself of the usefulness of certain rules; which he afterwards shall propose to his disciples for undoubted truths; which he undertakes to demonstrate in a subtile manner, and by the help of nice and intricate notions; it is not hard to conceive that such his disciples may, to save themselves the trouble of thinking, be inclined to confound the usefulness of a rule with the certainty of a truth, and accept the one for the other; especially if they are men accustomed rather to compute than to think; earnest rather to go on fast and

[1] "Introd. ad Quadraturam Curvarum."

far, than solicitous to set out warily and see their way distinctly.

11. The points or mere limits of nascent lines are undoubtedly equal, as having no more magnitude one than another, a limit as such being no quantity. If by a momentum you mean more than the very initial limit, it must be either a finite quantity or an infinitesimal. But all finite quantities are expressly excluded from the notion of a momentum. Therefore the momentum must be an infinitesimal. And, indeed, though much artifice hath been employed to escape or avoid the admission of quantities infinitely small, yet it seems ineffectual. For aught I see, you can admit no quantity as a medium between a finite quantity and nothing, without admitting infinitesimals. An increment generated in a finite particle of time is itself a finite particle; and cannot therefore be a momentum. You must therefore take an infinitesimal part of time wherein to generate your momentum. It is said, the magnitude of moments is not considered; and yet these same moments are supposed to be divided into parts. This is not easy to conceive, no more than it is why we should take quantities less than A and B in order to obtain the increment of AB, of which proceeding it must be owned the final cause or motive is obvious; but it is not so obvious or easy to explain a just and legitimate reason for it, or show it to be geometrical.

12. From the foregoing principle, so demonstrated, the general rule for finding the fluxion of any power of a flowing quantity is derived.[1] But, as there seems to have been some inward scruple or consciousness of defect in the foregoing demonstration, and as this finding the fluxion of a given power is a point of primary importance, it hath therefore been judged proper to demonstrate the same in a different manner, independent of the foregoing demonstration. But whether this other method be more legitimate and conclusive than the former, I proceed now to examine; and in order thereto shall premise the following lemma:—'If, with a view to demonstrate any proposition, a certain point is supposed, by virtue of which certain other points are attained; and such supposed point be itself afterwards destroyed or rejected

[1] "Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica," lib. ii., lem. 2.

by a contrary supposition; in that case, all the other points attained thereby, and consequent thereupon, must also be destroyed and rejected, so as from thenceforward to be no more supposed or applied in the demonstration.' This is so plain as to need no proof.

13. Now, the other method of obtaining a rule to find the fluxion of any power is as follows. Let the quantity x flow uniformly, and be it proposed to find the fluxion of x^n. In the same time that x by flowing becomes $x+o$, the power x^n becomes $\overline{x+o}\,|^n$, *i.e.* by the method of infinite series

$$x^n + nox^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2} oox^{n-2} + \&c.,$$

and the increments

$$o \text{ and } nox^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2} oox^{n-2} + \&c.$$

are one to another as

$$1 \text{ to } nx^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2} ox^{n-2} + \&c.$$

Let now the increments vanish, and their last proportion will be 1 to nx^{n-1}. But it should seem that this reasoning is not fair or conclusive. For when it is said, let the increments vanish, *i.e.* let the increments be nothing, or let there be no increments, the former supposition that the increments were something, or that there were increments, is destroyed, and yet a consequence of that supposition, *i.e.* an expression got by virtue thereof, is retained. Which, by the foregoing lemma, is a false way of reasoning. Certainly when we suppose the increments to vanish, we must suppose their proportions, their expressions, and everything else derived from the supposition of their existence, to vanish with them.

14. To make this point plainer, I shall unfold the reasoning, and propose it in a fuller light to your view. It amounts therefore to this, or may in other words be thus expressed. I suppose that the quantity x flows, and by flowing is increased, and its increment I call o, so that by flowing it becomes $x+o$. And as x increaseth, it follows that every

power of x is likewise increased in a due proportion. Therefore as x becomes $x+o$, x^n will become $\overline{x+o}\,|^n$: that is, according to the method of infinite series,

$$x^n + nox^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2}\,oox^{n-2} + \&c.$$

And if from the two augmented quantities we subduct the root and the power respectively, we shall have remaining the two increments, to wit,

$$o \text{ and } nox^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2}\,oox^{n-2} + \&c.$$

which increments, being both divided by the common divisor o, yield the quotients

$$1 \text{ and } nx^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2}\,ox^{n-2} + \&c.,$$

which are therefore exponents of the ratio of the increments. Hitherto I have supposed that x flows, that x hath a real increment, that o is something. And I have proceeded all along on that supposition, without which I should not have been able to have made so much as one single step. From that supposition it is that I get at the increment of x^n, that I am able to compare it with the increment of x, and that I find the proportion between the two increments. I now beg leave to make a new supposition contrary to the first, *i.e.* I will suppose that there is no increment of x, or that o is nothing; which second supposition destroys my first, and is inconsistent with it, and therefore with everything that supposeth it. I do nevertheless beg leave to retain nx^{n-1}, which is an expression obtained in virtue of my first supposition, which necessarily presupposed such supposition, and which could not be obtained without it. All which seems a most inconsistent way of arguing, and such as would not be allowed of in Divinity.

15. Nothing is plainer than that no just conclusion can be directly drawn from two inconsistent suppositions. You may indeed suppose anything possible; but afterwards you may not suppose anything that destroys what you first supposed: or, if you do, you must begin *de novo*. If therefore you suppose that the augments vanish, *i.e.* that there are no

augments, you are to begin again and see what follows from such supposition. But nothing will follow to your purpose. You cannot by that means ever arrive at your conclusion, or succeed in what is called by the celebrated author, the investigation of the first or last proportions of nascent and evanescent quantities, by instituting the analysis in finite ones. I repeat it again: you are at liberty to make any possible supposition: and you may destroy one supposition by another: but then you may not retain the consequences, or any part of the consequences, of your first supposition so destroyed. I admit that signs may be made to denote either anything or nothing: and consequently that in the original notation $x+o$, o might have signified either an increment or nothing. But then, which of these soever you make it signify, you must argue consistently with such its signification, and not proceed upon a double meaning: which to do were a manifest sophism. Whether you argue in symbols or in words the rules of right reason are still the same. Nor can it be supposed you will plead a privilege in mathematics to be exempt from them.

16. If you assume at first a quantity increased by nothing, and in the expression $x+o$, o stands for nothing, upon this supposition, as there is no increment of the root, so there will be no increment of the power; and consequently there will be none except the first of all those members of the series constituting the power of the binomial; you will therefore never come at your expression of a fluxion legitimately by such method. Hence you are driven into the fallacious way of proceeding to a certain point on the supposition of an increment, and then at once shifting your supposition to that of no increment. There may seem great skill in doing this at a certain point or period. Since, if this second supposition had been made before the common division by o, all had vanished at once, and you must have got nothing by your supposition. Whereas, by this artifice of first dividing and then changing your supposition, you retain 1 and nx^{n-1}. But, notwithstanding all this address to cover it, the fallacy is still the same. For, whether it be done sooner or later, when once the second supposition or assumption is made, in the same instant the former assumption and all that you got by it is destroyed, and goes

out together. And this is universally true, be the subject what it will, throughout all the branches of human knowledge; in any other of which, I believe, men would hardly admit such a reasoning as this, which in mathematics is accepted for demonstration.

17. It may not be amiss to observe that the method for finding the fluxion of a rectangle of two flowing quantities, as it is set forth in the Treatise of Quadratures, differs from the above-mentioned taken from the second book of the Principles, and is in effect the same with that used in the *calculus differentialis*.[1] For the supposing a quantity infinitely diminished, and therefore rejecting it, is in effect the rejecting an infinitesimal; and indeed it requires a marvellous sharpness of discernment to be able to distinguish between evanescent increments and infinitesimal differences. It may perhaps be said that the quantity being infinitely diminished becomes nothing, and so nothing is rejected. But, according to the received principles, it is evident that no geometrical quantity can by any division or subdivision whatsoever be exhausted, or reduced to nothing. Considering the various arts and devices used by the great author of the fluxionary method; in how many lights he placeth his fluxions; and in what different ways he attempts to demonstrate the same point; one would be inclined to think, he was himself suspicious of the justness of his own demonstrations, and that he was not enough pleased with any notion steadily to adhere to it. Thus much at least is plain, that he owned himself satisfied concerning certain points which nevertheless he would not undertake to demonstrate to others.[2] Whether this satisfaction arose from tentative methods or inductions, which have often been admitted by mathematicians (for instance, by Dr. Wallis, in his Arithmetic of Infinites), is what I shall not pretend to determine. But, whatever the case might have been with respect to the author, it appears that his followers have shown themselves more eager in applying his method, than accurate in examining his principles.

18. It is curious to observe what subtlety and skill this great genius employs to struggle with an insuperable diffi-

[1] "Analyse des Infiniment Petits," Part I., prop. 2.
[2] See "Letter to John Collins," Nov. 8, 1676.

culty; and through what labyrinths he endeavours to escape the doctrine of infinitesimals; which as it intrudes upon him whether he will or no, so it is admitted and embraced by others without the least repugnance; Leibnitz and his followers in their *calculus differentialis* making no manner of scruple, first to suppose, and secondly to reject, quantities infinitely small; with what clearness in the apprehension and justness in the reasoning, any thinking man, who is not prejudiced in favour of those things, may easily discern. The notion or idea of an *infinitesimal quantity*, as it is an object simply apprehended by the mind, hath been already considered.[1] I shall now only observe as to the method of getting rid of such quantities, that it is done without the least ceremony. As in fluxions the point of first importance, and which paves the way to the rest, is to find the fluxion of a product of two indeterminate quantities, so in the *calculus differentialis* (which method is supposed to have been borrowed from the former with some small alterations) the main point is to obtain the difference of such product. Now the rule for this is got by rejecting the product or rectangle of the differences. And in general it is supposed that no quantity is bigger or lesser for the addition or subduction of its infinitesimal: and that consequently no error can arise from such rejection of infinitesimals.

19. And yet it should seem that, whatever errors are admitted in the premises, proportional errors ought to be apprehended in the conclusion, be they finite or infinitesimal: and that therefore the ἀκρίβεια of geometry requires nothing should be neglected or rejected. In answer to this you will perhaps say, that the conclusions are accurately true, and that therefore the principles and methods from whence they are derived must be so too. But this inverted way of demonstrating your principles by your conclusions, as it would be peculiar to you gentlemen, so it is contrary to the rules of logic. The truth of the conclusion will not prove either the form or the matter of a syllogism to be true; inasmuch as the illation might have been wrong or the premises false, and the conclusion nevertheless true, though not in virtue of such illation or of such premises. I say that in every other science

[1] Sect. 5 and 6.

men prove their conclusions by their principles, and not their principles by the conclusions. But if in yours you should allow yourselves this unnatural way of proceeding, the consequence would be that you must take up with Induction, and bid adieu to Demonstration. And if you submit to this, your authority will no longer lead the way in points of Reason and Science.

20. I have no controversy about your conclusions, but only about your logic and method: how you demonstrate? what objects you are conversant with, and whether you conceive them clearly? what principles you proceed upon; how sound they may be; and how you apply them? It must be remembered that I am not concerned about the truth of your theorems, but only about the way of coming at them; whether it be legitimate or illegitimate, clear or obscure, scientific or tentative. To prevent all possibility of your mistaking me, I beg leave to repeat and insist, that I consider the geometrical analyst as a logician, *i.e.* so far forth as he reasons and argues; and his mathematical conclusions, not in themselves, but in their premises; not as true or false, useful or insignificant, but as derived from such principles, and by such inferences. And, forasmuch as it may perhaps seem an unaccountable paradox that mathematicians should deduce true propositions from false principles, be right in the conclusion and yet err in the premises; I shall endeavour particularly to explain why this may come to pass, and show how error may bring forth truth, though it cannot bring forth science.

21. In order therefore to clear up this point, we will suppose for instance that a tangent is to be drawn to a parabola, and examine the progress of this affair as it is performed by infinitesimal differences. Let AB be a curve, the abscissa $AP=x$, the ordinate $PB=y$, the difference of the abscissa $PM=dx$, the difference of the ordinate $RN=dy$. Now, by supposing the curve to be a polygon, and consequently BN, the increment or difference of the curve, to be a straight line coincident with the tangent, and the differential triangle BRN to be similar to the triangle TPB, the subtangent PT is found a fourth proportional to $RN : RB : PB$: that is, to $dy : dx : y$. Hence the subtangent will be $\frac{ydx}{dy}$. But herein

there is an error arising from the aforementioned false supposition, whence the value of PT comes out greater than the truth: for in reality it is not the triangle RNB but RLB



which is similar to PBT, and therefore (instead of RN) RL should have been the first term of the proportion, *i.e.* $RN+NL$, *i.e.* $dy+z$: whence the true expression for the subtangent should have been $\frac{y\,dx}{dy+z}$. There was therefore an error of defect in making dy the divisor; which error was equal to z, *i.e.* NL the line comprehended between the curve and the tangent. Now by the nature of the curve $yy=px$, supposing p to be the parameter, whence by the rule of differences $2y\,dy=p\,dx$ and $dy=\frac{p\,dx}{2y}$. But if you multiply $y+dy$ by itself, and retain the whole product without rejecting the square of the difference, it will then come out, by substituting the augmented quantities in the equation of the curve, that $dy=\frac{p\,dx}{2y}-\frac{dy\,dy}{2y}$ truly. There was therefore an error of excess in making $dy=\frac{p\,dx}{2y}$, which followed from the erroneous

rule of differences. And the measure of this second error is $\frac{dy\,dy}{2y} = z$. Therefore the two errors being equal and contrary destroy each other; the first error of defect being corrected by a second error of excess.

22. If you had committed only one error, you would not have come at a true solution of the problem. But by virtue of a twofold mistake you arrive, though not at science, yet at truth. For science it cannot be called, when you proceed blindfold, and arrive at the truth not knowing how or by what means. To demonstrate that z is equal to $\frac{dy\,dy}{2y}$, let BR or dx be m, and RN or dy be n. By the thirty-third proposition of the first book of the Conics of Apollonius, and from similar triangles, as $2x$ to y so is m to $n+z = \frac{my}{2x}$. Likewise from the nature of the parabola $yy + 2yn + nn = xp + mp$, and $2yn + nn = mp$: wherefore $\frac{2yn+nn}{p} = m$: and because $yy = px$, $\frac{yy}{p}$ will be equal to x. Therefore substituting these values instead of m and x we shall have

$$n + z = \frac{my}{2x} = \frac{2yynp + ynnp}{2yyp}$$

i.e. $$n + z = \frac{2yn + nn}{2y}:$$

which being reduced gives

$$z = \frac{nn}{2y} = \frac{dy\,dy}{2y}\ Q.E.D.$$

23. Now, I observe, in the first place, that the conclusion comes out right, not because the rejected square of dy was infinitely small, but because this error was compensated by another contrary and equal error. I observe, in the second place, that whatever is rejected, be it ever so small, if it be real, and consequently makes a real error in the premises, it

will produce a proportional real error in the conclusion. Your theorems therefore cannot be accurately true, nor your problems accurately solved, in virtue of premises which themselves are not accurate; it being a rule in logic that *conclusio sequitur partem debiliorem.* Therefore, I observe, in the third place, that when the conclusion is evident and the premises obscure, or the conclusion accurate and the premises inaccurate, we may safely pronounce that such conclusion is neither evident nor accurate, in virtue of those obscure inaccurate premises or principles; but in virtue of some other principles, which perhaps the demonstrator himself never knew or thought of. I observe, in the last place, that in case the differences are supposed finite quantities ever so great, the conclusion will nevertheless come out the same: inasmuch as the rejected quantities are legitimately thrown out, not for their smallness, but for another reason, to wit, because of contrary errors, which, destroying each other, do, upon the whole, cause that nothing is really, though something is apparently, thrown out. And this reason holds equally with respect to quantities finite as well as infinitesimal, great as well as small, a foot or a yard long as well as the minutest increment.

24. For the fuller illustration of this point, I shall con-



sider it in another light, and proceeding in finite quantities to the conclusion, I shall only then make use of one infinitesimal. Suppose the straight line MQ cuts the curve

AT in the points R and S. Suppose LR a tangent at the point R, AN the abscissa, NR and OS ordinates. Let AN be produced to O, and RP be drawn parallel to NO. Suppose $AN=x$, $NR=y$, $NO=v$, $PS=z$, the subsecant $MN=s$. Let the equation $y=xx$ express the nature of the curve: and supposing y and x increased by their finite increments we get $y+z=xx+2xv+vv$: whence the former equation being subducted, there remains $z=2xv+vv$. And by reason of similar triangles

$$PS : PR :: NR : NM, \textit{ i.e. } z : v :: y : s=\frac{vy}{z},$$

wherein if for y and z we substitute their values, we get

$$\frac{vxx}{2xv+v}v=s=\frac{xx}{2x+v}.$$

And supposing NO to be infinitely diminished, the subsecant NM will in that case coincide with the subtangent NL, and v as an infinitesimal may be rejected, whence it follows that

$$s=NL=\frac{xx}{2x}=\frac{x}{2}:$$

which is the true value of the subtangent. And, since this was obtained by one only error, *i.e.* by once ejecting one only infinitesimal, it should seem, contrary to what hath been said, that an infinitesimal quantity or difference may be neglected or thrown away, and the conclusion nevertheless be accurately true, although there was no double mistake or rectifying of one error by another, as in the first case. But, if this point be thoroughly considered, we shall find there is even here a double mistake, and that one compensates or rectifies the other. For, in the first place, it was supposed that when NO is infinitely diminished or becomes an infinitesimal then the subsecant NM becomes equal to the subtangent NL. But this is a plain mistake; for it is evident that as a secant cannot be a tangent, so a subsecant cannot be a subtangent. Be the difference ever so small, yet still there is a difference. And, if NO be infinitely small, there will even then be an infinitely small difference between NM and NL. Therefore FM or S was too little for your supposition (when you supposed it equal to NL); and this error was compensated by a

second error in throwing out v, which last error made s bigger than its true value, and in lieu thereof gave the value of the subtangent. This is the true state of the case, however it may be disguised. And to this in reality it amounts, and is at bottom the same thing, if we should pretend to find the subtangent by having first found, from the equation of the curve and similar triangles, a general expression for all subsecants, and then reducing the subtangent under this general rule, by considering it as the subsecant when v vanishes or becomes nothing.

25. Upon the whole I observe, First, that v can never be nothing, so long as there is a secant. Secondly, that the same line cannot be both tangent and secant. Thirdly, that when v or NO[1] vanisheth, PS and SR do also vanish, and with them the proportionality of the similar triangles. Consequently the whole expression, which was obtained by means thereof and grounded thereupon, vanisheth when v vanisheth. Fourthly, that the method for finding secants or the expression of secants, be it ever so general, cannot in common sense extend any farther than to all secants whatsoever: and, as it necessarily supposed similar triangles, it cannot be supposed to take place where there are not similar triangles. Fifthly, that the subsecant will always be less than the subtangent, and can never coincide with it; which coincidence to suppose would be absurd; for it would be supposing the same line at the same time to cut and not to cut another given line; which is a manifest contradiction, such as subverts the hypothesis and gives a demonstration of its falsehood. Sixthly, if this be not admitted, I demand a reason why any other apagogical demonstration, or demonstration *ad absurdum* should be admitted in geometry rather than this: or that some real difference be assigned between this and others as such. Seventhly, I observed that it is sophistical to suppose NO or RP, PS, and SR to be finite real lines in order to form the triangle, RPS, in order to obtain proportions by similar triangles; and afterwards to suppose there are no such lines, nor consequently similar triangles, and nevertheless to retain the consequence of the first supposition, after such supposition hath been destroyed

[1] See the foregoing figure.

by a contrary one. Eighthly, that although, in the present case, by inconsistent suppositions truth may be obtained, yet such truth is not demonstrated: that such method is not conformable to the rules of logic and right reason: that, however useful it may be, it must be considered only as a presumption, as a knack, an art, rather an artifice, but not a scientific demonstration.

26. The doctrine premised may be farther illustrated by the following simple and easy case, wherein I shall proceed by evanescent increments. Suppose $AB=x$, $BC=y$, $BD=o$, and that xx is equal to the area ABC: it is proposed



to find the ordinate y or BC. When x by flowing becomes $x+o$, then xx becomes $xx+2xo+oo$: and the area ABC becomes ADH, and the increment of xx will be equal to $BDHC$, the increment of the area, *i.e.* to $BCFD+CFH$. And if we suppose the curvilinear space CFH to be qoo, then $2xo+oo=yo+qoo$, which divided by o give $2x+o=y+qo$. And, supposing o to vanish, $2x=y$, in which case ACH will be a straight line, and the areas ABC, CFH triangles. Now with regard to this reasoning, it hath been already remarked,[1] that it is not legitimate or logical to suppose o to vanish, *i.e.* to be nothing, *i.e.* that there is no increment, unless we reject at the same time with the increment itself

[1] Sect. 12 and 13 *supra*.

every consequence of such increment, *i.e.* whatsoever could not be obtained by supposing such increment. It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the problem is rightly solved, and the conclusion true, to which we are led by this method. It will therefore be asked, how comes it to pass that the throwing out o is attended with no error in the conclusion? I answer, the true reason hereof is plainly this: because q being unit, qo is equal to o: and therefore

$$2x + o - qo = y = 2x,$$

the equal quantities qo and o being destroyed by contrary signs.

27. As, on the one hand, it were absurd to get rid of o by saying, Let me contradict myself; let me subvert my own hypothesis; let me take it for granted that there is no increment, at the same time that I retain a quantity which I could never have got at but by assuming an increment: so, on the other hand, it would be equally wrong to imagine that in a geometrical demonstration we may be allowed to admit any error, though ever so small, or that it is possible, in the nature of things, an accurate conclusion should be derived from inaccurate principles. Therefore o cannot be thrown out as an infinitesimal, or upon the principle that infinitesimals may be safely neglected; but only because it is destroyed by an equal quantity with a negative sign, whence $o - po$ is equal to nothing. And as it is illegitimate to reduce an equation, by subducting from one side a quantity when it is not to be destroyed, or when an equal quantity is not subducted from the other side of the equation: so it must be allowed a very logical and just method of arguing to conclude that if from equals either nothing or equal quantities are subducted they shall still remain equal. And this is a true reason why no error is at last produced by the rejecting of o. Which therefore must not be ascribed to the doctrine of differences, or infinitesimals, or evanescent quantities, or momentums, or fluxions.

28. Suppose the case to be general, and that x^n is equal to the area ABC, whence by the method of fluxions the ordinate is found nx^{n-1}, which we admit for true, and shall inquire how it is arrived at. Now if we are content to come at the conclusion in a summary way, by supposing that the

ratio of the fluxions of x and x^n is found[1] to be 1 and nx^{n-1}, and that the ordinate of the area is considered as its fluxion, we shall not so clearly see our way, or perceive how the truth comes out, that method as we have shewed before being obscure and illogical. But if we fairly delineate the area and its increment, and divide the latter into two parts, $BCFD$ and CFH,[2] and proceed regularly by equations between the algebraical and geometrical quantities, the reason of the thing will plainly appear. For, as x^n is equal to the area ABC, so is the increment of x^n equal to the increment of the area, *i.e.* to $BDHC$; that is to say

$$nox^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2} oox^{n-2} + \&c. = BDFC + CFH.$$

And only the first members on each side of the equation being retained, $nox^{n-1} = BDFC$: and dividing both sides by o or BD, we shall get $nx^{n-1} = BC$. Admitting therefore that the curvilinear space CFH is equal to the rejectaneous quantity

$$\frac{nn-n}{2} oox^{n-2} + \&c.,$$

and that when this is rejected on one side, that is rejected on the other, the reasoning becomes just and the conclusion true. And it is all one whatever magnitude you allow to BD, whether that of an infinitesimal difference or a finite increment ever so great. It is therefore plain that the supposing the rejectaneous algebraical quantity to be an infinitely small or evanescent quantity, and therefore to be neglected, must have produced an error, had it not been for the curvilinear space being equal thereto, and at the same time subducted from the other part or side of the equation, agreeably to the axiom, *If from equals you subduct equals, the remainders will be equal.* For those quantities which by the analyst are said to be neglected, or made to vanish, are in reality subducted. If therefore the conclusion be true, it is absolutely necessary that the finite space CFH be equal to the remainder of the increment expressed by

$$\frac{nn-n}{2} oox^{n-2} \&c.;$$

equal, I say, to the finite remainder of a finite increment.

[1] Sect. 13. [2] See the figure in sect. 26.

29. Therefore, be the power what you please, there will arise on one side an algebraical expression, on the other a geometrical quantity, each of which naturally divides itself into three members. The algebraical or fluxionary expression, into one which includes neither the expression of the increment of the abscissa nor of any power thereof; another which includes the expression of the increment itself; and the third including the expression of the powers of the increment. The geometrical quantity also or whole increased area consists of three parts or members, the first of which is the given area; the second a rectangle under the ordinate and the increment of the abscissa; and the third a curvilinear space. And, comparing the homologous or correspondent members on both sides, we find that as the first member of the expression is the expression of the given area, so the second member of the expression will express the rectangle or second member of the geometrical quantity, and the third, containing the powers of the increment, will express the curvilinear space, or third member of the geometrical quantity. This hint may perhaps be further extended, and applied to good purpose, by those who have leisure and curiosity for such matters. The use I make of it is to shew, that the analysis cannot obtain in augments or differences, but it must also obtain in finite quantities, be they ever so great, as was before observed.

30. It seems therefore, upon the whole, that we may safely pronounce the conclusion cannot be right, if in order thereto any quantity be made to vanish, or be neglected, except that either one error is redressed by another; or that, secondly, on the same side of an equation equal quantities are destroyed by contrary signs, so that the quantity we mean to reject is first annihilated; or, lastly, that from the opposite sides equal quantities are subducted. And therefore to get rid of quantities by the received principles of fluxions or of differences is neither good geometry nor good logic. When the augments vanish, the velocities also vanish. The velocities or fluxions are said to be *prime* and *ultimo*, as the augments nascent and evanescent. Take therefore the *ratio* of the evanescent quantities, it is the same with that of the fluxions. It will therefore answer all intents as well. Why then are fluxions introduced? Is it not to shun or rather to palliate

the use of quantities infinitely small? But we have no notion whereby to conceive and measure various degrees of velocity besides space and time; or, when the times are given, besides space alone. We have even no notion of velocity prescinded from time and space. When therefore a point is supposed to move in given times, we have no notion of greater or lesser velocities, or of proportions between velocities, but only of longer or shorter lines, and of proportions between such lines generated in equal parts of time.

31. A point may be the limit of a line: a line may be the limit of a surface: a moment may terminate time. But how can we conceive a velocity by the help of such limits? It necessarily implies both time and space, and cannot be conceived without them. And if the velocities of nascent and evanescent quantities, *i.e.* abstracted from time and space, may not be comprehended, how can we comprehend and demonstrate their proportions; or consider their *rationes primæ* and *ultimæ*? For, to consider the proportion or *ratio* of things implies that such things have magnitude; that such their magnitudes may be measured, and their relations to each other known. But, as there is no measure of velocity except time and space, the proportion of velocities being only compounded of the direct proportion of the spaces, and the reciprocal proportion of the times; doth it not follow that to talk of investigating, obtaining, and considering the proportions of velocities, exclusively of time and space, is to talk unintelligibly?

32. But you will say that, in the use and application of fluxions, men do not overstrain their faculties to a precise conception of the above-mentioned velocities, increments, infinitesimals, or any other such-like ideas of a nature so nice, subtile, and evanescent. And therefore you will perhaps maintain that problems may be solved without those inconceivable suppositions; and that, consequently, the doctrine of fluxions, as to the practical part, stands clear of all such difficulties. I answer that if in the use or application of this method those difficult and obscure points are not attended to, they are nevertheless supposed. They are the foundations on which the moderns build, the principles on which they proceed, in solving problems and discovering theorems. It is with the method of fluxions as with all other methods,

which presuppose their respective principles and are grounded thereon; although the rules may be practised by men who neither attend to, nor perhaps know the principles. In like manner, therefore, as a sailor may practically apply certain rules derived from astronomy and geometry, the principles whereof he doth not understand; and as any ordinary man may solve divers numerical questions, by the vulgar rules and operations of arithmetic, which he performs and applies without knowing the reasons of them: even so it cannot be denied that you may apply the rules of the fluxionary method: you may compare and reduce particular cases to general forms: you may operate and compute and solve problems thereby, not only without an actual attention to, or an actual knowledge of, the grounds of that method, and the principles whereon it depends, and whence it is deduced, but even without having ever considered or comprehended them.

33. But then it must be remembered that in such case, although you may pass for an artist, computist, or analyst, yet you may not be justly esteemed a man of science and demonstration. Nor should any man, in virtue of being conversant in such obscure analytics, imagine his rational faculties to be more improved than those of other men which have been exercised in a different manner and on different subjects; much less erect himself into a judge and an oracle concerning matters that have no sort of connexion with or dependence on those species, symbols, or signs, in the management whereof he is so conversant and expert. As you, who are a skilful computist or analyst, may not therefore be deemed skilful in anatomy; or *vice versa*, as a man who can dissect with art may, nevertheless, be ignorant in your art of computing: even so you may both, notwithstanding your peculiar skill in your respective arts, be alike unqualified to decide upon logic, or metaphysics, or ethics, or religion. And this would be true, even admitting that you understood your own principles and could demonstrate them.

34. If it is said that fluxions may be expounded or expressed by finite lines proportional to them; which finite lines, as they may be distinctly conceived and known and reasoned upon, so they may be substituted for the fluxions, and their mutual relations or proportions be considered as the proportions of fluxions—by which means the doctrine

becomes clear and useful: I answer that if, in order to arrive at these finite lines proportional to the fluxions, there be certain steps made use of which are obscure and inconceivable, be those finite lines themselves ever so clearly conceived, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that your proceeding is not clear nor your method scientific. For instance, it is supposed that *AB* being the abscissa, *BC* the ordinate, and *VCH* a tangent of the curve *AC*, *Bb* or *CE* the increment of the abscissa, *Ec* the increment of the ordinate, which produced meets *VH* in the point *T* and *Cc* the increment of the curve. The right line *Cc* being produced to *K*, there are formed three small triangles, the rectilinear *CEc*, the mixtilinear *CEc*, and the rectilinear triangle *CET*. It is evident these three triangles are different from each



other, the rectilinear *CEc* being less than the mixtilinear *CEc*, whose sides are the three increments above mentioned, and this still less than the triangle *CET*. It is supposed that the ordinate *bc* moves into the place *BC*, so that the point *c* is coincident with the point *C*; and the right line *CK*, and consequently the curve *Cc*, is coincident with the tangent *CH*. In which case the mixtilinear evanescent triangle *CEc* will, in its last form, be similar to the triangle *CET*: and its evanescent sides *CE*, *Ec*, and *Cc*, will be proportional to *CE*, *ET*, and *CT*, the sides of the triangle *CET*. And therefore it is concluded that the fluxions of the lines *AB*, *BC*, and *AC*, being in the last ratio of their evanescent increments, are proportional to the sides of the triangle *CET*, or, which is all one, of the triangle *VBC* similar thereunto.[1] It is particularly remarked and insisted on by the great author, that the points *C* and *c* must not be distant one from another,

[1] "Introd. ad Quadraturam Curvarum."

by any the least interval whatsoever: but that, in order to find the ultimate proportions of the lines CE, Ec, and Cc (*i.e.* the proportions of the fluxions or velocities) expressed by the finite sides of the triangle VBC, the points C and c must be accurately coincident, *i.e.* one and the same. A point therefore is considered as a triangle, or a triangle is supposed to be formed in a point. Which to conceive seems quite impossible. Yet some there are who, though they shrink at all other mysteries, make no difficulty of their own, who strain at a gnat and swallow a camel.

35. I know not whether it be worth while to observe, that possibly some men may hope to operate by symbols and suppositions, in such sort as to avoid the use of fluxions, momentums, and infinitesimals, after the following manner. Suppose x to be one abscissa of a curve, and z another abscissa of the same curve. Suppose also that the respective areas are xxx and zzz: and that $z-x$ is the increment of the abscissa, and $zzz-xxx$ the increment of the area, without considering how great or how small those increments may be. Divide now $zzz-xxx$ by $z-x$, and the quotient will be $zz+zx+xx$: and, supposing that z and x are equal, the same quotient will be $3xx$, which in that case is the ordinate, which therefore may be thus obtained independently of fluxions and infinitesimals. But herein is a direct fallacy: for, in the first place, it is supposed that the abscissæ z and x are unequal, without which supposition no one step could have been made; and in the second place, it is supposed they are equal; which is a manifest inconsistency, and amounts to the same thing that hath been before considered.[1] And there is indeed reason to apprehend that all attempts for setting the abstruse and fine geometry on a right foundation, and avoiding the doctrine of velocities, momentums, &c., will be found impracticable, till such time as the object and end of geometry are better understood than hitherto they seem to have been. The great author of the method of fluxions felt this difficulty, and therefore he gave in to those nice abstractions and geometrical metaphysics without which he saw nothing could be done on the received principles: and what in the way of demonstration he hath done with

[1] Sect. 15.

them the reader will judge. It must, indeed, be acknowledged that he used fluxions, like the scaffold of a building, as things to be laid aside or got rid of as soon as finite lines were found proportional to them. But then these finite exponents are found by the help of fluxions. Whatever therefore is got by such exponents and proportions is to be ascribed to fluxions: which must therefore be previously understood. And what are these fluxions? The velocities of evanescent increments. And what are these same evanescent increments? They are neither finite quantities, nor quantities infinitely small, nor yet nothing. May we not call them the ghosts of departed quantities?

36. Men too often impose on themselves and others as if they conceived and understood things expressed by signs, when in truth they have no idea, save only of the very signs themselves. And there are some grounds to apprehend that this may be the present case. The velocities of evanescent or nascent quantities are supposed to be expressed, both by finite lines of a determinate magnitude, and by algebraical notes or signs: but I suspect that many who, perhaps never having examined the matter take it for granted, would, upon a narrow scrutiny, find it impossible to frame any idea or notion whatsoever of those velocities, exclusive of such finite quanties and signs.



Suppose the line *KP* described by the motion of a point continually accelerated, and that in equal particles of time the unequal parts *KL*, *LM*, *MN*, *NO*, &c. are generated. Suppose also that *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, &c. denote the velocities of the generating point, at the several periods of the parts or increments so generated. It is easy to observe that these increments are each proportional to the sum of the velocities with which it is described: that, consequently, the several sums of the velocities, generated in equal parts of time, may be set forth by the respective lines *KL*, *LM*, *MN*, &c. generated in the same times. It is likewise an easy matter to say, that the last velocity generated in the first particle of time may be expressed by the symbol *a*, the last in the

second by b, the last generated in the third by c, and so on: that a is the velocity of LM in *statu nascenti*, and b, c, d, e, &c. are the velocities of the increments MN, NO, OP, &c. in their respective nascent estates. You may proceed and consider these velocities themselves as flowing or increasing quantities, taking the velocities of the velocities, and the velocities of the velocities of the velocities, *i.e.* the first, second, third, &c. velocities *ad infinitum*: which succeeding series of velocities may be thus expressed, $a.\ b-a.\ c-2b+a.\ d-3c-3b-a$ &c., which you may call by the names of first, second, third, fourth fluxions. And for an apter expression you may denote the variable flowing line KL, KM, KN, &c. by the letter x; and the first fluxions by $\dot{x}$, the second by $\ddot{x}$, the third by $\dddot{x}$, and so on *ad infinitum*.

37. Nothing is easier than to assign names, signs, or expressions to these fluxions; and it is not difficult to compute and operate by means of such signs. But it will be found much more difficult to omit the signs and yet retain in our minds the things which we suppose to be signified by them. To consider the exponents, whether geometrical, or algebraical, or fluxionary, is no difficult matter. But to form a precise idea of a third velocity for instance, in itself and by itself, *Hoc opus, hic labor.* Nor indeed is it an easy point to form a clear and distinct idea of any velocity at all, exclusive of and prescinding from all length of time and space; as also from all notes, signs, or symbols whatsoever. This, if I may be allowed to judge of others by myself, is impossible. To me it seems evident that measures and signs are absolutely necessary in order to conceive or reason about velocities; and that consequently, when we think to conceive the velocities simply and in themselves, we are deluded by vain abstractions.

38. It may perhaps be thought by some an easier method of conceiving fluxions to suppose them the velocities wherewith the infinitesimal differences are generated. So that the first fluxions shall be the velocities of the first differences, the second the velocities of the second differences, the third fluxions the velocities of the third differences, and so on *ad infinitum*. But, not to mention the insurmountable difficulty

of admitting or conceiving infinitesimals, and infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., it is evident that this notion of fluxions would not consist with the great author's view; who held that the minutest quantity ought not to be neglected, that therefore the doctrine of infinitesimal differences was not to be admitted in geometry, and who plainly appears to have introduced the use of velocities or fluxions, on purpose to exclude or do without them.

39. To others it may possibly seem that we should form a juster idea of fluxions by assuming the finite, unequal, isochronal increments *KL*, *LM*, *MN*, &c., and considering them in *statu nascenti*, also their increments in *statu nascenti*, and the nascent increments of those increments, and so on, supposing the first nascent increments to be proportional to the first fluxions or velocities, the nascent increments of those increments to be proportional to the second fluxions, the third nascent increments to be proportional to the third fluxions, and so onwards. And, as the first fluxions are the velocities of the first nascent increments, so the second fluxions may be conceived to be the velocities of the second nascent increments, rather than the velocities of velocities. By which means the analogy of fluxions may seem better preserved, and the notion rendered more intelligible.

40. And indeed it should seem that in the way of obtaining the second or third fluxion of an equation the given fluxions were considered rather as increments than velocities. But the considering them sometimes in one sense, sometimes in another, one while in themselves, another in their exponents, seems to have occasioned no small share of that confusion and obscurity which are found in the doctrine of fluxions. It may seem therefore that the notion might be still mended, and that instead of fluxions of fluxions, or fluxions of fluxions of fluxions, and instead of second, third, or fourth, &c. fluxions of a given quantity, it might be more consistent and less liable to exception to say, the fluxion of the first nascent increment, *i.e.* the second fluxion; the fluxion of the second nascent increment, *i.e.* the third fluxion; the fluxion of the third nascent increment, *i.e.* the fourth fluxion—which fluxions are conceived respectively proportional, each to the nascent principle of the increment succeeding that whereof it is the fluxion.

41. For the more distinct conception of all which it may be considered that if the finite increment LM[1] be divided into the isochronal parts Lm, mn, no, oM; and the increment MN into the parts Mp, pq, qr, rN isochronal to the former; as the whole increments LM, MN are proportional to the sums of their describing velocities, even so the homologous particles Lm, Mp are also proportional to the respective accelerated velocities with which they are described. And, as the velocity with which Mp is generated, exceeds that with which Lm was generated, even so the particle Mp exceeds the particle Lm. And in general, as the isochronal velocities describing the particles of MN exceed the isochronal velocities describing the particles of LM, even so the particles of the former exceed the correspondent particles of the latter. And this will hold, be the said particles ever so small. MN therefore will exceed LM if they are both taken in their nascent states: and that excess will be proportional to the excess of the velocity b above the velocity a. Hence we may see that this last account of fluxions comes, in the upshot, to the same thing with the first.[2]

42. But, notwithstanding what hath been said, it must still be acknowledged that the finite particles Lm or Mp, though taken ever so small, are not proportional to the velocities a and b; but each to a series of velocities changing every moment, or which is the same thing, to an accelerated velocity, by which it is generated during a certain minute particle of time: that the nascent beginnings or evanescent endings of finite quantities, which are produced in moments or infinitely small parts of time, are alone proportional to given velocities: that therefore, in order to conceive the first fluxions, we must conceive time divided into moments, increments generated in those moments, and velocities proportional to those increments: that, in order to conceive second and third fluxions, we must suppose that the nascent principles or momentaneous increments have themselves also other momentaneous increments, which are proportional to their respective generating velocities: that the velocities of these second momentaneous increments are

[1] See the foregoing scheme in sect. 36. [2] Sect. 36.

second fluxions: those of their nascent momentaneous increments third fluxions. And so on *ad infinitum.*

43. By subducting the increment generated in the first moment from that generated in the second, we get the increment of an increment. And by subducting the velocity generating in the first moment from that generating in the second, we get a fluxion of a fluxion. In like manner, by subducting the difference of the velocities generating in the two first moments from the excess of the velocity in the third above that in the second moment, we obtain the third fluxion. And after the same analogy we may proceed to fourth, fifth, sixth fluxions, &c. And if we call the velocities of the first, second, third, fourth moments, a, b, c, d, the series of fluxions will be as above, $a.\ b-a.\ c-2b+a.$

. . . ∴ : :

$d-3c+3b-a.$ *ad infinitum, i.e.* $x.\ x.\ x.\ x.$ *ad infinitum.*

44. Thus fluxions may be considered in sundry lights and shapes, which seem all equally difficult to conceive. And, indeed, as it is impossible to conceive velocity without time or space, without either finite length or finite duration,[1] it must seem above the powers of men to comprehend even the first fluxions. And if the first are incomprehensible, what shall we say of the second and third fluxions, &c.? He who can conceive the beginning of a beginning, or the end of an end, somewhat before the first or after the last, may be perhaps sharpsighted enough to conceive these things. But most men will, I believe, find it impossible to understand them in any sense whatever.

45. One would think that men could not speak too exactly on so nice a subject. And yet, as was before hinted, we may often observe that the exponents of fluxions, or notes representing fluxions are compounded with the fluxions themselves. Is not this the case when, just after the fluxions of flowing quantities were said to be the celerities of their increasing, and the second fluxions to be the mutations of the

‖ ∣ . : : ∴.

first fluxions or celerities, we are told that $z.\ z.\ z.\ z.\ z.\ z.$[2] represents a series of quantities whereof each subsequent quantity is the fluxion of the preceding; and each fore-

[1] Sect. 31. [2] "De Quadratura Curvarum."

going is a fluent quantity having the following one for its fluxion?

46. Divers series of quantities and expressions, geometrical and algebraical, may be easily conceived, in lines, in surfaces, in species, to be continued without end or limit. But it will not be found so easy to conceive a series, either of mere velocities or of mere nascent increments, distinct therefrom and corresponding thereunto. Some perhaps may be led to think the author intended a series of ordinates, wherein each ordinate was the fluxion of the preceding and fluent of the following, *i.e.* that the fluxion of one ordinate was itself the ordinate of another curve; and the fluxion of this last ordinate was the ordinate of yet another curve; and so on *ad infinitum*. But who can conceive how the fluxion (whether velocity or nascent increment) or an ordinate should be itself an ordinate? Or more than that each preceding quantity or fluent is related to its subsequent or fluxion, as the area of a curvilinear figure to its ordinate; agreeably to what the author remarks, that each preceding quantity in such series is as the area of a curvilinear figure, whereof the abscissa is z, and the ordinate is the following quantity?

47. Upon the whole it appears that the celerities are dismissed, and instead thereof areas and ordinates are introduced. But, however expedient such analogies or such expressions may be found for facilitating the modern quadratures, yet we shall not find any light given us thereby into the original real nature of fluxions; or that we are enabled to frame from thence just ideas of fluxions considered in themselves. In all this the general ultimate drift of the author is very clear, but his principles are obscure. But perhaps those theories of the great author are not minutely considered or canvassed by his disciples; who seem eager, as was before hinted, rather to operate than to know, rather to apply his rules and his forms than to understand his principles and enter into his notions. It is nevertheless certain that, in order to follow him in his quadratures, they must find fluents from fluxions; and in order to this, they must know to find fluxions from fluents; and in order to find fluxions, they must first know what fluxions are. Otherwise they proceed without clearness and without science. Thus the direct method precedes the inverse, and the knowledge of the principles is supposed in

both. But as for operating according to rules, and by the help of general forms, whereof the original principles and reasons are not understood, this is to be esteemed merely technical. Be the principles therefore ever so abstruse and metaphysical, they must be studied by whoever would comprehend the doctrine of fluxions. Nor can any geometrician have a right to apply the rules of the great author, without first considering his metaphysical notions whence they were derived. These, how necessary soever in order to science, which can never be obtained without a precise, clear, and accurate conception of the principles—are nevertheless by several carelessly passed over; while the expressions alone are dwelt on and considered and treated with great skill and management, thence to obtain other expressions by methods suspicious and indirect (to say the least) if considered in themselves, however recommended by Induction and Authority; two motives which are acknowledged sufficient to beget a rational faith and moral persuasion, but nothing higher.

48. You may possibly hope to evade the force of all that hath been said, and to screen false principles and inconsistent reasonings, by a general pretence that these objections and remarks are *metaphysical*. But this is a vain pretence. For the plain sense and truth of what is advanced in the foregoing remarks, I appeal to the understanding of every unprejudiced intelligent reader. To the same I appeal, whether the points remarked upon are not most incomprehensible metaphysics. And metaphysics not of mine, but your own. I would not be understood to infer that your notions are false or vain because they are metaphysical. Nothing is either true or false for that reason. Whether a point be called metaphysical or no avails little. The question is, whether it be clear or obscure, right or wrong, well or ill deduced?

49. Although momentaneous increments, nascent and evanescent quantities, fluxions and infinitesimals of all degrees are in truth such shadowy entities, so difficult to imagine or conceive distinctly, that (to say the least) they cannot be admitted as principles or objects of clear and accurate science; and although this obscurity and incomprehensibility of your metaphysics had been alone sufficient to allay your preten-

sions to evidence; yet it hath, if I mistake not, been further shewn, that your inferences are no more just than your conceptions are clear, and that your logics are as exceptionable as your metaphysics. It should seem, therefore, upon the whole, that your conclusions are not attained by just reasoning from clear principles: consequently, that the employment of modern analysts, however useful in mathematical calculations and constructions, doth not habituate and qualify the mind to apprehend clearly and infer justly; and, consequently, that you have no right, in virtue of such habits, to dictate out of your proper sphere, beyond which your judgment is to pass for no more than that of other men.

50. Of a long time I have suspected that these modern analytics were not scientifical, and gave some hints thereof to the public about twenty-five years ago.[1] Since which time, I have been diverted by other occupations, and imagined I might employ myself better than in deducing and laying together my thoughts on so nice a subject. And though of late I have been called upon to make good my suggestions; yet, as the person who made this call doth not appear to think maturely enough to understand either those metaphysics which he would refute, or mathematics which he would patronize, I should have spared myself the trouble of writing for his conviction. Nor should I now have troubled you or myself with this address, after so long an intermission of these studies, were it not to prevent, so far as I am able, your imposing on yourself and others in matters of much higher moment and concern. And, to the end that you may more clearly comprehend the force and design of the foregoing remarks, and pursue them still farther in your own meditations, I shall subjoin the following Queries.

Query 1. Whether the object of geometry be not the proportions of assignable extensions? And whether there be any need of considering quantities either infinitely great or infinitely small?

Qu. 2. Whether the end of geometry be not to measure assignable finite extension? And whether this practical view did not first put men on the study of geometry?

[1] *I.e.* in the "Principles of Human Knowledge." See sects. 124-132 (vol. i., p. 236-241).—ED.

Qu. 3. Whether the mistaking the object and end of geometry hath not created needless difficulties, and wrong pursuits in that science?

Qu. 4. Whether men may properly be said to proceed in a scientific method, without clearly conceiving the object they are conversant about, the end proposed, and the method by which it is pursued?

Qu. 5. Whether it doth not suffice, that every assignable number of parts may be contained in some assignable magnitude? And whether it be not unnecessary, as well as absurd, to suppose that finite extension is infinitely divisible?

Qu. 6. Whether the diagrams in a geometrical demonstration are not to be considered as signs of all possible finite figures, of all sensible and imaginable extensions or magnitudes of the same kind?

Qu. 7. Whether it be possible to free geometry from insuperable difficulties and absurdities, so long as either the abstract general idea of extension, or absolute external extension be supposed its true object?

Qu. 8. Whether the notions of absolute time, absolute place, and absolute motion be not most abstractedly metaphysical? Whether it be possible for us to measure, compute, or know them?

Qu. 9. Whether mathematicians do not engage themselves in disputes and paradoxes concerning what they neither do nor can conceive? And whether the doctrine of forces be not a sufficient proof of this?[1]

Qu. 10. Whether in geometry it may not suffice to consider assignable finite magnitude, without concerning ourselves with infinity? And whether it would not be righter to measure large polygons having finite sides, instead of curves, than to suppose curves are polygons of infinitesimal sides, a supposition neither true nor conceivable?

Qu. 11. Whether many points which are not readily assented to are not nevertheless true? And whether those in the two following queries may not be of that number?

Qu. 12. Whether it be possible that we should have had an idea or notion of extension prior to motion? Or whether, if

[1] See a Latin treatise, "De Motu," published at London in the year 1721. (The tract will be found translated in vol. ii.—ED.)

a man had never perceived motion, he would ever have known or conceived one thing to be distant from another?

Qu. 13. Whether geometrical quantity hath co-existent parts? And whether all quantity be not in a flux as well as time and motion?

Qu. 14. Whether extension can be supposed an attribute of a Being immutable and eternal?

Qu. 15. Whether to decline examining the principles, and unravelling the methods used in mathematics would not shew a bigotry in mathematicians?

Qu. 16. Whether certain maxims do not pass current among analysts which are shocking to good sense? And whether the common assumption, that a finite quantity divided by nothing is infinite, be not of this number?

Qu. 17. Whether the considering geometrical diagrams absolutely or in themselves, rather than as representatives of all assignable magnitudes or figures of the same kind, be not a principal cause of the supposing finite extension infinitely divisible; and of all the difficulties and absurdities consequent thereupon?

Qu. 18. Whether, from geometrical propositions being general, and the lines in diagrams being therefore general substitutes or representatives, it doth not follow that we may not limit or consider the number of parts into which such particular lines are divisible?

Qu. 19. When it is said or implied, that such a certain line delineated on paper contains more than any assignable number of parts, whether any more in truth ought to be understood, than that it is a sign indifferently representing all finite lines, be they ever so great. In which relative capacity it contains, *i.e.* stands for more than any assignable number of parts? And whether it be not altogether absurd to suppose a finite line, considered in itself or in its own positive nature, should contain an infinite number of parts?

Qu. 20. Whether all arguments for the infinite divisibility of finite extension do not suppose and imply, either general abstract ideas, or absolute external extension to be the object of geometry? And, therefore, whether, along with those suppositions, such arguments also do not cease and vanish?

Qu. 21. Whether the supposed infinite divisibility of finite extension hath not been a snare to mathematicians and a

thorn in their sides? And whether a quantity infinitely diminished and a quantity infinitely small are not the same thing?

Qu. 22. Whether it be necessary to consider velocities of nascent or evanescent quantities, or moments, or infinitesimals? And whether the introducing of things so inconceivable be not a reproach to mathematics?

Qu. 23. Whether inconsistencies can be truths? Whether points repugnant and absurd are to be admitted upon any subjects, or in any science? And whether the use of infinites ought to be allowed as a sufficient pretext and apology for the admitting of such points in geometry?

Qu. 24. Whether a quantity be not properly said to be known, when we know its proportion to given quantities? And whether this proportion can be known but by expressions or exponents, either geometrical, algebraical, or arithmetical? And whether expressions in lines or species can be useful but so far forth as they are reducible to numbers?

Qu. 25. Whether the finding out proper expressions or notations of quantity be not the most general character and tendency of the mathematics? And arithmetical operation that which limits and defines their use?

Qu. 26. Whether mathematicians have sufficiently considered the analogy and use of signs? And how far the specific limited nature of things corresponds thereto?

Qu. 27. Whether because, in stating a general case of pure algebra, we are at full liberty to make a character denote either a positive or a negative quantity, or nothing at all, we may therefore, in a geometrical case, limited by hypotheses and reasonings from particular properties and relations of figures, claim the same licence?

Qu. 28. Whether the shifting of the hypothesis, or (as we may call it) the *fallacia suppositionis* be not a sophism that far and wide infects the modern reasonings, both in the mechanical philosophy and in the abstruse and fine geometry?

Qu. 29. Whether we can form an idea or notion of velocity distinct from and exclusive of its measures, as we can of heat distinct from and exclusive of the degrees on the thermometer by which it is measured? And whether this be not supposed in the reasonings of modern analysts?

Qu. 30. Whether motion can be conceived in a point of

space? And if motion cannot, whether velocity can? And if not, whether a first or last velocity can be conceived in a mere limit, either initial or final, of the described space?

Qu. 31. Where there are no increments, whether there can be any *ratio* of increments? Whether nothings can be considered as proportional to real quantities? Or whether to talk of their proportions be not to talk nonsense? Also in what sense we are to understand the proportion of a surface to a line, of an area to an ordinate? And whether species or numbers, though properly expressing quantities which are not homogeneous, may yet be said to express their proportion to each other?

Qu. 32. Whether if all assignable circles may be squared, the circle is not, to all intents and purposes, squared as well as the parabola? Or whether a parabolical area can in fact be measured more accurately than a circular?

Qu. 33. Whether it would not be righter to approximate fairly than to endeavour at accuracy by sophisms?

Qu. 34. Whether it would not be more decent to proceed by trials and inductions, than to pretend to demonstrate by false principles?

Qu. 35. Whether there be not a way of arriving at truth, although the principles are not scientific, nor the reasoning just? And whether such a way ought to be called a knack or a science?

Qu. 36. Whether there can be science of the conclusion where there is not evidence of the principles? And whether a man can have evidence[1] of the principles without understanding them? And therefore, whether the mathematicians of the present age act like men of science, in taking so much more pains to apply their principles than to understand them?

Qu. 37. Whether the greatest genius wrestling with false principles may not be foiled? And whether accurate quadratures can be obtained without new *postulata* or assumptions?

[1] Where the word "evidence" appears here and above, the London issue of the first edition has "science." The Dublin issue reads "evidence." The British Museum copy of Tonson's edition contains an old manuscript alteration of "science" to "evidence," and that word also appears in the collected edition.—ED.

And if not, whether those which are intelligible and consistent ought not to be preferred to the contrary? See sect. 28 and 29.

Qu. 38. Whether tedious calculations in algebra and fluxions be the likeliest method to improve the mind? And whether men's being accustomed to reason altogether about mathematical signs and figures doth not make them at a loss how to reason without them?

Qu. 39. Whether, whatever readiness analysts acquire in stating a problem, or finding apt expressions for mathematical quantities, the same doth necessarily infer a proportionable ability in conceiving and expressing other matters?

Qu. 40. Whether it be not a general case or rule, that one and the same coefficient dividing equal products gives equal quotients? And yet whether such coefficient can be interpreted by o or nothing? Or whether any one will say that if the equation $2 \times o = 5 \times o$, be divided by o, the quotients on both sides are equal? Whether therefore a case may not be general with respect to all quantities and yet not extend to nothings, or include the case of nothing? And whether the bringing nothing under the notion of quantity may not have betrayed men into false reasoning?

Qu. 41. Whether in the most general reasonings about equalities and proportions men may not demonstrate as well as in geometry? Whether in such demonstrations they are not obliged to the same strict reasoning as in geometry? And whether such reasonings are not deduced from the same axioms with those in geometry? Whether therefore algebra be not as truly a science as geometry?

Qu. 42. Whether men may not reason in species as well as in words? Whether the same rules of logic do not obtain in both cases? And whether we have not a right to expect and demand the same evidence in both?

Qu. 43. Whether an algebraist, fluxionist, geometrician, or demonstrator of any kind can expect indulgence for obscure principles or incorrect reasonings? And whether an algebraical note or species can at the end of a process be interpreted in a sense which could not have been substituted for it at the beginning? Or whether any particular supposition can come under a general case which doth not consist with the reasoning thereof?

Qu. 44. Whether the difference between a mere computer and a man of science be not, that the one computes on principles clearly conceived, and by rules evidently demonstrated, whereas the other doth not?

Qu. 45. Whether, although geometry be a science, and algebra allowed to be a science, and the analytical a most excellent method, in the application, nevertheless, of the analysis to geometry, men may not have admitted false principles and wrong methods of reasoning?

Qu. 46. Whether, although algebraical reasonings are admitted to be ever so just, when confined to signs or species as general representatives of quantity, you may not nevertheless fall into error, if, when you limit them to stand for particular things, you do not limit yourself to reason consistently with the nature of such particular things? And whether such error ought to be imputed to pure algebra?

Qu. 47. Whether the view of modern mathematicians doth not rather seem to be the coming at an expression by artifice, than the coming at science by demonstration?

Qu. 48. Whether there may not be sound metaphysics as well as unsound? Sound as well as unsound logic? And whether the modern analytics may not be brought under one of these denominations, and which?

Qu. 49. Whether there be not really a *philosophia prima*, a certain transcendental science superior to and more extensive than mathematics, which it might behove our modern analysts rather to learn than despise?

Qu. 50. Whether, ever since the recovery of mathematical learning, there have not been perpetual disputes and controversies among the mathematicians? And whether this doth not disparage the evidence of their methods?

Qu. 51. Whether anything but metaphysics and logic can open the eyes of mathematicians and extricate them out of their difficulties?

Qu. 52. Whether, upon the received principles, a quantity can by any division or subdivision, though carried ever so far, be reduced to nothing?

Qu. 53. Whether, if the end of geometry be practice, and this practice be measuring, and we measure only assignable extensions, it will not follow that unlimited approximations completely answer the intention of geometry?

Qu. 54. Whether the same things which are now done by infinites may not be done by finite quantities? And whether this would not be a great relief to the imaginations and understandings of mathematical men?

Qu. 55. Whether those philomathematical physicians, anatomists, and dealers in the animal economy, who admit the doctrine of fluxions with an implicit faith, can with a good grace insult other men for believing what they do not comprehend?

Qu. 56. Whether the corpuscularian, experimental, and mathematical philosophy, so much cultivated in the last age, hath not too much engrossed men's attention; some part whereof it might have usefully employed?

Qu. 57. Whether, from this and other concurring causes, the minds of speculative men have not been borne downward, to the debasing and stupifying of the higher faculties? And whether we may not hence account for that prevailing narrowness and bigotry among many who pass for men of science, their incapacity for things moral, intellectual, or theological, their proneness to measure all truths by sense and experience of animal life?

Qu. 58. Whether it be really an effect of thinking, that the same men admire the great author for his fluxions, and deride him for his religion?

Qu. 59. If certain philosophical virtuosi of the present age have no religion, whether it can be said to be want of faith?

Qu. 60. Whether it be not a juster way of reasoning, to recommend points of faith from their effects, than to demonstrate mathematical principles by their conclusions?

Qu. 61. Whether it be not less exceptionable to admit points above reason than contrary to reason?

Qu. 62. Whether mysteries may not with better right be allowed of in Divine Faith than in human science?

Qu. 63. Whether such mathematicians as cry out against mysteries have ever examined their own principles?

Qu. 64. Whether mathematicians, who are so delicate in religious points, are strictly scrupulous in their own science? Whether they do not submit to authority, take things upon trust, and believe points inconceivable? Whether they have not their mysteries, and what is more, their repugnances and contradictions?

Qu. 65. Whether it might not become men who are puzzled and perplexed about their own principles, to judge warily, candidly, and modestly concerning other matters?

Qu. 66. Whether the modern analytics do not furnish a strong *argumentum ad hominem* against the philomathematical infidels of these times?

Qu. 67. Whether it follows from the above-mentioned remarks, that accurate and just reasoning is the peculiar character of the present age? And whether the modern growth of infidelity can be ascribed to a distinction so truly valuable?

A DEFENCE

OF

FREE-THINKING IN MATHEMATICS.

[THE mathematicians replied to the "Analyst" with a broadside of pamphlets in defence of Newton and the doctrine of Fluxions. The curious will find in Professor Fraser's valuable note to the "Defence" a very complete list of these works. Berkeley replied to three of them. In 1734 was published "Geometry no Friend to Infidelity; or a Defence of Sir Isaac Newton and the British Mathematicians; in a Letter to the Author of the 'Analyst;' by Philalethes Cantabrigiensis." The author of this was Dr. Jurin, a celebrated Cambridge mathematician, and his attack is both incisive and vivacious. Berkeley replied—not very successfully—with this present work. It was published in Dublin and London in 1735. Jurin retorted in 1735 with a second pamphlet, styled very wittily "The Minute Mathematician; or the Free-thinker no Just Thinker, etc." Berkeley did not reply to this second letter.]

A

DEFENCE

OF

Free-Thinking

IN

MATHEMATICS.

In Anſwer

To a Pamphlet of *Philalethes Cantabrigienſis*, intituled, *Geometry no Friend to Infidelity, or a Defence of Sir* ISAAC NEWTON, *and the* BRITISH *Mathematicians.* Alſo an Appendix concerning Mr. WALTON's *Vindication of the Principle of Fluxions againſt the Objections contained in the* ANALYST.

WHEREIN

It is attempted to put this Controverſy in ſuch a Light as that every Reader may be able to judge thereof.

By the Author of *The Minute Philoſopher.*

Veritas odium parit. Ter.

Επεὶ δὲ ὁ Μαθηματικὸς χρῆται τοῖς Κοινοῖς ἰδίως, Καὶ τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι τῆς πρώτης Φιλοσοφίας.
Ariſtot. Metaph. 1. xiij

DUBLIN: Printed by M. RHAMES, for R. GUNNE near the *Ram* in *Capel-ſtreet*, MDCCXXXV.

A DEFENCE OF FREE-THINKING IN MATHEMATICS, &c.

1.

WHEN I read your "Defence of the British Mathematicians," I could not, Sir, but admire your courage in asserting with such undoubting assurance things so easily disproved. This to me seemed unaccountable, till I reflected on what you say (p. 32,) when, upon my having appealed to every thinking reader, whether it be possible to frame any clear conception of Fluxions, you express yourself in the following manner, "Pray, Sir, who are those thinking readers you appeal to? Are they geometricians, or persons wholly ignorant of geometry? If the former, I leave it to them: if the latter, I ask, How well are they qualified to judge of the method of fluxions?" It must be acknowledged you seem by this dilemma secure in the favour of one part of your readers, and the ignorance of the other. I am nevertheless persuaded there are fair and candid men among the mathematicians. And for those who are not mathematicians, I shall endeavour so to unveil this mystery, and put the controversy between us in such a light as that every reader of ordinary sense and reflection may be a competent judge thereof.

2. You express an extreme surprise and concern, "that I should take so much pains to depreciate one of the noblest sciences, to disparage and traduce a set of learned men, whose labours so greatly conduce to the honour of this island (p. 5); to lessen the reputation and authority of Sir Isaac Newton and his followers, by shewing that they are not such masters of reason as they are generally presumed to be; and to depreciate the science they profess, by demonstrating to the world that it is not of that clearness

and certainty as is commonly imagined." All which, you insist, "appears very strange to you and the rest of that famous University, who plainly see of how great use mathematical learning is to mankind." Hence you take occasion to declaim on the usefulness of mathematics in the several branches, and then to redouble your surprise and amazement (p. 19 and 20). To all which declamation I reply, that it is quite beside the purpose. For, I allow, and always have allowed, its full claim of merit to whatever is useful and true in the mathematics: but that which is not so, the less it employs men's time and thoughts the better. And, after all you have said or can say, I believe the unprejudiced reader will think with me, that things obscure are not therefore sacred; and that it is no more a crime to canvass and detect unsound principles or false reasonings in mathematics than in any other part of learning.

3. You are, it seems, much at a loss to understand the usefulness, or tendency, or prudence of my attempt. I thought I had sufficiently explained this in the "Analyst." But for your further satisfaction shall here tell you, it is very well known that several persons who deride Faith and Mysteries in Religion, admit the doctrine of Fluxions for true and certain. Now, if it be shewn that fluxions are really most incomprehensible mysteries, and that those who believe them to be clear and scientific do entertain an implicit faith in the author of that method: will not this furnish a fair *argumentum ad hominem* against men who reject that very thing in religion which they admit in human learning? And is it not a proper way to abate the pride, and discredit the pretensions of those who insist upon clear ideas in points of faith, if it be shewn that they do without them even in science.

4. As to my timing this charge; why now and not before, since I had published hints thereof many years ago?[1] Surely I am obliged to give no account of this: if what hath been said in the "Analyst" be not sufficient. Suppose that I had not leisure, or that I did not think it expedient, or that I had no mind to it. When a man thinks fit to publish anything, either in mathematics or in any other part of

[1] *I.e.*, in the "Principles of Human Knowledge." See the footnote on page 43.—ED.

learning, what avails it, or indeed what right hath any one to ask, Why at this or that time; in this or that manner; upon this or that motive? Let the reader judge if it suffice not that what I publish is true, and that I have a right to publish such truths when and how I please in a free country.

5. I do not say that mathematicians, as such, are infidels; or that geometry is a friend to infidelity, which you untruly insinuate, as you do many other things; whence you raise topics for invective. But I say there are certain mathematicians who are known to be so; and that there are others who are not mathematicians who are influenced by a regard for their authority. Some, perhaps, who live in the University, may not be apprised of this: but the intelligent and observing reader, who lives in the world, and is acquainted with the humour of the times and the characters of men, is well aware there are too many that deride mysteries and yet admire fluxions; who yield that faith to a mere mortal which they deny to Jesus Christ, whose religion they make it their study and business to discredit. The owning this is not to own that men who reason well are enemies to religion, as you would represent it: on the contrary, I endeavour to shew that such men are defective in point of reason and judgment, and that they do the very thing they would seem to despise.

6. There are, I make no doubt, among the mathematicians many sincere believers in Jesus Christ: I know several such myself: but I addressed my "Analyst" to an infidel; and, on very good grounds, I supposed that, besides him, there were other deriders of faith who had nevertheless a profound veneration for fluxions: and I was willing to set forth the inconsistence of such men. If there be no such thing as infidels who pretend to knowledge in the modern analysis, I own myself misinformed, and shall gladly be found in a mistake; but even in that case, my remarks upon fluxions are not the less true; nor will it follow that I have no right to examine them on the foot of human science, even though religion were quite unconcerned, and though I had no end to serve but truth. But you are very angry (p. 13 and 14) that I should enter the lists with reasoning infidels, and attack them upon their pretensions to science: and hence you take occasion to shew your spleen against

the clergy. I will not take upon me to say that I know you to be a Minute Philosopher yourself; but I know the Minute Philosophers make just such compliments as you do to our church, and are just as angry as you can be at any who undertake to defend religion by reason. If we resolve all into faith, they laugh at us and our faith: and if we attempt to reason, they are angry at us: they pretend we go out of our province, and they recommend to us a blind implicit faith. Such is the inconsistence of our adversaries. But it is to be hoped there will never be wanting men to deal with them at their own weapons; and to shew they are by no means those masters of reason which they would fain pass for.

7. I do not say, as you would represent me, that we have no better reason for our religion than you have for fluxions: but I say that an infidel, who believes the doctrine of fluxions, acts a very inconsistent part in pretending to reject the Christian religion because he cannot believe what he doth not comprehend; or because he cannot assent without evidence; or because he cannot submit his faith to authority. Whether there are such infidels, I submit to the judgment of the reader. For my own part I make no doubt of it, having seen some shrewd signs thereof myself, and having been very credibly informed thereof by others. Nor doth this charge seem the less credible, for your being so sensibly touched, and denying it with so much passion. You, indeed, do not stick to affirm, that the persons who informed me are "a pack of base, profligate, and impudent liars" (p. 27). How far the reader will think fit to adopt your passions, I cannot say; but I can truly say, the late celebrated Mr. Addison is one of the persons whom you are pleased to characterise in these modest and mannerly terms. He assured me that the infidelity of a certain noted mathematician, still living, was one principal reason assigned by a witty man of those times for his being an infidel.[1] Not that I imagine geometry disposeth men to infidelity: but that, from other causes, such as presumption, ignorance, or vanity, like other men geometricians also become infidels,

[1] This is referred to in Stock's "Life of Berkeley," prefixed to all early editions of Berkeley's complete works. There Sir Samuel Garth is made to instance Halley's infidelity in support of his own. See Wright's edition (1843), vol. i., p. 12.—ED.

and that the supposed light and evidence of their science gains credit to their infidelity.

8. You reproach me with calumny, detraction, and artifice (p. 15). You recommend such means as are innocent and just, rather than the criminal method of lessening or detracting from my opponents (Ibid.). You accuse me of the *odium theologicum*, the intemperate zeal of divines, that I do *stare super vias antiquas* (p. 13); with much more to the same effect. For all which charge I depend on the reader's candour, that he will not take your word, but read and judge for himself. In which case he will be able to discern (though he should be no mathematician) how passionate and unjust your reproaches are, and how possible it is for a man to cry out against calumny and practise it in the same breath. Considering how impatient all mankind are when their prejudices are looked into, I do not wonder to see you rail and rage at the rate you do. But if your own imagination be strongly shocked and moved, you cannot therefore conclude that a sincere endeavour to free a science, so useful and ornamental to human life, from those subtleties, obscurities, and paradoxes which render it inaccessible to most men, will be thought a criminal undertaking by such as are in their right mind. Much less can you hope that an illustrious Seminary of learned men, which hath produced so many free-spirited inquiries after truth, will at once enter into your passions, and degenerate into a nest of bigots.

9. I observe upon the inconsistency of certain infidel analysts. I remark some defects in the principles of the modern analysis. I take the liberty decently to dissent from Sir Isaac Newton. I propose some helps to abridge the trouble of mathematical studies, and render them more useful. What is there in all this that should make you declaim on the usefulness of practical mathematics; that should move you to cry out, *Spain, Inquisition, Odium Theologicum?* By what figure of speech do you extend what is said of the modern analysis to mathematics in general; or what is said of mathematical infidels to all mathematicians; or the confuting an error in science to burning or hanging the authors? But it is nothing new or strange that men should choose to indulge their passions, rather than quit their opinions, how absurd soever. Hence the frightful

visions and tragical uproars of bigoted men, be the subject of their bigotry what it will. A very remarkable instance of this you give (p. 27), where, upon my having said that a deference to certain mathematical infidels, as I was credibly informed, had been one motive to infidelity, you ask, with no small emotion, "For God's sake are we in England or in Spain?" "Is this the language of a familiar who is whispering an inquisitor, &c.?" And the page before you exclaim in the following words—"Let us burn or hang up all the mathematicians in Great Britain, or halloo the mob upon them to tear them to pieces every mother's son of them, *Tros Rutulusve fuat*, laymen or clergymen, &c. Let us dig up the bodies of Dr. Barrow and Sir Isaac Newton, and burn them under the gallows."

10. The reader need not be a mathematician to see how vain all this tragedy of yours is. And if he be as thoroughly satisfied as I am that the cause of fluxions cannot be defended by reason, he will be as little surprised as I am to see you betake yourself to the arts of all bigoted men, raising terror and calling in the passions to your assistance. Whether those rhetorical flourishes about the inquisition and the gallows are not quite ridiculous, I leave to be determined by the reader. Who will also judge (though he should not be skilled in geometry) whether I have given the least grounds for this and a world of such-like declamation? And whether I have not constantly treated those celebrated writers with all proper respect, though I take the liberty in certain points to differ from them?

11. As I heartily abhor an inquisition in faith, so I think you have no right to erect one in science. At the time of writing your *Defence* you seem to have been overcome with passion: but, now you may be supposed cool, I desire you to reflect whether it be not wrote in the true spirit of an inquisitor? Whether this becomes a person so exceeding delicate himself upon that point? And whether your brethren the analysts will think themselves honoured or obliged by you, for having defended their doctrine in the same manner as any declaiming bigot would defend transubstantiation? The same false colours, the same intemperate sallies, and the same indignation against common sense!

12. In a matter of mere science, where authority hath

nothing to do, you constantly endeavour to overbear me with authorities, and load me with envy. If I see a sophism in the writings of a great author, and, in compliment to his understanding, suspect he could hardly be quite satisfied with his own demonstration; this sets you on declaiming for several pages. It is pompously set forth, as a criminal method of detracting from great men, as a concerted project to lessen their reputation, as making them pass for impostors. If I publish my free thoughts, which I have as much right to publish as any other man, it is imputed to rashness, and vanity, and the love of opposition. Though perhaps my late publication, of what had been hinted twenty-five years ago, may acquit me of this charge in the eyes of an impartial reader. But when I consider the perplexities that beset a man who undertakes to defend the doctrine of fluxions, I can easily forgive your anger.

13. Two sorts of learned men there are: one who candidly seek truth by rational means. These are never averse to have their principles looked into, and examined by the test of reason. Another sort there is who learn by *rote* a set of principles and a way of thinking which happen to be in vogue. These betray themselves by their anger and surprise, whenever their principles are freely canvassed. But you must not expect that your reader will make himself a party to your passions or your prejudices. I freely own that Sir Isaac Newton hath shewed himself an extraordinary mathematician, a profound naturalist, a person of the greatest abilities and erudition. Thus far I can readily go; but I cannot go the lengths that you do. I shall never say of him as you do, *Vestigia pronus adoro* (p. 70). This same adoration that you pay to him I will pay only to truth.

14. You may, indeed, yourself be an idolater of whom you please: but then you have no right to insult and exclaim at other men, because they do not adore your idol. Great as Sir Isaac Newton was, I think he hath, on more occasions than one, shewed himself not to be infallible. Particularly, his demonstration of the doctrine of fluxions I take to be defective; and I cannot help thinking that he was not quite pleased with it himself. And yet this doth not hinder but the method may be useful, considered as an art of invention. You, who are a mathematician, must acknowledge there have

been divers such methods admitted in mathematics, which are not demonstrative. Such, for instance, are the inductions of Dr. Wallis, in his Arithmetic of Infinites, and such what Harriot, and, after him, Descartes, have wrote concerning the roots of affected equations. It will not, nevertheless, thence follow that those methods are useless; but only that they are not to be allowed of as premises in a strict demonstration.

15. No great name upon earth shall ever make me accept things obscure for clear, or sophisms for demonstrations. Nor may you ever hope to deter me from freely speaking what I freely think, by those arguments *ab invidia* which at every turn you employ against me. You represent yourself (p. 52) as a man "whose highest ambition is in the lowest degree to imitate Sir Isaac Newton." It might, perhaps, have suited better with your appellation of *Philalethes*, and been altogether as laudable, if your highest ambition had been to discover truth. Very consistently with the character you give of yourself, you speak of it as a sort of crime (p. 70) to think it possible you should ever "see farther, or go beyond Sir Isaac Newton." And I am persuaded you speak the sentiments of many more besides yourself. But there are others who are not afraid to sift the principles of human science, who think it no honour to imitate the greatest man in his defects, who even think it no crime to desire to know, not only beyond Sir Isaac Newton, but beyond all mankind. And whoever thinks otherwise, I appeal to the reader whether he can properly be called a philosopher.

16. Because I am not guilty of your mean idolatry, you inveigh against me as a person conceited of my own abilities; not considering that a person of less abilities may know more on a certain point than one of greater; not considering that a purblind eye, in a close and narrow view, may discern more of a thing than a much better eye in a more extensive prospect; not considering that this is to fix a *ne plus ultra*, to put a stop to all future inquiries; lastly, not considering that this is in fact, so much as in you lies, converting the republic of letters into an absolute monarchy, that it is even introducing a kind of philosophic popery among a free people.

17. I have said (and I venture still to say) that a fluxion

is incomprehensible: that second, third, and fourth fluxions are yet more incomprehensible: that it is not possible to conceive a simple infinitesimal: that it is yet less possible to conceive an infinitesimal of an infinitesimal, and so onward.[1] What have you to say in answer to this? Do you attempt to clear up the notion of a fluxion or a difference? Nothing like it. You only "assure me (upon your bare word) from your own experience, and that of several others whom you could name, that the doctrine of fluxions may be clearly conceived and distinctly comprehended; and that if I am puzzled about it and do not understand it, yet others do." But can you think, Sir, I shall take your word, when I refuse to take your master's?

18. Upon this point every reader of common sense may judge as well as the most profound mathematician. The simple apprehension of a thing defined is not made more perfect by any subsequent progress in mathematics. What any man evidently knows, he knows as well as you or Sir Isaac Newton. And every one can know whether the object of this method be (as you would have us think) clearly conceivable. To judge of this no depth of science is requisite, but only a bare attention to what passes in his own mind. And the same is to be understood of all definitions in all sciences whatsoever. In none of which can it be supposed that a man of sense and spirit will take any definition or principle upon trust, without sifting it to the bottom, and trying how far he can or he cannot conceive it. This is the course I have taken, and shall take, however you and your brethren may declaim against it, and place it in the most invidious light.

19. It is usual with you to admonish me to look over a second time, to consult, examine, weigh the words of Sir Isaac. In answer to which I will venture to say that I have taken as much pains as (I sincerely believe) any man living to understand that great author, and to make sense of his principles. No industry, nor caution, nor attention, I assure you, have been wanting on my part. So that, if I do not understand him, it is not my fault but my misfortune. Upon other subjects you are pleased to compliment me with depth of thought and uncommon abilities (p. 5 and 84). But I

[1] "Analyst," sect. 4, 5, 6, &c.

freely own, I have no pretence to those things. The only advantage I pretend to is that I have always thought and judged for myself. And, as I never had a master in mathematics, so I fairly followed the dictates of my own mind in examining and censuring the authors I read upon that subject, with the same freedom that I used upon any other; taking nothing upon trust, and believing that no writer was infallible. And a man of moderate parts, who takes this painful course in studying the principles of any science, may be supposed to walk more surely than those of greater abilities, who set out with more speed and less care.

20. What I insist on is, that the idea of a fluxion, simply considered, is not at all improved or amended by any progress, though ever so great, in the analysis: neither are the demonstrations of the general rules of that method at all cleared up by applying them. The reason of which is, because, in operating or calculating, men do not return to contemplate the original principles of the method, which they constantly presuppose, but are employed in working, by notes and symbols denoting the fluxions supposed to have been at first explained, and according to rules supposed to have been at first demonstrated. This I say to encourage those who are not far gone in these studies, to use intrepidly their own judgment, without a blind or a mean deference to the best of mathematicians, who are no more qualified than they are to judge of the simple apprehension, or the evidence of what is delivered in the first elements of the method; men by further and frequent use or exercise becoming only more accustomed to the symbols and rules, which doth not make either the foregoing notions more clear, or the foregoing proofs more perfect. Every reader of common sense, that will but use his faculties, knows as well as the most profound analyst what idea he frames or can frame of velocity without motion, or of motion without extension, of magnitude which is neither finite nor infinite, or of a quantity having no magnitude which is yet divisible, of a figure where there is no space, of proportion between nothings, or of a real product from nothing multiplied by something. He need not be far gone in geometry to know that obscure principles are not to be admitted in demonstration; that if a man destroys his own hypothesis, he at the same time destroys what was built

upon it: that error in the premises, not rectified, must produce error in the conclusion.

21. In my opinion the greatest men have their prejudices. Men learn the elements of science from others: and every learner hath a deference more or less to authority, especially the young learners, few of that kind caring to dwell long upon principles, but inclining rather to take them upon trust: and things early admitted by repetition become familiar: and this familiarity at length passeth for evidence. Now to me it seems there are certain points tacitly admitted by mathematicians which are neither evident nor true. And such points or principles ever mixing with their reasonings do lead them into paradoxes and perplexities. If the great author of the fluxionary method was early imbued with such notions it would only shew he was a man. And if, by virtue of some latent error in his principles, a man be drawn into fallacious reasonings, it is nothing strange that he should take them for true: and, nevertheless, if, when urged by perplexities and uncouth consequences, and driven to arts and shifts, he should entertain some doubt thereof, it is no more than one may naturally suppose might befall a great genius grappling with an insuperable difficulty: which is the light in which I have placed Sir Isaac Newton.[1] Hereupon you are pleased to remark that I represent the great author not only as a weak but an ill man, as a deceiver and an impostor. The reader will judge how justly.

22. As to the rest of your colourings and glosses, your reproaches and insults and outcries, I shall pass them over, only desiring the reader not to take your word, but read what I have written, and he will want no other answer. It hath been often observed that the worst cause produceth the greatest clamour; and indeed you are so clamorous throughout your defence that the reader, although he should be no mathematician, provided he understands common sense, and hath observed the ways of men, will be apt to suspect that you are in the wrong. It should seem, therefore, that your brethren the analysts are but little obliged to you for this new method of declaiming in mathematics. Whether they are more obliged by your reasoning I shall now examine.

[1] "Analyst," sect. 18.

23. You ask me (p. 32) where I find Sir Isaac Newton using such expressions as the velocities of velocities, the second, third, and fourth velocities, &c. This you set forth as a pious fraud and unfair representation. I answer, that if according to Sir Isaac Newton a fluxion be the velocity of an increment, then according to him I may call the fluxion of a fluxion the velocity of a velocity. But for the truth of the antecedent see his Introduction to the Quadrature of Curves, where his own words are, *Motuum vel incrementorum velocitates nominando fluxiones.* See also the second lemma of the second book of his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, where he expresseth himself in the following manner: *Velocitates incrementorum ac decrementorum, quas etiam, motus, mutationes, et fluxiones quantitatum nominare licet.* And that he admits fluxions of fluxions, or second, third, fourth fluxions, &c., see his Treatise of the Quadrature of Curves. I ask now, Is it not plain that if a fluxion be a velocity, then the fluxion of a fluxion may, agreeably thereunto, be called the velocity of a velocity? In like manner, if by a fluxion is meant a nascent argument, will it not then follow that the fluxion of a fluxion or second fluxion is the nascent augment of a nascent augment? Can anything be plainer? Let the reader now judge who is unfair.

24. I had observed that the great author had proceeded illegitimately, in obtaining the fluxion or moment of the rectangle of two flowing quantities; and that he did not fairly get rid of the rectangle of the moments. In answer to this you allege that the error arising from the omission of such rectangle (allowing it to be an error) is so small that it is insignificant. This you dwell upon and exemplify to no other purpose but to amuse your reader and mislead him from the question; which in truth is not concerning the accuracy of computing or measuring in practice, but concerning the accuracy of the reasoning in science. That this was really the case, and that the smallness of the practical error nowise concerns it, must be so plain to anyone who reads the "Analyst" that I wonder how you could be ignorant of it.

25. You would fain persuade your reader that I make an absurd quarrel against errors of no significancy in practice, and represent mathematicians as proceeding blindfold in

their approximations, in all which I cannot help thinking there is on your part either great ignorance or great disingenuity. If you mean to defend the reasonableness and use of approximations or of the method of indivisibles, I have nothing to say. But then you must remember this is not the doctrine of fluxions: it is none of that analysis with which I am concerned. That I am far from quarrelling at approximations in geometry is manifest from the thirty-third and fifty-third queries in the "Analyst." And that the method of fluxions pretends to somewhat more than the method of indivisibles is plain; because Sir Isaac disclaims this method as not geometrical.[1] And that the method of fluxions is supposed accurate in geometrical rigour is manifest to whoever considers what the great author writes about it; especially in his Introduction to the Quadrature of Curves, where he saith, *In rebus mathematicis errores quam minimi non sunt contemnendi.* Which expression you have seen quoted in the "Analyst," and yet you seem ignorant thereof, and indeed of the very end and design of the great author of this his invention of fluxions.

26. As oft as you talk of finite quantities inconsiderable in practice, Sir Isaac disowns your apology. *Cave*, saith he, *intellexeris finitas.* And, although quantities less than sensible may be of no account in practice, yet none of your masters, nor will even you yourself, venture to say they are of no account in theory and in reasoning. The application in gross practice is not the point questioned, but the rigour and justness of the reasoning. And it is evident that, be the subject ever so little, or ever so inconsiderable, this doth not hinder but that a person treating thereof may commit very great errors in logic; which logical errors are in nowise to be measured by the sensible or practical inconveniences thence arising, which, perchance, may be none at all. It must be owned that, after you have misled and amused your less qualified reader (as you call him), you return to the real point in controversy, and set yourself to justify Sir Isaac's method of getting rid of the above-mentioned rectangle. And here I must entreat the reader to observe how fairly you proceed.

[1] See the Scholium at the end of the first section. Lib. i., "Phil. Nat. Princip. Math."

27. First then you affirm (p. 44), "that neither in the demonstration of the rule for finding the fluxion of the rectangle of two flowing quantities, nor in anything preceding or following it, is any mention, so much as once, made of the increment of the rectangle of such flowing quantities." Now I affirm the direct contrary. For, in the very passage by you quoted in this same page, from the first case of the second lemma of the second book of Sir Isaac's Principles, beginning with *Rectangulum quodvis motu perpetuo auctum*, and ending with *igitur laterum incrementis totis a et b generatur rectanguli incrementum aB+bA. Q.E.D.* in this very passage, I say, is express mention made of the increment of such rectangle. As this is matter of fact, I refer it to the reader's own eyes. Of what rectangle have we here the increment? Is it not plainly of that whose sides have *a* and *b* for their *incrementa tota*, that is, of *AB*. Let any reader judge whether it be not plain from the words, the sense, and the context, that the great author in the end of his demonstration understands his *incrementum* as belonging to the *rectangulum quodvis* at the beginning. Is not the same also evident from the very lemma itself prefixed to the demonstration? The sense whereof is (as the author there explains it), that if the moments of the flowing quantities *A* and *B* are called *a* and *b*, then the *momentum vel mutatio geniti rectanguli AB* will be *aB+bA*. Either therefore the conclusion of the demonstration is not the thing which was to be demonstrated, or the *rectanguli incrementum aB+bA* belongs to the rectangle *AB*.

28. All this is so plain that nothing can be more so; and yet you would fain perplex this plain case by distinguishing between an increment and a moment. But it is evident to every one who has any notion of demonstration that the *incrementum* in the conclusion must be the *momentum* in the lemma; and to suppose it otherwise is no credit to the author. It is in effect supposing him to be one who did not know what he would demonstrate. But let us hear Sir Isaac's own words: *Earum (quantitatum scilicet fluentium) incrementa vel decrementa momentanea sub nomine momentorum intelligo.* And you observe yourself that he useth the word *moment* to signify either an increment or decrement. Hence, with an intention to puzzle me, you propose the

increment and decrement of AB, and ask which of these I would call the moment? The case you say is difficult. My answer is very plain and easy, to wit, Either of them. You, indeed, make a different answer; and from the author's saying that by a moment he understands either the momentaneous increment or decrement of the flowing quantities, you would have us conclude, by a very wonderful inference, that his moment is neither the increment nor decrement thereof. Would it not be as good an inference, because a number is either odd or even, to conclude it is neither? Can any one make sense of this? Or can even yourself hope that this will go down with the reader, how little soever qualified? It must be owned, you endeavour to intrude this inference on him, rather by mirth and humour than by reasoning. You are merry, I say, and (p. 46) represent the two mathematical quantities as pleading their rights, as tossing up cross and pile, as disputing amicably. You talk of their claiming preference, their agreeing, their boyishness, and their gravity. And after this ingenious digression you address me in the following words—Believe me, there is no remedy, you must acquiesce. But my answer is that I will neither believe you nor acquiesce; there is a plain remedy in common sense; and, to prevent surprise, I desire the reader always to keep the controverted point in view, to examine your reasons, and be cautious how he takes your word, but most of all when you are positive, or eloquent, or merry.

29. A page or two after, you very candidly represent your case to be that of an ass between two bottles of hay: it is your own expression. The cause of your perplexity is that you know not whether the velocity of AB increasing, or of AB decreasing is to be esteemed the fluxion, or proportional to the moment of the rectangle. My opinion, agreeably to what hath been premised, is that either may be deemed the fluxion. But you tell us (p. 49) "that you think, the venerable ghost of Sir Isaac Newton whispers you, the velocity you seek for is neither the one nor the other of these, but it is the velocity which the flowing rectangle hath not while it is greater or less than AB, but at that very instant of time that it is AB." For my part, in the rectangle AB considered simply in itself, without either increasing or

diminishing, I can conceive no velocity at all. And if the reader is of my mind, he will not take either your word, or even the word of a ghost, how venerable soever, for velocity without motion. You proceed and tell us that, in like manner, the moment of the rectangle is neither its increment or decrement. This you would have us believe on the authority of his ghost, in direct opposition to what Sir Isaac himself asserted when alive. *Incrementa* (saith he) *vel decrementa momentanea sub nomine momentorum intelligo: ita ut incrementa pro momentis additiitiis seu affirmativis, ac decrementa pro subductitiis seu negativis habeantur.*[1] I will not in your style bid the reader believe me, but believe his eyes.

30. To me it verily seems that you have undertaken the defence of what you do not understand. To mend the matter, you say, "you do not consider *AB* as lying at either extremity of the moment, but as extended to the middle of it; as having acquired the one half of the moment, and as being about to acquire the other; or, as having lost one half of it, and being about to lose the other." Now, in the name of truth, I entreat you to tell what this moment is, to the middle whereof the rectangle is extended? This moment, I say, which is acquired, which is lost, which is cut in two, or distinguished into halves? Is it a finite quantity, or an infinitesimal, or a mere limit, or nothing at all? Take it in what sense you will, I cannot make your defence either consistent or intelligible. For, if you take it in either of the two former senses, you contradict Sir Isaac Newton. And, if you take it in either of the latter, you contradict common sense; it being plain, that what hath no magnitude, or is no quantity, cannot be divided. And here I must entreat the reader to preserve his full freedom of mind entire, and not weakly suffer his judgment to be overborne by your imagination and your prejudices, by great names and authorities, by ghosts and visions, and above all by that extreme satisfaction and complacency with which you utter your strange conceits; if words without a meaning may be called so. After having given this unintelligible account, you ask with your accustomed air, "What say you, Sir? Is this a

[1] "Princip. Phil. Nat.," lib. ii., lem. ii.

just and legitimate reason for Sir Isaac's proceeding as he did? I think you must acknowledge it to be so." But, alas! I acknowledge no such thing. I find no sense or reason in what you say. Let the reader find it if he can.

31. In the next place (p. 50), you charge me with want of caution. "Inasmuch (say you) as that quantity which Sir Isaac Newton, through his whole lemma, and all the several cases of it, constantly calls a *moment*, without confining it to be either an increment or decrement, is by you inconsiderately and arbitrarily, and without any shadow of reason given, supposed and determined to be an increment." To which charge I reply, that it is as untrue as it is peremptory. For that, in the foregoing citation from the first case of Sir Isaac's lemma, he expressly determines it to be an increment. And, as this particular instance or passage was that which I objected to, it was reasonable and proper for me to consider the moment in the same light. But, take it increment or decrement as you will, the objections still lie, and the difficulties are equally insuperable. You then proceed to extol the great author of the fluxionary method, and to bestow some *brusqueries* upon those who unadvisedly dare to differ from him. To all which I shall give no answer.

32. Afterwards to remove (as you say) all scruple and difficulty about this affair, you observe that the moment of the rectangle determined by Sir Isaac Newton, and the increment of the rectangle determined by me are perfectly and exactly equal, supposing a and b to be diminished *ad infinitum*: and, for proof of this, you refer to the first lemma of the first section of the first book of Sir Isaac's Principles. I answer that if a and b are real quantities, then $a\ b$ is something, and consequently makes a real difference: but if they are nothing, then the rectangles whereof they are coefficients become nothing likewise: and consequently the *momentum* or *incrementum*, whether Sir Isaac's or mine, are in that case nothing at all. As for the abovementioned lemma, which you refer to, and which you wish I had consulted sooner, both for my own sake and for yours; I tell you I had long since consulted and considered it. But I very much doubt whether you have sufficiently

considered that lemma, its demonstration, and its consequences. For, however that way of reasoning may do in the method of *exhaustions*, where quantities less than assignable are regarded as nothing; yet, for a fluxionist writing about momentums to argue that quantities must be equal because they have no assignable difference seems the most injudicious step that could be taken: it is directly demolishing the very doctrine you would defend. For, it will thence follow that all homogeneous momentums are equal, and consequently the velocities, mutations, or fluxions, proportional thereto, are all likewise equal. There is, therefore, only one proportion of equality throughout, which at once overthrows the whole system you undertake to defend. Your moments (I say) not being themselves assignable quantities, their differences cannot be assignable: and, if this be true, by that way of reasoning it will follow, they are all equal; upon which supposition you cannot make one step in the method of fluxions. It appears from hence, how unjustly you blame me (p. 32) for omitting to give any account of that first section of the first book of the "Principia," wherein (you say) the foundation of the method of fluxions is geometrically demonstrated and largely explained, and difficulties and objections against it are clearly solved. All which is so far from being true that the very first and fundamental lemma of that section is incompatible with and subversive of the doctrine of fluxions. And, indeed, who sees not that a demonstration *ad absurdum more veterum*, proceeding on a supposition that every difference must be some given quantity, cannot be admitted in, or consist with, a method wherein quantities, less than any given, are supposed really to exist, and be capable of division?

33. The next point you undertake to defend is that method for obtaining a rule to find the fluxion of any power of a flowing quantity, which is delivered in his Introduction to the Quadratures, and considered in the "Analyst."[1] And here the question between us is, whether I have rightly represented the sense of those words, *evanescant jam augmenta illa*, in rendering them, "let the increments

[1] Sect. 13, 14, &c.

vanish," *i.e.* let the increments be nothing, or let there be no increments? This you deny; but, as your manner is, instead of giving a reason you declaim. I, on the contrary, affirm, the increments must be understood to be quite gone, and absolutely nothing at all. My reason is, because without that supposition you can never bring the quantity or expression $nx^{n-1} + \frac{nn-n}{2} ox^{n-2}$ + &c. down to nx^{n-1}, the very thing aimed at by supposing the evanescence. Say whether this be not the truth of the case? Whether the former expression is not to be reduced to the latter? And whether this can possibly be done so long as o is supposed a real quantity? I cannot indeed say you are scrupulous about your affirmations, and yet I believe that even you will not affirm this; it being most evident, that the product of two real quantities is something real; and that nothing real can be rejected either according to the ἀκρίβεια of geometry, or according to Sir Isaac's own Principles; for the truth of which I appeal to all who know anything of these matters. Further, by *evanescent* must either be meant, let them (the increments) vanish and become nothing, in the obvious sense, or else let them become infinitely small. But that this latter is not Sir Isaac's sense is evident from his own words in the very same page, that is, in the last of his Introduction to the Quadratures, where he expressly saith, *volui ostendere quod in methodo fluxionum non opus sit figuras infinite parvas in geometriam introducere.* Upon the whole, you seem to have considered this affair so very superficially as greatly to confirm me in the opinion you are so angry with, to wit, that Sir Isaac's followers are much more eager in applying his method than accurate in examining his principles. You raise a dust about evanescent augments, which may perhaps amuse and amaze your reader, but I am much mistaken if it ever instructs or enlightens him. For, to come to the point, those evanescent augments either are real quantities, or they are not. If you say they are; I desire to know how you get rid of the rejectaneous quantity? If you say they are not; you indeed get rid of those quantities in the composition whereof they are coefficients; but then you are of the same opinion with me, which opinion you are pleased to call (p. 58) "a most palpable, inexcusable, and

unpardonable blunder," although it be a truth most palpably evident.

34. Nothing, I say, can be plainer to any impartial reader than that by the evanescence of augments in the above-cited passage, Sir Isaac means their being actually reduced to nothing. But, to put it out of all doubt that this is the truth, and to convince even you, who shew so little disposition to be convinced, I desire you to look into his "Analysis per Æquationes Infinitas" (p. 20), where, in his preparation for demonstrating the first rule for the squaring of simple curves, you will find that, on a parallel occasion, speaking of an augment which is supposed to vanish, he interprets the word *evanescere* by *esse nihil.* Nothing can be plainer than this, which at once destroys your defence. And yet, plain as it is, I despair of making you acknowledge it; though I am sure you feel it, and the reader if he useth his eyes must see it. The words *evanescere sive esse nihil* do (to use your own expression) stare us in the face. Lo! This is what you call (p. 56) "so great, so unaccountable, so horrid, so truly Bœotian a blunder," that, according to you, it was not possible Sir Isaac Newton could be guilty of it. For the future, I advise you to be more sparing of hard words; since, as you incautiously deal them about, they may chance to light on your friends as well as your adversaries. As for my part, I shall not retaliate. It is sufficient to say you are mistaken. But I can easily pardon your mistakes. Though, indeed, you tell me, on this very occasion, that I must expect no quarter from Sir Isaac's followers. And I tell you that I neither expect nor desire any. My aim is truth. My reasons I have given. Confute them, if you can. But think not to overbear me either with authorities or harsh words. The latter will recoil upon yourselves. The former, in a matter of science, are of no weight with indifferent readers; and, as for bigots, I am not concerned about what they say or think.

35. In the next place you proceed to declaim upon the following passage, taken from the seventeenth section of the "Analyst." "Considering the various arts and devices used by the great author of the fluxionary method; in how many lights he placeth his fluxions; and in what different ways he attempts to demonstrate the same point: one would be inclined to think he was himself suspicious of the justness of

his own demonstrations." This passage you complain of as very hard usage of Sir Isaac Newton. You declaim copiously, and endeavour to show that placing the same point in various lights is of great use to explain it; which you illustrate with much rhetoric. But the fault of that passage is not the hard usage it contains: but, on the contrary, that it is too modest, and not so full and expressive of my sense as perhaps it should have been. Would you like it better if I should say —"The various *inconsistent* accounts which this great author gives of his momentums and his fluxions may convince every intelligent reader that he had no clear and steady notions of them, without which there can be no demonstration?" I own frankly that I see no clearness or consistence in them. You tell me, indeed, in Miltonic verse, that the fault is in my own eyes,

> "So thick a drop serene has quench'd their orbs,
> Or dim suffusion veil'd."

At the same time you acknowledge yourself obliged for those various lights which have enabled you to understand his doctrine. But as for me, who do not understand it, you insult me, saying: "For God's sake, what is it you are offended at, who do not still understand him?" May not I answer, that I am offended for this very reason—because I cannot understand him or make sense of what he says? You say to me that I am all in the dark. I acknowledge it, and entreat you who see so clearly to help me out.

36. You, Sir, with the bright eyes, be pleased to tell me, whether Sir Isaac's momentum be a finite quantity, or an infinitesimal, or a mere limit? If you say a finite quantity: be pleased to reconcile this with what he saith in the scholium of the second lemma of the first section of the first book of his Principles: *Cave intelligas quantitates magnitudine determinatas, sed cogita semper diminuendas sine limite.* If you say, an infinitesimal: reconcile this with what is said in his Introduction to the Quadratures: "*Volui ostendere quod in methodo fluxionum non opus sit figuras infinite parvas in geometriam introducere.* If you should say, it is a mere limit; be pleased to reconcile this with what we find in the first case of the second lemma in the second book of his Principles: *Ubi de lateribus A et B deerant momentorum dimidia,*

&c., where the moments are supposed to be divided. I should be very glad a person of such a luminous intellect would be so good as to explain whether by fluxions we are to understand the nascent or evanescent quantities themselves, or their motions, or their velocities, or simply their proportions: and, having interpreted them in what sense you will, that you would then condescend to explain the doctrine of second, third, and fourth fluxions, and shew it to be consistent with common sense if you can. You seem to be very sanguine when you express yourself in the following terms: "I do assure you, Sir, from my own experience, and that of many others whom I could name, that the doctrine may be clearly conceived and distinctly comprehended" (p. 31). And it may be uncivil not to believe what you so solemnly affirm, from your own experience. But I must needs own I should be better satisfied of this, if, instead of entertaining us with your rhetoric, you would vouchsafe to reconcile those difficulties, and explain those obscure points above mentioned. If either you, or any one of those many whom you could name will but explain to others what you so clearly conceive yourselves, I give you my word that several will be obliged to you who, I may venture to say, understand those matters no more than myself. But, if I am not much mistaken, you and your friends will modestly decline this task.

37. I have long ago done what you so often exhort me to do—diligently read and considered the several accounts of this doctrine given by the great author in different parts of his writings; and upon the whole I could never make it out to be consistent and intelligible. I was even led to say that "one would be inclined to think he was himself suspicious of the justness of his own demonstrations; and that he was not enough pleased with any one notion steadily to adhere to it." After which I added, "Thus much is plain, that he owned himself satisfied concerning certain points, which nevertheless he could not undertake to demonstrate to others." (See the seventeenth section of the "Analyst.") It is one thing when a doctrine is placed in various lights; and another when the principles and notions are shifted. When new devices are introduced and substituted for others, a doctrine instead of being illustrated may be explained away. Whether there be

not something of this in the present case, I appeal to the writings of the great author—his "Methodus Rationum Primarum et Ultimarum," his second lemma in the second book of his "Principles," his Introduction and Treatise of the Quadrature of Curves. In all which, it appears to me, there is not one uniform doctrine explained and carried throughout the whole, but rather sundry inconsistent accounts of this new Method, which still grows more dark and confused the more it is handled: I could not help thinking, the greatest genius might lie under the influence of false principles; and where the object and notions were exceedingly obscure, he might possibly distrust even his own demonstrations. "At least thus much seemed plain, that Sir Isaac had sometimes owned himself satisfied, where he could not demonstrate to others. In proof whereof I mentioned his letter to Mr. Collins; hereupon you tell me: there is a great deal of difference between saying, I cannot undertake to prove a thing, and I will not undertake it." But, in answer to this. I desire you will be pleased to consider that I was not making a precise extract out of that letter, in which the very words of Sir Isaac should alone be inserted. But I made my own remark and inference from what I remembered to have read in that letter; where, speaking of a certain mathematical matter, Sir Isaac expresseth himself in the following terms: "It is plain to me by the fountain I draw it from, though I will not undertake to prove it to others." Now, whether my inference may not be fairly drawn from those words of Sir Isaac Newton, and whether the difference as to the sense be so great between *will* and *can* in that particular case, I leave to be determined by the reader.

38. In the next paragraph you talk big but prove nothing. You speak of driving out of intrenchments, of sallying, and attacking, and carrying by assault; of slight and untenable works, of a new-raised and undisciplined militia, and of veteran regular troops. Need the reader be a mathematician to see the vanity of this paragraph? After this you employ (p. 65) your usual colouring, and represent the great author of the Method of Fluxions "as a good old gentleman fast asleep, and snoring in his easy chair; while dame Fortune is bringing him her apron full of beautiful theorems and pro-

blems, which he never knows or thinks of." This you would have pass for a consequence of my notions. But I appeal to all those who are ever so little knowing in such matters, whether there are not divers fountains of experiment, induction, and analogy, whence a man may derive and satisfy himself concerning the truth of many points in mathematics and mechanical philosophy, although the proofs thereof afforded by the modern analysis should not amount to demonstration? I further appeal to the conscience of all the most profound mathematicians, whether they can, with perfect acquiescence of mind, free from all scruple, apply any proposition merely upon the strength of a demonstration involving second or third fluxions, without the aid of any such experiment, or analogy, or collateral proof whatsoever? Lastly, I appeal to the reader's own heart, whether he cannot clearly conceive a medium between being fast asleep and demonstrating? But, you will have it that I represent Sir Isaac's conclusions as coming out right, because one error is compensated by another contrary and equal error, which perhaps he never knew himself nor thought of: that by a twofold mistake he arrives though not at science yet at truth: that he proceeds blindfold, &c. All which is untruly said by you, who have misapplied to Sir Isaac what was intended for the Marquis de l'Hospital and his followers; for no other end (as I can see) but that you may have an opportunity to draw that ingenious portraiture of Sir Isaac Newton and dame Fortune, as will be manifest to whoever reads the "Analyst."

39. You tell me (p. 70) if I think fit to persist in asserting "that this affair of a double error is entirely a new discovery of my own, which Sir Isaac and his followers never knew or thought of, that you have unquestionable evidence to convince me of the contrary, and that all his followers are clearly apprised that this very objection of mine was long since foreseen, and clearly and fully removed by Sir Isaac Newton, in the first section of the first book of his 'Principia.'" All which I do as strongly deny as you affirm. And I do aver that this is an unquestionable proof of the matchless contempt which you, *Philalethes*, have for truth. And I do here publicly call upon you to produce that evidence which you pretend to have, and to make good that fact which you

so confidently affirm. And, at the same time, I do assure the reader that you never will, nor can.

40. If you defend Sir Isaac's notions, as delivered in his "Principia," it must be on the rigorous foot of rejecting nothing, neither admitting nor casting away infinitely small quantities. If you defend the Marquis, whom you also style your Master, it must be on the foot of admitting that there are infinitesimals, that they may be rejected, that they are nevertheless real quantities, and themselves infinitely subdivisible. But you seem to have grown giddy with passion, and in the heat of controversy to have mistaken and forgot your part. I beseech you, Sir, to consider that the Marquis (whom alone, and not Sir Isaac, this double error in finding the subtangent doth concern) rejects indeed infinitesimals, but not on the foot that you do, to wit, their being inconsiderable in practical geometry or mixed mathematics. But he rejects them in the accuracy of speculative knowledge: in which respect there may be great logical errors, although there should be no sensible mistake in practice; which, it seems, is what you cannot comprehend. He rejects them likewise in virtue of a postulatum, which I venture to call rejecting them without ceremony. And, though he inferreth a conclusion accurately true, yet he doth it, contrary to the rules of logic, from inaccurate and false premises. And how this comes about, I have at large explained in the "Analyst," and shewed in that particular case of tangents, that the rejectaneous quantity might have been a finite quantity of any given magnitude, and yet the conclusion have come out exactly the same way; and, consequently, that the truth of this method doth not depend on the reason assigned by the Marquis, to wit, the postulatum for throwing away infinitesimals; and, therefore, that he and his followers acted blindfold, as not knowing the true reason for the conclusions coming out accurately right, which I shew to have been the effect of a double error.

41. This is the truth of the matter, which you shamefully misrepresent and declaim upon, to no sort of purpose but to amuse and mislead your reader. For which conduct of yours throughout your remarks, you will pardon me if I cannot otherwise account, than from a secret hope that the reader of your "Defence" would never read the "Analyst."

If he doth, he cannot but see what an admirable method you take to defend your cause: how, instead of justifying the reasoning, the logic, or the theory of the case specified, which is the real point, you discourse of sensible and practical errors: and how all this is a manifest imposition upon the reader. He must needs see that I have expressly said, "I have no controversy except only about your logic and method: that I consider how you demonstrate; what objects you are conversant about; and whether you conceive them clearly." That I have often expressed myself to the same effect, desiring the reader to remember, "that I am only concerned about the way of coming at your theorems, whether it be legitimate or illegitimate, clear or obscure, scientific or tentative: that I have, on this very occasion, to prevent all possibility of mistake, repeated and insisted that I consider the geometrical analyst as a logician, *i.e.* so far forth as he reasons and argues; and his mathematical conclusions, not in themselves but in their premises; not as true or false, useful or insignificant, but as derived from such principles, and by such inferences."[1] You affirm (and indeed what can you not affirm?) that the difference between the true subtangent and that found without any compensation is absolutely nothing at all. I profess myself of a contrary opinion. My reason is, because nothing cannot be divided into parts. But this difference is capable of being divided into any, or into more than any given number of parts; for the truth of which consult the Marquis de l'Hospital. And, be the error in fact or in practice ever so small, it will not thence follow that the error in reasoning, which is what I am alone concerned about, is one whit the less, it being evident that a man may reason most absurdly about the minutest things.

42. Pray answer me fairly, once for all, whether it be your opinion that whatsoever is little and inconsiderable enough to be rejected without inconvenience in practice, the same may in like manner be safely rejected and overlooked in theory and demonstration. If you say *No*, it will then follow that all you have been saying here and elsewhere, about yards, and inches, and decimal fractions,

[1] "Analyst," sect. 20.

setting forth and insisting on the extreme smallness of the rejectaneous quantity, is quite foreign to the argument, and only a piece of skill to impose upon your reader. If you say *Yes*, it follows that you then give up at once all the orders of fluxions and infinitesimal differences; and so most imprudently turn all your sallies and attacks and veterans to your own overthrow. If the reader is of my mind, he will despair of ever seeing you get clear of this dilemma. The points in controversy have been so often and so distinctly noted in the "Analyst" that I very much wonder how you could mistake, if you had no mind to mistake. It is very plain, if you are in earnest, that you neither understand me nor your masters. And what shall we think of other ordinary analysts, when it shall be found that even you, who like a champion step forth to defend their principles, have not considered them?

43. The impartial reader is entreated to remark throughout your whole performance how confident you are in asserting, and withal how modest in proving or explaining: how frequent it is with you to employ figures and tropes instead of reasons: how many difficulties proposed in the "Analyst" are discreetly overlooked by you, and what strange work you make with the rest: how grossly you mistake and misrepresent, and how little you practise the advice which you so liberally bestow. Believe me, Sir, I had long and maturely considered the principles of the modern analysis, before I ventured to publish my thoughts thereupon in the "Analyst." And, since the publication thereof, I have myself freely conversed with mathematicians of all ranks, and some of the ablest professors, as well as made it my business to be informed of the opinions of others, being very desirous to hear what could be said towards clearing my difficulties or answering my objections. But, though you are not afraid or ashamed to represent the analysts as very clear and uniform in their conception of these matters, yet I do solemnly affirm (and several of themselves know it to be true) that I found no harmony or agreement among them, but the reverse thereof—the greatest dissonance, and even contrariety of opinions, employed to explain what after all seemed inexplicable.

44. Some fly to proportions between nothings. Some

reject quantities because infinitesimal. Others allow only finite quantities, and reject them because inconsiderable. Others place the method of fluxions on a foot with that of *exhaustions*, and admit nothing new therein. Some maintain the clear conception of fluxions. Others hold they can demonstrate about things incomprehensible. Some would prove the algorism of fluxions by *reductio ad absurdum*; others *a priori*. Some hold the evanescent increments to be real quantities, some to be nothings, some to be limits. As many men, so many minds: each differing one from another, and all from Sir Isaac Newton. Some plead inaccurate expressions in the great author, whereby they would draw him to speak their sense; not considering that if he meant as they do, he could not want words to express his meaning. Others are magisterial and positive, say they are satisfied, and that is all; not considering that we, who deny Sir Isaac Newton's authority, shall not submit to that of his disciples. Some insist that the conclusions are true, and therefore the principles; not considering what hath been largely said in the "Analyst"[1] on that head. Lastly, several (and those none of the meanest) frankly owned the objections to be unanswerable. All which I mention by way of antidote to your false colours: and that the unprejudiced inquirer after truth may see it is not without foundation that I call on the celebrated mathematicians of the present age to clear up these obscure analytics, and concur in giving to the public some consistent and intelligible account of their great Master: which if they do not, I believe the world will take it for granted that they cannot.

45. Having gone through your defence of the British mathematicians, I find, in the next place, that you attack me on a point of metaphysics, with what success the reader will determine. I had upon another occasion many years ago wrote against *abstract* general ideas.[2] In opposition to which, you declare yourself to adhere to the vulgar opinion —that neither geometry nor any other general science can subsist without general ideas (p. 74). This implies that I

[1] Sect. 19, 20, &c.

[2] Introduction to the "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge."

hold there are no general ideas. But I hold the direct contrary—that there are indeed general ideas, but not formed by abstraction in the manner set forth by Mr. Locke. To me it is plain there is no consistent idea the likeness whereof may not really exist: whatsoever therefore is said to be somewhat which cannot exist, the idea thereof must be inconsistent. Mr. Locke acknowledgeth it doth require pains and skill to form his general idea of a triangle. He farther expressly saith it must be neither oblique nor rectangular, neither equilateral, equicrural nor scalenum; but all and none of these at once. He also saith it is an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.[1] All this looks very like a contradiction. But, to put the matter past dispute, it must be noted that he affirms it to be somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; consequently, the idea thereof is impossible or inconsistent.

46. I desire to know whether it is not impossible for anything to exist which doth not include a contradiction: and, if it is, whether we may not infer that what may not possibly exist, the same doth include a contradiction: I further desire to know, whether the reader can frame a distinct idea of anything that includes a contradiction? For my part, I cannot, nor consequently of the above-mentioned triangle; though you (who it seems know better than myself what I can do) are pleased to assure me of the contrary. Again, I ask whether that which it is above the power of man to form a complete idea of may not be called incomprehensible? And whether the reader can frame a complete idea of this imperfect impossible triangle? And, if not, whether it doth not follow that it is incomprehensible? It should seem that a distinct aggregate of a few consistent parts was nothing so difficult to conceive or impossible to exist; and that, therefore, your comment must be wide of the author's meaning. You give me to understand (p. 82) that this account of a general triangle was a trap which Mr. Locke set to catch fools. Who is caught therein let the reader judge.

47. It is Mr. Locke's opinion that every general name stands for a general abstract idea, which prescinds from the species or individuals comprehended under it. Thus, for

[1] "Essay on Human Understanding," bk. iv., ch. vii., § 9.

example, according to him, the general name *colour* stands for an idea which is neither blue, red, green, nor any other particular colour, but somewhat distinct and abstracted from them all. To me it seems the word *colour* is only a more general name applicable to all and each of the particular colours: while the other specific names, as blue, red, green, and the like, are each restrained to a more limited signification. The same may be said of the word *triangle.* Let the reader judge whether this be not the case; and whether he can distinctly frame such an idea of colour as shall prescind from all the species thereof, or of a triangle which shall answer Mr. Locke's account, prescinding and abstracting from all the particular sorts of triangles, in the manner aforesaid.

48. I entreat my reader to think. For, if he doth not, he may be under some influence from your confident and positive way of talking. But any one who thinks may, if I mistake not, plainly perceive that you are deluded, as it often happens, by mistaking the terms for ideas. Nothing is easier than to define in terms or words that which is incomprehensible in idea; forasmuch as any words can be either separated or joined as you please, but ideas always cannot. It is as easy to say a round square as an oblong square, though the former be inconceivable. If the reader will but take a little care to distinguish between the definition and the idea, between words or expressions and the conceptions of the mind, he will judge of the truth of what I now advance, and clearly perceive how far you are mistaken in attempting to illustrate Mr. Locke's doctrine, and where your mistake lies. Or, if the reader is minded to make a short work, he needs only at once to try whether, laying aside the words, he can frame in his mind the idea of an impossible triangle; upon which trial the issue of this dispute may be fairly put. This doctrine of abstract general ideas seemed to me a capital error, productive of numberless difficulties and disputes, that runs not only throughout Mr. Locke's book, but through most parts of learning. Consequently, my animadversions thereupon were not an effect of being inclined to carp or cavil at a single passage, as you would wrongfully insinuate, but proceeded from a love of truth, and a desire to banish, so far as in me lay, false prin-

ciples and wrong ways of thinking, without respect of persons. And, indeed, though you and other party-men are violently attached to your respective masters, yet I, who profess myself only attached to truth, see no reason why I may not as freely animadvert on Mr. Locke or Sir Isaac Newton, as they would on Aristotle or Descartes. Certainly the more extensive the influence of any error, and the greater the authority which supports it, the more it deserves to be considered and detected by sincere inquirers after knowledge.

49. In the close of your performance, you let me understand that your zeal for truth and the reputation of your masters have occasioned your reprehending me with the utmost freedom. And it must be owned you have shewn a singular talent therein. But I am comforted under the severity of your reprehensions, when I consider the weakness of your arguments, which, were they as strong as your reproofs, could leave no doubt in the mind of the reader concerning the matters in dispute between us. As it is, I leave him to reflect and examine by your light, how clearly he is enabled to conceive a fluxion, or the fluxion of a fluxion, a part infinitely small subdivided into an infinity of parts, a nascent or evanescent increment, that which is neither something nor nothing, a triangle formed in a point, velocity without motion, and the rest of those *arcana* of the modern analysis. To conclude, I had some thoughts of advising you how to conduct yourself for the future, in return for the advice you have so freely imparted to me: but, as you think it becomes me rather to inform myself than instruct others, I shall, for my farther information, take leave to propose a few Queries to those learned gentlemen of Cambridge, whom you associate with yourself and represent as being equally surprised at the tendency of my "Analyst."

50. I desire to know whether those who can neither demonstrate nor conceive the principles of the modern analysis, and yet give in to it, may not be justly said to have Faith, and be styled believers of Mysteries? Whether it is impossible to find among the physicians, mechanical philosophers, mathematicians, and philomathematicians, of the present age, some such believers, who yet deride Christians

for their belief of mysteries? Whether with such men it is not a fair, reasonable, and legitimate method to use the *argumentum ad hominem?* And, being so, whether it ought to surprise either Christians or scholars? Whether in an age wherein so many pretenders to science attack the Christian religion, we may not be allowed to make reprisals, in order to shew that the irreligion of those men is not to be presumed an effect of deep and just thinking? Whether an attempt to detect false reasonings, and remedy defects in mathematics, ought to be ill received by mathematicians? Whether the introducing more easy methods, and more intelligible principles in any science should be discountenanced? Whether there may not be fair objections as well as cavils? And whether to inquire diligently into the meaning of terms and the proof of propositions, not excepting against anything without assigning a reason, nor affecting to mistake the signification of words, or stick at an expression where the sense was clear, but considering the subject in all lights, sincerely endeavouring to find out any sense or meaning whatsoever, candidly setting forth what seems obscure and what fallacious, and calling upon those who profess the knowledge of such matters to explain them; whether, I say, such a proceeding can be justly called cavilling? Whether there be an *ipse dixit* erected? And, if so, when, where, by whom, and upon what authority? Whether, even where authority was to take place, one might not hope the mathematics, at least, would be excepted? Whether the chief end, in making mathematics so considerable a part of academical education, be not to form in the minds of young students habits of just and exact reasoning? And whether the study of abstruse and subtle matters can conduce to this end, unless they are well understood, examined, and sifted to the bottom? Whether, therefore, the bringing geometrical demonstrations to the severest test of reason should be reckoned a discouragement to the studies of any learned society? Whether, to separate the clear parts of things from the obscure, to distinguish the real principles whereon truths rest, and whence they are derived, and to proportion the just measures of assent according to the various degrees of evidence, be a useless or unworthy undertaking? Whether the making more of an argument than it will bear, and

placing it in an undue rank of evidence, be not the likely way to disparage it? Whether it may not be of some use, to provoke and stir up the learned professors to explain a part of mathematical learning which is acknowledged to be most profound, difficult, and obscure, and at the same time set forth by *Philalethes* and many others as the greatest instance that has ever been given of the extent of human abilities? Whether, for the sake of a great man's discoveries, we must adopt his errors? Lastly, whether in an age wherein all other principles are canvassed with the utmost freedom, the principles of Fluxions are to be alone excepted?

AN

APPENDIX

Concerning

Mr. *WALTON*'s

VINDICATION

Of Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S *Principles of* FLUXIONS.[1]

1.

I HAD no sooner considered the performance of "Philalethes," but Mr. Walton's "Vindication of Fluxions" was put into my hands. As this Dublin professor gleans after the "Cantabrigian," only endeavouring to translate a few passages from Sir Isaac Newton's "Principia," and enlarge on a hint or two of "Philalethes," he deserves no particular notice. It may suffice to advertise the reader that the foregoing "Defence" contains a full and explicit answer to Mr. Walton, as he will find, if he thinks it worth his pains to read what this gentleman hath written, and compare it therewith: particularly with sect. 18, 20, 30, 32-36, 43. It is not, I am sure, worth mine to repeat the same things, or confute the same notions twice over, in mere regard to a writer who hath copied even the manners of "Philalethes," and whom in answering the other I have, if I am not much mistaken sufficiently answered.

[1] Another attack on the "Analyst" was made in 1735 by J. Walton in his "Vindication of Sir Isaac Newton's Principles of Fluxions." This "Appendix" is a reply to that work.—ED.

2. Mr. Walton touches on the same points that the other had touched upon before him. He pursues a hint which the other had given [1] about Sir Isaac's first section concerning the *rationes primæ et ultimæ*. He discreetly avoids, like the other, to say one syllable of second, third, or fourth fluxions, and of divers other points mentioned in the "Analyst," about all which I observe in him a most prudent and profound silence. And yet he very modestly gives his reader to understand that he is able to clear up all difficulties and objections that have ever been made (p. 5). Mr. Walton, in the beginning, like "Philalethes," from a particular case makes a general inference; supposing that Infidelity to be imputed to mathematicians in general which I suppose only in the person to whom the "Analyst" was addressed, and certain other persons of the same mind with him. Whether this extraordinary way of reasoning be the cause or effect of his passion, I now not: but before I had got to the end of his "Vindication," I ceased to be surprised at his logic and his temper in the beginning. The double error, which in the "Analyst" was plainly meant to belong to others, he with "Philalethes" (whose very oversight he adopts) supposeth to have been ascribed to Sir Isaac Newton (p. 36). And this writer also, as well as the "Cantabrigian," must needs take upon him to explain the motive of my writing against fluxions; which he gives out, with great assurance, to have been because Sir Isaac Newton had presumed to interpose in prophecies and revelations, and to decide in religious affairs (p. 4); which is so far from being true that, on the contrary, I have a high value for those learned remains of that great man, whose original and free genius is an eternal reproach to that tribe of followers, who are always imitating but never resemble him. This specimen of Mr. Walton's truth will be a warning to the reader to use his own eyes, and in obscure points never to trust the gentleman's candour, who dares to misrepresent the plainest.

3. I was thinking to have said no more concerning this author's performance, but, lest he should imagine himself too much neglected, I entreat the reader to have the patience

[1] "Philalethes," p. 32.

to peruse it; and if he finds any one point of the doctrine of fluxions cleared up, or any one objection in the "Analyst" answered, or so much as fairly stated, let him then make his compliments to the author. But, if he can no more make sense of what this gentleman has written than I can, he will need no answer to it. Nothing is easier than for a man to translate, or copy, or compose a plausible discourse of some pages in technical terms, whereby he shall make a show of saying somewhat, although neither the reader nor himself understand one tittle of it. Whether this be the case of Mr. Walton, and whether he understands either Sir Isaac Newton, or me, or himself (whatever I may think), I shall not take upon me to say. But one thing I know, that many an unmeaning speech passeth for significant by the mere assurance of the speaker, till he cometh to be catechized upon it; and then the truth sheweth itself. This Vindicator, indeed, by his dissembling nine parts in ten of the difficulties proposed in the "Analyst," sheweth no inclination to be catechized by me. But his scholars have a right to be informed. I therefore recommend it to them not to be imposed on by hard words and magisterial assertions, but carefully to pry into his sense, and sift his meaning, and particularly to insist on a distinct answer to the following Questions.

4. Let them ask him, whether he can conceive velocity without motion, or motion without extension, or extension without magnitude? If he answers that he can, let him teach them to do the same. If he cannot, let him be asked, how he reconciles the idea of a fluxion which he gives (p. 13) with common sense?—Again, let him be asked, Whether nothing be not the product of nothing multiplied by something; and, if so, when the difference between the gnomen and the sum of the rectangles[1] vanisheth, whether the rectangles themselves do not also vanish? *i.e.* when $a\,b$ is nothing, whether $A\,b + B\,a$ be not also nothing? *i.e.* whether the momentum of $A\,B$ be not nothing?—Let him then be asked, what his momentums are good for, when they are thus brought to nothing?—Again, I wish

[1] See "Vindication," p. 17.

he were asked to explain the difference between a magnitude infinitely small and a magnitude infinitely diminished. If he saith, there is no difference, then let him be farther asked, how he dares to explain the method of fluxions, by the *ratio* of magnitudes infinitely diminished (p. 9), when Sir Isaac Newton hath expressly excluded all consideration of quantities infinitely small?[1] If this able vindicator should say that quantities infinitely diminished are nothing at all, and consequently that, according to him, the first and last *ratios* are proportions between nothings, let him be desired to make sense of this, or explain what he means by "proportion between nothings." If he should say, the ultimate proportions are the *ratios* of mere limits, then let him be asked how the limits of lines can be proportioned or divided? After all, who knows but this gentleman, who hath already complained of me for an uncommon way of treating mathematics and mathematicians (p. 5), may (as well as the "Cantabrigian") cry out "Spain and the Inquisition!" when he finds himself thus closely pursued and beset with interrogatories? That we may not, therefore, seem too hard on an innocent man, who probably meant nothing, but was betrayed by following another into difficulties and straits that he was not aware of, I shall propose one single expedient, by which his disciples (whom it most concerns) may soon satisfy themselves whether this Vindicator really understands what he takes upon him to vindicate. It is, in short, that they would ask him to explain the second, third, or fourth fluxions upon his principles. Be this the touchstone of his "Vindication." If he can do it, I shall own myself much mistaken: if he cannot, it will be evident that he was much mistaken in himself, when he presumed to defend fluxions without so much as knowing what they are. So, having put the merits of the cause on this issue, I leave him to be tried by his scholars.

[1] See his Introduction to the "Quadratures."

REASONS

FOR NOT REPLYING TO

MR. WALTON'S FULL ANSWER,

1735.

[WALTON returned to the fray in his "Catechism of the Author of the Minute Philosopher fully considered" (1735). Berkeley answered him with the following tract. It is an interesting work, with an air of briskness that comes with relief after the querulous tone of the "Defence." Walton replied with an Appendix to his "Catechism," but elicited no response from Berkeley. The "Reasons" appeared in 1735, and closed the controversy so far as Berkeley himself is concerned. The shower of pamphlets continued for seven more years.]

REASONS

For not Replying to

Mr. *WALTON's*

FULL ANSWER

IN A

LETTER to *P. T. P.*

By the Author of the

MINUTE PHILOSOPHER

Ex Fumo Lucem

DUBLIN:

Printed by M. RHAMES, for R. GUNNE,
Bookſeller in *Capel-ſtreet*, MDCCXXXV.

REASONS

FOR NOT REPLYING TO MR. WALTON'S FULL ANSWER.

1.

THERE are some men that can neither give nor take an answer, but, writing merely for the sake of writing, multiply words to no purpose. There are also certain careless writers that, in defiance of common sense, publish such things as, though they are not ashamed to utter, yet, other men may well be ashamed to answer. Whether there be anything in Mr. Walton's method of vindicating Fluxions, that might justify my taking no farther notice of him, on the above-mentioned considerations, I leave you and every other reader to judge. But those, Sir, are not the reasons I shall assign for not replying to Mr. Walton's full answer. The true reason is, that he seems at bottom a facetious man, who, under the colour of an opponent, writes on my side of the question, and really believes no more than I do of Sir Isaac Newton's doctrine about fluxions, which he exposes, contradicts, and confutes, with great skill and humour, under the mask of a grave vindication.

2. At first I considered him in another light, as one who had good reason for keeping to the beaten track, who had been used to dictate, who had terms of art at will, but was indeed at small trouble about putting them together, and perfectly easy about his readers understanding them. It must be owned, in an age of so much ludicrous humour, it is not every one can at first sight discern a writer's real design. But, be a man's assertions ever so strong in favour of a doctrine, yet if his reasonings are directly levelled against it, whatever question there may be about the matter in dispute, there can be none about the intention of the writer.

Should a person, so knowing and discreet as Mr. Walton, thwart and contradict Sir Isaac Newton, under pretence of defending his fluxions, and should he at every turn say such uncouth things of these same fluxions, and place them in such odd lights as must set all men in their wits against them, could I hope for a better second in this cause? Or could there remain any doubt of his being a disguised Free-thinker in mathematics, who defended fluxions just as a certain Free-thinker in religion did the rights of the Christian church?[1]

3. Mr. Walton indeed after his free manner calls my "Analyst" a libel.[2] But this ingenious gentleman well knows a bad vindication is the bitterest libel. Had you a mind, Sir, to betray and ridicule any cause under the notion of vindicating it, would you not think it the right way to be very strong and dogmatical in the affirmative, and very weak and puzzled in the argumentative parts of your performance? To utter contradictions and paradoxes without remorse, and to be at no pains about reconciling or explaining them? And with great good-humour, to be at perpetual variance with yourself and the author you pretend to vindicate? How successfully Mr. Walton hath practised these arts, and how much to the honour of the great client he would seem to take under his protection, I shall particularly examine throughout every article of his full answer.

4. First, then, saith Mr. Walton, "I am to be asked, whether I can conceive velocity without motion, or motion without extension, or extension without magnitude?" To which he answereth in positive terms, that he can conceive velocity and motion in a point (p. 7). And to make out this he undertakes to demonstrate, "that if a thing be moved by an agent operating continually by the same force, the velocity will not be the same in any two different points of the described space; but that it must vary upon the least change of space." Now, admitting thus much to be demonstrated, yet I am still at a loss to conceive how Mr. Walton's conclusion will

[1] Berkeley is here referring to Tindal's "Rights of the Christian Church asserted, etc." (1706). See Berkeley's note to sect. 48 of "Passive Obedience," vol. i., p. 286.—ED.

[2] "Vindication," p. 1.

follow, to wit, "that I am greatly mistaken in imagining there can be no motion, no velocity, in a point of space" (p. 10). Pray, Sir, consider his reasoning. The same velocity cannot be in two points of space; therefore velocity can be in a point of space. Would it not be just as good reasoning to say, the same man cannot be in two nutshells; therefore a man can be in a nutshell? Again, velocity must vary upon the least change of space; therefore there may be velocity without space. Make sense of this if you can. What have these consequences to do with their premises? Who but Mr. Walton could have inferred them? Or how could even he have inferred them had it not been in jest?

5. Suppose the centre of a falling body to describe a line; divide the time of its fall into equal parts, for instance, into minutes. The spaces described in those equal parts of time will be unequal. That is, from whatsoever points of the described line you measure a minute's descent, you will still find it a different space. This is true. But how or why from this plain truth a man should infer, that motion can be conceived in a point, is to me as obscure as any the most obscure mysteries that occur in this profound author. Let the reader make the best of it. For my part, I can as easily conceive Mr. Walton should walk without stirring, as I can his idea of motion without space. After all, the question was not whether motion could be proved to exist in a point, but only whether it could be conceived in a point. For, as to the proof of things impossible, some men have a way of proving that may equally prove anything. But I much question whether any reader of common sense will undertake to conceive what this pleasant man at inference undertakes to prove.

6. If Mr. Walton really meant to defend the author of the fluxionary method, would he not have done it in a way consistent with this illustrious author's own principles? Let us now see what may be Sir Isaac's notion about this matter. He distinguisheth two sorts of motion, absolute and relative. The former he defineth to be a translation from absolute place to absolute place, the latter from one relative place to another.[1] Mr. Walton's is plainly neither of these sorts of

[1] See Schol. def. VIII., "Philos. Nat. Princip. Math."

motion. But some third kind, which what it is, I am at a loss to comprehend. But I can clearly comprehend that, if we admit motion without space, then Sir Isaac Newton's account of it must be wrong: for place by which he defines motion is, according to him, a part of space. And if so, then this notable defender hath cut out new work for himself to defend and explain. But about this, if I mistake not, he will be very easy. For, as I said before, he seems at bottom a back friend to that great man; which opinion you will see farther confirmed in the sequel.

7. I shall no more ask Mr. Walton to explain anything: for I can honestly say, the more he explains, the more I am puzzled. But I will ask his readers to explain, by what art a man may conceive motion without space. And, supposing this to be done, in the second place to explain, how it consists with Sir Isaac Newton's account of motion. Is it not evident that Mr. Walton hath deserted from his old master, and been at some pains to expose him, while he defends one part of his principles by overturning another? Let any reader tell me, what Mr. Walton means by motion, or, if he can guess, what this third kind is, which is neither absolute nor relative, which exists in a point, which may be conceived without space. This learned professor saith, "I have no clear conception of the principles of motion" (p. 24). And in another place (p. 7) he saith, "I might have conceived velocity in a point, if I had understood and considered the nature of motion." I believe I am not alone in not understanding his principles. For myself, I freely confess the case to be desperate. I neither understand them, nor have any hopes of ever being able to understand them.

8. Being now satisfied that Mr. Walton's aim is not to clear up or defend Sir Isaac's principles, but rather to contradict and expose them, you will not, I suppose, think it strange, if, instead of putting questions to this intrepid answerer, who is never at a loss, how often soever his readers may, I entreat you, or any other man of plain sense, to read the following passage, cited from the thirty-first section of the "Analyst," and then try to apply Mr. Walton's answer to it: whereby you will clearly perceive what a vein of raillery that gentleman is master of. "Velocity necessarily implies both time and space, and cannot be conceived without them.

And if the velocities of nascent or evanescent quantities, *i.e.* abstracted from time and space, may not be comprehended, how can we comprehend and demonstrate their proportions? Or consider their *rationes primæ et ultimæ*. For, to consider the proportion or ratio of things implieth that such things have magnitude: that such their magnitudes may be measured, and their relations to each other known. But, as there is no measure of velocity except time and space, the proportion of velocities being only compounded of the direct proportion of the spaces and the reciprocal proportion of the times; doth it not follow, that to talk of investigating, obtaining, and considering the proportions of velocities, exclusively of time and space, is to talk unintelligibly?" Apply now, as I said, Mr. Walton's full answer, and you will soon find how fully you are enlightened about the nature of fluxions.

9. In the following article of Mr. Walton's full answer, he saith divers curious things, which being derived from this same principle—that motion may be conceived in a point—are altogether as incomprehensible as the origin from whence they flow. It is obvious and natural to suppose *Ab* and *Ba*[1] to be rectangles produced from finite lines multiplied by increments. Mr. Walton indeed supposeth that when the increments vanish or become nothing the velocities remain, which being multiplied by finite lines produce those rectangles (p. 13). But, admitting the velocities to remain, yet how can any one conceive a rectangular surface to be produced from a line multiplied by velocity, otherwise than by supposing such line multiplied by a line or increment which shall be exponent of or proportional to such velocity? You may try to conceive it otherwise. I must own I cannot. Is not the increment of a rectangle itself a rectangle? must not then *Ab* and *Ba* be rectangles? and must not the coefficients or sides of rectangles be lines? Consequently are not *b* and *a* lines, or (which is the same thing) increments of lines? These increments may indeed be considered as proportional to and exponents of velocity. But exclusive of such exponents to talk of rectangles under lines and velocities is, I conceive, to talk unintelligibly. And yet this is

[1] See "Nat. Phil. Princip. Math.," l. II. lem. 2.

what Mr. Walton doth, when he maketh b and a in the rectangles Ab and Ba to denote mere velocities.

10. As to the question, whether nothing be not the product of nothing multiplied by something, Mr. Walton is pleased to answer in the affirmative. And nevertheless, when ab is nothing, that is, when a and b are nothing, he denies that $Ab + Ba$ is nothing. This is one of those many inconsistencies which I leave the reader to reconcile. But, saith Mr. Walton, the sides of the given rectangle still remain, which two sides according to him must form the increment of the flowing rectangle. But in this he directly contradicts Sir Isaac Newton, who asserts that $Ab + Ba$ and not $A + B$ is the increment of the rectangle $A.\ B.$ And, indeed, how is it possible a line should be the increment of a surface? *Laterum incrementis totis a et b generatur rectanguli incrementum* $Ab + Ba$, are the words of Sir Isaac,[1] which words seem utterly inconsistent with Mr. Walton's doctrine. But no wonder that gentleman should not agree with Sir Isaac, since he cannot agree even with himself; but contradicts what he saith elsewhere, as the reader may see, even before he gets to the end of that same section, wherein he hath told us, that "the gnomon and the sum of the two rectangles are turned into those two sides by a retroverted motion" (pp. 11 and 12). Which proposition, if you or any other person should try to make sense of, you may possibly be convinced that this profound author is as much at variance with common sense as he is with himself and Sir Isaac Newton.

11. Mr. Walton, in the ninth page of his "Vindication," in order to explain the nature of fluxions, saith that "to obtain the last ratio of synchronal increments, the magnitude of those increments must be infinitely diminished." Notwithstanding which, in the twenty-third page of his full answer, he chargeth me as greatly mistaken, in supposing that he explained the doctrine of fluxions by the ratio of magnitudes infinitely diminished. It is an easy matter for any author to write so as to betray his readers into mistakes about his meaning. But then it is not easy to conceive what right he hath to upbraid them with such their mistakes. If I have mistaken his sense, let any one judge if he did not

[1] See "Nat. Phil. Princip. Math.," l. II. lem. 2.

fairly lead me into the mistake. When a man puzzleth his reader, saith and unsaith, useth ambiguous terms and obscure terms, and putteth them together in so perverse a manner that it is odds you can make out no sense at all, or, if any, wrong sense; pray who is in fault but the writer himself? Let any one consider Mr. Walton's own words, and then say whether I am not justified in making this remark.

12. In the twentieth page of his full answer, Mr. Walton tells us that "fluxions are measured by the first or last proportions of isochronal increments generated or destroyed by motion." A little after he saith, these ratios subsist when the isochronal increments have no magnitude. Now, I would fain know whether the isochronal increments themselves subsist when they have no magnitude? Whether by isochronal increments we are not to understand increments generated in equal times? Whether there can be an increment where there is no increase, or increase where there is no magnitude? Whether if magnitudes are not generated in those equal times, what else is generated therein, or what else is it that Mr. Walton calls isochronal? I ask the reader these questions. I dare not ask Mr. Walton. For, as I hinted before, the subject grows still more obscure in proportion as this able writer attempts to illustrate it.

13. We are told (p. 22) "that the first or last ratio of the isochronal spaces hath a real existence, forasmuch as it is equal to the ratio of the two motions of two points; which motions, subsisting when the isochronal spaces are nothing, preserve the existence of the first or last ratio of these spaces, or keep it from being a ratio of nothings." In order to assist your understanding, it must not be omitted that the said two points are supposed to exist at the same time in one point, and to be moved different ways without stirring from that point. Mr. Walton hath the conscience to call this riddle a full and clear answer: to make sense of which you must suppose it one of his ironies. In the next and last article of his performance, you still find him proceed in the same vein of raillery upon fluxions.

14. It will be allowed that whoever seriously undertook to explain the second, third, and fourth fluxions of Sir Isaac Newton would have done it in a way agreeable to that great man's own doctrine. What Sir Isaac's precise notion is I

will not pretend to say. And yet I will venture to say, it is something that cannot be explained by the three dimensions of a cube. I frankly own, I do not understand Sir Isaac's doctrine so far as to frame a positive idea of his fluxions. I have, nevertheless, a negative conception thereof, so far as to see that Mr. Walton is in jest, or (if in earnest) that he understands it no more than I do.

15. Sir Isaac tells us that he considers indeterminate quantities as flowing, or in other words, as increasing or decreasing by a perpetual motion. Which quantities he denotes by the latter letters of the alphabet, and their fluxions or celerities of increasing by the same letters pointed over head, and the fluxions of fluxions or second fluxions, *i.e.*, the mutations more or less swift of the first celerities, by the same letters pointed with double points; and the mutations of those mutations of the first mutations or fluxions or celerities of increasing, which he calls fluxions of fluxions of fluxions, or third fluxions, by three points; the fourth fluxions by four points; the fifth by five; and so on.[1] Sir Isaac, you see, speaks of quantity in general. And in the "Analyst" the doctrine is exemplified and the case is put in lines. Now in lines, where there is only one dimension, how are we enabled to conceive second, third, or fourth fluxions, by conceiving the generation of three dimensions in a cube? Let any one but read what Sir Isaac Newton or what I have said, and then apply what Mr. Walton hath written about the three dimensions of a cube, and see whether the difficulties are solved, or the doctrine made one whit the clearer by this explication.

16. That you may the better judge of the merit of this part of Mr. Walton's performance, I shall beg leave to set down a passage or two from the "Analyst." "As it is impossible to conceive velocity without time or space, without either finite length or finite duration, it must seem above the power of man to comprehend even the first fluxions. And if the first are incomprehensible, what shall we say of the second and third fluxions, etc.? He who can conceive the beginning of a beginning, or the end of an end, somewhat before the first or after the last, may perhaps be sharp-sighted

[1] See his Treatise "De Quadratura Curvarum."

enough to conceive these things. But most men, I believe, will find it impossible to understand them in any sense whatsoever. One would think that men could not speak too exactly on so nice a subject. And yet we may often observe that the exponents of fluxions, or notes representing fluxions are confounded with the fluxions themselves. Is not this the case when, just after the fluxions of flowing quantities were said to be the celerities of their increasing, and the second fluxions to be the mutations of the first fluxions or celerities, we are told that $z.\ z.\ z.\ z.\ z.\ z.$ represents a series of quantities, whereof each subsequent quantity is the fluxion of the preceding; and each foregoing is a fluent quantity having the following one for its fluxion? Divers series of quantities and expressions, geometrical and algebraical, may be easily conceived, in lines, in surfaces, in species, to be continued without end or limit. But it will not be found so easy to conceive a series, either of mere velocities or of mere nascent increments, distinct therefrom and corresponding thereunto."[1] Compare what is here said with Mr. Walton's genesis of a cube, and you will then clearly see how far this answerer is from explaining the nature of second, third, and fourth fluxions: and how justly I might repay that gentleman in kind, and tell him in his own language, that "all his skill is vain and impertinent." ("Vind." p. 36.)

17. But it doth not become me to find fault with this learned professor, who at bottom militates on my side, and in this very section makes it his business directly to overthrow Sir Isaac Newton's doctrine. For he saith in plain terms that there can be no fourth fluxion of a cube (p. 25), that is, there can be no second fluxion of a line, and *à fortiori*, no third, fourth, fifth, etc. Insomuch that, with one single dash of his pen, Mr. Walton destroys, to the great relief of the learned world, an indefinite rank of fluxions of different orders that might have reached from pole to pole. I had distinctly pointed out the difficulties, in several parts both of my "Analyst" and "Defence" and I leave you to judge whether he explains, or even attempts to explain, one of

[1] "Analyst," sect. 44-46.

them. Instead thereof he tells us of the trine dimension of a cube generated by motion: whence he takes occasion, as hath been observed, to explode Sir Isaac's own doctrine, which is utterly inconsistent with Mr. Walton's. And can you now doubt the real design of this egregious vindicator?

18. Before ever Sir Isaac Newton thought of his fluxions, everybody knew there were three dimensions in a cube, and that a solid might be generated by the motion of a surface, a surface by the motion of a line, and a line by the motion of a point. And this in effect is all we know from Mr. Walton's explication. As for his dwelling so minutely on the genesis of the solid parts of a cube, a thing so foreign from the purpose, the only rational account I can give of it is that Mr. Walton, by puzzling the imagination of his vulgar readers, hoped the better to disguise his betraying the doctrine of his great client, which to a discerning eye he manifestly gives up; and instead thereof humorously substitutes what all the world knew before Sir Isaac was born, to wit, the three dimensions of a cube and the genesis thereof by motion.

19. Upon the whole, I appeal to you and every intelligent reader, whether this thing, which Mr. Walton is pleased ironically to call a "full answer," doth not carry throughout a sly insinuation that the profound science of fluxions cannot be maintained but by the help of most unintelligible paradoxes and inconsistencies? So far, indeed, as affirmations go, he sheweth himself an able support of Sir Isaac Newton. But then in his reasonings he drops that great man upon the most important points, to wit, his doctrine of motion and his doctrine of fluxions; not regarding how far the demonstration of his famous "Principia" is interested therein. To convince you still more and more of the truth hereof, do but reflect a little on Mr. Walton's conduct. Can you think it probable that so learned and clear-headed a writer would have laid down such a direct repugnancy to common sense, as his idea of motion in a point, for the groundwork of his explanation, had it been his real intention to explain? Or, can you suppose he would have been absolutely silent on so many points urged home both in the "Analyst" and "Defence," which it concerned a vindicator of Sir Isaac not to have overlooked? Can you imagine that if he meant seriously to defend the doctrine of fluxions, he

would have contented himself with barely asserting that "Sir Isaac Newton in the introduction to his Quadrature of Curves, in the second lemma of the second book, and in the scholium to the first section of the first book of his Principles of Philosophy, hath delivered his doctrine of fluxions in so clear and distinct a manner, without the least inconsistency in terms or arguments, that one would have thought it impossible for any person not to have understood him" (p. 30).

20. Is it possible, I say, that Mr. Walton could in earnest hope we should take his bare word, as so much more credible than Sir Isaac's, and not rather have endeavoured to answer the questions, and reconcile the difficulties set forth in my "Defence of Free-thinking"; for instance, in sect. 36? Wherein I entreat my antagonist to explain "whether Sir Isaac's momentum be a finite quantity, or an infinitesimal, or a mere limit," adding, "If you say a finite quantity, be pleased to reconcile this with what he saith in the scholium of the second lemma of the first section of the first book of his Principles— *Cave intelligas quantitates magnitudine determinatas, sed cogita semper diminuendas sine limite.* If you say, an infinitesimal: reconcile this with what is said in his introduction to the Quadratures— *Volui ostendere quod in methodo fluxionum non opus sit figuras infinite parvas in geometriam inducere.* If you should say, it is a mere limit, be pleased to reconcile this with what we find in the first case of the second lemma in the second book of his Principles— *Ubi de lateribus A et B deerant momentorum dimidia, &c.*," where the moments are supposed to be divided. I shall scarce think it worth my while to bestow a serious thought on any writer who shall pretend to maintain Sir Isaac's doctrine, and yet leave this passage without a reply. And the reader, I believe, will think with me that, in answer to difficulties distinctly proposed and insisted on, to offer nothing but a magisterial assertion is a mere grimace of one who made merry with fluxions, under the notion of defending them. And he will be farther confirmed in this way of thinking, when he observes that Mr. Walton hath not said one syllable in reply to those several sections of my "Defence," which I particularly referred to, as containing a full answer to his "Vindication." But it is no wonder if, with Sir Isaac's

doctrine, he should drop also his own arguments in favour thereof.

21. I have been at the pains once for all to write this short comment on Mr. Walton, as the only way I could think of for making him intelligible, which will also serve as a key to his future writing on this subject. And I was the rather inclined to take this trouble, because it seemeth to me there is no part of learning that wants to be cleared up more than this same doctrine of fluxions, which hath hitherto walked about in a mist to the stupefaction of the literati of the present age. To conclude, I accept this professor's recantation, nor am at all displeased at the ingenious method he takes to disguise it. Some zealous fluxionists may perhaps answer him.

THE QUERIST,

1735—1737.

(Revised Edition of 1750.)

[WHATEVER else Berkeley may have been he was a master of literary form. Differing vastly in their scope and aim, his works have in the outlines of their form and the details of their style that inevitable justness, that nice proportion of means and matter, which, by whatever name we call it, is a factor of greatness in every art. The "Querist" is perhaps the most satisfying example of Berkeley's instinct for the form most suited to his immediate needs. The last few pages of the "Analyst" show us what a formidable weapon of controversy Berkeley had found in ironical and pungent queries; here in the present work he exhibits fresh skill in the use of this weapon. Despite its uninviting appearance, the "Querist" will be found one of the most interesting of the works in these volumes; and a careful study of its contents will make it evident that for arousing general interest in somewhat dull matters Berkeley's terse and often humorous queries are singularly successful where pamphlets and treatises would fail.

The work appeared in three parts in the years 1735, 1736, and 1737; but in that form is very unlike the work here printed, and is, moreover, among the rarest of pamphlets. A complete set exists in the invaluable "Haliday Collection" in the library of the Royal Irish Academy, and thanks to the courtesy of the late Sir John Gilbert and Mr. Macsweeny it has been possible to give to readers of these volumes the first complete reprint of the three original parts. (See Appendix A.) Berkeley reissued the work, with many alterations, in 1750, and this being his final revision the work next printed of course follows that text. The three parts are compressed into one, and the queries numbered consecutively; most of the financial queries are excised, and the tract concludes with a reprint of "A Word to the Wise." Professor Fraser printed most of the omitted queries in an appendix to his edition; but, unfortunately, misnumbering and insufficiency of data make impossible the construction of the first edition from this appendix. The three parts of the original issue contained in all eight hundred and ninety-five queries; for the second edition three hundred and forty-five were omitted, and forty-five new ones added. The work was not further revised, if we except the alteration indicated on p. 148, but was reprinted in the "Miscellany" of 1752. An edition had previously been issued in Glasgow (1751); and, indeed, the work seems to have been rather popular.

After the lapse of nearly two centuries, many of the queries are still pertinent, and deserve attention from those in whom an acute sense of Ireland's political wrongs is not incompatible with an insight into the real possibilities of her welfare. Berkeley's attitude towards the harsh and unjust disabilities of various kinds which existed in his time is very significant and instructive. However, on some matters Berkeley confesses to views that are distinctly opposed to modern ideas; such, for instance, as the harsh treatment of pauperism, the use of child labour, and the enforcing of sumptuary laws. His advocacy of temporary slavery for beggars is not really so startling as might at first appear.

An asterisk prefixed to a query denotes that it was added to the second edition of 1750.]

THE

QUERIST,

CONTAINING

Several *QUERIES*,

Propoſed to the

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

PUBLIC.

By the Right Reverend Dr. GEORGE BERKLEY,
Lord Biſhop of *CLOYNE*.

I the Lord have brought down the high Tree, have exalted the low Tree, have dried up the green Tree, and have made the dry Tree to flouriſh. Ezek. xvii. 24.

To which is added, by the ſame AUTHOR,

A

Word to the Wife:

OR, AN

Exhortation to the ROMAN CATHOLIC Clergy of *IRELAND*.

LONDON:

Printed for W. INNYS, C. DAVIS, C. HITCH, W. BOWYER; and ſold by M. COOPER, in *Pater-noſter-Row*. 1750.

[Price One Shilling and Six-Pence.]

ADVERTISEMENT BY THE AUTHOR.[1]

THE "Querist" was first printed in the year one thousand seven hundred and thirty-five; since which time the face of things is somewhat changed. In this edition some alterations have been made. The three Parts are published in one; some few Queries are added, and many omitted—particularly of those relating to the sketch or plan of a national bank; which it may be time enough to take again in hand when the public shall seem disposed to make use of such an expedient. I had determined with myself never to prefix my name to the "Querist," but in the last edition was overruled by a friend, who was remarkable for pursuing the public interest with as much diligence as others do their own. I apprehend the same censure on this that I incurred upon another occasion,[2] for meddling out of my profession. Though to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, by promoting an honest industry, will, perhaps, be deemed no improper employment for a clergyman who still thinks himself a member of the commonwealth. As the sum of human happiness is supposed to consist in the goods of mind, body, and fortune, I would fain make my studies of some use to mankind, with regard to each of these three particulars, and hope it will not be thought faulty or indecent in any man, of of what profession soever, to offer his mite towards improving the manners, health, and prosperity of his fellow-creatures.

[1] This "Advertisement" was of course added to the edition of 1750. —ED.

[2] *I.e.* on the occasion of "Siris" and the other tracts recommending the use of tar-water for all kinds of ailments. —ED.

THE QUERIST.

Query 1.

WHETHER there ever was, is, or will be, an industrious nation poor, or an idle rich?

2. Whether a people can be called poor, where the common sort are well fed, clothed, and lodged?

3. Whether the drift and aim of every wise state should not be, to encourage industry in its members? And whether those who employ neither heads nor hands for the common benefit deserve not to be expelled like drones out of a well-governed state?

4. Whether the four elements, and man's labour therein, be not the true source of wealth?

5. Whether money be not only so far useful, as it stirreth up industry, enabling men mutually to participate the fruits of each other's labour?

6. Whether any other means, equally conducing to excite and circulate the industry of mankind, may not be as useful as money.

7. Whether the real end and aim of men be not power? And whether he who could have everything else at his wish or will would value money?

8. Whether the public aim in every well-governed state be not that each member, according to his just pretensions and industry, should have power?

9. Whether power, be not referred to action; and whether action doth not follow appetite or will?

10. Whether fashion doth not create appetites; and whether the prevailing will of a nation is not the fashion?

11. Whether the current of industry and commerce be not determined by this prevailing will?

12. Whether it be not owing to custom that the fashions are agreeable?

13. Whether it may not concern the wisdom of the legislature to interpose in the making of fashions; and not leave an affair of so great influence to the management of women and fops, tailors and vintners?

14. Whether reasonable fashions are a greater restraint on freedom than those which are unreasonable?

15. Whether a general good taste in a people would not greatly conduce to their thriving? And whether an uneducated gentry be not the greatest of national evils?

16. Whether customs and fashions do not supply the place of reason in the vulgar of all ranks? Whether, therefore, it doth not very much import that they should be wisely framed?

17. Whether the imitating those neighbours in our fashions, to whom we bear no likeness in our circumstances, be not one cause of distress to this nation?

18. Whether frugal fashions in the upper rank, and comfortable living in the lower, be not the means to multiply inhabitants?

19. Whether the bulk of our Irish natives are not kept from thriving, by that cynical content in dirt and beggary which they possess to a degree beyond any other people in Christendom?

20. Whether the creating of wants be not the likeliest way to produce industry in a people? And whether, if our peasants were accustomed to eat beef and wear shoes, they would not be more industrious?

21. Whether other things being given, as climate, soil, etc., the wealth be not proportioned to the industry, and this to the circulation of credit, be the credit circulated or transferred by what marks or tokens soever?

22. Whether, therefore, less money, swiftly circulating, be not, in effect, equivalent to more money slowly circulating? Or, whether, if the circulation be reciprocally as the quantity of coin, the nation can be a loser?

23. Whether money is to be considered as having an intrinsic value, or as being a commodity, a standard, a measure, or a pledge, as is variously suggested by writers? And whether the true idea of money, as such, be not altogether that of a ticket or counter?

24. Whether the value or price of things be not a com-

pounded proportion, directly as the demand, and reciprocally as the plenty?

25. Whether the terms crown, livre, pound sterling, etc., are not to be considered as exponents or denominations of such proportion? And whether gold, silver, and paper are not tickets or counters for reckoning, recording, and transferring thereof?

26. Whether the denominations being retained, although the bullion were gone, things might not nevertheless be rated, bought, and sold, industry promoted, and a circulation of commerce maintained?

27. Whether an equal raising of all sorts of gold, silver, and copper coin can have any effect in bringing money into the kingdom? And whether altering the proportions between the several sorts can have any other effect but multiplying one kind and lessening another, without any increase of the sum total?

28. Whether arbitrary changing the denomination of coin be not a public cheat?

29. What makes a wealthy people? Whether mines of gold and silver are capable of doing this? And whether the negroes, amidst the gold sands of Afric, are not poor and destitute?

30. Whether there be any virtue in gold or silver, other than as they set people at work, or create industry?

31. Whether it be not the opinion or will of the people, exciting them to industry, that truly enricheth a nation? And whether this doth not principally depend on the means for counting, transferring, and preserving power, that is, property of all kinds?

32. Whether if there was no silver or gold in the kingdom, our trade might not, nevertheless, supply bills of exchange, sufficient to answer the demands of absentees in England or elsewhere?

33. Whether current bank-notes may not be deemed money? And whether they are not actually the greater part of the money of this kingdom?

34. Provided the wheels move, whether it is not the same thing, as to the effect of the machine, be this done by the force of the wind, or water, or animals?

35. Whether power to command the industry of others be

not real wealth? And whether money be not in truth tickets or tokens for conveying and recording such power, and whether it be of great consequence what materials the tickets are made of?

36. Whether trade, either foreign or domestic, be in truth any more than this commerce of industry?

37. Whether to promote, transfer, and secure this commerce, and this property in human labour, or, in other words, this power, be not the sole means of enriching a people, and how far this may be done independently of gold and silver?

38. Whether it were not wrong to suppose land itself to be wealth? And whether the industry of the people is not first to be considered, as that which constitutes wealth, which makes even land and silver to be wealth, neither of which would have any value but as means and motives to industry?

39. Whether in the wastes of America a man might not possess twenty miles square of land, and yet want his dinner, or a coat to his back?

40. Whether a fertile land, and the industry of its inhabitants, would not prove inexhaustible funds of real wealth, be the counters for conveying and recording thereof what you will, paper, gold, or silver?

41. Whether a single hint be sufficient to overcome a prejudice? And whether even obvious truths will not sometimes bear repeating?

42. Whether, if human labour be the true source of wealth, it doth not follow that idleness should of all things be discouraged in a wise state?

43. Whether even gold, or silver, if they should lessen the industry of its inhabitants, would not be ruinous to a country? And whether Spain be not an instance of this?

44. Whether the opinion of men, and their industry consequent thereupon, be not the true wealth of Holland and not the silver supposed to be deposited in the bank at Amsterdam?

45. Whether there is in truth any such treasure lying dead? And whether it be of great consequence to the public that it should be real rather than notional?

46. Whether, in order to understand the true nature of

wealth and commerce, it would not be right to consider a ship's crew cast upon a desert island, and by degrees forming themselves to business and civil life, while industry begot credit, and credit moved to industry?

47. Whether such men would not all set themselves to work? Whether they would not subsist by the mutual participation of each other's industry? Whether, when one man had in his way procured more than he could consume, he would not exchange his superfluities to supply his wants? Whether this must not produce credit? Whether, to facilitate these conveyances, to record and circulate this credit, they would not soon agree on certain tallies, tokens, tickets, or counters?

48. Whether reflection in the better sort might not soon remedy our evils? And whether our real defect be not a wrong way of thinking?

49. Whether it would not be an unhappy turn in our gentlemen, if they should take no more thought to create an interest to themselves in this or that county, or borough, than to promote the real interest of their country?

50. Whether if a man builds a house he doth not in the first place provide a plan which governs his work? And shall the public act without an end, a view, a plan?

51. Whether by how much the less particular folk think for themselves, the public be not so much the more obliged to think for them?

52. Whether small gains be not the way to great profit? And if our tradesmen are beggars, whether they may not thank themselves for it?

53. Whether some way might not be found for making criminals useful in public works, instead of sending them either to America, or to the other world?

54. Whether we may not, as well as other nations, contrive employment for them? And whether servitude, chains, and hard labour, for a term of years, would not be a more discouraging, as well as a more adequate punishment for felons than even death itself?

55. Whether there are not such things in Holland as bettering houses for bringing young gentlemen to order? And whether such an institution would be useless among us?

56. Whether it be true that the poor in Holland have no resource but their own labour, and yet there are no beggars in their streets?

57. Whether he whose luxury consumeth foreign products, and whose industry produceth nothing domestic to exchange for them, is not so far forth injurious to his country?

58. Whether necessity is not to be hearkened to before convenience, and convenience before luxury?

59. Whether to provide plentifully for the poor be not feeding the root, the substance whereof will shoot upwards into the branches, and cause the top to flourish?

60. Whether there be any instance of a state wherein the people, living neatly and plentifully, did not aspire to wealth?

61. Whether nastiness and beggary do not, on the contrary, extinguish all such ambition, making men listless, hopeless, and slothful?

62. Whether a country inhabited by a people well fed, clothed, and lodged would not become every day more populous? And whether a numerous stock of people in such circumstances would not constitute a flourishing nation? and how far the product of our own country may suffice for the compassing this end?

63. Whether a people who had provided themselves with the necessaries of life in good plenty would not soon extend their industry to new arts and new branches of commerce?

64. Whether those same manufactures which England imports from other countries may not be admitted from Ireland? And, if so, whether lace, carpets, and tapestry, three considerable articles of English importation, might not find encouragement in Ireland? And whether an academy for design might not greatly conduce to the perfecting those manufactures among us?

65. Whether France and Flanders could have drawn so much money from England for figured silks, lace, and tapestry, if they had not had academies for designing?

66. Whether, when a room was once prepared, and models in plaster of Paris, the annual expense of such an academy need stand the public in above two hundred pounds a year?

67. Whether our linen-manufacture would not find the benefit of this institution? And whether there be anything that makes us fall short of the Dutch in damasks, diapers, and printed linen, but our ignorance in design?

68. Whether those who may slight this affair as notional have sufficiently considered the extensive use of the art of design, and its influence in most trades and manufactures, wherein the forms of things are often more regarded than the materials?[1]

69. Whether there be any art sooner learned than that of making carpets? And whether our women, with little time and pains, may not make more beautiful carpets than those imported from Turkey? And whether this branch of the woollen manufacture be not open to us?

70. Whether human industry can produce, from such cheap materials, a manufacture of so great value, by any other art, as by those of sculpture and painting?

71. Whether pictures and statues are not in fact so much treasure? And whether Rome and Florence would not be poor towns without them?

72. Whether they do not bring ready money as well as jewels? Whether in Italy debts are not paid, and children portioned with them, as with gold and silver?

73. Whether it would not be more prudent, to strike out and exert ourselves in permitted branches of trade, than to fold our hands, and repine that we are not allowed the woollen?

74. Whether it be true that two millions are yearly expended by England in foreign lace and linen?

75. Whether immense sums are not drawn yearly into the Northern countries, for supplying the British navy with manufactures?

76. Whether there be anything more profitable than hemp? And whether there should not be greater premiums for encouraging our hempen trade? What advantages may not Great Britain make of a country where land and labour are so cheap?

77. Whether Ireland alone might not raise hemp sufficient for the British navy? And whether it would not be vain to

[1] Since the first publication of this Query, the Art of Design seems to be more considered and countenanced among us.

expect this from the British Colonies in America, where hands are so scarce, and labour so excessively dear?

78. Whether, if our own people want will or capacity for such an attempt, it might not be worth while for some undertaking spirits in England to make settlements, and raise hemp in the counties of Clare and Limerick, than which, perhaps, there is not fitter land in the world for that purpose? And whether both nations would not find their advantage therein?

79. Whether if all the idle hands in this kingdom were employed on hemp and flax, we might not find sufficient vent for these manufactures?

80. How far it may be in our own power to better our affairs, without interfering with our neighbours?

81. Whether the prohibition of our woollen trade ought not naturally to put us on other methods which give no jealousy?

82. Whether paper be not a valuable article of commerce? And whether it be not true that one single bookseller in London yearly expended above four thousand pounds in that foreign commodity?

83. How it comes to pass that the Venetians and Genoese, who wear so much less linen, and so much worse than we do, should yet make very good paper, and in great quantity, while we make very little?

84. How long it will be before my countrymen find out that it is worth while to spend a penny in order to get a groat?

85. If all the land were tilled that is fit for tillage, and all that sowed with hemp and flax that is fit for raising them, whether we should have much sheep-walk beyond what was sufficient to supply the necessities of the kingdom?

86. Whether other countries have not flourished without the woollen-trade?

87. Whether it be not a sure sign, or effect of a country's thriving, to see it well cultivated and full of inhabitants? And, if so, whether a great quantity of sheep-walk be not ruinous to a country, rendering it waste and thinly inhabited?

88. Whether the employing so much of our land under sheep be not in fact an Irish blunder?

89. Whether our hankering after our woollen-trade be not the true and only reason which hath created a jealousy in England towards Ireland? And whether anything can hurt us more than such jealousy?

90. Whether it be not the true interest of both nations to become one people? And whether either be sufficiently apprised of this?

91. Whether the upper part of this people are not truly English, by blood, language, religion, manners, inclination, and interest?

92. Whether we are not as much Englishmen as the children of old Romans, born in Britain, were still Romans?

93. Whether it be not our true interest, not to interfere with them; and, in every other case, whether it be not their true interest to befriend us?

94. Whether a mint in Ireland might not be of great convenience to the kingdom; and whether it could be attended with any possible inconvenience to Great Britain? And whether there were not mints in Naples and in Sicily, when those kingdoms were provinces to Spain, or the house of Austria?

95. Whether anything can be more ridiculous than for the north of Ireland to be jealous of a linen manufacturer in the south?

96. Whether the county of Tipperary be not much better land than the county of Armagh; and yet whether the latter is not much better improved and inhabited than the former?

97. Whether every landlord in the kingdom doth not know the cause of this? And yet how few are the better for such their knowledge?

98. Whether large farms under few hands, or small ones under many are likely to be made most of? And whether flax and tillage do not naturally multiply hands, and divide lands into small holdings, and well-improved?

99. Whether, as our exports are lessened, we ought not to lessen our imports? And whether these will not be lessened as our demands, and these as our wants, and these as our customs or fashions? Of how great consequence therefore are fashions to the public?

100. Whether it would not be more reasonable to mend

our state than complain of it; and how far this may be in our own power?

101. What the nation gains by those who live in Ireland upon the produce of foreign countries?

102. How far the vanity of our ladies in dressing, and of our gentlemen in drinking, contribute to the general misery of the people?

103. Whether nations, as wise and opulent as ours, have not made sumptuary laws; and what hinders us from doing the same?

104. Whether those who drink foreign liquors, and deck themselves and their families with foreign ornaments, are not so far forth to be reckoned absentees?

105. Whether, as our trade is limited, we ought not to limit our expenses; and whether this be not the natural and obvious remedy?

106. Whether the dirt, and famine, and nakedness of the bulk of our people might not be remedied, even although we had no foreign trade? And whether this should not be our first care; and whether, if this were once provided for, the conveniences of the rich would not soon follow?

107. Whether comfortable living doth not produce wants, and wants industry, and industry wealth?

108. Whether there is not a great difference between Holland and Ireland? And whether foreign commerce, without which the one could not subsist, be so necessary for the other?

109. Might we not put a hand to the plough, or the spade, although we had no foreign commerce?

110. Whether the exigencies of nature are not to be answered by industry on our own soil? And how far the conveniences and comforts of life may be procured, by a domestic commerce between the several parts of this kingdom?

111. Whether the women may not sew, spin, weave, embroider, sufficiently for the embellishment of their persons, and even enough to raise envy in each other, without being beholden to foreign countries?

112. Suppose the bulk of our inhabitants had shoes to their feet, clothes to their backs, and beef in their bellies, might not such a state be eligible for the public, even though the squires were condemned to drink ale and cider?

113. Whether, if drunkenness be a necessary evil, men may not as well get drunk with the growth of their own country?

114. Whether a nation within itself might not have real wealth, sufficient to give its inhabitants power and distinction, without the help of gold and silver?

115. Whether, if the arts of sculpture and painting were encouraged among us, we might not furnish our houses in a much nobler manner with our own manufactures?

116. Whether we have not, or may not have, all the necessary materials for building at home?

117. Whether tiles and plaster may not supply the place of Norway fir for flooring and wainscot?

118. Whether plaster be not warmer, as well as more secure, than deal? And whether a modern fashionable house, lined with fir, daubed over with oil and paint, be not like a fire-ship, ready to be lighted up by all accidents?

119. Whether larger houses, better built and furnished, a greater train of servants, the difference with regard to equipage and table between finer and coarser, more and less elegant, may not be sufficient to feed a reasonable share of vanity, or support all proper distinctions? And whether all these may not be procured by domestic industry out of the four elements, without ransacking the four quarters of the globe?

120. Whether anything is a nobler ornament, in the eye of the world, than an Italian palace, that is, stone and mortar skilfully put together, and adorned with sculpture and painting; and whether this may not be compassed without foreign trade?

121. Whether an expense in gardens and plantations would not be an elegant distinction for the rich, a domestic magnificence, employing many hands within, and drawing nothing from abroad?

122. Whether the apology which is made for foreign luxury in England, to wit, that they could not carry on their trade without imports as well as exports, will hold in Ireland?

123. Whether one may not be allowed to conceive and suppose a society, or nation of human creatures, clad in woollen cloths and stuffs, eating good bread, beef, and mutton, poultry, and fish, in great plenty, drinking ale, mead, and cider, inhabiting decent houses built of brick and marble,

taking their pleasure in fair parks and gardens, depending on no foreign imports either for food or raiment? And whether such people ought much to be pitied?

124. Whether Ireland be not as well qualified for such a state as any nation under the sun?

125. Whether in such a state the inhabitants may not contrive to pass the twenty-fours with tolerable ease and cheerfulness? And whether any people upon earth can do more?

126. Whether they may not eat, drink, play, dress, visit, sleep in good beds, sit by good fires, build, plant, raise a name, make estates, and spend them?

127. Whether, upon the whole, a domestic trade may not suffice in such a country as Ireland, to nourish and clothe its inhabitants, and provide them with the reasonable conveniences and even comforts of life?

128. Whether a general habit of living well would not produce numbers and industry; and whether, considering the tendency of human kind, the consequence thereof would not be foreign trade and riches, how unnecessary soever?

129. Whether, nevertheless, it be a crime to inquire how far we may do without foreign trade, and what would follow on such a supposition?

130. Whether the number and welfare of the subjects be not the true strength of the crown?

131. Whether in all public institutions there should not be an end proposed, which is to be the rule and limit of the means? Whether this end should not be the well-being of the whole? And whether, in order to this, the first step should not be to clothe and feed our people?

132. Whether there be upon earth any Christian or civilized people, so beggarly, wretched, and destitute as the common Irish?

133. Whether, nevertheless, there is any other people whose wants may be more easily supplied from home?

134. Whether, if there was a wall of brass a thousand cubits high round this kingdom, our natives might not nevertheless live cleanly and comfortably, till the land, and reap the fruits of it?

135. What should hinder us from exerting ourselves, using our hands and brains, doing something or other, man,

woman, and child, like the other inhabitants of God's earth?

136. Be the restraining our trade well or ill advised in our neighbours, with respect to their own interest, yet whether it be not plainly ours to accommodate ourselves to it?

137. Whether it be not vain to think of persuading other people to see their interest, while we continue blind to our own?

138. Whether there be any other nation possessed of so much good land, and so many able hands to work it, which yet is beholden for bread to foreign countries?

139. Whether it be true that we import corn to the value of two hundred thousand pounds in some years?[1]

140. Whether we are not undone by fashions made for other people? And whether it be not madness in a poor nation to imitate a rich one?

141. Whether a woman of fashion ought not to be declared a public enemy?

142. Whether it be not certain that from the single town of Cork were exported, in one year, no less than one hundred and seven thousand one hundred and sixty-one barrels of beef; seven thousand three hundred and seventy-nine barrels of pork; thirteen thousand four hundred and sixty-one casks, and eighty-five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven firkins of butter? And what hands were employed in this manufacture?

143. Whether a foreigner could imagine that one half of the people were starving, in a country which sent out such plenty of provisions?

144. Whether an Irish lady, set out with French silks and Flanders lace, may not be said to consume more beef and butter than a hundred of our labouring peasants?

145. Whether nine-tenths of our foreign trade be not carried on singly to support the article of vanity?

146. Whether it can be hoped that private persons will not indulge this folly, unless restrained by the public?

147. How vanity is maintained in other countries? Whether in Hungary, for instance, a proud nobility are not subsisted with small imports from abroad?

[1] Things are now better in respect of this particular, and some others, than they were when the "Querist" was first published.

taking their pleasure in fair parks and gardens, depending on no foreign imports either for food or raiment? And whether such people ought much to be pitied?

124. Whether Ireland be not as well qualified for such a state as any nation under the sun?

125. Whether in such a state the inhabitants may not contrive to pass the twenty-fours with tolerable ease and cheerfulness? And whether any people upon earth can do more?

126. Whether they may not eat, drink, play, dress, visit, sleep in good beds, sit by good fires, build, plant, raise a name, make estates, and spend them?

127. Whether, upon the whole, a domestic trade may not suffice in such a country as Ireland, to nourish and clothe its inhabitants, and provide them with the reasonable conveniences and even comforts of life?

128. Whether a general habit of living well would not produce numbers and industry; and whether, considering the tendency of human kind, the consequence thereof would not be foreign trade and riches, how unnecessary soever?

129. Whether, nevertheless, it be a crime to inquire how far we may do without foreign trade, and what would follow on such a supposition?

130. Whether the number and welfare of the subjects be not the true strength of the crown?

131. Whether in all public institutions there should not be an end proposed, which is to be the rule and limit of the means? Whether this end should not be the well-being of the whole? And whether, in order to this, the first step should not be to clothe and feed our people?

132. Whether there be upon earth any Christian or civilized people, so beggarly, wretched, and destitute as the common Irish?

133. Whether, nevertheless, there is any other people whose wants may be more easily supplied from home?

134. Whether, if there was a wall of brass a thousand cubits high round this kingdom, our natives might not nevertheless live cleanly and comfortably, till the land, and reap the fruits of it?

135. What should hinder us from exerting ourselves, using our hands and brains, doing something or other, man,

woman, and child, like the other inhabitants of God's earth?

136. Be the restraining our trade well or ill advised in our neighbours, with respect to their own interest, yet whether it be not plainly ours to accommodate ourselves to it?

137. Whether it be not vain to think of persuading other people to see their interest, while we continue blind to our own?

138. Whether there be any other nation possessed of so much good land, and so many able hands to work it, which yet is beholden for bread to foreign countries?

139. Whether it be true that we import corn to the value of two hundred thousand pounds in some years?[1]

140. Whether we are not undone by fashions made for other people? And whether it be not madness in a poor nation to imitate a rich one?

141. Whether a woman of fashion ought not to be declared a public enemy?

142. Whether it be not certain that from the single town of Cork were exported, in one year, no less than one hundred and seven thousand one hundred and sixty-one barrels of beef; seven thousand three hundred and seventy-nine barrels of pork; thirteen thousand four hundred and sixty-one casks, and eighty-five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven firkins of butter? And what hands were employed in this manufacture?

143. Whether a foreigner could imagine that one half of the people were starving, in a country which sent out such plenty of provisions?

144. Whether an Irish lady, set out with French silks and Flanders lace, may not be said to consume more beef and butter than a hundred of our labouring peasants?

145. Whether nine-tenths of our foreign trade be not carried on singly to support the article of vanity?

146. Whether it can be hoped that private persons will not indulge this folly, unless restrained by the public?

147. How vanity is maintained in other countries? Whether in Hungary, for instance, a proud nobility are not subsisted with small imports from abroad?

[1] Things are now better in respect of this particular, and some others, than they were when the "Querist" was first published.

148. Whether there be a prouder people upon earth than the noble Venetians, although they all wear plain black clothes?

149. Whether a people are to be pitied that will not sacrifice their little particular vanities to the public good? And yet, whether each part would not except their own foible from this public sacrifice, the squire his bottle, the lady her lace?

150. Whether claret be not often drunk rather for vanity than for health, or pleasure?

151. Whether it be true that men of nice palates have been imposed on, by elder wine for French claret, and by mead for palm sack?

152. Do not Englishmen abroad purchase beer and cider at ten times the price of wine?

153. How many gentlemen are there in England of a thousand pound per annum who never drink wine in their own houses? Whether the same may be said of any in Ireland who have even one hundred pounds per annum?

154. What reason have our neighbours in England for discouraging French wines which may not hold with respect to us also?

155. How much of the necessary sustenance of our people is yearly exported for brandy?

156. Whether, if people must poison themselves, they had not better do it with their own growth?

157. If we imported neither claret from France, nor fir from Norway, what the nation would save by it?

158. When the root yieldeth insufficient nourishment, whether men do not top the tree to make the lower branches thrive?

159. Whether, if our ladies drank sage or balm tea out of Irish ware, it would be an insupportable national calamity?

160. Whether it be really true that such wine is best as most encourages drinking, *i.e.* that must be given in the largest dose to produce its effect? And whether this holds with regard to any other medicine?

161. Whether that trade should not be accounted most pernicious wherein the balance is most against us? And whether this be not the trade with France?

162. Whether it be not even madness to encourage trade with a nation that takes nothing of our manufacture?

163. Whether Ireland can hope to thrive if the major part of her patriots shall be found in the French interest?

*164. Whether great plenty and variety of excellent wines are not to be had on the coasts of Italy and Sicily? And whether those countries would not take our commodities of linen, leather, butter, &c. in exchange for them?

*165. Particularly, whether the *Vinum Mamertinum*, which grows on the mountains about Messina, a red generous wine, highly esteemed (if we may credit Pliny) by the ancient Romans, would not come cheap, and please the palates of our Islanders?

166. Why, if a bribe by the palate or the purse be in effect the same thing, they should not be alike infamous?

167. Whether the vanity and luxury of a few ought to stand in competition with the interest of a nation?

168. Whether national wants ought not to be the rule of trade? And whether the most pressing wants of the majority ought not to be first considered?

169. Whether it is possible the country should be well improved, while our beef is exported, and our labourers live upon potatoes?

170. If it be resolved that we cannot do without foreign trade, whether, at least, it may not be worth while to consider what branches thereof deserve to be entertained, and how far we may be able to carry it on under our present limitations?

171. What foreign imports may be necessary for clothing and feeding the families of persons not worth above one hundred pounds a year? And how many wealthier there are in the kingdom, and what proportion they bear to the other inhabitants?

172. Whether trade be not then on a right foot, when foreign commodities are imported in exchange only for domestic superfluities?

173. Whether the quantities of beef, butter, wool, and leather, exported from this island, can be reckoned the superfluities of a country, where there are so many natives naked and famished?

174. Whether it would not be wise so to order our trade

as to export manufactures rather than provisions, and of those such as employ most hands?

175. Whether she would not be a very vile matron, and justly thought either mad or foolish, that should give away the necessaries of life from her naked and famished children, in exchange for pearls to stick in her hair, and sweetmeats to please her own palate?

176. Whether a nation might not be considered as a family?

*177. Whether the remark made by a Venetian ambassador to Cardinal Richelieu—"That France needed nothing to be rich and easy, but to know how to spend what she dissipates"—may not be of use also to other people?

*178. Whether hungry cattle will not leap over bounds? And whether most men are not hungry in a country where expensive fashions obtain?

*179. Whether there should not be published yearly schedules of our trade, containing an account of the imports and exports of the foregoing year?

180. Whether other methods may not be found for supplying the funds, besides the custom on things imported?

181. Whether any art or manufacture be so difficult as the making of good laws?

182. Whether our peers and gentlemen are born legislators? Or, whether that faculty be acquired by study and reflection?

183. Whether to comprehend the real interest of a people, and the means to procure it, do not imply some fund of knowledge, historical, moral, and political, with a faculty of reason improved by learning?

184. Whether every enemy to learning be not a Goth? And whether every such Goth among us be not an enemy to the country?

185. Whether, therefore, it would not be an omen of ill presage, a dreadful phenomenon in the land, if our great men should take it in their heads to deride learning and education?

186. Whether, on the contrary, it should not seem worth while to erect a mart of literature in this kingdom, under wise regulations and better discipline than in any other part

of Europe? And whether this would not be an infallible means of drawing men and money into the kingdom?

187. Whether the governed be not too numerous for the governing part of our college? And whether it might not be expedient to convert thirty natives-places into twenty fellowships?

188. Whether, if we had two colleges, there might not spring a useful emulation between them? And whether it might not be contrived so to divide the fellows, scholars, and revenues, between both, as that no member should be a loser thereby?

189. Whether ten thousand pounds well laid out might not build a decent college, fit to contain two hundred persons; and whether the purchase-money of the chambers would not go a good way towards defraying the expense?

190. Where this college should be situated?

*191. Whether, in imitation of the Jesuits at Paris, who admit Protestants to study in their colleges, it may not be right for us also to admit Roman Catholics into our college, without obliging them to attend chapel duties, or catechisms, or divinity lectures? And whether this might not keep money in the kingdom, and prevent the prejudices of a foreign education?

192. Whether it is possible a state should not thrive, whereof the lower part were industrious, and the upper wise?

193. Whether the collected wisdom of ages and nations be not found in books?

*194. Whether Themistocles his art of making a little city, or a little people, become a great one be learned anywhere so well as in the writings of the ancients?

*195. Whether a wise state hath any interest nearer heart than the education of youth?

*196. Whether the mind, like soil, doth not by disuse grow stiff; and whether reasoning and study be not like stirring and dividing the glebe?

*197. Whether an early habit of reflexion, although obtained by speculative sciences, may not have its use in practical affairs?

*198. Whether even those parts of academical learning which are quite forgotten may not have improved and

enriched the soil, like those vegetables which are raised, not for themselves, but ploughed in for a dressing of land?

199. Whether it was not an Irish professor who first opened the public schools at Oxford? Whether this island hath not been anciently famous for learning? And whether at this day it hath any better chance of being considerable?

200. Whether we may not with better grace sit down and complain, when we have done all that lies in our power to help ourselves?

201. Whether the gentleman of estate hath a right to be idle; and whether he ought not to be the great promoter and director of industry among his tenants and neighbours?

*202. Whether in the cantons of Switzerland all under thirty years of age are not excluded from their great councils?

*203. Whether Homer's compendium of education,

Μύθων μὲν ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι, πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.—*Iliad* ix.

would not be a good rule for modern educators of youth? And whether half the learning and study of these kingdoms is not useless, for want of a proper delivery and punctuation being taught in our schools and colleges?

204. Whether in any order a good building can be made of bad materials? Or whether any form of government can make a happy state out of bad individuals?

205. What was it that Solomon compared to a jewel of gold in a swine's snout?

206. Whether the public is more concerned in anything than in the procreation of able citizens?

207. Whether to the multiplying of human kind, it would not much conduce, if marriages were made with good-liking?

208. Whether, if women had no portions, we should then see so many unhappy and unfruitful marriages?

209. Whether the laws be not, according to Aristotle, a mind without appetite or passion? And consequently without respect of persons?

210. Suppose a rich man's son marries a poor man's daughter, suppose also that a poor man's daughter is deluded and debauched by the son of a rich man; which is most to be pitied?

211. Whether the punishment should be placed on the seduced or the seducer?

212. Whether a promise made before God and man in the most solemn manner ought to be violated?

213. Whether it was Plato's opinion that, "for the good of the community, rich should marry with rich?"—*De Leg.* lib. iv.

*214. Whether, as seed equally scattered produceth a goodly harvest, even so an equal distribution of wealth doth not cause a nation to flourish?

*215. Whence is it that Barbs and Arabs are so good horses? And whether in those countries they are not exactly nice in admitting none but males of a good kind to their mares?

*216. What effects would the same care produce in families?

217. Whether the real foundation for wealth must not be laid in the numbers, the frugality, and the industry of the people? And whether all attempts to enrich a nation by other means, as raising the coin, stock-jobbing, and such arts are not vain?

218. Whether a door ought not to be shut against all other methods of growing rich, save only by industry and merit? And whether wealth got otherwise would not be ruinous to the public?

219. Whether the abuse of banks and paper-money is a just objection against the use thereof? And whether such abuse might not easily be prevented?

220. Whether national banks are not found useful in Venice, Holland, and Hamburg? And whether it is not possible to contrive one that may be useful also in Ireland?

221. Whether the banks of Venice and Amsterdam are not in the hands of the public?

222. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves in the nature of those banks? And what reason can be assigned why Ireland should not reap the benefit of such public banks as well as other countries?

223. Whether a bank of national credit, supported by public funds and secured by Parliament, be a chimera or impossible thing? And if not, what would follow from the supposal of such a bank?

224. Whether the currency of a credit so well secured would not be of great advantage to our trade and manufactures?

225. Whether the notes of such public bank would not have a more general circulation than those of private banks, as being less subject to frauds and hazards?

226. Whether it be not agreed that paper hath in many respects the advantage above coin, as being of more dispatch in payments, more easily transferred, preserved, and recovered when lost?

227. Whether, besides these advantages, there be not an evident necessity for circulating credit by paper, from the defect of coin in this kingdom?

228. Whether it be rightly remarked by some that, as banking brings no treasure into the kingdom like trade, private wealth must sink as the bank riseth? And whether whatever causeth industry to flourish and circulate may not be said to increase our treasure?

229. Whether the ruinous effects of the Mississippi, South Sea, and such schemes were not owing to an abuse of paper-money or credit, in making it a means for idleness and gaming, instead of a motive and help to industry?

230. Whether the rise of the bank of Amsterdam was not purely casual, for the sake of security and dispatch of payments? And whether the good effects thereof, in supplying the place of coin, and promoting a ready circulation of industry and commerce, may not be a lesson to us, to do that by design which others fell upon by chance?

231. Whether plenty of small cash be not absolutely necessary for keeping up a circulation among the people; that is, whether copper be not more necessary than gold?

232. Whether that which increaseth the stock of a nation be not a means of increasing its trade? And whether that which increaseth the current credit of a nation may not be said to increase its stock?

*233. Whether the credit of the public funds be not a mine of gold to England? And whether any step that should lessen this credit ought not to be dreaded?

*234. Whether such credit be not the principal advantage that England hath over France? I may add, over every other country in Europe?

*235. Whether by this the public is not become possessed of the wealth of foreigners as well as natives? And whether England be not in some sort the treasury of Christendom?

236. Whether, as our current domestic credit grew, industry would not grow likewise; and if industry, our manufactures; and if these, our foreign credit?

*237. Whether foreign demands may not be answered by our exports without drawing cash out of the kingdom?

238. Whether as industry increased, our manufactures would not flourish; and as these flourished, whether better returns would not be made from estates to their landlords, both within and without the kingdom?

239. Whether the sure way to supply people with tools and materials, and to set them at work, be not a free-circulation of money, whether silver or paper?

240. Whether in New England all trade and business are not as much at a stand, upon a scarcity of paper-money, as with us from the want of specie?

241. Whether it be certain that the quantity of silver in the bank of Amsterdam be greater now than at first; but whether it be not certain that there is a greater circulation of industry and extent of trade, more people, ships, houses, and commodities of all sorts, more power by sea and land?

242. Whether money, lying dead in the bank of Amsterdam, would not be as useless as in the mine?

243. Whether our visible security in land could be doubted? And whether there be anything like this in the bank of Amsterdam?

244. Whether it be just to apprehend danger from trusting a national bank with power to extend its credit, to circulate notes which it shall be felony to counterfeit, to receive goods on loans, to purchase lands, to sell also or alienate them, and to deal in bills of exchange; when these powers are no other than have been trusted for many years with the bank of England, although in truth but a private bank?

245. Whether the objection from monopolies and an overgrowth of power, which are made against private banks, can possibly hold against a national one?

246. Whether the evil effects which of late years have attended paper-money and credit in Europe did not spring from subscriptions, shares, dividends, and stock-jobbing?

247. Whether the great evils attending paper-money in the British Plantations of America have not sprung from the overrating their lands, and issuing paper without discretion, and from the legislators breaking their own rules in favour of themselves, thus sacrificing the public to their own private benefit? And whether a little sense and honesty might not easily prevent all such inconveniences?

248. Whether the subject of free-thinking in religion be not exhausted? And whether it be not high time for our Free-thinkers to turn their thoughts to the improvement of their country?

249. Whether it must not be ruinous for a nation to sit down to game, be it with silver or with paper?

250. Whether, therefore, the circulating paper, in the late ruinous schemes of France and England, was the true evil, and not rather the circulating thereof without industry? And whether the bank of Amsterdam, where industry had been for so many years subsisted and circulated by transfers on paper, doth not clearly decide this point?

251. Whether there are not to be seen in America fair towns, wherein the people are well lodged, fed, and clothed, without a beggar in their streets, although there be not one grain of gold or silver current among them?

252. Whether these people do not exercise all arts and trades, build ships and navigate them to all parts of the world, purchase lands, till and reap the fruits of them, buy and sell, educate and provide for their children? Whether they do not even indulge themselves in foreign vanities?

253. Whether, whatever inconveniences those people may have incurred from not observing either rules or bounds in their paper-money, yet it be not certain that they are in a more flourishing condition, have larger and better built towns, more plenty, more industry, more arts and civility, and a more extensive commerce, than when they had gold and silver current among them?

254. Whether a view of the ruinous effects of absurd schemes and credit mismanaged, so as to produce gaming and madness instead of industry, can be any just objection against a national bank calculated purely to promote industry?

255. Whether a scheme for the welfare of this nation

should not take in the whole inhabitants? And whether it be not a vain attempt, to project the flourishing of our Protestant gentry, exclusive of the bulk of the natives?

256. Whether an oath, testifying allegiance to the king, and disclaiming the pope's authority in temporals, may not be justly required of the Roman Catholics? And whether, in common prudence or policy, any priest should be tolerated who refuseth to take it?

257. Whether there is any such thing as a body of inhabitants, in any Roman Catholic country under the sun, that profess an absolute submission to the pope's orders in matters of an indifferent nature, or that in such points do not think it their duty to obey the civil government?

258. Whether since the peace of Utrecht, mass was not celebrated, and the sacraments administered in divers dioceses of Sicily, notwithstanding the pope's interdict?

259. Whether a sum which would go but a little way towards erecting hospitals for maintaining and educating the children of the native Irish might not go far in binding them out apprentices to Protestant masters, for husbandry, useful trades, and the service of families?

260. Whether there be any instance of a people's being converted in a Christian sense, otherwise than by preaching to them and instructing them in their own language?

261. Whether catechists in the Irish tongue may not easily be procured and subsisted? And whether this would not be the most practicable means for converting the natives?

262. Whether it be not of great advantage to the Church of Rome, that she hath clergy suited to all ranks of men, in gradual subordination from cardinals down to mendicants?

263. Whether her numerous poor clergy are not very useful in missions, and of much influence with the people?

264. Whether, in defect of able missionaries, persons conversant in low life, and speaking the Irish tongue, if well instructed in the first principles of religion, and in the popish controversy, though for the rest on a level with the parish clerks, or the schoolmasters of charity-schools, may not be fit to mix with and bring over our poor illiterate natives to the Established Church? Whether it is not to be wished that some parts of our liturgy and homilies were publicly read in the Irish language? And whether, in these views, it

may not be right to breed up some of the better sort of children in the charity-schools, and qualify them for missionaries, catechists, and readers?

*265. Whether a squire possessed of land to the value of a thousand pounds per annum, or a merchant worth twenty thousand pounds in cash, would have most power to do good or evil upon any emergency? And whether the suffering Roman Catholics to purchase forfeited lands would not be good policy, as tending to unite their interest with that of the government?

*266. Whether the sea-ports of Galway, Limerick, Cork, and Waterford are not to be looked on as keys of this kingdom? And whether the merchants are not possessed of these keys; and who are the most numerous merchants in those cities?

*267. Whether a merchant cannot more speedily raise a sum, more easily conceal or transfer his effects, and engage in any desperate design with more safety, than a landed man, whose estate is a pledge for his behaviour?

*268. Whether a wealthy merchant bears not great sway among the populace of a trading city? And whether power be not ultimately lodged in the people?

269. Whether, as others have supposed an Atlantis or Utopia, we also may not suppose an Hyperborean island inhabited by reasonable creatures?

270. Whether an indifferent person, who looks into all hands, may not be a better judge of the game than a party who sees only his own?

271. Whether there be any country in Christendom more capable of improvement than Ireland?

272. Whether we are not as far before other nations with respect to natural advantages, as we are behind them with respect to arts and industry?

273. Whether we do not live in a most fertile soil and temperate climate, and yet whether our people in general do not feel great want and misery?

274. Whether my countrymen are not readier at finding excuses than remedies?

275. Whether the wealth and prosperity of our country do not hang by a hair, the probity of one banker, the caution of another, and the lives of all?

276. Whether we have not been sufficiently admonished of this by some late events?

277. Whether a national bank would not at once secure our properties, put an end to usury, facilitate commerce, supply the want of coin, and produce ready payments in all parts of the kingdom?

278. Whether the use or nature of money, which all men so eagerly pursue, be yet sufficiently understood or considered by all?

*279. What doth Aristotle mean by saying—

Δῆρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα.—*De Repub.* lib. ix. 9?

280. Whether mankind are not governed by imitation rather than by reason?

281. Whether there be not a measure or limit, within which gold and silver are useful, and beyond which they may be hurtful?

282. Whether that measure be not the circulating of industry?

283. Whether a discovery of the richest gold mine that ever was, in the heart of the kingdom, would be a real advantage to us?

284. Whether it would not tempt foreigners to prey upon us?

285. Whether it would not render us a lazy, proud, and dastardly people?

286. Whether every man who had money enough would not be a gentleman? And whether a nation of gentlemen would not be a wretched nation?

287. Whether all things would not bear a high price? And whether men would not increase their fortunes without being the better for it?

288. Whether the same evils would be apprehended from paper-money under an honest and thrifty regulation?

289. Whether, therefore, a national bank would not be more beneficial than even a mine of gold?

290. Whether without private banks what little business and industry there is would not stagnate? But whether it be not a mighty privilege for a private person to be able to create a hundred pounds with a dash of his pen?

291. Whether the wise state of Venice was not the first that conceived the advantage of a national bank?

292. Whether the great exactness and integrity with which this bank is managed be not the chief support of that republic?

293. Whether the bank of Amsterdam was not begun about one hundred and thirty years ago, and whether at this day its stock be not conceived to amount to three thousand tons of gold, or thirty millions sterling?

294. Whether all payments of contracts for goods in gross, and letters of exchange must not be made by transfers in the bank-books, provided the sum exceed three hundred florins?

295. Whether it be not owing to this bank that the city of Amsterdam, without the least confusion, hazard, or trouble, maintains and every day promotes so general and quick a circulation of industry?

296. Whether it be not the greatest help and spur to commerce that property can be so readily conveyed and so well secured by a *compte en banc*, that is, by only writing one man's name for another's in the bank-book?

297. Whether, at the beginning of the last century, those who had lent money to the public during the war with Spain were not satisfied by the sole expedient of placing their names in a *compte en banc*, with liberty to transfer their claims?

298. Whether the example of those easy transfers in the *compte en banc*, thus casually erected, did not tempt other men to become creditors to the public, in order to profit by the same secure and expeditious method of keeping and transferring their wealth?

299. Whether this *compte en banc* hath not proved better than a mine of gold to Amsterdam?

300. Whether that city may not be said to owe her greatness to the uncompromising accident of her having been in debt more than she was able to pay?

301. Whether it be known that any state from such small beginnings, in so short a time, ever grew to so great wealth and power as the province of Holland hath done; and whether the bank of Amsterdam hath not been the real cause of such extraordinary growth?

302. Whether the success of those public banks in Venice, Amsterdam and Hamburg would not naturally produce in other states an inclination to the same methods?

303. Whether it be possible for a national bank to subsist and maintain its credit under a French government?

304. Whether our natural appetites, as well as powers, are not limited to their respective ends and uses? But whether artificial appetites may not be infinite?

305. Whether the simple getting of money, or passing it from hand to hand without industry, be an object worthy of a wise government?

306. Whether, if money be considered as an end, the appetite thereof be not infinite? But whether the ends of money itself be not bounded?

307. Whether the total sum of all other powers, be it of enjoyment or action, which belong to a man, or to all mankind together, is not in truth a very narrow and limited quantity? But whether fancy is not boundless?

308. Whether this capricious tyrant, which usurps the place of reason, doth not most cruelly torment and delude those poor men, the usurers, stockjobbers, and projectors, of content to themselves from heaping up riches, that is, from gathering counters, from multiplying figures, from enlarging denominations, without knowing what they would be at, and without having a proper regard for the use, or end, or nature of things?

309. Whether the *ignis fatuus* of fancy doth not kindle immoderate desires, and lead men into endless pursuits and wild labyrinths?

310. Whether counters be not referred to other things, which, so long as they keep pace and proportion with the counters, it must be owned the counters are useful; but whether beyond that to value or covet counters be not direct folly?

311. Whether the public aim ought not to be, that men's industry should supply their present wants, and the overplus be converted into a stock of power?

312. Whether the better this power is secured, and the more easily it is transferred, industry be not so much the more encouraged?

313. Whether money, more than is expedient for those

purposes, be not upon the whole hurtful rather than beneficial to a state?

314. Whether the promoting of industry should not be always in view, as the true and sole end, the rule and measure, of a national bank? And whether all deviations from that object should not be carefully avoided?

315. Whether it may not be useful, for supplying manufactures and trade with stock, for regulating exchange, for quickening commerce, and for putting spirit into the people?

316. Whether we are sufficiently sensible of the peculiar security there is in having a bank that consists of land and paper, one of which cannot be exported, and the other is in no danger of being exported?

317. Whether it be not delightful to complain? And whether there be not many who had rather utter their complaints than redress their evils?

318. Whether, if "the crown of the wise be their riches,"[1] we are not the foolishest people in Christendom?

319. Whether we have not all the while great civil as well as natural advantages?

320. Whether there be any people who have more leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, and study the public weal?

321. Whether other nations who enjoy any share of freedom, and have great objects in view, be not unavoidably embarrassed and distracted by factions? But whether we do not divide upon trifles, and whether our parties are not a burlesque upon politics?

322. Whether it be not an advantage that we are not embroiled in foreign affairs, that we hold not the balance of Europe, that we are protected by other fleets and armies, that it is the true interest of a powerful people, from whom we are descended, to guard us on all sides?

323. Whether England doth not really love us and wish well to us, as bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh? And whether it be not our part to cultivate this love and affection all manner of ways?

324. What sea-ports or foreign trade have the Swisses; and yet how warm are those people, and how well provided?

325. Whether there may not be found a people who so

[1] Prov. xiv. 24.

contrive as to be impoverished by their trade? And whether we are not that people?

326. Whether it would not be better for this island, if all our fine folk of both sexes were shipped off, to remain in foreign countries, rather than that they should spend their estates at home in foreign luxury, and spread the contagion thereof through their native land?

327. Whether our gentry understand or have a notion of magnificence, and whether for want thereof they do not affect very wretched distinctions?

328. Whether there be not an art or skill in governing human pride, so as to render it subservient to the public aim?

329. Whether the great and general aim of the public should not be to employ the people?

330. What right an eldest son hath to the worst education?

331. Whether men's counsels are not the result of their knowledge and their principles?

332. Whether there be not labour of the brains as well as of the hands, and whether the former is beneath a gentleman?

333. Whether the public be more interested to protect the property acquired by mere birth than that which is the immediate fruit of learning and virtue?

334. Whether it would not be a poor and ill judged project to attempt to promote the good of the community, by invading the rights of one part thereof, or of one particular order of men?

*335. Whether there be a more wretched, and at the same time a more unpitied case, than for men to make precedents for their own undoing?

*336. Whether to determine about the rights and properties of men by other rules than the law be not dangerous?

*337. Whether those men who move the corner-stones of a constitution may not pull an old house on their own heads?

*338. Whether there be not two general methods whereby men become sharers in the national stock of wealth or power, industry and inheritance? And whether it would be wise in

a civil society to lessen that share which is allotted to merit and industry?

*339. Whether all ways of spending a fortune be of equal benefit to the public, and what sort of men are aptest to run into an improper expense?

*340. If the revenues allotted for the encouragement of religion and learning were made hereditary in the hands of a dozen lay lords and as many overgrown commoners, whether the public would be much the better for it?

*341. Whether the Church's patrimony belongs to one tribe alone; and whether every man's son, brother, or himself, may not, if he please, be qualified to share therein?

*342. What is there in the clergy to create a jealousy in the public? Or what would the public lose by it, if every squire in the land wore a black coat, said his prayers, and was obliged to reside?

*343. Whether there be anything perfect under the sun? And whether it be not with the world as with a particular state, and with a state or body politic as with the human body, which lives and moves under various indispositions, perfect health being seldom or never to be found?

*344. Whether, nevertheless, men should not in all things aim at perfection? And, therefore, whether any wise and good man would be against applying remedies? But whether it is not natural to wish for a benevolent physician?

345. Whether the public happiness be not proposed by the legislature, and whether such happiness doth not contain that of the individuals?

346. Whether, therefore, a legislator should be content with a vulgar share of knowledge? Whether he should not be a person of reflection and thought, who hath made it his study to understand the true nature and interest of mankind, how to guide men's humours and passions, how to incite their active powers, how to make their several talents cooperate to the mutual benefit of each other, and the general good of the whole?

347. Whether it doth not follow that above all things a gentleman's care should be to keep his own faculties sound and entire?

348. Whether the natural phlegm of this island needs any additional stupifier?

349. Whether all spirituous liquors are not in truth opiates?

350. Whether our men of business are not generally very grave by fifty?

351. Whether all men have not faculties of mind or body which may be employed for the public benefit?

352. Whether the main point be not to multiply and employ our people?

353. Whether hearty food and warm clothing would not enable and encourage the lower sort to labour?

354. Whether, in such a soil as ours, if there was industry, there could be want?

355. Whether the way to make men industrious be not to let them taste the fruits of their industry? And whether the labouring ox should be muzzled?

356. Whether our landlords are to be told that industry and numbers would raise the value of their lands, or that one acre about the Tholsel is worth ten thousand acres in Connaught?

357. Whether our old native Irish are not the most indolent and supine people in Christendom?

358. Whether they are yet civilized, and whether their habitations and furniture are not more sordid than those of the savage Americans?

359. Whether it be not a sad circumstance to live among lazy beggars? And whether, on the other hand, it would not be delightful to live in a country swarming, like China, with busy people?

360. Whether we should not cast about, by all manner of means, to excite industry, and to remove whatever hinders it? And whether every one should not lend a helping hand?

361. Whether vanity itself should not be engaged in this good work? And whether it is not to be wished that the finding of employment for themselves and others were a fashionable distinction among the ladies?

362. Whether idleness be the mother or daughter of spleen?

363. Whether it may not be worth while to publish the conversation of Ischomachus and his wife in Xenophon, for the use of our ladies?

364. Whether it is true that there have been, upon a time, one hundred millions of people employed in China, without the woollen trade, or any foreign commerce?

365. Whether the natural inducements to sloth are not greater in the Mogul's country than in Ireland, and yet whether, in that suffocating and dispiriting climate, the Banyans are not all, men, women, and children, constantly employed?

366. Whether it be not true that the Great Mogul's subjects might undersell us even in our own markets, and clothe our people with their stuffs and calicoes, if they were imported duty free?

367. Whether there can be a greater reproach on the leading men and the patriots of a country, than that the people should want employment?[1] And whether methods may not be found to employ even the lame and the blind, the dumb, the deaf, and the maimed, in some or other branch of our manufactures?

368. Whether much may not be expected from a biennial consultation of so many wise men about the public good?

369. Whether a tax upon dirt would not be one way of encouraging industry?

370. Whether it would be a great hardship if every parish were obliged to find work for their poor?

371. Whether children especially should not be inured to labour betimes?

372. Whether there should be not erected, in each province, an hospital for orphans and foundlings, at the expense of old bachelors?

373. Whether it be true that in the Dutch workhouses things are so managed that a child four years old may earn its own livelihood?

374. What a folly is it to build fine houses, or establish lucrative posts and large incomes, under the notion of providing for the poor?

375. Whether the poor, grown up and in health, need any other provision but their own industry, under public inspection?

[1] From this point to the end of the query (four lines) was added to the edition contained in the "Miscellany" of 1752.—ED.

376. Whether the poor-tax in England hath lessened or increased the number of poor?

377. Whether workhouses should not be made at the least expense, with clay floors, and walls of rough stone, without plastering, ceiling, or glazing?

378. Whether it be an impossible attempt to set our people at work, or whether industry be a habit, which, like other habits, may by time and skill be introduced among any people?

379. Whether all manner of means should not be employed to possess the nation in general with an aversion and contempt for idleness and all idle folk?

380. Whether it would be a hardship on people destitute of all things, if the public furnished them with necessaries which they should be obliged to earn by their labour?

381. Whether other nations have not found great benefit from the use of slaves in repairing high roads, making rivers navigable, draining bogs, erecting public buildings, bridges, and manufactories?

382. Whether temporary servitude would not be the best cure for idleness and beggary?

383. Whether the public hath not a right to employ those who cannot, or who will not find employment for themselves?

384. Whether all sturdy beggars should not be seized and made slaves to the public for a certain term of years?

385. Whether he who is chained in a jail or dungeon hath not, for the time, lost his liberty? And if so, whether temporary slavery be not already admitted among us?

386. Whether a state of servitude, wherein he should be well worked, fed, and clothed, would not be a preferment to such a fellow?

387. Whether criminals in the freest country may not forfeit their liberty, and repair the damage they have done the public by hard labour?

388. What the word servant signifies in the New Testament?

389. Whether the view of criminals chained in pairs and kept at hard labour would not be very edifying to the multitude?

390. Whether the want of such an institution be not

plainly seen in England, where the disbelief of a future state hardeneth rogues against the fear of death, and where, through the great growth of robbers and housebreakers, it becomes every day more necessary?

391. Whether it be not easier to prevent than to remedy, and whether we should not profit by the example of others?

392. Whether felons are not often spared, and therefore encouraged, by the compassion of those who should prosecute them?

393. Whether many that would not take away the life of a thief may not nevertheless be willing to bring him to a more adequate punishment?

394. Whether the most indolent would be fond of idleness, if they regarded it as the sure road to hard labour?

395. Whether the industry of the lower part of our people doth not much depend on the expense of the upper?

396. What would be the consequence if our gentry affected to distinguish themselves by fine houses rather than fine clothes?

397. Whether any people in Europe are so meanly provided with houses and furniture, in proportion to their incomes, as the men of estates in Ireland?

398. Whether building would not peculiarly encourage all other arts in this kingdom?

399. Whether smiths, masons, bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, joiners, tilers, plumbers, and glaziers would not all find employment if the humour of building prevailed?

400. Whether the ornaments and furniture of a good house do not employ a number of all sorts of artificers, in iron, wood, marble, brass, pewter, copper, wool, flax, and divers other materials?

401. Whether in buildings and gardens a great number of day-labourers do not find employment?

402. Whether by these means much of that sustenance and wealth of this nation which now goes to foreigners would not be kept at home, and nourish and circulate among our own people?

403. Whether, as industry produced good living, the number of hands and mouths would not be increased; and in proportion thereunto, whether there would not be every

day more occasion for agriculture? And whether this article alone would not employ a world of people?

404. Whether such management would not equally provide for the magnificence of the rich, and the necessities of the poor?

405. Whether an expense in building and improvements doth not remain at home, pass to the heir, and adorn the public? And whether any of these things can be said of claret?

406. Whether fools do not make fashions, and wise men follow them?

407. Whether, for one who hurts his fortune by improvements, twenty do not ruin themselves by foreign luxury?

408. Whether in proportion as Ireland was improved and beautified by fine seats, the number of absentees would not decrease?

409. Whether he who employs men in buildings and manufactures doth not put life in the country, and whether the neighbourhood round him be not observed to thrive?

410. Whether money circulated on the landlord's own lands, and among his own tenants, doth not return into his own pocket?

411. Whether every squire that made his domain swarm with busy hands, like a bee-hive or ant-hill, would not serve his own interest, as well as that of his country?

412. Whether a gentleman who hath seen a little of the world, and observed how men live elsewhere, can contentedly sit down in a cold, damp, sordid habitation, in the midst of a bleak country, inhabited by thieves and beggars?

413. Whether, on the other hand, a handsome seat amidst well-improved lands, fair villages, and a thriving neighbourhood, may not invite a man to dwell on his own estate, and quit the life of an insignificant saunterer about town, for that of a useful country-gentleman?

414. Whether it would not be of use and ornament if the towns throughout this kingdom were provided with decent churches, townhouses, workhouses, market-places, and paved streets, with some order taken for cleanliness?

415. Whether, if each of these towns were addicted to some peculiar manufacture, we should not find that the employing many hands together on the same work was the

way to perfect our workmen? And whether all these things might not soon be provided by a domestic industry, if money were not wanting?

416. Whether money could ever be wanting to the demands of industry, if we had a national bank?

417. Whether the fable of Hercules and the carter ever suited any nation like this nation of Ireland?

418. Whether it be not a new spectacle under the sun, to behold, in such a climate and such a soil, and under such a gentle government, so many roads untrodden, fields untilled, houses desolate, and hands unemployed?

419. Whether there is any country in Christendom, either kingdom or republic, depending or independent, free or enslaved, which may not afford us a useful lesson?

420. Whether the frugal Swisses have any other commodities but their butter and cheese and a few cattle, for exportation; whether, nevertheless, the single canton of Berne hath not in her public treasury two millions sterling?

421. Whether that small town of Berne, with its scanty barren territory, in a mountainous corner, without sea-ports, without manufactures, without mines, be not rich by mere dint of frugality?

422. Whether the Swisses in general have not sumptuary laws, prohibiting the use of gold, jewels, silver, silk, and lace in their apparel, and indulging the women only to wear silk on festivals, weddings, and public solemnities?

423. Whether there be not two ways of growing rich, sparing and getting? But whether the lazy spendthrift must not be doubly poor?

424. Whether money circulating be not the life of industry; and whether the want thereof doth not render a state gouty and inactive?

425. But whether, if we had a national bank, and our present cash (small as it is) were put into the most convenient shape, men should hear any public complaints for want of money?

426. Whether all circulation be not alike a circulation of credit, whatsoever medium (metal or paper) is employed, and whether gold be any more than credit for so much power?

427. Whether the wealth of the richest nations in Christen-

dom doth not consist in paper vastly more than in gold and silver?

428. Whether Lord Clarendon doth not aver of his own knowledge, that the Prince of Orange, with the best credit, and the assistance of the richest men in Amsterdam, was above ten days endeavouring to raise £20,000 in specie, without being able to raise half the sum in all that time? (See Clarendon's "History," b. xii.)

429. Supposing there had been hitherto no such thing as a bank, and the question were now first proposed, whether it would be safer to circulate unlimited bills in a private credit, or bills to a limited value on the public credit of the community, what would men think?

430. Whether the maxim, "What is everybody's business is nobody's," prevails in any country under the sun more than in Ireland?

431. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security? And whether anything but the ruin of the state can produce a national bankruptcy?

432. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power, and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people?

433. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate through London and throughout England, as freely as that of any part of his Majesty's dominions?

434. Whether therefore it be not evidently the interest of the people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our wealth which shall not impair their own?

435. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of their good offices?

436. Whether we can propose to thrive so long as we entertain a wrongheaded distrust of England?

437. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry, and that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as some accession to our own?

438. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank? And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit?

439. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong, but whether they are not still prejudices?

440. Whether paper doth not by its stamp and signature acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold?

441. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket, entitling to power, and fitted to record and transfer such power?

442. Though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all, pay out money, yet whether every man possessed of specie be not ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank?

443. Whether we may not obtain that as friends which it is in vain to hope for as rivals?

444. Whether in every instance by which we prejudice England, we do not in a greater degree prejudice ourselves?

445. Whether in the rude original of society the first step was not the exchanging of commodities; the next a substituting of metals by weight as the common medium of circulation; after this the making use of coin; lastly, a further refinement by the use of paper with proper marks and signatures? And whether this, as it is the last, so it be not the greatest improvement?

446. Whether we are not in fact the only people who may be said to starve in the midst of plenty?

447. Whether there can be a worse sign than that people should quit their country for a livelihood? Though men often leave their country for health, or pleasure, or riches, yet to leave it merely for a livelihood, whether this be not exceeding bad, and sheweth some peculiar mismanagement?

448. Whether, in order to redress our evils, artificial helps

are not most wanted in a land where industry is most against the natural grain of the people?

449. Whether, although the prepossessions about gold and silver have taken deep root, yet the example of our Colonies in America doth not make it as plain as day-light that they are not so necessary to the wealth of a nation as the vulgar of all ranks imagine?

450. Whether it be not evident that we may maintain a much greater inward and outward commerce, and be five times richer than we are, nay, and our bills abroad be of far greater credit, though we had not one ounce of gold or silver in the whole island?

451. Whether wrongheaded maxims, customs, and fashions are not sufficient to destroy any people which hath so few resources as the inhabitants of Ireland.

452. Whether it would not be a horrible thing to see our matrons make dress and play their chief concern?

453. Whether our ladies might not as well endow monasteries as wear Flanders lace? And whether it be not true that Popish nuns are maintained by Protestant contributions?

454. Whether England, which hath a free trade, whatever she remits for foreign luxury with one hand, doth not with the other receive much more from abroad? Whether, nevertheless, this nation would not be a gainer, if our women would content themselves with the same moderation in point of expense as the English ladies?

455. But whether it be not a notorious truth that our Irish ladies are on a foot, as to dress, with those of five times their fortune in England?

456. Whether it be not even certain that the matrons of this forlorn country send out a greater proportion of its wealth, for fine apparel, than any other females on the whole surface of this terraqueous globe?

457. Whether the expense, great as it is, be the greatest evil; but whether this folly may not produce many other follies, an entire derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption in both sexes?

458. Whether the first beginning of expedients do not always meet with prejudices? And whether even the prejudices of a people ought not to be respected?

459. Whether a national bank be not the true philosopher's stone in a state?

460. Whether all regulations of coin should not be made with a view to encourage industry, and a circulation of commerce, throughout the kingdom?

461. Whether to oil the wheels of commerce be not a common benefit? And whether this be not done by avoiding fractions and multiplying small silver?

462. Whether, all things considered, a general raising the value of gold and silver be not so far from bringing greater quantities thereof into the kingdom that it would produce a direct contrary effect, inasmuch as less, in that case, would serve, and therefore less be wanted? And whether men do not import a commodity in proportion to the demand or want of it?

463. Whether the lowering of our gold would not create a fever in the state? And whether a fever be not sometimes a cure, but whether it be not the last cure a man would choose?

464. Whether raising the value of a particular species will not tend to multiply such species, and to lessen others in proportion thereunto? And whether a much less quantity of cash in silver would not, in reality, enrich the nation more than a much greater in gold?

465. Whether, *cæteris paribus*, it be not true that the prices of things increase as the quantity of money increaseth, and are diminished as that is diminished? And whether, by the quantity of money, is not to be understood the amount of the denominations, all contracts being nominal for pounds, shillings, and pence, and not for weights of gold or silver?

466. Whether our exports do not consist of such necessaries as other countries cannot well be without?

467. Whether upon the circulation of a national bank more land would not be tilled, more hands employed, and consequently more commodities exported?

468. Whether silver and small money be not that which circulates the quickest, and passeth through all hands, on the road, in the market, at the shop?

469. Whether, all things considered, it would not be better for a kingdom that its cash consisted of half a million in small silver, than of five times that sum in gold?

470. Whether there be not every day five hundred lesser payments made for one that requires gold?

471. Whether Spain, where gold bears the highest value, be not the laziest, and China, where it bears the lowest, be not the most industrious country in the known world?

472. Whether it be not evidently the interest of every state, that its money should rather circulate than stagnate?

473. Whether the principal use of cash be not its ready passing from hand to hand, to answer common occasions of the common people, and whether common occasions of all sorts of people are not small ones?

474. Whether business at fairs and markets is not often at a stand and often hindered, even though the seller hath his commodities at hand, and the purchaser his gold, for want of change?

475. As wealth is really power, and coin a ticket conveying power, whether those tickets which are the fittest for that use ought not to be preferred?

476. Whether those tickets which singly transfer small shares of power, and, being multiplied, large shares, are not fitter for common use than those which singly transfer large shares?

477. Whether the public is not more benefited by a shilling that circulates than a pound that lies dead?

478. Whether sixpence twice paid be not as good as a shilling once paid?

479. Whether the same shilling circulating in a village may not supply one man with bread, another with stockings, a third with a knife, a fourth with paper, a fifth with nails, and so answer many wants which must otherwise have remained unsatisfied?

480. Whether facilitating and quickening the circulation of power to supply wants be not the promoting of wealth and industry among the lower people? And whether upon this the wealth of the great doth not depend?

481. Whether, without the proper means of circulation, it be not vain to hope for thriving manufactures and a busy people?

482. Whether four pounds in small cash may not circulate

and enliven an Irish market, which many four-pound pieces would permit to stagnate?[1]

483. Whether a man that could move nothing less than a hundred-pound weight would not be much at a loss to supply his wants; and whether it would not be better for him to be less strong and more active?

484. Whether the natural body can be in a state of health and vigour without a due circulation of the extremities, even in the fingers and toes? And whether the political body, any more than the natural, can thrive without a proportionable circulation through the minutest and most inconsiderable parts thereof?

485. If we had a mint for coining only shillings, sixpences, and copper-money, whether the nation would not soon feel the good effects thereof?

486. Whether the greater waste by wearing of small coins would not be abundantly overbalanced by their usefulness?

487. Whether it be not the industry of common people that feeds the state, and whether it be possible to keep this industry alive without small money?

488. Whether the want of this be not a great bar to our employing the people in these manufactures which are open to us, and do not interfere with Great Britain?

489. Whether therefore such want doth not drive men into the lazy way of employing land under sheep-walk?

490. Whether the running of wool from Ireland can so effectually be prevented as by encouraging other business and manufactures among our people?

491. Whatever commodities Great Britain importeth which we might supply, whether it be not her real interest to import them from us rather than from any other people?

492. Whether the apprehension of many among us (who for that very reason stick to their wool), that England may hereafter prohibit, limit, or discourage our linen trade, when it hath been once, with great pains and expense, thoroughly introduced and settled in this land, be not altogether groundless and unjust?

493. Whether it is possible for this country, which hath

[1] In the year 1735, this country abounded with the large gold coins of Portugal, which, being over-rated, flowed in from all parts. But that evil is since remedied.

neither mines of gold nor a free trade, to support for any time the sending out of specie?

494. Whether in fact our payments are not made by bills? And whether our foreign credit doth not depend on our domestic industry, and our bills on that credit?

495. Whether, in order to mend it, we ought not first to know the peculiar wretchedness of our state? And whether there be any knowing of this but by comparison?

496. Whether there are not single market towns in England that turn more money in buying and selling than whole countries (perhaps provinces) with us?

497. Whether the small town of Birmingham alone doth not, upon an average, circulate every week, one way or other, to the value of fifty thousand pounds? But whether the same crown may not be often paid?

498. Whether any kingdom in Europe be so good a customer at Bordeaux as Ireland?

499. Whether the police and economy of France be not governed by wise councils? And whether any one from this country, who sees their towns, and manufactures, and commerce, will not wonder what our senators have been doing?

500. What variety and number of excellent manufactures are to be met with throughout the whole kingdom of France?

501. Whether there are not everywhere some or other mills for many uses, forges and furnaces for iron-work, looms for tapestry, glass-houses, and so forth?

502. What quantities of paper, stockings, hats; what manufactures of wool, silk, linen, hemp, leather, wax, earthenware, brass, lead, tin, &c.?

503. Whether the manufactures and commerce of the single town of Lyons do not amount to a greater value than all the manufactures and all the trade of this kingdom taken together?

504. Whether, in the anniversary fair at the small town of Beaucair upon the Rhone, there be not as much money laid out as the current cash of this kingdom amounts to?

505. Whether the very shreds shorn from woollen cloth, which are thrown away in Ireland, do not make a beautiful tapestry in France?

506. Whether there be not French towns subsisted merely by making pins?

507. Whether the coarse fingers of those very women, those same peasants who one part of the year till the ground and dress the vineyards, are not another employed in making the finest French point?

508. Whether there is not a great number of idle fingers among the wives and daughters of our peasants?

509. Whether the French do not raise a trade from saffron, dyeing drugs, and the like products, which may do with us as well as with them?

510. Whether we may not have materials of our own growth to supply all manufactures, as well as France, except silk, and whether the bulk of what silk even France manufactures be not imported?

511. Whether it be possible for this country to grow rich, so long as what is made by domestic industry is spent in foreign luxury?

512. Whether our natural Irish are not partly Spaniards and partly Tartars; and whether they do not bear signatures of their descent from both these nations, which is also confirmed by all their histories?

513. Whether the Tartar progeny is not numerous in this land? And whether there is an idler occupation under the sun than to attend flocks and herds of cattle?

514. Whether the wisdom of the state should not wrestle with this hereditary disposition of our Tartars, and with a high hand introduce agriculture?

515. Whether once upon a time France did not, by her linen alone, draw yearly from Spain about eight millions of livres?

516. Whether the French have not suffered in their linen trade with Spain, by not making their cloth of due breadth; and whether any other people have suffered, and are still likely to suffer, through the same prevarication?[1]

517. Whether the Spaniards are not rich and lazy, and whether they have not a particular inclination and favour for the inhabitants of this island? But whether a punctual people do not love punctual dealers?

[1] Things, we hear, are in a way of being mended with us in this respect.

518. Whether about fourteen years ago we had not come into a considerable share of the linen trade with Spain, and what put a stop to this?

519. Whether, if the linen manufacture were carried on in the other provinces as well as in the north, the merchants of Cork, Limerick, and Galway would not soon find the way to Spain?

520. Whether the woollen manufacture of England is not divided into several parts or branches, appropriated to particular places, where they are only or principally manufactured; fine cloths in Somersetshire, coarse in Yorkshire, long ells at Exeter, saies[1] at Sudbury, crapes at Norwich, linseys at Kendal, blankets at Witney, and so forth?

521. Whether the united skill, industry, and emulation of many together on the same work be not the way to advance it? And whether it had been otherwise possible for England to have carried on her woollen manufacture to so great perfection?

522. Whether it would not on many accounts be right if we observed the same course with respect to our linen manufacture; and that diapers were made in one town or district, damasks in another, sheeting in a third, fine wearing linen in a fourth, coarse in a fifth, in another cambrics, in another thread and stockings, in others stamped linen, or striped linen, or tickings, or dyed linens, of which last kinds there is so great a consumption among the seafaring men of all nations?

523. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves of the different sorts of linen which are in request among different people?

524. Whether we do not yearly consume of French wines about a thousand tuns more than either Sweden or Denmark, and yet whether those nations pay ready money as we do?

525. Whether it be not a custom for some thousands of Frenchmen to go about the beginning of March into Spain, and having tilled the lands and gathered the harvest of Spain, to return home with money in their pockets about the end of November?

526. Whether of late years our Irish labourers do not carry on the same business in England, to the great dis-

[1] *I.e.*, serges.—ED.

content of many there? But whether we have not much more reason than the people of England to be displeased at this commerce?

527. Whether, notwithstanding the cash, supposed to be brought into it, any nation is, in truth, a gainer by such traffic?

528. Whether the industry of our people employed in foreign lands, while our own are left uncultivated, be not a great loss to the country?

529. Whether it would not be much better for us, if, instead of sending our men abroad, we could draw men from the neighbouring countries to cultivate our own?

530. Whether, nevertheless, we are not apt to think the money imported by our labourers to be so much clear gains to this country; but whether a little reflection and a little political arithmetic may not shew us our mistake?

531. Whether our prejudices about gold and silver are not very apt to infect or misguide our judgments and reasonings about the public weal?

532. Whether it be not a good rule whereby to judge of the trade of any city, and its usefulness, to observe whether there is a circulation through the extremities, and whether the people round about are busy and warm?

533. Whether we had not, some years since, a manufacture of hats at Athlone, and of earthenware at Arklow, and what became of those manufactures?

534. Why we do not make tiles of our own, for flooring and roofing, rather than bring them from Holland?

535. What manufactures are there in France and Venice of gilt-leather, how cheap and how splendid a furniture?

536. Whether we may not, for the same use, manufacture divers things at home of more beauty and variety than wainscot, which is imported at such expense from Norway?

537. Whether the use and the fashion will not soon make a manufacture?

538. Whether, if our gentry used to drink mead and cider, we should not soon have those liquors in the utmost perfection and plenty?

539. Whether it be not wonderful that with such pastures, and so many black cattle, we do not find ourselves in cheese?

540. Whether great profits may not be made by fisheries; but whether those of our Irish who live by that business do not contrive to be drunk and unemployed one half of the year?

541. Whether it be not folly to think an inward commerce cannot enrich a state, because it doth not increase its quantity of gold and silver? And whether it is possible a country should not thrive, while wants are supplied, and business goes on?

542. Whether plenty of all the necessaries and comforts of life be not real wealth?

543. Whether Lyons, by the advantage of her midland situation and the rivers Rhone and Saone, be not a great magazine or mart for inward commerce? And whether she doth not maintain a constant trade with most parts of France; with Provence for oils and dried fruits, for wines and cloth with Languedoc, for stuffs with Champagne, for linen with Picardy, Normandy, and Brittany, for corn with Burgundy?

544. Whether she doth not receive and utter all those commodities, and raise a profit from the distribution thereof, as well as of her own manufactures, throughout the kingdom of France?

545. Whether the charge of making good roads and navigable rivers across the country would not be really repaid by an inward commerce?

546. Whether, as our trade and manufactures increased, magazines should not be established in proper places, fitted by their situation, near great roads and navigable rivers, lakes, or canals, for the ready reception and distribution of all sorts of commodities from and to the several parts of the kingdom; and whether the town of Athlone, for instance, may not be fitly situated for such a magazine, or centre of domestic commerce?

547. Whether an inward trade would not cause industry to flourish, and multiply the circulation of our coin, and whether this may not do as well as multiplying the coin itself?

548. Whether the benefits of a domestic commerce are sufficiently understood and attended to; and whether the cause thereof be not the prejudiced and narrow way of thinking about gold and silver?

549. Whether there be any other more easy and unenvied method of increasing the wealth of a people?

550. Whether we of this island are not from our peculiar circumstances determined to this very commerce above any other, from the number of necessaries and good things that we possess within ourselves, from the extent and variety of our soil, from the navigable rivers and good roads which we have or may have, at a less expense than any people in Europe, from our great plenty of materials for manufactures, and particularly from the restraints we lie under with regard to our foreign trade?

551. Whether annual inventories should not be published of the fairs throughout the kingdom, in order to judge of the growth of its commerce?

552. Whether there be not every year more cash circulated at the card-tables of Dublin than at all the fairs of Ireland?

553. Whether the wealth of a country will not bear proportion to the skill and industry of its inhabitants?

554. Whether foreign imports that tend to promote industry should not be encouraged, and such as have a tendency to promote luxury should not be discouraged?

555. Whether the annual balance of trade between Italy and Lyons be not about four millions in favour of the former, and yet, whether Lyons be not a gainer by this trade?

556. Whether the general rule, of determining the profit of a commerce by its balance, doth not, like other general rules, admit of exceptions?

557. Whether it would not be a monstrous folly to import nothing but gold and silver, supposing we might do it, from every foreign part to which we trade? And yet, whether some men may not think this foolish circumstance a very happy one?

558. But whether we do not all see the ridicule of the Mogul's subjects, who take from us nothing but our silver, and bury it under ground, in order to make sure thereof against the resurrection?

559. Whether he must not be a wrongheaded patriot or politician, whose ultimate view was drawing money into a country, and keeping it there?

560. Whether it be not evident that not gold but industry causeth a country to flourish?

561. Whether it would not be a silly project in any nation

to hope to grow rich by prohibiting the exportation of gold and silver?

562. Whether there can be a greater mistake in politics than to measure the wealth of the nation by its gold and silver?

563. Whether gold and silver be not a drug, where they do not promote industry? Whether they be not even the bane and undoing of an idle people?

564. Whether gold will not cause either industry or vice to flourish? And whether a country, where it flowed in without labour, must not be wretched and dissolute like an island inhabited by Buccaneers?

565. Whether arts and virtue are not likely to thrive, where money is made a means to industry? But whether money without this would be a blessing to any people?

566. Whether keeping cash at home, or sending it abroad, just as it most serves to promote industry, be not the real interest of every nation?

567. Whether commodities of all kinds do not naturally flow where there is the greatest demand? Whether the greatest demand for a thing be not where it is of most use? Whether money, like other things, hath not its proper use? Whether this use be not to circulate? Whether therefore there must not of course be money where there is a circulation of industry?

568. Whether it is not a great point to know what we would be at? And whether whole states, as well as private persons, do not often fluctuate for want of this knowledge?

569. Whether gold may not be compared to Sejanus's horse, if we consider its passage through the world, and the fate of those nations which have been successively possessed thereof?

570. Whether means are not so far useful as they answer the end? And whether, in different circumstances, the same ends are not obtained by different means?

571. If we are a poor nation, abounding with very poor people, will it not follow that a far greater proportion of our stock should be in the smallest and lowest species than would suit with England?

572. Whether, therefore, it would not be highly expedient, if our money were coined of peculiar values, best suited to the circumstances and uses of our own country; and whether

any other people could take umbrage at our consulting our own convenience, in an affair entirely domestic, and that lies within ourselves?

573. Whether every man doth not know, and hath not long known, that the want of a mint causeth many other wants in this kingdom?

574. What harm did England sustain about three centuries ago, when silver was coined in this kingdom?

575. What harm was it to Spain that her provinces of Naples and Sicily had all along mints of their own?

576. Whether it may not be presumed that our not having a privilege, which every other kingdom in the world enjoys, be not owing to our want of diligence and unanimity in soliciting for it?

577. Whether it be not the interest of England that we should cultivate a domestic commerce among ourselves? And whether it could give them any possible jealousy, if our small sum of cash was contrived to go a little farther, if there was a little more life in our markets, a little more buying and selling in our shops, a little better provision for the backs and bellies of so many forlorn wretches throughout the towns and villages of this island?

578. Whether Great Britain ought not to promote the prosperity of her Colonies, by all methods consistent with her own? And whether the Colonies themselves ought to wish or aim at it by others?

579. Whether the remotest parts from the metropolis, and the lowest of the people, are not to be regarded as the extremities and capillaries of the political body?

580. Whether, although the capillary vessels are small, yet obstructions in them do not produce great chronical diseases?

581. Whether faculties are not enlarged and improved by exercise?

582. Whether the sum of the faculties put into act, or, in other words, the united action of a whole people, doth not constitute the *momentum* of a state?

583. Whether such *momentum* be not the real stock or wealth of a state; and whether its credit be not proportional thereunto?

584. Whether in every wise state the faculties of the mind are not most considered?

585. Whether the *momentum* of a state doth not imply the whole exertion of its faculties, intellectual and corporeal; and whether the latter without the former could act in concert?

586. Whether the divided force of men, acting singly, would not be a rope of sand?

587. Whether the particular motions of the members of a state, in opposite directions, will not destroy each other, and lessen the *momentum* of the whole; but whether they must not conspire to produce a great effect?

588. Whether the ready means to put spirit into this state, to fortify and increase its *momentum*, would not be a national bank, and plenty of small cash?

589. Whether that which employs and exerts the force of a community deserves not to be well considered and well understood?

590. Whether the immediate mover, the blood and spirits, be not money, paper, or metal; and whether the soul or will of the community, which is the prime mover that governs and directs the whole, be not the legislature?

591. Supposing the inhabitants of a country quite sunk in sloth, or even fast asleep, whether, upon the gradual awakening and exertion, first of the sensitive and locomotive faculties, next of reason and reflection, then of justice and piety, the *momentum* of such country or state would not, in proportion thereunto, become still more and more considerable?

592. Whether that which in the growth is last attained, and is the finishing perfection of a people, be not the first thing lost in their declension?

593. Whether force be not of great consequence, as it is exerted; and whether great force without wisdom may not be a nuisance?

594. Whether the force of a child, applied with art, may not produce greater effects than that of a giant? And whether a small stock in the hands of a wise state may not go farther, and produce more considerable effects, than immense sums in the hands of a foolish one?

595. Whose fault is it if poor Ireland still continues poor?

A DISCOURSE

ADDRESSED TO MAGISTRATES.

1736.

[STOCK, in his "Life of Berkeley," in stating that this work was published in 1736, adds the following footnote: "Occasioned by an impious society called 'Blasters,' which this pamphlet put a stop to. He expressed his sentiments on the same occasion in the House of Lords, the only time he ever spoke there. The speech was received with much applause" (see Wright's "Berkeley," p. 12). The work requires no further explanation. The student should compare it with Berkeley's first tract of this nature—the discourse on "Passive Obedience" (vol. i., pp. 253-290), and notice the references made by the author to "Alciphron." Attention may be drawn to the multitude of citations, ranging from Berkeley's particular aversions, Shaftesbury and Mandeville, to the "Scientia Sinensis" and the Anthology of Stobæus. Here, and still more in the "Siris," we get indications of the extent and variety of Berkeley's reading. The tract was published in 1736, reprinted in 1738 (the title-page here given is that of the Dublin issue of 1738), and included in the "Miscellany" of 1752.]

A

DISCOURSE

ADDRESSED TO

MAGISTRATES

AND

Men in AUTHORITY.

OCCASIONED

By the enormous Licence, and Irreligion of the Times.

GALLIO *cared for none of thoſe Things.*
Acts, Ch. xviii. Ver. 17.

DUBLIN:
Printed by GEORGE FAULKNER.

M, DCC, XXX, VIII.

P. 173

A DISCOURSE

ADDRESSED TO MAGISTRATES AND MEN IN AUTHORITY.

THE pretensions and discourse of men throughout these kingdoms would, at first view, lead one to think the inhabitants were all politicians; and yet, perhaps, political wisdom hath in no age or country been more talked of, and less understood. License is taken for the end of government, and popular humour for its origin. No reverence for the law, no attachment to the constitution, little attention to matters of consequence, and great altercation upon trifles, such idle projects about religion and government, as if the public had both to choose, a general contempt for all authority, divine and human, an indifference about the prevailing opinions, whether they tend to produce order or disorder, to promote the empire of God or the devil, these are the symptoms that strongly mark the present age; and this could never have been the case, if a neglect of religion had not made way for it.

When the Jews accused Paul upon religious matters and points of their law before Gallio, the Roman magistrate, it is said that Gallio "cared for none of those things." And, it is to be feared, there are not a few magistrates in this Christian country who think with the same indifference on the subject of religion. Herein, nevertheless, they judge amiss, and are much wanting to their duty. For, although it be admitted that the magistrate's peculiar object is the temporal welfare of the state; yet, this will by no means exclude a proper care about the prevailing notions and opinions of religion, which influence the lives and actions of men, and have therefore a mighty effect on the public.

Men's behaviour is the consequence of their principles. Hence it follows that, in order to make a state thrive and flourish, care must be taken that good principles be propagated in the minds of those who compose it.

It would be vain to depend on the outward form, the constitution, and structure, of a state; while the majority are ever governed by their inward ways of thinking, which at times will break out and shew themselves paramount to all laws and institutions whatsoever. It must be great folly therefore to overlook notions, as matters of small moment to the state; while experience shews there is nothing more important; and that a prevailing disorder in the principles and opinions of its members is ever dangerous to society, and capable of producing the greatest public evils.

Man is an animal formidable both from his passions and his reason; his passions often urging him to great evils, and his reason furnishing means to achieve them. To tame this animal, and make him amenable to order, to inure him to a sense of justice and virtue, to withhold him from ill courses by fear, and encourage him in his duty by hopes; in short, to fashion and model him for society, hath been the aim of civil and religious institutions; and in all times, the endeavour of good and wise men. The aptest method for attaining this end hath been always judged a proper education.

If men's actions are an effect of their principles, that is, of their notions, their belief, their persuasions; it must be admitted that principles early sown in the mind are the seeds which produce fruit and harvest in the ripe state of manhood. How lightly soever some men may speak of notions, yet, so long as the soul governs the body, men's notions must influence their actions, more or less, as they are stronger or weaker; and to good or evil, as they are better or worse.

Our notions and opinions are a constant check on our appetites, and balance to our passions: and although they may not in every instance control and rule, yet they will never fail strongly to affect both the one and the other. What is it that bridles the impetuous desires of men? that restrains them when they are driven by the most violent passions? In a word, what is it that renders this world habitable, but the prevailing notions of order, virtue, duty,

and Providence? Some, perhaps, may imagine that the eye of the magistrate alone is sufficient to keep mankind in awe. But, if every man's heart was set to do all the mischief his appetite should prompt him to as often as opportunity and secrecy presented themselves, there could be no living in the world.

And although too many of those intrusted with civil power, in these our days, may be said with Gallio to "care for none of those things;" and many more, who would pass for men of judgment and knowledge, may look on notions early imbibed, before their grounds and reasons are apprehended or understood, to be but mere prejudices, yet this will detract nothing from their truth and usefulness. To place this matter in a due light, I propose to shew that a system of salutary notions is absolutely necessary to the support of every civil constitution. I shall enforce this point by the testimony of those who are esteemed the wisest men; and I shall make some remarks on the modern prevailing spirit, and the tendency of the maxims of our times.

Order is necessary, not only to the well-being, but to the very being of a state. Now, order and regularity in the actions of men are not an effect of appetite or passion, but of judgment: and the judgment is governed by notions or opinions. There must, therefore, of necessity, in every state, be a certain system of salutary notions, a prevailing set of opinions, acquired either by private reason and reflection, or taught and instilled by the general reason of the public; that is, by the law of the land. True it is that where men either cannot or will not use their own reason, think, and examine for themselves; in such case the notions taught or instilled into their minds are embraced rather by the memory than the judgment. Nor will it be any objection to say that these are prejudices; inasmuch as they are therefore neither less useful nor less true, although their proofs may not be understood by all men.[1]

[1] The following paragraph was omitted from the last edition: "Licentious habits of youth give a cast or turn to age: the young rake makes an old infidel; libertine practices beget libertine opinions; and a vicious life generally ends in an old age of prejudice not to be conquered by reasoning. Of this we see instances even in persons

Prejudices are notions or opinions which the mind entertains without knowing the grounds and reasons of them, and which are assented to without examination. The first notions which take possession of the minds of men, with regard to duties social, moral, and civil, may therefore be justly styled prejudices. The mind of a young creature cannot remain empty; if you do not put into it that which is good, it will be sure to receive that which is bad.

Do what you can, there will still be a bias from education; and, if so, is it not better this bias should lie towards things laudable and useful to society? This bias still operates, although it may not always prevail. The notions first instilled have the earliest influence, take the deepest root, and generally are found to give a colour and complexion to the subsequent lives of men, inasmuch as they are in truth the great source of human actions. It is not gold, or honour, or power that move men to act, but the opinions they entertain of those things. Hence it follows that if a magistrate should say, "No matter what notions men embrace, I will take heed to their actions;"—therein he shews his weakness; for, such as are men's notions, such will be their deeds.

For a man to do as he would be done by; to love his neighbour as himself; to honour his superiors; to believe that God scans all his actions, and will reward or punish them; and to think that he who is guilty of falsehood or injustice hurts himself more than any one else: are not these such notions and principles as a very wise governor or legislator would covet above all things to have firmly rooted in the mind of every individual under his care? This is allowed, even by the enemies of religion, who would fain have it thought the offspring of state policy, honouring its usefulness at the same time that they disparage its truth. What, therefore, cannot be acquired by every man's reasoning must be introduced by precept, and rivetted by custom; that is to say, the bulk of mankind must, in all civilized societies, have their minds, by timely instruction, well

celebrated for parts, and who reason admirably on other points where they are not biassed; but on the subject of religion obtrude their guesses, surmises, and broken hints for arguments. Against such there is no reasoning."—ED.

seasoned and furnished with proper notions, which, although the grounds or proofs thereof be unknown to them, will nevertheless influence their conduct, and so far render them useful members of the state. But, if you strip men of these their notions, or, if you will, prejudices, with regard to modesty, decency, justice, charity, and the like, you will soon find them so many monsters, utterly unfit for human society.

I desire it may be considered that most men want leisure, opportunity, or faculties to derive conclusions from their principles, and establish morality on a foundation of human science. True it is (as St. Paul observes) that "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world are clearly seen" (Romans i. 20). And from thence the duties of natural religion may be discovered. But these things are seen and discovered by those alone who open their eyes and look narrowly for them. Now, if you look throughout the world, you shall find but few of these narrow inspectors and inquirers, very few who make it their business to analyze opinions and pursue them to their rational source, to examine whence truths spring, and how they are inferred. In short, you shall find all men full of opinions, but knowledge only in a few.

It is impossible, from the nature and circumstances of human kind, that the multitude should be philosophers, or that they should know things in their causes. We see every day that the rules or conclusions alone are sufficient for the shopkeeper to state his account, the sailor to navigate his ship, or the carpenter to measure his timber; none of which understand the theory; that is to say, the grounds and reasons either of arithmetic or geometry. Even so in moral, political, and religious matters, it is manifest that the rules and opinions early imbibed at the first dawn of understanding, and without the least glimpse of science, may yet produce excellent effects, and be very useful to the world; and that in fact they are so will be very visible to every one who shall observe what passeth round about him.

It may not be amiss to inculcate that the difference between prejudices and other opinions doth not consist in this—that the former are false, and the latter true; but in this—that the former are taken upon trust, and the latter

acquired by reasoning. He who hath been taught to believe the immortality of the soul may be as right in his notion as he who hath reasoned himself into that opinion. It will then by no means follow that because this or that notion is a prejudice, it must be therefore false. The not distinguishing between prejudices and errors is a prevailing oversight among our modern Free-thinkers.

There may be, indeed, certain mere prejudices or opinions, which, having no reasons either assigned or assignable to support them, are nevertheless entertained by the mind, because they intruded betimes into it. Such may be supposed false, not because they were early learned, or learned without their reasons; but because there are in truth no reasons to be given for them.

Certainly, if a notion may be concluded false because it was early imbibed, or because it is with most men an object of belief rather than of knowledge, one may by the same reasoning conclude several propositions of Euclid to be false. A simple apprehension of conclusions as taken in themselves, without the deductions of science, is what falls to the share of mankind in general. Religious awe, the precepts of parents and masters, the wisdom of legislators, and the accumulated experience of ages supply the place of proofs and reasonings with the vulgar of all ranks: I would say that discipline, national constitution, and laws human and divine are so many plain land-marks, which guide them into the paths wherein it is presumed they ought to tread.

From what hath been premised, it plainly appears, that in the bulk of mankind there are and must be prejudices, that is, opinions taken upon trust; or, in other words, that there are points of faith among all men whatsoever, as well as among Christians.

And, as it is evident that the unthinking part of every age, sex, and condition among us, must necessarily receive notions with the submission of faith; so it is very reasonable that they should submit their faith to the greatest authorities human and Divine, the law and the gospel. But if once all reverence for these be destroyed, our pretenders to moral knowledge will have no authority to imbue the multitude with such notions as may control their appetites. From all which it follows that the modern schemes of our Free-

thinkers, who pretend to separate morality from religion, how rational soever they may seem to their admirers, are, in truth and effect, most irrational and pernicious to civil society.

Let any one who thinks at all consider the savage state of undisciplined men, whose minds are nurtured to no doctrine, broke by no instruction, governed by no principle. Let him at the same time reflect on a society of persons educated in the principles of our Church, formed betimes to fear God, to reverence their superiors, to be grateful to their benefactors, forgiving to their enemies, just and charitable to all men; and he will then be able to judge of the merits of those who are so active to weed out the prejudices of education.

Among the many wild notions broached in these giddy times, it must be owned that some of our declaimers against prejudice have wrought themselves into a sort of esteem for savages, as a virtuous and unprejudiced people. In proof of which, they allege their being free from many vices practised in civilized nations. Now, it is very true, among savages there are few instances to be found of luxury, avarice, or ambition; not that the contrary virtues take place, but because the opportunities and faculties for such vices are wanting. For the same reason, you do not see them in brutes.

What they esteem and admire in those creatures is not innocence, but ignorance: it is not virtue, but necessity. Give them but the means of transgressing, and they know no bounds. For example: supply the water-drinking savage with strong liquor, and he shall be drunk for several days and nights together. Again: we admit an uneducated savage knows not how to supplant a rival with the refined treachery of a courtier; yet, if you put his foe once in his power, you shall soon see what a horrible relish and delight the monster hath in cruelty.

Above all others, religious notions, or, if you will, prejudices (since this, as hath been already observed, detracts nothing from their truth and usefulness) have the most influence, they are the strongest curb from vice, and the most effectual spur to worthy conduct. And, indeed, whether we consider the reason of things, or the practice of men in

all times, we shall be satisfied that nothing truly great and good can enter into the heart of one attached to no principles of religion, who believes no Providence, who neither fears hell, nor hopes for heaven.

Punishments and rewards have always had, and always will have, the greatest weight with men; and the most considerable of both kinds are proposed by religion, the duties whereof fall in with the views of the civil magistrate: it undeniably follows, that nothing can add more strength to a good and righteous government than religion. Therefore it mainly concerns governors to keep an attentive eye on the religion of their subjects. And indeed it is one lesson to magistrate and people, prince and subject, "Keep my commandments and live; and my law as the apple of thine eye" (Prov. vii. 2).

Although it is no consequence, from what hath been said, that men should be debarred the free use of reason and inquiry, yet surely it will follow that, without good reason, a man should not reject those notions which have been instilled by the laws and education of his country. And even they who think they have such reason have nevertheless no right of dictating to others.[1] It is true, Divine authority is superior to all human prejudices, institutions, and regards whatsoever. And it is wise, although at the risk of liberty or life, to obey God rather than man. But our modern reformers of prejudices have nothing to plead of that kind.[2]

There is no magistrate so ignorant as not to know that power—physical power—resides in the people: but authority is from opinion, which authority is necessary to restrain and direct the people's power, and therefore religion is the great stay and support of a state. Every religion that inculcates virtue and discourageth vice is so far of public benefit. The Christian religion doth not only this, but further makes every legal constitution sacred by commanding our submission thereto. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers (saith St. Paul), for the powers that be are ordained of

[1] Though a man's private judgment be a rule to himself, it will not thence follow that he hath any right to set it up for a rule to others.

[2] No man can say he is obliged in conscience, honour, or prudence, to insult the public wisdom, or to ridicule the laws under whose protection he lives.

God" (Rom. xiii. 1). And, in effect, for several years past, while the reverence for our church and religion hath been decaying and wearing off from the minds of men, it may be observed that loyalty hath in proportion lost ground; and now the very word seems quite forgotten. Submission for conscience, as well as for wrath, was once reckoned a useful lesson; but now, with other good lessons, is laid aside as an obsolete prejudice.

The prince or magistrate, however great or powerful, who thinks his own authority sufficient to make him respected and obeyed, lies under a woful mistake, and never fails to feel it sooner or later. Obedience to all civil power is rooted in the religious fear of God: it is propagated, preserved, and nourished by religion. This makes men obey, not with eye-service, but in sincerity of heart. Human regards may restrain men from open and penal offences; but the fear of God is a restraint from all degrees of all crimes, however circumstanced. Take away this stay and prop of duty, this root of civil authority; and all that was sustained by it, or grew from it, shall soon languish. The authority, the very being of the magistrate, will prove a poor and precarious thing.

An inward sense of the supreme majesty of the King of kings is the only thing that can beget and preserve a true respect for subordinate majesty in all the degrees of power—the first link of authority being fixed at the throne of God. But, in these our days, that *majestas imperii*, that sacredness of character, which rooted in a religious principle was the great guard and security of the state, is through want thereof become the public scorn. And indeed what hold can the prince or magistrate have on the conscience of those who have no conscience? How can he build on the principles of such as have no principles? Or how can he hope for respect where God himself is neglected?

It is manifest that no prince upon earth can hope to govern well, or even to live easy and secure, much less respected by his people, if he do not contribute by his example and authority to keep up in their minds an awful sense of religion. As for a moral sense, and moral fitness, or eternal relations, how insufficient those things are for establishing general and just notions of morality, or for keeping men

within due bounds, is so evident from fact and experience that I need not now enter into a particular disquisition about them.[1]

It must be owned that the claws of rapine and violence may in some degree be pared and blunted by the outward polity of a state. But should we not rather try, if possible, to pull them quite out? The evil effects of wickedness may be often redressed by public justice. But would it not be better to heal the source, and, by an inward principle, extirpate wickedness from the heart, rather than depend altogether on human laws for preventing or redressing the bad effects thereof? "I might (said the Chinese Doctor Confucius) hear and decide controversies as well as another: but what I would have is, that men should be brought to abstain from controversies out of an inward love and regard for each other."[2]

Too many in this age of free remarks and projects are delighted with republican schemes; and imagine they might remedy whatever was amiss, and render a people great and happy, merely by a new plan or form of government. This dangerous way of thinking and talking is grown familiar, through the foolish freedom of the times.[3] But, alas! those men do not seem to have touched either the true cause or cure of public evils. Be the plan ever so excellent, or the architects ever so able, yet no man in his wits would undertake to build a palace with mere mud or dirt. There must be fit materials; and without a religious principle men can never be fit materials for any society, much less for a republic. Religion is the centre which unites, and the cement which connects the several parts or members of the political body. Such it hath been held by all wise men, from the remotest times down to our ingenious contemporaries; who, if they are in the right, it must be admitted that all the rest of the world have been in the wrong.

From the knowledge of its being absolutely necessary to the government of a state that the hearts and minds of the people be inwardly imbued with good principles, Plato[4] tells

[1] See "Alciphron," Dial. iii. and iv.

[2] "Scientia Sinensis," lib. i., fol. 12.

[3] Men forget that liberty consists in a mean, or that there is any other extreme beside tyranny.

[4] In "Protagora."

that "Jupiter, to preserve the race of men from perishing, sent Mercury, with orders to introduce modesty and justice among them, as the firmest ties of human society; and without which it could not subsist." And elsewhere the same author[1] gives it plainly as his sense that "concerning those great duties which men's appetites and passions render difficult, it should seem rather the work of God to provide, than of human legislators, if it were possible to hope for a system of laws framed and promulgated by God himself." You see how agreeable the Mosaic and Christian institutions are to the wishes of the wisest heathen.

Moses, indeed, doth not insist on a future state, the common basis of all political institutions; nor do other lawgivers make a particular mention of all things necessary, but suppose some things as generally known or believed. The belief of a future state (which it is manifest the Jews were possessed of long before the coming of Christ) seems to have obtained among the Hebrews from primeval tradition; which might render it unnecessary for Moses to insist on that article. But the Sadducees and Epicureans had, in progress of time, gone so far towards rooting out this ancient and original sentiment that it was in danger of being lost, had it not been taught and promulgated in a new light by our blessed Saviour.

But many among us who would pass for assertors of truth and liberty are accustomed to rail at this, and all other established opinions, as prejudices which people are taught whether they will or no, and before they are able to distinguish whether they are right or wrong. These lovers of truth would do well to consider that, in political, moral, and religious matters, the opinions of the vulgar, whether they go in coaches, or walk on foot, are for the most part prejudices; and are so like to be whatever side of the question they embrace; whether they follow the old maxims of the religion of their country, or the modern instructions of their new masters. I have already observed that a point's being useful, and inculcated betimes, can be no argument of its falsehood, even although it should be a prejudice; far otherwise, utility and truth are not to be divided; the

[1] "De Legibus," lib. viii.

general good of mankind being the rule or measure of moral truth.[1]

I shall now add, that it is to be apprehended many of those who are the most forward to banish prejudices would be the first to feel the want of them. It is even pitiful to think what would become of certain modern declaimers on that article were prejudice really set aside, and were all men to be weighed in the exact scale of merit, and considered in proportion only to their intrinsic worth. Some prejudices are grounded in truth, reason, and nature. Such are the respects which are paid to knowledge, learning, age, honesty, and courage, in all civilized countries. Others are purely the effect of particular constitutions; such are the respects, rights, and preeminences ascribed to some men by their fellow-subjects, on account of their birth and quality; which, in the great empires of Turkey and China, pass for nothing; and will pass for nothing elsewhere, as soon as men have got rid of their prejudices, and learned to despise the constitutions of their country. It may behove those who are concerned to reflect on this betimes.

God, comprehending within himself the beginning, end, and middle of all things and times, exerts his energy throughout the whole creation. He never ceaseth to influence by instinct, by the light of nature, by his declared will. And it is the duty of magistrates and lawgivers to cultivate and encourage those Divine impressions in the minds of all men under their care. We are not to think it is the work of God, and therefore not to be seconded by human care. Far otherwise, for that very reason it claims our utmost care and diligence; it being the indispensable duty of all good men, throughout the whole course of their lives, to co-operate with the designs of Providence. In religion, as in nature, God doth somewhat, and somewhat is to be done on the part of man. He causeth the earth to bring forth materials for food and raiment; but human industry must improve, prepare, and properly apply both the one and the other, or mankind may perish with cold and hunger. And, according to this same analogy,[2] the principles of piety and religion, the things that belong to our salvation, although originally and

[1] See "Alciphron," Dial. i., sect. 16.

[2] It will be sufficient if such analogy appears between the dispensa-

primarily the work of God, yet require the protection of human government, as well as the furtherance and aid of all wise and good men.

And if religion in all governments be necessary, yet it seems to be so more especially in monarchies: forasmuch as the frugal manners and more equal fortunes in republics do not so much inflame men's appetites, or afford such power or temptation to mischief, as the high estate and great wealth of nobles under a king. Therefore, although the magistrate (as was already observed) hath for his peculiar object the temporal well being of the state, yet this will by no means exempt him from a due concern for the religion of his country.

What was the sense of our ancestors on this point appears throughout the whole constitution of these kingdoms; and, in order to justify this constitution, and the wisdom of those who framed it, I shall crave leave to make use of some unsuspected testimonies, ancient and modern, which will shew that the public care of a National Religion hath been always a most principal point in the esteem of wise men, however run down by the prevailing licence of our times.

The first testimony I shall produce is that of Zeleucus, the famous lawgiver of the Locrians, who, in his preamble to his laws,[1] begins with religion, laying it down as the corner-stone or foundation of his whole superstructure, "that every inhabitant, subject of the state, should be persuaded that there is a God and Divine Providence: that the only way of becoming dear to God is by endeavouring above all things to be good, both in deed and in will: that a worthy citizen is one that prefers integrity to wealth." He farther admonishes those who are difficult to persuade, "to bethink themselves of God's providence, and the punishments that await evil-doers; and in all their actions to be ever mindful of the last day as if it were present, or in case the devil[2] should tempt a man to sin, he exhorts such a one to frequent

tions of grace and nature, as may make it probable to suppose them derived from the same Author.—"Alciphron," Dial. vi., sect. 31.

[1] Stobæus, "De Leg. et Consuet.," Ser. 145.

[2] Δαίμων κακός.

the temples and altars, worshipping and imploring the Divine assistance."

Aristotle,[1] discoursing of the means to preserve a monarchy, admonishes the supreme magistrate, above all things, to shew himself zealous in religious matters; and this particularly for two reasons. "1. Because the subjects will have less to fear from one who fears God. 2. Because they will be less apt to rebel against him whom they take to be the favourite of Heaven." And elsewhere the same philosopher recommends the worship of the gods, as the first care of the state.[2]

Plato likewise begins his Laws with the care of religious rites. He even maintains religion or Divine worship, to be the chief aim and scope of human life.[3]

Hippodamus the Milesian,[4] in his scheme of a republic, allotted a third part of the land for maintaining Divine worship.[5]

The Roman historians and poets do so abound with passages ascribing the successes of their government to religion, and its declension to the want or neglect thereof, that it may seem impertinent to enter into a detail of what every school-boy knows.

To come from ancient to modern authority, Machiavel himself represents religion as absolutely necessary to maintain civil order and government. He observes, that for many years there was a most awful sense of religion in the old Romans; and that this did much facilitate their great undertakings. He likewise observes, and shews by divers instances, that the Romans were more afraid to break an oath than to transgress the laws; and that those things which even the love of their country and constitution could not bring them to, they were brought to through a sense of religion. Upon the whole he concludes, that old Rome was more obliged to Numa, who established a national religion, than to Romulus himself, the founder of that state.[6]

[1] "De Republ.," lib. v.
[2] *Ibid.*, lib. vii., cap. xvii.
[3] "De Leg.," lib. iv. et lib. vi.
[4] Arist., "De Republ.," lib. ii., cap. viii.
[5] The abolishing of the Christian religion upon a frugal principle must be bad policy, if we may judge what will be by what hath been in the great Pagan states of antiquity; whose religions, upon a fair estimate, will be found to have been more expensive.
[6] "Discorsi," lib. i., cap. xii.

And here by the by I shall take notice, that some may imagine the various forms and institutions of religion ought to unsettle men's minds with regard to the truth and certainty of any. But this matter rightly considered, will, I think, produce a contrary effect. It sheweth, indeed, that men groping out their way by the dim twilight of nature did only approach, some nearer, some farther off, while all were short of the truth. But then it sheweth likewise, upon the whole and in general, that religion is so natural to our minds, so useful to society, and of so necessary importance to the world, as might well prove its truth, and render it worthy of the Divine care to propagate by prophecies, miracles, and the mission of the Son of God.

Philip de Comines,[1] a wise statesman and honest writer, who had great experience in affairs, declares it to be his opinion, "that want of religious faith is the only fountain of all mischiefs."

And that able minister, the famous Monsieur Colbert, makes it his observation, "that if once the ecclesiastical character, as such, is vilified, the civil magistrate, even the crown itself, will, in consequence thereof, lose all authority."[2]

It would be no hard matter to produce a cloud of testimonies in behalf of a national religion, from the most eminent of our own writers; but I shall content myself with adding one only, and that from a very unsuspected writer, Mr. Harrington, author of the "Oceana," who shews that to be just and fair which others have shewed to be expedient. "A man (saith he) that, pleading for liberty of conscience, refuseth liberty to the national conscience, must be most absurd."[3] And again: "If the conviction of a man's private conscience produce his private religion, the conviction of the national conscience must produce a national religion."[4]

All these authorities are taken from thinking men and able politicians, none of which can be supposed to say what he did not really think; and it had been very easy to have increased the number. But I am sorry I was obliged to mention any at all, in proof of so plain and fundamental a point as that of a national religion. It is, indeed, a shameful

[1] "Hist.," b. v.
[2] "Test. Pol.," c. viii.
[3] P. 27, first edition.
[4] *Ibid.*

necessity we lie under, at proving at this time of the day the first elements, I will not say of Christianity, but even of natural light, from reasons and from authorities. The spirit of the times hath rendered this unavoidable.

If it should be asked after all, How comes it then to pass that the fashionable and prevailing maxims among our betters in a neighbouring nation should run directly counter to all such reasons and authorities? I will answer this question by asking, When were our neighbours known to abound to that degree in highwaymen, murderers, housebreakers, incendiaries? When did such numbers lay violent hands on themselves? When was there such a general and indecent contempt of whatever is esteemed sacred, in the state as well as the church? When were there known among them such public frauds, such open confederacies in villany, as the present age hath produced? When were they lower in the esteem of mankind, more divided at home, or more insulted abroad?

We of this land have a fatal tendency to overlook the good qualities, and imitate whatever is amiss in those whom we respect. This leads me to make some remarks on the modern spirit of reformation, that works so strongly in both these kingdoms.

Freedom of thought is the general plea and cry of the age; and we all grant that thinking is the way to know; and the more real knowledge there is in the land, the more likely it will be to thrive. We are not therefore against freedom of thought, but we are against those unthinking overbearing people,[1] who, in these odd times, under that pretence, set up for reformers, and new moulders of the constitution. We declare against those, who would seduce innocent and unexperienced persons from the reverence they owe to the laws and religion of their country; and, under the notion of extirpating prejudices, would erase from their minds all impressions of piety and virtue, in order to introduce prejudices of another kind, destructive of society.

We esteem it a horrible thing to laugh at the apprehen-

[1] It is not reason candidly proposed that offends, but the reviling, insulting, ridiculing, of the national laws and religion; all this profiteth for free-thinking, and must needs be offensive to all reasonable men.

sions of a future state, with the author of the "Characteristics;"[1] or, with him who wrote the "Fable of the Bees," to maintain that "moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride";[2] that "in morals there is no greater certainty than in fashions of dress";[3] that, indeed, "the doctrine of good manners teacheth men to speak well of all virtues; but requires no more of them in any age or country, than the outward appearance of those in fashion."[4] Two authors of infidel systems these, who, setting out upon opposite principles, are calculated to draw all mankind, by flattering either their vanity or their passions, into one or other system. And yet the people among whom such books are published wonder how it comes to pass that the civil magistrate daily loseth his authority, that the laws are trampled upon, and the subject in constant fear of being robbed and murdered, or having his house burnt over his head?

It may be presumed that the science of finding fault, which above all others is easiest to learn, suits best with a modern education. Too many there are of better fortunes than understandings, who have made the inquiry after truth a very small part of their care; these see somewhat, but not enough. It were to be wished they knew either less or more. One thing it is evident they do not know; to wit, that while they rail at prejudice, they are undoing themselves: they do not comprehend (what hath been before hinted), that their whole figure, their political existence, is owing to certain vulgar prejudices, in favour of birth, title, or fortune, which add nothing of real worth either to mind or body; and yet cause the most worthless person to be respected.

Freedom of thought is the prerogative of human kind; it is a quality inherent in the very nature of a thinking being. Nothing is more evident than that every one can think his own way, in spite of any outward force or power whatsoever. It is therefore ridiculous for any man to declaim in defence

[1] Vol. iii., "Miscel.," iii., cap. ii. (Shaftesbury).
[2] "Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue." Ed. vi., p. 37 (Mandeville).
[3] The author's "Remarks" on his "Fable of the Bees," p. 379.
[4] "Remarks," part ii., p. 155.

of a privilege which cannot be denied or taken from him. But this will not infer a boundless freedom of speech,[1] an open contempt of laws, and a prescribing from private judgment[2] against public authority, things never borne in any well-ordered state; and which make the crying distemper of our times.

The constitution of these kingdoms hath been one while overheated by the indiscreet zeal of one set of men: Again it hath been cold and lifeless through the indifference of another. We[3] have alternately felt the furious effects of superstition and fanaticism; and our present impending danger is from the setting up of private judgment, or an inward light in opposition to human and divine laws. Such an inward conceited principle always at work, and proceeding gradually and steadily, may be sufficient to dissolve any human fabric of polity or civil government. To pretend to be wiser than the laws hath never been suffered in any wise State, saith Aristotle.[4] And indeed what wise State would encourage or endure a spirit of opposition[5] publicly to operate against its own decrees? who can say to such a spirit, Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther?

The Magistrate, perhaps, may not be sufficiently aware that those pretended advocates for private light and free thought are in reality seditious men, who set up themselves against national laws and constitutions. And yet, one would think, all mankind might see, that the spirit which prevails against the Church and Religion proceeds from an opposition rather to the laws of the land than to the Gospel. Men quarrel not so vehemently against articles of Faith themselves, as against the establishing of such matters; which is the sole effect of law and the supreme power. It clearly

[1] Is there no difference between indulging scrupulous consciences, and tolerating public deriders of all conscience and religion?

[2] A man who is himself permitted to follow his own private judgment, cannot well complain, although he may not set it up as a public rule.

[3] There is a medium in things, which wise men find out, while the unwise are always blundering in extremes.

[4] "Rhet.," lib. i., cap. xv.

[5] Reason modestly pleading from a conscientious principle hath nothing cruel to apprehend from our laws, and I hope it never will. At the same time, it must be allowed, that every plea against law ought to be very meek and modest.

follows, the freedom pleaded for is not so much freedom of thought against the doctrines of the Gospel as freedom of speech and action against the laws of the land. It is strange, that those who are not blind in other matters, should yet not see this; or, that seeing it, they should not discern the consequences thereof.[1]

I am sensible, that whatever looks like a restraint on freedom of inquiry, must be very disagreeable to all reasoning and inquisitive men. But against this I have said nothing.[2] On the contrary, I will freely own, a judicious and impartial search after truth is the most valuable employment of the mind. Those who have the talents, and will be at the pains, cannot do better than engage in that noble pursuit. But those who are not qualified by age or education; those who have neither disposition nor leisure, nor faculties to dig in the mine of truth themselves, must take it as retailed out by others. I see no remedy. God, who knows the opportunities of every man, requires impossibilities from no man. And where there is a sincere love of truth and virtue, the grace of God can easily supply the defect of human means.

It hath been before observed, and shewed at large, that the bulk of mankind must have their minds betimes imbued with good and wholesome notions or principles, by their parents, pastors, and tutors, or else bad notions, hurtful to themselves and others, will undoubtedly take possession thereof. Such bad notions have, for several years past, been propagated with uncommon industry in these kingdoms: they now bring forth fruit every day more and more abundant. It is to be feared that what hath been long ripening is now near ripe. Many are the signs and tokens. He that runs may read.

But there cannot be a higher or more flagrant symptom of the madness of our times than that execrable Fraternity of Blasphemers, lately set up within this city of Dublin. Blasphemy against God is a great crime against the state. But that a set of men should, in open contempt of the laws, make this very crime their profession, distinguish themselves

[1] The last two paragraphs were omitted—doubtless by mistake—from the reprint of this tract in the Dublin "Miscellany" (1752).—ED.

[2] The profane and lawless scorner is one thing, and the modest inquirer after truth another.

by a peculiar name,[1] and form a distinct Society, whereof the proper and avowed business shall be, to shock all serious Christians by the most impious and horrid blasphemies, uttered in the most public manner: this surely must alarm all thinking men. It is a new thing under the sun reserved for our worthy times and country.

It is no common blasphemy I speak of: it is not simple cursing and swearing: it is not the effect either of habit or surprise; but a train of studied, deliberate indignities against the Divine Majesty; and those of so black and hellish a kind as the tongues alone which uttered them can duly characterize and express. This is no speculative heresy, no remote or doubtful inference from an author's tenets. It is a direct and open attack on God himself. It is such a calm premeditated insult upon religion, law, and the very light of nature that there is no sect or nation of men, whether Christians, Jews, Mahometans, or even civilized heathens, that would not be struck with horror and amazement at the thought of it, and that would not animadvert[2] on its authors with the utmost severity.

Deliberate, atheistical blasphemy, is of all crimes most dangerous to the public, inasmuch as it opens the door to all other crimes, and virtually contains them all; a religious awe and fear of God, being (as we have already observed) the centre that unites, and the cement that connects all human society. He who makes it his business to lessen or root out from the minds of men this principle doth in effect endeavour to fill his country with highwaymen, housebreakers, murderers, fraudulent dealers, perjured witnesses, and every other pest of society. Therefore, it would be the greatest cruelty to our children, neighbours, and country to connive at such a crime; a crime which hath no natural passion or temptation to plead for it, but is the pure effect of an abandoned impudence in wickedness; and, perhaps, of a mistaken hope that the laws and magistrates are asleep.

The question is not now, whether religion shall be estab-

[1] Blasters.

[2] They (if there be any such) who think to serve the Reformation, by joining with Blasters and devil-worshippers in a plea for licence, are in truth a scandal and reproach to the Protestant cause.

lished by law: the thing is already done (and done with good reason, as appeareth from the premises), but whether a reverence[1] for the laws shall be preserved. Religion, considered as a system of saving truths, hath its sanction from heaven; its rewards and penalties are divine. But religion, as useful and necessary to society, hath been wisely established by law; and so established, and wrought into the very frame and principles of our government, is become a main part of the civil constitution. Our laws are the laws of a Christian country: our government hath been constituted and modelled by Christians; and is still administered and maintained by men professing belief in Christ. Can it then be supposed that impious men shall with impunity invent[2] and publicly utter the most horrid blasphemies; and, at the same time the whole constitution not be endangered? Or can it be supposed that magistrates, or men invested with power, should look on, and see the most sacred part of our constitution trampled under foot, and yet imagine their own dignity and authority to be secure, which rest entirely thereupon? I will venture to say that whoever is a wise man, and a lover of his country, will not only be solicitous to preserve the honour of God sacred and entire; he will even discourage that prevailing prejudice against the dispensers of God's word, the teachers of those salutary doctrines, without which the public cannot thrive or subsist. He will be no contemner, not even of those rites and ordinances enjoined by law, as necessary to imprint and retain a sense of religion in the minds of men. He will extend his care to the outworks, as knowing that when these are gone, it may be difficult to preserve the rest.

Notwithstanding the vain assertion of those men who would justify the present by saying "all times are alike," it is most evident that the magistrates, the laws, the very constitution of these realms have lost no small share of their authority and reverence, since this great growth and spreading

[1] They who plead a right to contradict the laws, can pretend none for doing it with insolence or disrespect.

[2] To make the cause of such men the cause of liberty or toleration would be monstrous. A man is not suffered publicly to blaspheme, therefore he may not think freely: a profane miscreant is not indulged in the public worship of the devil, therefore a conscientious person may not serve God his own way;—is not this absurd?

of impious principles. Whatever be the cause, the effect is apparent. Whether we ascribe it to the natural course of things, or to a just judgment upon those who, having been careless to preserve a due sense of the Divine authority, have seen and shall see their own despised.

Darius, a heathen prince, made a decree, that in every dominion of his kingdom men should tremble and fear before God (Dan. vi. 26). Nebuchadnezzar, likewise, another heathen, made a decree, that every people, nation, language which spoke anything amiss against God should be cut in pieces, and their houses made a dunghill (Dan. iii. 29). And if these things were done in Persia and Babylon, surely it may be expected that impious blasphemers against God and his worship should at least be discouraged and put out of countenance in these Christian countries. Now, a constant course of disfavour from men in authority would prove a most effectual check to all such miscreants. When, therefore, they are public and bold in their blasphemies, this is no small reflection on those who might check them if they would.

It is not so much the execution of the laws as the countenance of those in authority that is wanting to the maintenance of religion. If men of rank and power, who have a share in distributing justice, and a voice in the public councils, shall be observed to neglect divine worship themselves, it must needs be a great temptation for others to do the same. But if they and their families should set a good example, it may be presumed that men of less figure would be disposed to follow it. Fashions are always observed to descend, and people are generally fond of being in the fashion; whence one would be apt to suspect the prevailing contempt of God's word, and estrangement from his house, to a degree that was never known in any Christian country, must take its rise from the irreligion and bad example of those who are styled "the better sort."

Offences must come, but woe be to him by whom the offence cometh. A man who is entrusted with power and influence in his country hath much to answer for, if religion and virtue suffer through want of his authority and countenance. But, in case he should, by the vanity of his discourse, his favour to wicked men, or his own apparent

neglect of all religious duties, countenance what he ought to condemn, and authorize by his own example what he ought to punish; such a one, whatever he may pretend, is in fact a bad patriot, a bad citizen, and a bad subject, as well as a bad Christian.

Our prospect is very terrible, and the symptoms grow stronger every day. The morals of a people are in this like their fortunes; when they feel a national shock, the worst doth not shew itself immediately. Things make a shift to subsist for a time on the credit of old notions and dying opinions. But the youth born and brought up in wicked times, without any bias to good from early principle or instilled opinion, when they grow ripe must be monsters indeed. And it is to be feared, that age of monsters is not far off.

Whence this impiety springs, by what means it gains ground among us, and how it may be remedied, are matters that deserve the attention of all those who have the power and the will to serve their country. And although many things look like a prelude to general ruin; although it is much to be apprehended, we shall be worse before we are better; yet who knows what may ensue, if all persons in power, from the supreme executor of the law down to a petty constable, would, in their several stations, behave themselves like men truly conscious and mindful that the authority they are clothed with is but a ray derived from the supreme authority of Heaven? This may not a little contribute to stem that torrent, which, from small beginnings, and under specious pretences, hath grown to such a head, and daily gathers force more and more, to that degree as threatens a general inundation and destruction of these realms.

SIRIS

1744

[" SIRIS " is one of the most extraordinary books ever written; certainly the most amazing work in the literature of British philosophy. Berkeley had heard of medicinal uses of tar-water during his residence in America; he tried it during an epidemical sickness at Cloyne, found it successful, and wrote this book to recommend its general use. From the sober details of its concoction he passes by almost insensible gradations to consider the reasons for its success; then to speculate on the ideas suggested by these reasons; and so we are led upward step by step through cloudy speculation till the limit of human knowledge alone bars the dizzy progress. Thus at the beginning the reader is told to pour water on tar and stir it with a stick; and at the end he is asked to contemplate the essential trinity of the Universe. The reader is never conscious of this progress; the amazing flight is accomplished by unforced connection in a " chain " of " subjects arising one from another." (See a note on page 335 on this idea of a chain.)

The book first appeared in 1744 as " A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions, etc.; " its present title (" Siris," from σειρά, a chain) being added to the second edition which appeared, as did the third, in the same year. Fourth and fifth editions were called for in 1746 and 1748. Thus the work sold largely. Not only did people buy the book, they drank the tar-water. It became a common beverage to both rich and poor, and its rapid sale alarmed the physicians. They denounced it vigorously, thereby, as one cynic said, proving its value beyond all question. Pamphlets of attack and defence soon gathered round it, and indeed, it is scarcely possible to find a specimen of the more intimate literature of the period which does not make some reference to the " epidemical madness of drinking tar-water." Nor did the seas confine the influence of the book, for Thomas Prior tells us that " Siris," or the medical portion of it, was translated into French, German, Dutch, and Portuguese. The craze abated; and " Siris " was forgotten until people gradually came to discover that the work contained matter of more value than instructions for the making of tar-water.

It is impossible within the narrow limits of an edition like this to add any notes. " Siris " must be fully annotated or not at all. The reader, however, may be urged to consult the second volume of Professor Fraser's " Berkeley," where the work will be found treated equally with reserve and completeness in a manner hardly to be surpassed.

" Siris " is among the greatest of Berkeley's works; yet it is not to be numbered with the more closely reasoned works of his earlier years. It is rather the unstudied murmurings of a cultured and persuasive philosopher who in the evening of his life has fallen a-musing. One would as soon turn to Sir Thomas Browne for exact science as to " Siris; " but who seeks in " Siris " delicate food for meditation will not seek in vain. The actual value of its speculations may not be great; yet the whole range of Berkeley's works contains nothing more completely characteristic of its author; more subtle and suggestive in matter and more harmonious and splendid in style.]

A

CHAIN

OF

Philoſophical Reflexions

AND

INQUIRIES

Concerning the VIRTUES of

TAR-WATER,

And divers other SUBJECTS connected together and ariſing one from another.

By the Rev. Dr. GEORGE BERKLEY, Lord Biſhop of *Cloyne*, and Author of *the Minute Philoſopher.*

As we have opportunity let us do good unto all men.
GAL. vi. 10.
Hoc opus hoc ſtudium parvi properemus et ampli. HOR.

LONDON:

Printed for C. HITCH, in *Paternoſter-Row*; and C. DAVIS, in *Holborn*, againſt *Gray's-Inn-Gate.*

MDCCXLIV.

SIRIS:

A CHAIN of

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLEXIONS

AND

INQUIRIES

Concerning the VIRTUES of

TAR WATER,

And divers other *Subjects* connected together and ariſing one from another.

BY THE

Right Rev. Dr. GEORGE BERKELEY,
Lord Biſhop of CLOYNE,
And Author of *The Minute Philoſopher*.

As we have opportunity let us do good unto all men. Gal. vi. 10.
Hoc opus, hoc ſtudium, parvi properemus et ampli. Hor.

A NEW EDITION,
With ADDITIONS and EMENDATIONS.

DUBLIN Printed,
LONDON Re-printed,
For W. INNYS, and C. HITCH, in *Pater-noſter-row*
and C. DAVIS in *Holbourn*. MDCCXLIV.
[Price Two Shillings.]

CONTENTS.[1]

	SECT.
Tar-water, how made	1
How much to be taken at a time	3, 116, 217
How long to be continued	110
How made palatable	115
A preservative and preparative against the small-pox	2
Useful in it	74, 83
A cure for foulness of blood, ulceration of bowels, lungs, consumptive coughs, pleurisy, peripneumony, erysipelas, asthma, indigestion, cachectic and hysteric cases, gravel, dropsy, and all inflammations	4-7
Answers all the purposes of elixir proprietatis, Stoughton's drops, best turpentine, decoction of the woods, and mineral waters	53, 61-65
And of the most costly balsams	21, 22, 62, 63
May be given to children	67
Of great use in the gout	68, 80
In fevers	75-77
Cures a gangrene as well as erysipelas	82, 83
The scurvy, and all hypochondriac maladies	86-109
Whence this English malady proceeds	88, 89
High food how prejudicial	66, 104
More particularly spirituous liquors	103-109
A preservative for the teeth and gums	114
Is particularly recommended to seafaring persons, ladies, and men of studious and sedentary lives	117-119
Its specific virtues consist in its volatile salts	8, 123
Tar preserves trees from the biting of goats and other injuries	9
Its virtues heretofore known, but only in part	9, 11, 111
Tar, whence produced	10-17
Resin, whence	18, 19
Turpentine, what	20
Tar mixed with honey, a cure for the cough	21
Resin, an effectual cure for the bloody-flux	79
Recommended to vintners to medicate their wines with	111
Scotch firs what, and how they might be improved	25
Pine and fir, different species of each	26-28

[1] This table is not contained in the first edition.—ED.

SECT.

The wonderful structure of trees 29-38
Juices produced with the least violence best. 46
Myrrh soluble by the human body would prolong life . . 49
Tar-water, by what means and in what manner it operates . 50-57
Is a soap at once and a vinegar 59
Soap, opium, and mercury, though they bid fair for Universal Medicines, in what respects dangerous 69-71
Aromatic flavours of vegetables depend on light as much as colours 40, 162, 214, 215
Analogy between the specific qualities of vegetable juices and colours 165, 181
A fine subtile spirit, the distinguishing principle of all vegetables 121
What the principle of vegetation, and how promoted . . 126-128
Theory of acids, salts, and alkalies 129-136, 227
Air the common seminary of all vivifying principles . . 137-144
Air, of what it consists 145-151, 195-197
Pure æther or invisible fire, the Spirit of the Universe, which operates in everything 152-162
The world how understood to be an animal. 152-156, 166, 175, 261, 262, 273-279
Opinion of the ancients concerning it 166-179, 229
And of the Chinese, conformable to them 180-182
What meant by the forms of the Peripatetics . . . 167, 310
Fire worshipped among various nations 183, 185
Opinion of the best modern chemists concerning it . . 189, 190
Ultimately the only menstruum in nature 191
Adds to the weight of bodies, and even gold made by the introduction of it into quicksilver 169, 192-196
Pure elementary fire, how inherent in bodies without being subject to the senses 198-201
Opinion of Hippocrates, and Dr. Willis of a vital flame . 204, 205
The theory of Ficinus and others concerning light . . 206-213
Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis of a subtile æther examined . 221-228, 237, 246
No accounting for phænomena, either by attraction and repulsion, or by elastic æther, without the presence of an incorporeal agent 231-238, 246-249, 294-297
The doctrine of all things unfolding themselves from seeds ill founded 233
More ancient than many are aware 282
Nature better explained by attraction than by Des Cartes' principles of size and figure 243, 244
Attraction in some degree discovered by Galilæi . . . 245
Phænomena are but appearances in the soul, not to be accounted for upon mechanical principles . . 251, 252, 310
The ancients not ignorant of many things in physics and metaphysics which we think the discovery of modern times 265-269
Had some advantages beyond us. 298
Of absolute space, and fate. 270-273

SECT.
Of the *anima mundi* of Plato 276-284, 322
What meant by the Egyptian Isis and Osiris . . . 268, 299
Plato and Aristotle's threefold distinction of objects . . 306, 307
Their opinion of ideas being innate, or not 308, 309
Neither of them believed the absolute existence of corporeal things 311, 312, 316-318
The study of the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras would have secured the minds of men from that selfishness which the mechanic philosophy has introduced . 331, 332
The study of Plato recommended 332, 338
Who agrees with Scripture in many particulars . . . 339
His opinion of the Deity, and particularly of a Trinity, agreeable to revelation 341-365

SIRIS;

A CHAIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLEXIONS AND INQUIRIES, ETC.

FOR introduction to the following piece, I assure the reader that nothing could, in my present situation, have induced me to be at the pains of writing it, but a firm belief that it would prove a valuable present to the public. What entertainment soever the reasoning or notional part may afford the mind, I will venture to say, the other part seemeth so surely calculated to do good to the Body that both must be gainers. For, if the lute be not well tuned, the musician fails of his harmony. And, in our present state, the operations of the mind so far depend on the right tone or good condition of its instrument, that anything which greatly contributes to preserve or recover the health of the body is well worth the attention of the mind. These considerations have moved me to communicate to the public the salutary virtues of tar-water; to which I thought myself indispensably obliged by the duty every man owes to mankind. And, as effects are linked with their causes, my thoughts on this low but useful theme led to farther inquiries, and those on to others, remote perhaps and speculative, but I hope not altogether useless or unentertaining.

---

1. In certain parts of America, tar-water is made by putting a quart of cold water to a quart of tar, and stirring them well together in a vessel, which is left standing till the tar sinks to the bottom. A glass of water, being poured off for a draught, is replaced by the same quantity of fresh water, the vessel being shaken and left to stand as before. And this is repeated for every glass, so long as the tar continues to

impregnate the water sufficiently, which appears by the smell and taste. But, as this method produceth tar-water of a nauseous kind, and different degrees of strength, I choose to make it in the following manner: Pour a gallon of cold water on a quart of tar, and stir, work, and mix them thoroughly together, with a wooden ladle or flat stick, for the space of five or six minutes; after which the vessel must stand close covered and unmoved three days and nights, that the tar may have full time to subside; and then the clear water, having been first carefully skimmed without shaking the vessel, is to be poured off, and kept in bottles well stopped for use,[1] no more being made from the same tar, which may still serve for common uses.[2]

2. The cold infusion of tar hath been used in some of our Colonies, as a preservative or preparative against the small-pox, which foreign practice induced me to try it in my own neighbourhood, when the small-pox raged with great violence. And the trial fully answered my expectation: all those within my knowledge who took the tar-water having either escaped that distemper, or had it very favourably. In one family there was a remarkable instance of seven children, who came all very well through the small-pox, except one young child which could not be brought to drink tar-water as the rest had done.

3. Several were preserved from taking the small-pox by the use of this liquor; others had it in the mildest manner; and others, that they might be able to take the infection, were obliged to intermit drinking the tar-water. I have found it may be drunk with great safety and success for any length of time, and this not only before, but also during the distemper. The general rule for taking it is about half a pint night and morning on an empty stomach, which quantity

[1] I make this water stronger than that first prescribed in "Siris," having found, on more general experience, that five or six minutes' stirring, when the water is carefully cleared and skimmed, agrees with most stomachs.

[2] In the first edition the directions for use are as follows: "Pour a gallon of cold water on a quart of tar, and stir and mix them thoroughly with a ladle or flat stick for the space of three or four minutes; after which the vessel must stand eight and forty hours that the tar may have time to subside, when the clear water is to be poured off and kept for use, no more," etc.—ED.

may be varied, according to the case and age of the patient, provided it be always taken on an empty stomach, and about two hours before or after a meal.[1] For children and squeamish persons it may be made weaker, or given little and often; more water or less stirring makes it weaker, as less water or more stirring makes it stronger. It should not be lighter than French, nor deeper coloured than Spanish white wine. If a spirit be not very sensibly perceived on drinking, either the tar must have been bad, or already used, or the tar-water carelessly made or kept. Particular experience will best shew how much and how strong the stomach can bear, and what are the properest times for taking it. I apprehend no danger from excess in the use of this medicine.

4. It seemed probable that a medicine of such efficacy in a distemper attended with so many purulent ulcers might be also useful in other foulnesses of the blood; accordingly, I tried it on several persons infected with cutaneous eruptions and ulcers, who were soon relieved, and soon after cured. Encouraged by these successes, I ventured to advise it in the foulest distempers, wherein it proved much more successful than salivations and wood drinks had done.

5. Having tried it in a great variety of cases, I found it succeeded beyond my hopes:—in a tedious and painful ulceration of the bowels; in a consumptive cough, and (as appeared by expectorated pus) an ulcer in the lungs; in a pleurisy and peripneumony. And when a person who for some years had been subject to erysipelatous fevers perceived the usual forerunning symptoms to come on, I advised her to drink tar-water, which prevented the erysipelas.

6. I never knew anything so good for the stomach as tar-water: it cures indigestion and gives a good appetite. It is an excellent medicine in an asthma. It imparts a kindly warmth and quick circulation to the juices without heating, and is therefore useful, not only as a pectoral and balsamic, but also as a powerful and safe deobstruent in cachetic and hysteric cases. As it is both healing and diuretic, it is very good for the gravel. I believe it to be of great use in dropsy,

[1] What follows to "made or kept" (eight lines) appears first in the third edition; the remainder of the section was added to the last edition.—ED.

having known it cure a very bad anarsaca in a person whose thirst, though very extraordinary, was in a short time removed by the drinking of tar-water.

7. The usefulness of this medicine in inflammatory cases is evident, from what has been already observed. (Sect. 5.) And yet some perhaps may suspect that, as the tar itself is sulphureous, tar-water must be of a hot and inflaming nature. But it is to be noted that all balsams contain an acid spirit, which is in truth a volatile salt. Water is a menstruum that dissolves all sorts of salts, and draws them from their subjects. Tar, therefore, being a balsam, its salutary acid is extracted by water; which yet is incapable of dissolving its gross resinous parts, whose proper menstruum is spirit of wine. Therefore tar-water, not being impregnated with resin, may be safely used in inflammatory cases: and in fact it hath been found an admirable febrifuge, at once the safest cooler and cordial.

8. The volatile salts separated by infusion from tar, may be supposed to contain its specific virtues. Mr. Boyle and other later chemists are agreed that fixed salts are much the same in all bodies. But it is well known that volatile salts do greatly differ, and the easier they are separated from the subject, the more do they possess of its specific qualities. Now, the most easy separation is by the infusion of tar in cold water, which to smell and taste shewing itself well impregnated may be presumed to extract and retain the most pure volatile and active particles of that vegetable balsam.

9. Tar was by the ancients esteemed good against poisons, ulcers, the bites of venomous creatures; also for phthisical, scrofulous, paralytic, and asthmatic persons. But the method of rendering it an inoffensive medicine and agreeable to the stomach by extracting its virtues in cold water, was unknown to them. The leaves and tender tops of pine and fir are in our times used for diet drinks, and allowed to be antiscorbutic and diuretic. But the most elaborate juice, salt, and spirit of these evergreens, are to be found in tar; whose virtues extend not to animals alone, but also to vegetables. Mr. Evelyn, in his treatise on "Forest Trees," observes with wonder, that stems of trees, smeared over with tar, are pre-

served thereby from being hurt by the invenomed teeth of goats, and other injuries, while every other thing of an unctuous nature is highly prejudicial to them.

10. It seems that tar and turpentine may be had, more or less, from all sorts of pines and firs whatsoever; and that the native spirits and essential salts of those vegetables are the same in turpentine and common tar. In effect, this vulgar tar, which cheapness and plenty may have rendered contemptible, appears to be an excellent balsam, containing the virtues of most other balsams; which it easily imparts to water, and by that means readily and inoffensively insinuates them into the habit of the body.

11. The resinous exudations of pines and firs are an important branch of the materia medica, and not only useful in the prescriptions of physicians, but have been also thought otherwise conducive to health. Pliny tells us that wines in the time of the old Romans were medicated with pitch and resin; and Jonstonus in his "Dendrographia" observes, that it is wholesome to walk in groves of pine-trees, which impregnate the air with balsamic particles. That all turpentines and resins are good for the lungs, against gravel also and obstructions, is no secret. And that the medicinal properties of those drugs are found in tar-water, without heating the blood, or disordering the stomach, is confirmed by experience; and particularly, that phthisical and asthmatic persons receive speedy and great relief from the use of it.

12. Balsams, as all unctuous and oily medicines, create a nauseating in the stomach. They cannot therefore be taken in substance so much or so long as to produce all those salutary effects, which, if thoroughly mixed with the blood and juices, they would be capable of producing. It must therefore be a thing of great benefit to be able to introduce any requisite quantity of their volatile parts into the finest ducts and capillaries, so as not to offend the stomach, but, on the contrary, to comfort and strengthen it in a great degree.

13. According to Pliny, liquid pitch (as he calls it) or tar was obtained by setting fire to billets of old fat pines or firs. The first running was tar, the latter or thicker running was

pitch. Theophrastus is more particular: he tells us the Macedonians made huge heaps of the cloven trunks of those trees, wherein the billets were placed erect beside each other: that such heaps or piles of wood were sometimes a hundred and eighty cubits round, and sixty or even a hundred high: and that, having covered them with sods of earth to prevent the flame from bursting forth (in which case the tar was lost), they set on fire those huge heaps of pine or fir, letting the tar and pitch run out in a channel.

14. Pliny saith, it was customary for the ancients to hold fleeces of wool over the steam of boiling tar, and squeeze the moisture from them, which watery substance was called *pissinum*. Ray will have this to be the same with the *pisselæum* of the ancients; but Hardouin, in his notes on Pliny, thinks the *pisselæum* to have been produced from the cones of cedars. What use they made of these liquors anciently I know not; but it may be presumed they were used in medicine, though at present, for aught I can find, they are not used at all.

15. From the manner of procuring tar (sect. 13) it plainly appears to be a natural production, lodged in the vessels of the tree, whence it is only freed and let loose (not made) by burning. If we may believe Pliny, the first running or tar was called *cedrium*, and was of such efficacy to preserve from putrefaction that in Egypt they embalmed dead bodies with it. And to this he ascribes their mummies continuing uncorrupted for so many ages.

16. Some modern writers inform us that tar flows from the trunks of pines and firs, when they are very old, through incisions made in the bark near the root; that pitch is tar inspissated; and both are the oil of the tree grown thick and ripened with age and sun. The trees, like old men, being unable to perspire, and their secretory ducts obstructed, they are, as one may say, choked and stuffed with their own juice.

17. The method used by our Colonies in America for making tar and pitch is in effect the same with that of the ancient Macedonians; as appears from the account given in the "Philosophical Transactions." And the relation of Leo Africanus, who describes, as an eye-witness, the making of tar on Mount Atlas, agrees in substance with the methods

used by the Macedonians of old, and the people of New England at this day.

18. Jonstonus, in his "Dendrographia," is of opinion, that pitch was anciently made of cedar, as well as of the pine and fir grown old and oily. It should seem indeed that one and the same word was used by the ancients in a large sense, so as to comprehend the juices issuing from all those trees. Tar and all sorts of exudations from evergreens are, in a general acceptation, included under the name resin. Hard coarse resin or dry pitch is made from tar, by letting it blaze till the moisture is spent. Liquid resin is properly an oily viscid juice oozing from the bark of evergreen trees, either spontaneously or by incision. It is thought to be the oil of the bark inspissated by the sun. As it issues from the tree it is liquid, but becomes dry and hard, being condensed by the sun or by fire.

19. According to Theophrastus, resin was obtained by stripping off the bark from pines, and by incisions made in the silver fir and the pitch pine. The inhabitants of Mount Ida, he tells us, stripped the trunk of the pine on the sunny side two or three cubits from the ground. He observes that a good pine might be made to yield resin every year; an indifferent every other year; and the weaker trees once in three years; and that three runnings were as much as a tree could bear. It is remarked by the same author that a pine doth not at once produce fruit and resin, but the former only in its youth, the latter in its old age.

20. Turpentine is a fine resin. Four kinds of this are in use. The turpentine of Chios or Cyprus, which flows from the turpentine tree: the Venice turpentine, which is got by piercing the larch tree: the Strasburgh turpentine, which Mr. Ray informs us is procured from the knots of the silver fir; it is fragrant and grows yellow with age: the fourth kind is common turpentine, neither transparent nor so liquid as the former; and this Mr. Ray taketh to flow from the mountain pine. All these turpentines are useful in the same intentions. Theophrastus saith, the best resin or turpentine is got from the *terebinthus* growing in Syria and some of the Greek islands. The next best from the silver fir and pitch pine.

21. Turpentine is on all hands allowed to have great

medicinal virtues. Tar and its infusion contain those virtues. Tar-water is extremely pectoral and restorative; and, if I may judge from what experience I have had, it possesseth the most valuable qualities ascribed to the several balsams of Peru, of Tolu, of Capivi, and even to the balm of Gilead, such is its virtue in asthmas and pleurisies, in obstructions and ulcerous erosions of the inward parts. Tar in substance mixed with honey I have found an excellent medicine for coughs. Balsams, as hath been already observed, are apt to offend the stomach, but tar-water may be taken without offending the stomach. For the strengthening whereof it is the best medicine I have ever tried.

22. The folly of man rateth things by their scarceness, but Providence hath made the most useful things most common. Among those liquid oily extracts from trees and shrubs which are termed balsams, and valued for medicinal virtues, tar may hold its place as a most valuable balsam. Its fragrancy sheweth that it is possessed of active qualities, and its oiliness that it is fitted to retain them. This excellent balsam may be purchased for a penny a pound, whereas the balsam of Judea, when most plenty, was sold on the very spot that produced it, for double its weight in silver, if we may credit Pliny; who also informs us, that the best balsam of Judea flowed only from the bark, and that it was adulterated with resin and oil of turpentine. Now, comparing the virtues I have experienced in tar with those I find ascribed to the precious balm of Judea, of Gilead, or of Mecha, (as it is diversely called), I am of opinion that the latter is not a medicine of more value or efficacy than the former.

23. Pliny supposed amber to be a resin, and to distil from some species of pine—which he gathered from its smell. Nevertheless, its being dug out of the earth shews it to be a fossil, though of a very different kind from other fossils. But thus much is certain, that the medicinal virtues of amber are to be found in the balsamic juices of pines and firs. Particularly the virtues of the most valuable preparation, I mean salt of amber, are in a great degree answered by tar-water, as a detergent, diaphoretic, and diuretic.

24. There is, as hath been already observed, more or less oil and balsam in all evergreen trees, which retains the acid

spirit, that principle of life and verdure; the not retaining whereof in sufficient quantity causeth other plants to droop and wither. Of these evergreen trees productive of resin, pitch and tar, Pliny enumerates six kinds in Europe; Jonstonus reckons up thrice that number of the pine and fir family. And, indeed, their number, their variety, and their likeness, make it difficult to be exact.

25. It is remarked, both by Theophrastus and Jonstonus, that trees growing in low and shady places do not yield so good tar as those which grow in higher and more exposed situations. And Theophrastus farther observes, that the inhabitants of Mount Ida in Asia, who distinguish the Idean pine from the maritime, affirm, that the tar flowing from the former is in greater plenty, as well as more fragrant than the other. Hence, it should seem the pines or firs in the mountains of Scotland might be employed that way, and rendered valuable; even where the timber, by its remoteness from water carriage, is of small value. What we call the Scotch fir is falsely so called, being in truth a wild forest pine, and (as Mr. Ray informs us) agreeing much with the description of a pine growing on Mount Olympus in Phrygia, probably the only place where it is found out of these islands; in which of late years it is so much planted and cultivated with so little advantage, while the cedar of Lebanon might perhaps be raised, with little more trouble, and much more profit and ornament.

26. The pines, which differ from the firs in the length and disposition of their leaves and hardness of the wood, do not, in Pliny's account, yield so much resin as the fir-trees. Several species of both are accurately described and delineated by the naturalists. But they all agree so far as to seem related. Theophrastus gives the preference to that resin which is got from the silver fir and pitch-tree (ἐλάτη and πίτυς) before that yielded by the pine, which yet he saith is in greater plenty. Pliny, on the contrary, affirms that the pine produceth the smallest quantity. It should seem therefore that the interpreter of Theophrastus might have been mistaken, in rendering πεύκη by *pinus*; as well as Jonstonus, who likewise takes the pine for the πεύκη of Theophrastus. Hardouin will have the pinus of Pliny to have been by others called πεύκη, but by Theophrastus πίτυς. Ray thinks

the common fir, or *picea* of the Latins, to be the male fir of Theophrastus. This was probably the spruce fir; for the *picea*, according to Pliny, yields much resin, loves a cold and mountainous situation, and is distinguished, *tonsili facilitate*, by its fitness to be shorn, which agrees with the spruce-fir, whereof I have seen close-shorn hedges.

27. There seems to have been some confusion in the naming of these trees, as well among the ancients as the moderns. The ancient Greek and Latin names are by later authors applied very differently. Pliny himself acknowledgeth it is not easy even for the skilful to distinguish the trees by their leaves, and know their sexes and kinds; and that difficulty is since much increased, by the discovery of many new species of that evergreen tribe, growing in various parts of the globe. But descriptions are not so easily misapplied as names. Theophrastus tells that πίτυς differeth from πεύκη among other things, in that it is neither so tall nor so straight, nor hath so large a leaf. The fir he distinguisheth into male and female: the latter is softer timber than the male; it is also a taller and fairer tree, and this is probably the silver fir.

28. To say no more on this obscure business, which I leave to the critics, I shall observe that according to Theophrastus not only the turpentine-trees, the pines, and the firs yield resin or tar, but also the cedars and palm-trees; and the words *pix* and *resina* are taken by Pliny in so large a sense as to include the weepings of the lentiscus and cypress, and the balms of Arabia and Judea; all which perhaps are near of kin, and in their most useful qualities concur with common tar, especially the Norwegian, which is the most liquid, and best for medicinal uses of any that I have experienced. Those trees that grow on mountains, exposed to the sun or the north wind, are reckoned by Theophrastus to produce the best and purest tar; and the Idæan pines were distinguished from those growing on the plain, as yielding a thinner, sweeter, and better scented tar, all which differences I think I have observed, between the tar that comes from Norway, and that which comes from low and swampy countries.

29. Agreeable to the old observation of the Peripatetics, that heat gathereth homogeneous things, and disperseth

such as are heterogeneous, we find Chemistry is fitted for the analysis of bodies. But the chemistry of nature is much more perfect than that of human art, inasmuch as it joineth to the power of heat that of the most exquisite mechanism. Those who have examined the structure of trees and plants by microscopes have discovered an admirable variety of fine capillary tubes and vessels, fitted for several purposes, as the imbibing or attracting of proper nourishment, the distributing thereof through all parts of the vegetable, the discharge of superfluities, the secretion of particular juices. They are found to have ducts answering to the tracheæ in animals, for the conveying of air; they have others answering to lacteals, arteries, and veins. They feed, digest, respire, perspire, and generate their kind, and are provided with organs nicely fitted for all those uses.

30. The sap vessels are observed to be fine tubes running up through the trunk from the root. Secretory vessels are found in the bark, buds, leaves, and flowers. Exhaling vessels, for carrying off excrementitious parts, are discovered throughout the whole surface of the vegetable. And (though this point be not so well agreed) Dr. Grew, in his "Anatomy of Plants," thinks there appears a circulation of the sap, moving downwards in the root, and feeding the trunk upwards.

31. Some difference indeed there is between learned men, concerning the proper use of certain parts of vegetables. But, whether the discoverers have rightly guessed at all their uses or no, thus much is certain—that there are innumerable fine and curious parts in a vegetable body, and a wonderful similitude or analogy between the mechanism of plants and animals. And perhaps some will think it not unreasonable to suppose the mechanism of plants more curious than even that of animals, if we consider not only the several juices secreted by different parts of the same plant, but also the endless variety of juices drawn and formed out of the same soil, by various species of vegetables; which must therefore differ in an endless variety, as to the texture of their absorbent vessels and secretory ducts.

32. A body, therefore, either animal or vegetable, may be considered as an organized system of tubes and vessels,

containing several sorts of fluids. And as fluids are moved through the vessels of animal bodies by the systole and diastole of the heart, the alternate expansion and condensation of the air, and the oscillations in the membranes and tunics of the vessels, even so, by means of air expanded and contracted in the tracheæ or vessels made up of elastic fibres, the sap is propelled through the arterial tubes of a plant, and the vegetable juices, as they are rarefied by heat or condensed by cold, will either ascend and evaporate into air, or descend in the form of a gross liquor.

33. Juices, therefore, first purified by straining through the fine pores of the root, are afterwards exalted by the action of the air and the vessels of the plant; but, above all, by the action of the sun's light; which, at the same time that it heats, doth wonderfully rarefy and raise the sap, till it perspires and forms an atmosphere, like the effluvia of animal bodies. And, though the leaves are supposed to perform principally the office of lungs, breathing out excrementitious vapours, and drawing in alimentary; yet it seems probable, that the reciprocal actions of repulsion and attraction are performed all over the surface of vegetables as well as animals. In which reciprocation Hippocrates supposeth the manner of nature's acting for the nourishment and health of animal bodies chiefly to consist. And, indeed, what share of a plant's nourishment is drawn, through the leaves and bark, from that ambient heterogeneous fluid called air, is not easy to say. It seems very considerable, and altogether necessary, as well to vegetable as animal life.

34. It is an opinion received by many, that the sap circulates in plants as the blood in animals; that it ascends through capillary arteries in the trunk, into which are inosculated other vessels of the bark answering to veins, which bring back to the root the remainder of the sap, over and above what had been deposited during its ascent by the arterial vessels, and secreted for the several uses of the vegetable throughout all its parts, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit. Others deny this circulation, and affirm that the sap doth not return through the bark vessels. It is nevertheless agreed by all that there are ascending and descending juices; while some will have the ascent and

descent to be a circulation of the same juices through different vessels; others will have the ascending juice to be one sort attracted by the root, and the descending another imbibed by the leaves, or extremities of the branches; lastly, others think that the same juice, as it is rarefied or condensed by heat or cold, rises and subsides in the same tube. I shall not take upon me to decide this controversy. Only I cannot help observing that the vulgar argument from analogy between plants and animals loses much of its force, if it be considered that the supposed circulating of the sap, from the root or lacteals through the arteries, and thence returning, by inosculations, through the veins or bark vessels to the root or lacteals again, is in no sort conformable or analogous to the circulation of the blood.

35. It is sufficient to observe, what all must acknowledge, that a plant or tree is a very nice and complicated machine (sect. 30, 31); by the several parts and motions whereof, the crude juices, admitted through the absorbent vessels, whether of the root, trunk, or branches, are variously mixed, separated, altered, digested, and exalted, in a very wonderful manner. The juice, as it passeth in and out, up and down, through tubes of different textures, shapes, and sizes, and is affected by the alternate compression and expansion of elastic vessels, by the vicissitudes of seasons, the changes of weather, and the various action of the solar light, grows still more and more elaborate.

36. There is therefore no chemistry like that of nature, which addeth to the force of fire the most delicate, various, and artificial percolation (sect. 29). The incessant action of the sun upon the elements of air, earth, and water, and on all sorts of mixed bodies, animal, vegetable, and fossil, is supposed to perform all sorts of chemical operations. Whence it should follow, that the air contains all sorts of chemic productions, the vapours, fumes, oils, salts, and spirits of all the bodies we know: from which general aggregate or mass, those that are proper being drawn in, through the fine vessels of the leaves, branches, and stem of the tree, undergo, in its various organs, new alterations, secretions, and digestions, till such time as they assume the most elaborate form.

37. Nor is it to be wondered that the peculiar texture of

each plant or tree, co-operating with the solar fire and pre-existing juices, should so alter the fine nourishment drawn from earth and air (sect. 33), as to produce various specific qualities of great efficacy in medicine; especially if it be considered that in the opinion of learned men, there is an influence on plants derived from the sun, besides its mere heat. Certainly, Dr. Grew, that curious anatomist of plants, holds the solar influence to differ from that of a mere culinary fire no otherwise than by being only a more temperate and equal heat.

38. The alimentary juice taken into the lacteals, if I may so say, of vegetables, consists of oily, aqueous, and saline particles, which being dissolved, volatilized, and diversely agitated, part thereof is spent and exhaled into the air; and that part which remains is, by the economy of the plant, and action of the sun, strained, purified, concocted, and ripened, into an inspissated oil or balsam, and deposited in certain cells placed chiefly in the bark, which is thought to answer the *panniculus adiposus* in animals, defending trees from the weather, and, when in sufficient quantity, rendering them evergreen. This balsam, weeping or sweating through the bark, hardens into resin; and this most copiously in the several species of pines and firs, whose oil being in greater quantity, and more tenacious of the acid spirit, or vegetable soul (as perhaps it may not improperly be called), abides the action of the sun, and, attracting the sunbeams, is thereby exalted and enriched, so as to become a most noble medicine: such is the last product of a tree, perfectly maturated by time and sun.

39. It is remarked by Theophrastus that all plants and trees while they put forth have most humour, but when they have ceased to germinate and bear, then the humour is strongest, and most sheweth the nature of the plant, and that, therefore, trees yielding resin should be cut after germination. It seems also very reasonable to suppose the juice of old trees, whose organs bring no new sap, should be better ripened than that of others.

40. The aromatic flavours of vegetables seem to depend upon the sun's light as much as colours. As in the production of the latter, the reflecting powers of the object, so in that of the former, the attractive and organical powers of

the plant co-operate with the sun (sect. 36, 37). And as from Sir Isaac Newton's experiments it appears that all colours are virtually in the white light of the sun, and shew themselves when the rays are separated by the attracting and repelling powers of objects, even so the specific qualities of the elaborate juices of plants seem to be virtually or eminently contained in the solar light, and are actually exhibited upon the separation of the rays, by the peculiar powers of the capillary organs in vegetables, attracting and imbibing certain rays, which produce certain flavours and qualities, in like manner as certain rays, being reflected, produce certain colours.

41. It hath been observed by some curious anatomists that the secretory vessels in the glands of animal bodies are lined with a fine down, which in different glands is of different colours. And it is thought that each particular down, being originally imbued with its own proper juice, attracts none but that sort; by which means so many various juices are secreted in different parts of the body. And perhaps there may be something analogous to this in the fine absorbent vessels of plants, which may co-operate towards producing that endless variety of juices, elaborated in plants from the same earth and air.

42. The balsam or essential oil of vegetables contains a spirit, wherein consist the specific qualities, the smell and taste, of the plant. Boerhaave holds the native presiding spirit to be neither oil, salt, earth, or water; but somewhat too fine and subtle to be caught alone and rendered visible to the eye. This when suffered to fly off, for instance, from the oil of rosemary, leaves it destitute of all flavour. This spark of life, this spirit or soul, if we may so say, of the vegetable departs without any sensible diminution of the oil or water wherein it was lodged.

43. It should seem that the forms, souls, or principles of vegetable life subsist in the light or solar emanation (sect. 40); which in respect of the macrocosm is what the animal spirit is to the microcosm—the interior tegument, the subtle instrument and vehicle of power. No wonder, then, that the *ens primum* or *scintilla spirituosa*, as it is called, of plants should be a thing so fine and fugacious as to escape our nicest search. It is evident that nature at the sun's approach

vegetates, and languishes at his recess; this terrestrial globe seeming only a matrix disposed and prepared to receive life from his light; whence Homer in his Hymns styleth earth the wife of heaven, ἄλοχ' οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.

44. The luminous spirit which is the form or life of a plant, from whence its differences and properties flow, is somewhat extremely volatile. It is not the oil, but a thing more subtle, whereof oil is the vehicle, which retains it from flying off, and is lodged in several parts of the plant, particularly in the cells of the bark and in the seeds. This oil, purified and exalted by the organical powers of the plant, and agitated by warmth, becomes a proper receptacle of the spirit: part of which spirit exhales through the leaves and flowers, and part is arrested by this unctuous humour that detains it in the plant. It is to be noted this essential oil, animated, as one may say, with the flavour of the plant, is very different from any spirit that can be procured from the same plant by fermentation.

45. Light impregnates air (sect. 37, 43), air impregnates vapour; and this becomes a watery juice by distillation, having risen first in the cold still with a kindly gentle heat. This fragrant vegetable water is possessed of the specific odour and taste of the plant. It is remarked that distilled oils added to water for counterfeiting the vegetable water can never equal it, artificial chemistry falling short of the natural.

46. The less violence is used to nature the better its produce. The juice of olives or grapes issuing by the lightest pressure is best. Resins that drop from the branches spontaneously, or ooze upon the slightest incision, are the finest and most fragrant. And infusions are observed to act more strongly than decoctions of plants; the more subtle and volatile salts and spirits, which might be lost or corrupted by the latter, being obtained in their natural state by the former. It is also observed that the finest, purest, and most volatile part is that which first ascends in distillation. And, indeed, it should seem the lightest and most active particles required least force to disengage them from the subject.

47. The salts, therefore, and more active spirits of the tar are got by infusion in cold water; but the resinous part is

not to be dissolved thereby (sect. 7). Hence the prejudice which some perhaps may entertain against tar-water as a medicine, the use whereof might inflame the blood by its sulphur and resin, appears to be not well grounded; it being indeed impregnated with a fine acid spirit, balsamic, cooling, diuretic, and possessed of many other virtues (sect. 42, 44). Spirits are supposed to consist of salts and phlegm, probably, too, somewhat of a fine oily nature, differing from oil in that it mixeth with water, and agreeing with oil in that it runneth in rivulets by distillation. Thus much is allowed, that the water, earth, and fixed salt are the same in all plants; that, therefore, which differenceth a plant, or makes it what it is—the native spark or form, in the language of the chemists or schools—is none of those things, nor yet the finest oil, which seemeth only its receptacle or vehicle. It is observed by chemists that all sorts of balsamic wood afford an acid spirit, which is the volatile oily salt of the vegetable; herein are chiefly contained their medicinal virtues; and, by the trials I have made, it appears that the acid spirit in tar-water possesseth the virtues, in an eminent degree, of that of *guaiacum*, and other medicinal woods.

48. Qualities in a degree too strong for human nature to subdue, and assimilate to itself must hurt the constitution. All acids, therefore, may not be useful or innocent. But this seemeth an acid so thoroughly concocted, so gentle, bland, and temperate, and withal a spirit so fine and volatile, as readily to enter the smallest vessels, and be assimilated with the utmost ease.

49. If any one were minded to dissolve some of the resin, together with the salt or spirit, he need only mix some spirit of wine with the water. But such an entire solution of resins and gums as to qualify them for entering and pervading the animal system, like the fine acid spirit that first flies off from the subject, is perhaps impossible to obtain. It is an apothegm of the chemists, derived from Helmont, that whoever can make myrrh soluble by the human body has the secret of prolonging his days: and Boerhaave owns that there seems to be truth in this, from its resisting putrefaction. Now, this quality is as remarkable in tar, with which the ancients embalmed and preserved dead bodies. And though Boerhaave himself, and other chemists before him, have

given methods for making solutions of myrrh, yet it is by means of alcohol which extracts only the inflammable parts. And it doth not seem that any solution of myrrh is impregnated with its salt or acid spirit. It may not, therefore, seem strange if this water should be found more beneficial for procuring health and long life than any solution of myrrh whatsoever.

50. Certainly divers resins and gums may have virtues, and yet not be able for their grossness to pass the lacteals and other finer vessels, nor yet, perhaps, readily impart those virtues to a menstruum that may with safety and speed convey them throughout the human body. Upon all which accounts, I believe tar-water will be found to have singular advantages. It is observed that acid spirits prove the stronger, by how much the greater degree of heat is required to raise them. And indeed there seemeth to be no acid more gentle than this obtained by the simple affusion of cold water; which carries off from the subject the most light and subtile parts, and, if one may so speak, the very flower of its specific qualities. And here it is to be noted that the volatile salt and spirit of vegetables do, by gently stimulating the solids, attenuate the fluids contained in them, and promote secretions, and that they are penetrating and active, contrary to the general nature of other acids.

51. It is a great maxim for health, that the juices of the body be kept fluid in a due proportion. Therefore, the acid volatile spirit in tar-water, at once attenuating and cooling in a moderate degree, must greatly conduce to health, as a mild salutary deobstruent, quickening the circulation of the fluids without wounding the solids, thereby gently removing or preventing those obstructions which are the great and general cause of most chronical diseases; in this manner, answering to the antihysterics, *assafœtida*, *galbanum*, myrrh, amber, and, in general, to all the resins and gums of trees or shrubs useful in nervous cases.

52. Warm water is itself a deobstruent. Therefore the infusion of tar drunk warm is easier insinuated into all the nice capillary vessels, and acts not only by virtue of the balsam, but also by that of the vehicle. Its taste, its diuretic quality, its being so great a cordial, shew the activity of this medicine. And, at the same time that it quickens the

sluggish blood of the hysterical, its balsamic oily nature abates the too rapid motion of the sharp thin blood in those who are hectic. There is a lentor and smoothness in the blood of healthy strong people; on the contrary, there is often an acrimony and solution in that of weakly morbid persons. The fine particles of tar are not only warm and active, they are also balsamic and emollient; softening and enriching the sharp and vapid blood, and healing the erosions occasioned thereby in the blood-vessels and glands.

53. Tar-water possesseth the stomachic and cardiac qualities of *elixir proprietatis*, Stoughton's drops, and many such tinctures and extracts; with this difference, that it worketh its effect more safely, as it hath nothing of that spirit of wine, which, however mixed and disguised, may yet be well accounted a poison in some degree.

54. Such medicines are supposed to be diaphoretic, which, being of an active and subtle nature, pass through the whole system, and work their effect in the finest capillaries and perspiratory ducts, which they gently cleanse and open. Tar-water is extremely well fitted to work by such an insensible diaphoresis, by the fineness and activity of its acid volatile spirit. And surely those parts ought to be very fine, which can scour the perspiratory ducts, under the scarf skin or cuticle, if it be true, that one grain of sand would cover the mouths of more than a hundred thousand.

55. Another way wherein tar-water operates is by urine, than which perhaps none is more safe and effectual, for cleansing the blood and carrying off its salts But it seems to produce its principal effect as an alterative, sure and easy, much safer than those vehement, purgative, emetic, and salivating medicines, which do violence to nature.

56. An obstruction of some vessels causeth the blood to move more swiftly in other vessels which are not obstructed. Hence manifold disorders. A liquor that dilutes and attenuates resolves the concretions which obstruct. Tar-water is such a liquor. It may be said, indeed, of common water, that it attenuates; also of mercurial preparations, that they attenuate. But it should be considered that mere water only distends the vessels, and thereby weakens their tone; and that mercury by its great momentum may justly be

suspected of hurting the fine capillaries, which two deobstruents therefore might easily overact their parts, and (by lessening the force of the elastic vessels) remotely produce those concretions they are intended to remove.

57. Weak and rigid fibres are looked on by the most able physicians, as sources of two different classes of distempers: a sluggish motion of the liquids occasioning weak fibres: therefore tar-water is good to strengthen them, as it gently accelerates their contents. On the other hand, being an unctuous, bland fluid, it moistens and softens the dry and stiff fibres, and so proves a remedy for both extremes.

58. Common soaps are compositions of lixivial salt and oil. The corrosive acrimony of the saline particles, being softened by the mixture of an unctuous substance, they insinuate themselves into the small ducts with less difficulty and danger. The combination of these different substances makes up a very subtle and active medicine, fitted for mixing with all humours, and resolving all obstructions. Soap, therefore, is justly esteemed a most efficacious medicine in many distempers. Alkaline soap is allowed to be cleansing, attenuating, opening, resolving, sweetening; it is pectoral, vulnerary, diuretic, and hath other good qualities which are also to be found in tar-water. It is granted that oil and acid salts combined together exist in vegetables, and that consequently there are acid soaps as well as alkaline. And the saponaceous nature of the acid vegetable spirits is what renders them so diuretic, sudorific, penetrating, abstersive, and resolving. Such, for instance, is the acid spirit of *guaiacum*. And all these same virtues seem to be in tar-water in a mild and salutary degree.

59. It is the general opinion that all acids coagulate the blood. Boerhaave excepts vinegar, which he holds to be a soap, inasmuch as it is found to contain an oil as well as an acid spirit. Hence it is both unctuous and penetrating, a powerful antiphlogistic, and preservative against corruption and infection. Now it seems evident that tar-water is a soap as well as vinegar. For, though it be a character of resin, which is an inspissated gross oil, not to dissolve in water (sect. 47), yet the salts attract some fine particles of essential oil: which fine oil serves as a vehicle for the acid salts, and shews itself in the colour of the tar-water: for all pure salts are colourless.

And, though the resin will not dissolve in water, yet the subtle oil, in which the vegetable salts are lodged, may as well mix with water as vinegar doth, which contains both oil and salt. And, as the oil in tar-water discovers itself to the eye, so the acid salts do manifest themselves to the taste. Tar-water therefore is a soap, and as such hath the medicinal qualities of soap.

60. It operates more gently as the acid salts lose their acrimony, being sheathed in oil, and thereby approaching the nature of neutral salts, are more benign and friendly to the animal system: and more effectually, as, by the help of a volatile, smooth, insinuating oil, those same salts are more easily introduced into the capillary ducts. Therefore, in fevers and epidemical distempers it is (and I have found it so), as well as in chronical diseases, a most safe and efficacious medicine, being good against too great fluidity as a balsamic, and good against viscidity as a soap. There is something in the fiery corrosive nature of lixivial salts, which makes alkaline soap a dangerous remedy in all cases where an inflammation is apprehended. And, as inflammations are often occasioned by obstructions, it should seem an acid soap was much the safer deobstruent.

61. Even the best turpentines, however famous for their vulnerary and detergent qualities, have yet been observed by their warmth to dispose to inflammatory tumours. But the acid spirit (sect 7, 8) being in so great proportion in tar-water, renders it a cooler and safer medicine. And the æthereal oil of turpentine, though an admirable dryer, healer, and anodyne, when outwardly applied to wounds and ulcers, and not less useful in cleansing the urinary passages and healing their ulcerations, yet is known to be of a nature so very relaxing as sometimes to do much mischief when taken inwardly.[1] Tar-water is not attended with the same ill effects, which I believe are owing in a great measure to the æthereal oils being deprived of the acid spirit in distillation, which, vellicating and contracting as a stimulus, might have proved a counterpoise to the excessive lubricating and relaxing qualities of the oil.

62. Woods in decoction do not seem to yield so ripe and

[1] "When taken inwardly" not in the first three editions.—ED.

elaborate a juice, as that which is deposited in the cells or *loculi terebinthiaci*, and spontaneously oozes from them. And indeed, though the balsam of Peru, obtained by boiling wood and scumming the decoction, be a very valuable medicine, and of great account in divers cases, particularly asthmas, nephritic pains, nervous colics, and obstructions, yet I do verily think (and I do not say this without experience) that tar-water is a more efficacious remedy in all those cases than even that costly drug.

63. It hath been already observed that the restorative pectoral antihysterical virtues of the most precious balsams and gums are possessed in a high degree by tar-water (sect. 9, 21, 22, 23). And I do not know any purpose answered by the wood drinks for which tar-water may not be used with at least equal success. It contains the virtues even of *guaiacum*, which seems the most efficacious of all woods, warming and sweetening the humours, diaphoretic and useful in gouts, dropsies, and rheums, as well as in the foul disease. Nor should it seem strange if the virtues obtained by boiling an old dry wood prove inferior to those extracted from a balsam.

64. There is a fine volatile spirit in the waters of Geronster, the most esteemed of all the fountains about the Spa, but whose waters do not bear transporting. The stomachic, cardiac, and diuretic qualities of this fountain somewhat resemble those of tar-water, which, if I am not greatly mistaken, contains the virtues of the best chalybeate and sulphureous waters; with this difference, that those waters are apt to affect the head in taking, which tar-water is not. Besides, there is a regimen of diet to be observed, especially with chalybeate waters, which I never found necessary with this. Tar-water layeth under no restraint either as to diet, hours, or employment. A man may study, or exercise, or repose, keep his own hours, pass his time either within or without, and take wholesome nourishment of any kind.

65. The use of mineral waters, however excellent for the nerves and stomach, is often suspended by colds and inflammatory disorders; in which they are acknowledged to be very dangerous: whereas tar-water is so far from hurting in those cases, or being discontinued on that account, that it greatly contributes to their cure (sect. 7).

66. Cordials, vulgarly so called, act immediately on the

stomach, and by consent of nerves on the head. But medicines of an operation too fine and light to produce a sensible effect in the *primæ viæ* may, nevertheless, in their passage through the capillaries, operate on the sides of those small vessels, in such manner as to quicken their oscillations, and consequently the motion of their contents, producing, in issue and effect, all the benefits of a cordial much more lasting and salutary than those of distilled spirits, which by their caustic and coagulating qualities do incomparably more mischief than good. Such a cardiac medicine is tar-water. The transient fits of mirth, produced from fermented liquors, and distilled spirits,[1] are attended with proportionable depression of spirit in their intervals. But the calm cheerfulness arising from this *water of health* (as it may be justly called) is permanent. In which it emulates the virtues of that famous plant Gen Seng, so much valued in China as the only cordial that raises the spirits without depressing them. Tar-water is so far from hurting the nerves, as common cordials do, that it is highly useful in cramps, spasms of the viscera, and paralytic numbness.

67. Emetics are on certain occasions administered with great success. But the overstraining and weakening of nature may be very justly apprehended from a course of emetics. They are nevertheless prescribed and substituted for exercise. But it is well remarked in Plato's "Timæus" that vomits and purges are the worst exercise in the world. There is something in the mild operation of tar-water, that seems more friendly to the economy, and forwards the digestions and secretions in a way more natural and benign; the mildness of this medicine being such that I have known children take it, for above six months together, with great benefit, and without any inconvenience: and, after long and repeated experience, I do esteem it a most excellent diet-drink, fitted to all seasons and ages.

68. It is I think allowed that the origin of the gout lies in a faulty digestion. And it is remarked by the ablest physicians, that the gout is so difficult to cure, because heating medicines aggravate its immediate, and cooling its remote

[1] "And distilled spirits" first added to third edition.—ED.

cause. But tar-water, although it contains active principles that strengthen the digestion beyond anything I know, and consequently must be highly useful, either to prevent or lessen the following fit, or by invigorating the blood to cast it upon the extremities, yet it is not of so heating a nature as to do harm even in the fit. Nothing is more difficult or disagreeable than to argue men out of their prejudices; I shall not therefore enter into controversies on this subject, but, if men dispute and object, shall leave the decision to time and trial.

69. In the modern practice, soap, opium, and mercury, bid fairest for Universal Medicines. The first of these is highly spoken of. But then, those who magnify it most except against the use of it in such cases where the obstruction is attended with a putrefactive alkali, or where an inflammatory disposition appears. It is acknowledged to be very dangerous in a phthisis, fever, and some other cases in which tar-water is not only safe but useful.

70. Opium, though a medicine of great extent and efficacy, yet is frequently known to produce grievous disorders in hysterical or hypochondriacal persons, who make a great part, perhaps the greatest, of those who lead sedentary lives in these islands. Besides, upon all constitutions dangerous errors may be committed in the use of opium.

71. Mercury hath of late years become a medicine of very general use, the extreme minuteness, mobility, and momentum of its parts rendering it a most powerful cleanser of all obstructions, even in the most minute capillaries. But then we should be cautious in the use of it, if we consider that the very thing which gives it power of doing good above other deobstruents doth also dispose it to do mischief. I mean its great momentum, the weight of it being about ten times that of blood, and the momentum being the joint product of the weight and velocity, it must needs operate with great force; and may it not be justly feared that so great a force, entering the minutest vessels, and breaking the obstructed matter, might also break or wound the fine tender coats of those small vessels, and so bring on the untimely effects of old age, producing more, perhaps, and worse obstructions than those it removed? Similar consequences may justly be apprehended from other mineral and ponderous

medicines. Therefore, upon the whole, there will not perhaps be found any medicine more general in its use, or more salutary in its effects, than tar-water.

72. To suppose that all distempers, arising from very different, and it may be from contrary causes, can be cured by one and the same medicine must seem chimerical. But it may with truth be affirmed, that the virtue of tar-water extends to a surprising variety of cases very distant and unlike (sect 3, 4, 5, 6, 21, etc.). This I have experienced in my neighbours, my family, and myself. And, as I live in a remote corner, among poor neighbours, who for want of a regular physician have often recourse to me, I have had frequent opportunities of trial, which convince me it is of so just a temperament as to be an enemy to all extremes. I have known it to do great good in a cold, watery constitution, as a cardiac and stomachic: and at the same time allay heat and feverish thirst in another. I have known it correct costive habits in some, and the contrary habit in others. Nor will this seem incredible if it be considered that middle qualities naturally reduce the extreme. Warm water, for instance, mixed with hot and cold, will lessen the heat in that, and the cold in this.

73. They who know the great virtues of common soap, whose coarse lixivial salts are the product of culinary fire, will not think it incredible that virtues of mighty force and extent should be found in a fine acid soap (sect. 58), the salts and oil whereof are a most elaborate product of nature and the solar light.

74. It is certain tar-water warms, and therefore some may perhaps still think it cannot cool. The more effectually to remove this prejudice, let it be farther considered that as, on the one hand, opposite causes do sometimes produce the same effect, for instance, heat by rarefaction and cold by condensation do both increase the air's elasticity; so, on the other hand, the same cause shall sometimes produce opposite effects: heat for instance thins, and again heat coagulates the blood.[1] It is not therefore strange, that tar-water should warm one habit and cool another, have one good effect on a cold constitution, and another good effect on an inflamed

[1] In first edition, "heat for instance in one degree thins and in another coagulates the blood."—ED.

one; nor, if this be so, that it should cure opposite disorders. All which justifies to reason what I have often found true in fact. The salts, the spirits, the heat of tar-water are of a temperature congenial to the constitution of a man, which receives from it a kindly warmth, but no inflaming heat. It was remarkable that two children in my neighbourhood, being in a course of tar-water, upon an intermission of it, never failed to have their issues inflamed by a humour much more hot and sharp than at other times. But its great use in the small-pox, pleurisies, and fevers is a sufficient proof that tar-water is not of an inflaming nature.

75. I have dwelt the longer on this head, because some gentlemen of the faculty have thought fit to declare that tar-water must inflame, and that they would never visit any patient in a fever who had been a drinker of it. But I will venture to affirm, that it is so far from increasing a feverish inflammation, that it is on the contrary a most ready means to allay and extinguish it. It is of admirable use in fevers, being at the same time the surest, safest and most effectual, both paregoric and cordial: for the truth of which I appeal to any person's experience who shall take a large draught of it milk warm in the paroxysm of a fever, even when plain water or herb-teas shall be found to have little or no effect. To me it seems that its singular and surprising use in fevers of all kinds, were there nothing else, would be alone sufficient to recommend it to the public.

76. The best physicians make the idea of a fever to consist in a too great velocity of the heart's motion, and too great resistance at the capillaries. Tar-water, as it softens and gently stimulates those nice vessels, helps to propel their contents, and so contributes to remove the latter part of the disorder. And for the former, the irritating acrimony which accelerates the motion of the heart is diluted by watery, corrected by acid, and softened by balsamic remedies, all which intentions are answered by this aqueous, acid, balsamic medicine. Besides, the viscid juices coagulated by the febrile heat are resolved by tar-water as a soap, and not too far resolved, as it is a gentle acid soap; to which we may add, that the peccant humours and salts are carried off by its diaphoretic and diuretic qualities.

77. I found all this confirmed by my own experience in

the late sickly season of the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-one, having had twenty-five fevers in my own family cured by this medicinal water, drunk copiously. The same method was practised on several of my poor neighbours with equal success. It suddenly calmed the feverish anxieties, and seemed every glass to refresh, and infuse life and spirit into the patient. At first some of these patients had been vomited, but afterwards I found that without vomiting, bleeding, blistering, or any other evacuation or medicine whatever, very bad fevers could be cured by the sole drinking of tar-water, milk warm, and in good quantity, perhaps a large glass every hour or oftener taken in bed. And it was remarkable that such as were cured by this comfortable cordial recovered health and spirits at once, while those who had been cured by evacuations often languished long, even after the fever had left them, before they could recover of their medicines and regain their strength.

78. In peripneumonies and pleurisies I have observed tar-water to be excellent, having known some pleuritic persons cured without bleeding, by a blister early applied to the stitch, and the copious drinking of tar-water, four or five quarts, or even more in four-and-twenty hours. And I do recommend it to farther trial, whether in all cases of a pleurisy, one moderate bleeding, a blister on the spot, and plenty of tepid tar-water may not suffice, without those repeated and immoderate bleedings, the bad effects of which are perhaps never got over. I do even suspect that a pleuritic patient betaking himself to bed betimes, and drinking very copiously of tar-water, may be cured by that alone, without bleeding, blistering, or any other medicine whatsoever: certainly I have found this succeed at a glass every half hour.

79. I have known a bloody flux of long continuance, after divers medicines had been tried in vain, cured by tar-water. But that which I take to be the most speedy and effectual remedy in a bloody flux is a clyster of an ounce of common brown resin dissolved over a fire in two ounces of oil, and added to a pint of broth, which not long since I had frequent occasion of trying when that distemper was epidemical. Nor can I say that any to whom I advised it miscarried. This experiment I was led to make by the

opinion I had of tar as a balsamic: and resin is only tar inspissated.

80. Nothing that I know corroborates the stomach so much as tar-water (sect. 68). Whence it follows, that it must be of singular use to persons afflicted with the gout. And, from what I have observed in five or six instances, I do verily believe it the best and safest medicine either to prevent the gout, or so to strengthen nature against the fit, as to drive it from the vitals.[1] Dr. Sydenham, in his Treatise of the Gout, declares that whoever finds a medicine the most efficacious for strengthening digestion will do more service in the cure of that and other chronical distempers, than he can even form a notion of. And I leave it to trial, whether tar-water be not that medicine, as I myself am persuaded it is, by all the experiments I could make. But in all trials I would recommend discretion; for instance, a man with the gout in his stomach ought not to drink cold tar-water. This Essay leaves room for future experiment in every part of it, not pretending to be a complete treatise.

81. It is evident to sense that blood, urine, and other animal juices, being let to stand, soon contract a great acrimony. Juices, therefore, from a bad digestion retained, and stagnating in the body, grow sharp and putrid. Hence a fermenting heat, the immediate cause of the gout. The curing this by cooling medicines, as they would increase the antecedent cause, must be a vain attempt. On the other hand, spices and spirituous liquors, while they contribute to remove the antecedent cause or bad digestion, would, by inflaming the blood, increase the proximate or immediate cause of the gout, to wit, the fermenting heat. The scope therefore must be, to find a medicine that shall corroborate but not inflame. Bitter herbs are recommended; but they are weak in comparison of tar-water.

82. The great force of tar-water to correct the acrimony of the blood appears in nothing more than in the cure of a gangrene from an internal cause; which was performed on a servant of my own, by prescribing the copious and constant use of tar-water for a few weeks. From my representing tar-water as good for so many things, some perhaps may con-

[1] In the first three editions these words followed, "or at other times to change a worse illness into the gout, and to get rid of it."—ED.

clude it is good for nothing. But charity obligeth me to say what I know, and what I think, howsoever it may be taken. Men may censure and object as they please, but I appeal to time and experiment. Effects misimputed, cases wrong told, circumstances overlooked, perhaps, too, prejudices and partialities against truth may for a time prevail, and keep her at the bottom of her well, from whence nevertheless she emergeth sooner or later, and strikes the eyes of all those who do not keep them shut.

83. Boerhaavè thinks a specific may be found for that peculiar venom which infects the blood in the small-pox, and that the prospect of so great a public benefit should stir up men to search for it. Its wonderful success in preventing and mitigating that distemper (sect. 2, 3) would incline one to suspect that tar-water is such a specific especially since I have found it of sovereign use as well during the small-pox as before it.[1] Some think an erysipelas and the plague differ only in degree. If so, tar-water should be useful in the plague, for I have known it cure an erysipelas.

84. Tar-water, as cleansing, healing, and balsamic, is good in all disorders of the urinary passages, whether obstructed or ulcerated. Dr. Lister supposeth, indeed, that turpentines act by a caustic quality, which irritates the coats of the urinary ducts to expel sand or gravel. But it should seem this expelling diuretic virtue consisted rather in the salts than the resin, and consequently resides in the tar-water, gently stimulating by its salts, without the dangerous force of a caustic. The violent operation of ipecacuanha lies in its resin, but the saline extract is a gentle purge and diuretic, by the stimulus of its salts.

85. That which acts as a mild cordial (sect. 66), neither hurting the capillary vessels as a caustic, nor affecting the nerves, nor coagulating the juices, must in all cases be a friend to nature, and assist the *vis vitæ* in its struggle against all kinds of contagion. And from what I have observed, tar-water appears to me a useful preservative in all epidemical disorders, and against all other infection whatsoever, as well as that of the small-pox. What effects the *animi pathemata* have in human maladies is well known, and consequently

[1] From "especially" to this point (three lines) was added to the second edition.—ED.

the general benefit of such a cardiac may be reasonably supposed.

86. As the body is said to clothe the soul, so the nerves may be said to constitute her inner garment. And, as the soul animates the whole, what nearly touches the soul relates to all. Therefore the asperity of tartarous salts, and the fiery acrimony of alkaline salts, irritating and wounding the nerves, produce nascent passions and anxieties in the soul; which both aggravate distempers, and render men's lives restless and wretched, even when they are afflicted with no apparent distemper. This is the latent spring of much woe, spleen, and *tædium vitæ*. Small imperceptible irritations of the minutest fibres or filaments, caused by the pungent salts of wines and sauces, do so shake and disturb the microcosms of high livers, as often to raise tempests in courts and senates. Whereas the gentle vibrations that are raised in the nerves, by a fine subtle acid, sheathed in a smooth volatile oil (sect. 59, 61), softly stimulating and bracing the nervous vessels and fibres, promote a due circulation and secretion of the animal juices, and create a calm satisfied sense of health. And, accordingly, I have often known tar-water procure sleep and compose the spirits in cruel vigils, occasioned either by sickness or by too intense application of mind.

87. In diseases sometimes accidents happen from without by mismanagement, sometimes latent causes operate within, jointly with the specific taint or peculiar cause of the malady. The causes of distempers are often complicated, and there may be something in the idiosyncrasy of the patient that puzzles the physician. It may therefore be presumed that no medicine is infallible, not even in any one disorder. But, as tar-water possesseth the virtues of fortifying the stomach, as well as purifying and invigorating the blood, beyond any medicine that I know, it may be presumed of great and general efficacy in all those numerous illnesses which take their rise from foul or vapid blood, or from a bad digestion. The animal spirits are elaborated from the blood. Such therefore as the blood is, such will be the animal spirits, more or less, weaker or stronger. This sheweth the usefulness of tar-water in all hysteric and hypo-

chondriac cases: which, together with the maladies from indigestion, comprise almost the whole tribe of chronical diseases.

88. The *scurvy* may be reckoned in these climates a universal malady, as people in general are subject to it, and as it mixes more or less in almost all diseases. Whether this proceeds from want of elasticity in our air, upon which the tone of the vessels depends, and upon that the several secretions; or whether it proceeds from the moisture of our climate, or the grossness of our food, or the salts in our atmosphere, or from all these together—thus much at least seems not absurd to suppose, that as physicians in Spain and Italy are apt to suspect the venereal taint to be a latent principle, and bear a part in every illness, so far, as good reason, the scurvy should be considered by our physicians as having some share in most disorders and constitutions that fall in their way. It is certain our perspiration is not so free as in clearer air and warmer climates. Perspirable humours not discharged will stagnate and putrefy. A diet of animal food will be apt to render the juices of our bodies alkalescent. Hence ichorous and corrosive humours and many disorders. Moist air makes viscid blood; and saline air inflames this viscid blood. Hence broken capillaries, extravasated blood, spots, and ulcers, and other scorbutic symptoms. The body of a man attracts and imbibes the moisture and salts of the air and whatever floats in the atmosphere, which as it is common to all, so it affects all more or less.

89. Doctor Musgrave thinks the Devonshire scurvy a relic of the leprosy, and that it is not owing to the qualities of the air. But, as these insulars in general live in a gross saline air, and their vessels being less elastic are consequently less able to subdue and cast off what their bodies as sponges draw in, one would be tempted to suspect the air not a little concerned, especially in such a situation as that of Devonshire. In all these British islands we enjoy a great mediocrity of climate; the effect whereof is, that we have neither heat enough to exalt and dissipate the gross vapours, as in Italy, nor cold enough to condense and precipitate them, as in Sweden. So they are left floating in the air, which we constantly breathe, and imbibe through the whole surface of our bodies. And this, together with exhalations from coal fires, and the

various fossils wherein we abound, doth greatly contribute to render us scorbutic and hypochondriac.

90. There are some who derive all diseases from the scurvy, which indeed must be allowed to create or mimic most other maladies. Boerhaave tells us, it produceth pleuritic colic, nephritic, hepatic pains, various fevers, hot, malignant, intermitting dysenteries, faintings, anxieties, dropsies, consumptions, convulsions, palsies, fluxes of blood. In a word, it may be said to contain the seeds and origin of almost all distempers. Insomuch that a medicine which cures all sorts of scurvy may be presumed good for most maladies.

91. The scurvy doth not only in variety of symptoms imitate most distempers, but also, when come to a height, in degree of virulence equal the most malignant. Of this we have a remarkable proof in that horrible description of the scorbutic patients in the hospitals of Paris, given by Monsieur Poupart, in the Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Sciences, for the year 1699. That author thinks he saw some resemblance in it to the plague of Athens. It is hard to imagine anything more dreadful than the case of those men, rotting alive by scurvy in its supreme degree. To obviate such putrefaction, I believe the most effectual method would be, to embalm (if one may so say) the living body with tar-water copiously drunk; and this belief is not without experience.

92. It is the received opinion that the animal salts of a sound body are of a neutral, bland, and benign nature: that is, the salts in the juices past the *primæ viæ* are neither acid or alkaline, having been subdued by the constitution, and changed into a third nature. Where the constitution wants force to do this, the aliment is not duly assimilated: and, so far as the salts retain their pristine qualities, sickly symptoms ensue, acids and alkalies not perfectly subdued producing weak ferments in the juices. Hence scurvy, cachexy, and a long train of ills.

93. A cachexy or ill habit is much of the same kind with the scurvy, proceeds from the same causes, and is attended with like symptoms, which are so manifold and various, that the scurvy may well be looked on as a general cachexy, infecting the whole habit, and vitiating all the digestions.

Some have reckoned as many sorts of the scurvy as there are taints of the blood. Others have supposed it a collection of all illnesses together. Some suppose it an accumulation of several diseases *in fieri*. Others take it for an assemblage of the relics of old distempers.

94. But thus much is certain, the cure of the scurvy is no more to be attempted by strongly active medicines, than (to use the similitude of an ingenious writer) a thorn in the flesh, or pitch on silk, to be removed by force. The viscid humour must be gently resolved and diluted, the tone of the vessels recovered by a moderate stimulation, and the tender fibres and capillary vessels gradually cleared from the concreted stuff that adheres and obstructs them. All which is in the aptest manner performed by a watery diluent, containing a fine vegetable soap. And although a complete cure by alteratives, operating on the small capillaries, and by insensible discharges, must require length of time, yet the good effect of this medicine on cachectic and scorbutic persons is soon perceived, by the change it produceth in their pale discoloured looks, giving a florid healthy countenance in less time than perhaps any other medicine.

95. It is supposed by physicians that the immediate cause of the scurvy lies in the blood, the fibrous part of which is too thick and the serum too thin and sharp; and that hence ariseth the great difficulty in the cure, because in the correcting of one part regard must be had to the other. It is well known how extremely difficult it is to cure an inveterate scurvy: how many scorbutic patients have grown worse by an injudicious course of evacuations: how many are even rendered incurable by the treatment of inconsiderate physicians; and how difficult, tedious, and uncertain, the cure is in the hands even of the best, who are obliged to use such variety and change of medicines, in the different stages of that malady: which nevertheless may be cured (if I may judge by what I have experienced) by the sole, regular, constant, copious use of tar-water.

96. Tar-water moderately inspissates with its balsamic virtue, and renders mild the thin and sharp part of the blood, the same as a soapy medicine dissolves the grumous concretions of the fibrous part. As a balsam it destroys the ulcerous acrimony of the humours, and as a de-

obstruent it opens and cleans the vessels, restores their tone, and strengthens the digestion, whose defects are the principal cause of scurvy and cachexy.

97. In the cure of the scurvy the principal aim is to subdue the acrimony of the blood and juices. But, as this acrimony proceeds from different causes, or even opposite, as acid and alkaline, what is good in one sort of scurvy proves dangerous or even mortal in another. It is well known that hot antiscorbutics, where the juices of the body are alkalescent, increase the disease. And sour fruits and vegetables produce a like effect in the scurvy, caused by an acid acrimony. Hence fatal blunders are committed by unwary practitioners, who, not distinguishing the nature of the disease, do frequently aggravate instead of curing it. If I may trust what trials I have been able to make, this water is good in the several kinds of scurvy, acid, alkaline, and muriatic, and I believe it the only medicine that cures them all without doing hurt to any. As it contains a volatile acid (sect. 7) with a fine volatile oil, why may not a medicine cool in one part and warm in another be a remedy to either extreme (sect. 72)? I have observed it to produce a kindly genial warmth without heat, a thing to be aimed at in all sorts of scurvy. Besides, the balsam in tar-water sheathes all scorbutic salts alike: and its great virtues as a digester and deobstruent are of general use in all scorbutic, and I may add, in all chronical cases whatsoever.

98. I cannot be sure that I have tried it in a scrofulous case, though I have tried it successfully in one that I suspected to be so. And I apprehend it would be very serviceable in such disorders. For although Dr. Gibbs in his treatise on the King's Evil derives that disease from a coagulating acid, which is also agreeable to the opinion of some other physicians, and although tar-water contain an acid, yet, as it is a soap (sect. 58), it resolves instead of coagulating the juices of the body.

99. For hysterical and hypochondriacal disorders so frequent among us, it is commonly supposed that all acids are bad. But I will venture to except the acid soap of tar-water, having found by my own experience and that of many others, that it raises the spirits, and is an excellent antihysteric, nor less innocent than potent, which cannot be

said of those others in common use, that often leave people worse than they found them.

100. In a high degree of scurvy a mercurial salivation is looked on by many as the only cure; which, by the vehement shock it gives the whole frame, and the sensible secretion it produceth, may be thought more adequate to such an effect. But the disorder occasioned by that violent process, it is to be feared, may never be got over. The immediate danger, the frequent bad effects, the extreme trouble and nice care attending such a course, do very deservedly make people afraid of it. And though the sensible secretion therein be so great, yet in a longer tract of time the use of tar-water may produce as great a discharge of scorbutic salts by urine and by perspiration, the effect of which last, though not so sensible, may yet be greater than that of salivation; especially if it be true that in common life insensible perspiration is to nutrition, and all sensible excretions, as five to three.

101. Many hysteric and scorbutic ailments, many taints contracted by themselves, or inherited from their ancestors, afflict the people of condition in these islands, often rendering them, upon the whole, much more unhappy than those whom poverty and labour have ranked in the lowest lot of life, which ailments might be safely removed or relieved by the sole use of tar-water; and those lives which seem hardly worth living for bad appetite, low spirits, restless nights, wasting pains and anxieties, be rendered easy and comfortable.

102. As the nerves are instruments of sensation, it follows that spasms in the nerves may produce all symptoms, and therefore a disorder in the nervous system shall imitate all distempers, and occasion, in appearance, an asthma for instance, a pleurisy, or a fit of the stone. Now, whatever is good for the nerves in general is good against all such symptoms. But tar-water, as it includes in an eminent degree the virtues of warm gums and resins, is of great use for comforting and strengthening the nerves (sect. 86), curing twitches in the nervous fibres, cramps also, and numbness in the limbs, removing anxieties, and promoting sleep: in all which cases I have known it very successful.

103. This safe and cheap medicine suits all circumstances and all constitutions, operating easily, curing without dis-

turbing, raising the spirits without depressing them, a circumstance that deserves repeated attention, especially in these climates, where strong liquors so fatally and so frequently produce those very distresses they are designed to remedy; and, if I am not misinformed, even among the ladies themselves, who are truly much to be pitied. Their condition of life makes them a prey to imaginary woes, which never fail to grow up in minds unexercised and unemployed. To get rid of these, it is said, there are who betake themselves to distilled spirits. And it is not improbable they are led gradually to the use of those poisons by a certain complaisant pharmacy, too much used in the modern practice, palsy drops, poppy cordial, plague water, and such like, which being in truth nothing but drams disguised, yet, coming from the apothecaries, are considered only as medicines.

104. The soul of man was supposed by many ancient sages to be thrust into the human body as into a prison, for punishment of past offences. But the worst prison is the body of an indolent epicure, whose blood is inflamed by fermented liquors (sect. 66) and high sauces, or rendered putrid, sharp, and corrosive, by a stagnation of the animal juices through sloth and indolence; whose membranes are irritated by pungent salts; whose mind is agitated by painful oscillations of the nervous system (sect. 86), and whose nerves are mutually affected by the irregular passions of his mind. This ferment in the animal economy darkens and confounds the intellect. It produceth vain terrors and vain conceits, and stimulates the soul with mad desires, which, not being natural, nothing in nature can satisfy. No wonder, therefore, there are so many fine persons of both sexes, shining themselves, and shone on by fortune, who are inwardly miserable and sick of life.

105. The hardness of stubbed vulgar constitutions renders them insensible of a thousand things that fret and gall those delicate people who, as if their skin was peeled off, feel to the quick everything that touches them. The remedy for this exquisite and painful sensibility is commonly sought from fermented, perhaps from distilled, liquors, which render many lives wretched that would otherwise have been only ridiculous. The tender nerves and low spirits of such

poor creatures would be much relieved by the use of tar-water, which might prolong and cheer their lives. I do therefore recommend to them the use of a cordial, not only safe and innocent, but giving health and spirits as surely as other cordials destroy them.

106. I do verily think there is not any other medicine whatsoever so effectual to restore a crazy constitution, and cheer a dreary mind, or so likely to subvert that gloomy empire of the spleen (sect. 103) which tyrannizeth over the better sort (as they are called) of these free nations; and maketh them, in spite of their liberty and property, more wretched slaves than even the subjects of absolute power, who breathe clear air in a sunny climate: while men of low degree often enjoy a tranquillity and content that no advantage of birth or fortune can equal. Such, indeed, was the case while the rich alone could afford to be debauched; but when even beggars became debauchees, the case was altered.

107. The public virtue and spirit of the British legislature never shewed itself more conspicuous in any act than in that for suppressing the immoderate use of distilled spirits[1] among the people, whose strength and numbers constitute the true wealth of a nation: though evasive arts will, it is feared, prevail so long as distilled spirits of any kind are allowed, the character of Englishmen in general being that of Brutus, *Quicquid vult, valde vult.* But why should such a canker be tolerated in the vitals of a state, under any pretence or in any shape whatsoever? Better by far the whole present set of distillers were pensioners of the public, and their trade abolished by law; since all the benefit thereof put together would not balance the hundredth part of its mischief.

108. To prove the destructive effects of such spirits with regard both to the human species and individuals, we need not go so far as our Colonies, or the savage natives of America. Plain proof may be had nearer home. For, albeit there is in every town or district throughout England some tough dram-drinker, set up as the devil's decoy, to draw in proselytes; yet the ruined health and morals, and the beggary of such numbers, evidently shew that we need no other enemy

[1] First two editions have "spirituous liquors."—ED.

to complete our destruction, than this cheap luxury at the lower end of the state, and that a nation lighted up at both ends must soon be consumed.

109. It is much to be lamented that our insulars, who act and think so much for themselves, should yet, from grossness of air and diet, grow stupid or dote sooner than other people, who by virtue of elastic air, water drinking, and light food, preserve their faculties to extreme old age; an advantage which may perhaps be approached, if not equalled, even in these regions, by tar-water, temperance, and early hours. The last is a sure addition to life, not only in regard of time, which, being taken from sleep, the image of death, is added to the waking hours, but also in regard of longevity and duration in the vulgar sense. I may say too in regard of spirit and vivacity, which within the same compass of duration, may truly and properly be affirmed to add to man's life: it being manifest, that one man, by a brisker motion of his spirits and succession of his ideas, shall live more in one hour than another in two: and that the quantity of life is to be estimated, not merely from the duration, but also from the intenseness of living. Which intense living, or, if I may so say, lively life, is not more promoted by early hours as a regimen, than by tar-water as a cordial; which acts, not only as a slow medicine, but hath also an immediate and cheerful effect on the spirits (sect. 66).

110. It must be owned, the light attracted, secreted, and detained in tar (sect. 8, 29, 40), and afterwards drawn off in its finest balsamic particles, by the gentle menstruum of cold water, is not a violent and sudden medicine, always to produce its effect at once (such, by irritating, often do more mischief than good), but a safe and mild alterative, which penetrates the whole system, opens, heals, and strengthens the remote vessels, alters and propels their contents, and enters the minutest capillaries, and cannot therefore, otherwise than by degrees and in time, work a radical cure of chronic distempers. It gives nevertheless speedy relief in most cases, as I have found by myself and many others. I have been surprised to see persons fallen away and languishing under a bad digestion, after a few weeks recover a good stomach, and with it flesh and strength, so as to seem renewed, by the drinking of tar-water. The strength and

quantity of this water to be taken by each individual person is best determined from experience. And as for the time of taking, I never knew any evil ensue from its being continued ever so long; but, on the contrary, many and great advantages, which sometimes would not perhaps begin to shew themselves till it had been taken two or three months.

111. We learn from Pliny that in the first ferment of new wine or *mustum*, the ancients were wont to sprinkle it with powdered resin, which gave it a certain sprightliness, *quædam saporis acumina*. This was esteemed a great improver of its odour and taste, and was, I doubt not, of its salubrity also. The brown old resin, that is to say hardened tar, as being more easily pulverized and sifted, was most in request for this purpose. They used likewise to season their wine vessels with pitch or resin. And I make no doubt that if our vintners would contrive to medicate their wines with the same ingredients, they might improve and preserve them with less trouble and expense to themselves, and less danger to others. He that would know more particulars of this matter may consult Pliny and Columella. I shall only add, that I doubt not a similar improvement may be made of malt liquor.

112. The ῥητίνη of Theophrastus and *resina* of Pliny are sometimes used in a general sense, to signify all sorts of oily viscid exudations from plants or trees. The crude watery juice that riseth early in the spring is gradually ripened and inspissated by the solar heat, becoming in orderly succession with the seasons an oil, a balsam, and at last a resin. And it is observed by chemists that turpentine dissolved over a gentle fire is, by the constant operation of heat, successively transformed into oil, balsam, pitch, and hard friable resin, which will incorporate with oil or rectified spirit, but not with water.

113. Sir John Floyer remarks, that we want a method for the use of turpentine: and again, he who shall hit, saith he, on the pleasantest method of giving turpentine will do great cures in the gout, stone, catarrhs, dropsies, and cold scurvies, rheumatisms, ulcers, and obstructions of the glands. Lastly, he subjoins, that, for the use of altering and amending the juices and fibres, it must be given frequently, and in such small quantities at a time, and in so commodious a manner, as will agree best with the stomach (sect. 9), stay longest in

the body, and not purge itself off; for large doses (saith he) go through too quick, and besides offend the head. Now, the infusion of tar or turpentine in cold water seems to supply the very method that was wanted, as it leaves the more unctuous and gross parts behind (sect. 47), which might offend the stomach, intestines, and head; and, as it may be easily taken, and as often, and in such quantity and such degree of strength, as suits the case of the patient. Nor should it seem that the fine spirit and volatile oil, obtained by infusion of tar (sect. 7, 42, 58), is inferior to that of turpentine, to which it superadds the virtue of wood soot, which is known to be very great with respect to the head and nerves; and this appears evident from the manner of obtaining tar (sect. 13). And as the fine volatile parts of tar or turpentine are drawn off by infusion in cold water, and easily conveyed throughout the whole system of the human body; so it should seem the same method may be used with all sorts of balsams or resins whatsoever, as the readiest, easiest, and most inoffensive, as well as in many cases the most effectual way of obtaining and imparting their virtues.

114. After having said so much of the uses of tar, I must further add that, being rubbed on them, it is an excellent preservative of the teeth and gums: that it sweetens the breath, and that it clears and strengthens the voice. And, as its effects are various and useful, so there is nothing to be feared from the operation of an alterative so mild and friendly to nature. It was a wise maxim of certain ancient philosophers, that diseases ought not to be irritated by medicines (sect. 103). But no medicine disturbs the animal economy less than this, which, if I may trust my own experience, never produces any disorder in a patient when rightly taken.

115. I knew indeed a person who took a large glass of tar-water just before breakfast, which gave him an invincible nausea and disgust, although he had before received the greatest benefit from it. But, if the tar-water be taken and made in the manner prescribed at the beginning of this Essay, it will, if I mistake not, have enough of the salt to be useful, and little enough of the oil to be inoffensive.[1] I mean my own manner of making it, and not the American,

[1] From here to "so successful" (six lines) added with some slight variations to the second edition.—ED.

which makes it sometimes too strong and sometimes too weak; and however serviceable as there used, merely for a preservative against the small-pox, yet may not be fit to use in all those various cases wherein I have found tar-water so successful. Persons more delicate than ordinary may render it palatable, by mixing a drop of the chemical oil of nutmegs, or a spoonful of mountain-wine in each glass. It may not be amiss to observe that I have known some, whose nice stomachs could not bear it in the morning, take it at night going to bed without any inconvenience.[1] For[2] outward washes and fomentations, it may be made stronger, as by pouring on warm water; also for brute beasts, as horses, in whose disorders I have found it very useful, I believe more so than that bituminous substance called Barbadoes tar.

116. In very dangerous and acute cases much may be taken and often; as far as the stomach can bear. But in chronical cases, about half a pint night and morning may suffice[3] or, in case so large a dose should prove disagreeable, half the quantity may be taken at four times, to wit, in the morning early, at night going to bed, and about two hours after dinner and breakfast. A medicine of so great virtue in so many different disorders, and especially in that grand enemy the fever, must needs be a benefit to mankind in general. There are nevertheless three sorts of people to whom I would peculiarly recommend it: seafaring persons, ladies, and men of studious and sedentary lives.

117. To sailors and all seafaring persons, who are subject to scorbutic disorders and putrid fevers, especially in long southern voyages, I am persuaded this tar-water would be beneficial. And this may deserve particular notice in the present course of marine expeditions, when so many of our countrymen have perished by such distempers, contracted at sea and in foreign climates. Which, it is probable, might have been prevented by the copious use of tar-water.

118. This same water will also give charitable relief to the

[1] Here came in the first edition, "and that with some it agrees best warm, with others cold."—ED.

[2] From this point to the end of the section (five lines) added with some variation to the second edition.—ED.

[3] From this point to "breakfast" (four lines) not contained in the first edition.—ED.

ladies (sect. 103), who often want it more than the parish poor; being many of them never able to make a good meal, and sitting pale, puny, and forbidden like ghosts, at their own table, victims of vapours and indigestion.

119. Studious persons also, pent up in narrow holes, breathing bad air, and stooping over their books, are much to be pitied. As they are debarred the free use of air and exercise, this I will venture to recommend as the best succedaneum to both. Though it were to be wished that modern scholars would, like the ancients, meditate and converse more in walks and gardens and open air, which upon the whole would perhaps be no hinderance to their learning, and a great advantage to their health. My own sedentary course of life had long since thrown me into an ill habit, attended with many ailments, particularly a nervous colic, which rendered my life a burthen, and the more so, because my pains were exasperated by exercise. But, since the use of tar-water, I find, though not a perfect recovery from my old and rooted illness, yet such a gradual return of health and ease, that I esteem my having taken this medicine the greatest of all temporal blessings, and am convinced that, under Providence, I owe my life to it.

120. In the distilling of turpentine and other balsams by a gentle heat, it hath been observed that there riseth first an acid spirit (sect. 7) that will mix with water; which spirit, except the fire be very gentle, is lost. This grateful acid spirit that first comes over is, as a learned chemist and physician informs us, highly refrigeratory, diuretic, sudorific, balsamic, or preservative from putrefaction, excellent in nephritic cases, and for quenching thirst—all which virtues are contained in the cold infusion which draws forth from tar only its fine flower or quintessence, if I may so say, or the native vegetable spirit, together with a little volatile oil.

121. The distinguishing principle of all vegetables, that whereon their peculiar smell, taste, and specific properties depend, seems to be some extremely fine and subtle spirit, whose immediate vehicle is an exceeding thin volatile oil; which is itself detained in a grosser and more viscid resin or balsam, lodged in proper cells in the bark and seeds, and

most abounding in autumn or winter, after the crude juices have been thoroughly concocted, ripened, and impregnated with solar light. The spirit itself is by some supposed to be an oil highly subtilized, so as to mix with water. But such volatile oil is not the spirit, but only its vehicle. Since aromatic oils being long exposed to air will lose their specific smell and taste, which fly off with the spirit or vegetable salt, without any sensible diminution of the oil.

122. Those volatile salts that are set free and raised by a gentle heat may justly be supposed essential (sect. 8), and to have pre-existed in the vegetable; whereas the lixivial fixed salts, obtained by the incineration of the subject, whose natural constituent parts have been altered or destroyed by the extreme force of fire, are, by later chemists, upon very good grounds, supposed not to have pre-existed therein—all such salts appearing, from the experiments of Signor Redi, not to preserve the virtues of the respective vegetable subjects; and to be alike purgative and in an equal degree, whatsoever may be the shape of their points, whether sharp or obtuse. But, although fixed or lixivial salts may not contain the original properties of the subject, yet volatile salts, raised by a slight heat from vegetables, are allowed to preserve their native virtues: and such salts are readily imbibed by water.

123. The most volatile of the salts, and the most attenuated part of the oil may be supposed the first and readiest to impregnate a cold infusion (sect. 1, 7). And this will assist us to account for the virtues of tar-water. That volatile acid in vegetables, which resists putrefaction and is their great preservative, is detained in a subtle oil, miscible with water; which oil is itself imprisoned in the resin or grosser part of the tar, from which it is easily set free and obtained pure by cold water.

124. The mild native acids are observed more kindly to work upon, and more thoroughly to dissolve metallic bodies, than the strongest acid spirits produced by a vehement fire; and it may be suspected they have the same advantage as a medicine. And, as no acid, by the observation of some of the best chemists, can be obtained from the substance of animals thoroughly assimilated, it should follow that the acids received into a healthy body must be quite subdued

and changed by the vital powers: but it is easier to subdue and assimilate the gentler than the stronger acids (sect. 48).

125. I am very sensible that on such subjects arguments fall short of evidence: and that mine fall short even of what they might have been if I enjoyed better health, or those opportunities of a learned commerce from which I am cut off in this remote corner. I shall nevertheless go on as I have begun, and proceed, by reason, by conjecture, and by authority, to cast the best light I can on the obscure paths that lie in my way.

126. Sir Isaac Newton, Boerhaave, and Homberg, are all agree that the Acid is a fine subtle substance, pervading the whole terraqueous globe; which produceth divers kinds of bodies, as it is united to different subjects. This, according to Homberg, is the pure salt, salt the principle, in itself similar and uniform, but never found alone. And although this principle be called the salt of the earth, yet it should seem it may more properly be called the salt of the air, since earth turned up and lying fallow receives it from the air. And it should seem that this is the great principle of vegetation, derived into the earth from all sorts of manures, as well as from the air. The acid is allowed to be the cause of fermentation in all fermented liquors. Why, therefore, may it not be supposed to ferment the earth, and to constitute that fine penetrating principle, which introduces and assimilates the food of plants, and is so fugitive as to escape all the filtrations and perquisitions of the most nice observers?

127. It is the doctrine of Sir Isaac Newton and Monsieur Homberg that, as the watery acid is that which renders salt soluble in water, so it is that same which joined to the earthy part makes it a salt. Let it therefore be considered that the organs of plants are tubes (sect. 30, 31, 35)—the filling, unfolding, and distending whereof, by liquors, doth constitute what is called the vegetation or growth of the plant. But earth itself is not soluble in water, so as to form one vegetable fluid therewith. Therefore the particles of earth must be joined with a watery acid; that is, they must become salts, in order to dissolve in water; that so, in the form of a vegetable juice, they may pass through the

strainers and tubes of the root into the body of the plant, swelling and distending its parts and organs, that is, increasing its bulk. Therefore the vegetable matter of the earth is in effect earth changed into salt. And to render earth fertile is to cause many of its particles to assume a saline form.

128. Hence it is observed, there are more salts in the root than in the bark, more salts in vegetables during the spring than in the autumn or winter; the crude saline juices being in the summer months partly evaporated, and partly ripened, by the action and mixture of light. Hence also it appears why the dividing of earth, so as to enlarge its surface, whereby it may admit more acid from the air, is of such use in promoting vegetation: and why ashes, lime, and burnt clay are found so profitable manures—fire being in reality the acid, as is proved in the sequel (sect. 202). Marls also and shells are useful, forasmuch as those alkaline bodies attract the acid, and raise an effervescence with it, thereby promoting a fermentation in the glebe. The excrements of animals and putrid vegetables do in like manner contribute to vegetation, by increasing the salts of the earth. And where fallows are well broken, and lie long to receive the acid of the air into all their parts; this alone will be sufficient to change many terrene particles into salts, and consequently render them soluble in water, and therefore a fit aliment for vegetables.

129. The acid, saith Homberg, is always joined to some sulphur, which determines it to this or that species, producing different salts, as it is the vegetable, bituminous, or metallic sulphur. Even the alkaline, whether volatile or lixivial salts, are supposed to be nothing but this same acid strictly detained by oil and earth, in spite of the extreme force of fire, which lodgeth in them, without being able to dislodge some remains of the acid.

130. Salts, according to Sir Isaac Newton, are dry earth and watery acid united by attraction, the acid rendering them soluble in water (sect. 127). He supposeth the watery acid to flow round the terrestrial part, as the ocean doth round the earth, being attracted thereby; and compares each particle of salt to a chaos, whereof the innermost part is hard and earthy, but the surface soft and

watery. Whatever attracts and is attracted most strongly is an acid in his sense.

131. It seems impossible to determine the figures of particular salts. All acid solvents, together with the dissolved bodies, are apt to shoot into certain figures. And the figures in which the fossil salts crystallize have been supposed the proper natural shapes of them and their acids. But Homberg hath clearly shewed the contrary: forasmuch as the same acid dissolving different bodies assumes different shapes. Spirit of nitre, for instance, having dissolved copper, shoots into hexagonal crystals; the same having dissolved iron, shoots into irregular squares; and again, having dissolved silver, forms thin crystals of a triangular figure.

132. Homberg, nevertheless, holds in general, that acids are shaped like daggers, and alkalies like sheaths: and that, moving in the same liquor, the daggers run into the sheaths fitted to receive them with such violence as to raise that effervescence observed in the mixture of acids and alkalies. But it seems very difficult to conceive how or why the mere configuration of daggers and sheaths floating in the same liquor should cause the former to rush with such vehemence, and direct their points so aptly into the latter, any more than a parcel of spigots and fossets floating together in the same water should rush one into the other.

133. It should seem rather that the vehement attraction which Sir Isaac Newton attributes to all acids, whereby he supposeth them to rush towards, penetrate, shake, and divide the most solid bodies, and to ferment the liquid of vegetables, could better account for this phenomenon. It is in this attraction that Sir Isaac placeth all their activity: and indeed it should seem, the figures of salts were not of such efficacy in producing their effects, as the strong active powers whereby they are agitated and do agitate other bodies. Especially if it be true (what was before remarked) that lixivious salts are alike purgative, whatever may be the shape of their angles, whether more or less acute or obtuse.

134. Sir Isaac Newton accounts for the watery acid's making earthy corpuscles soluble in water, by supposing the acid to be a mean between earth and water, its particles

greater than those of water, and less than those of earth, and strongly to attract both. But perhaps there is no necessary reason for supposing the parts of the acid grosser than the parts of water, in order to produce this effect; may not this as well be accounted for, by giving them only a strong attraction or cohesion with the bodies to which they are joined?

135. The acid spirit or salt, that mighty instrument in the hand of nature, residing in the air, and diffused throughout that whole element, is discernible also in many parts of the earth, particularly in fossils, such as sulphur, vitriol, and alum. It was already observed, from Homberg, that this acid is never found pure, but hath always sulphur joined with it, and is classed by the difference of its sulphurs, whether mineral, vegetable, or animal.

136. Salts are vulgarly reckoned the most active of chemical principles. But Homberg derives all their activity from the sulphurs joined with them. From which also, as hath been said, he derives all their kinds and differences (sect. 129). Salt, water, oil, and earth seem to be originally the same in all vegetables. All the difference, according to the chemists, ariseth from a spirit residing in the oil, called the *rector* or *archæus*. This is otherwise called by chemists *ens primum*, or the native spirit; whereon depend, and wherein are contained, the peculiar flavour and odour, the specific qualities and virtues, of the plant.

137. These native spirits or vegetable souls are all breathed or exhaled into the Air, which seems the receptacle as well as source of all sublunary forms, the great mass or chaos which imparts and receives them. The air or atmosphere that surrounds our earth contains a mixture of all the active volatile parts of the whole habitable world, that is, of all vegetables, minerals, and animals. Whatever perspires, corrupts, or exhales, impregnates the air; which, being acted upon by the solar fire, produceth within itself all sorts of chemical operations, dispensing again those salts and spirits in new generations, which it had received from putrefactions.

138. The perpetual oscillations of this elastic and restless element operate without ceasing on all things that have life,

whether animal or vegetable, keeping their fibres, vessels, and fluids in a motion, always changing; as heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and other causes alter the elasticity of the air: which accounts, it must be owned, for many effects. But there are many more which must be derived from other principles or qualities in the air. Thus iron and copper are corroded and gather rust in the air, and bodies of all sorts are dissolved or corrupted, which sheweth an acid to abound and diffuse itself throughout the air.

139. By this same air fire is kindled, the lamp of life preserved, respiration, digestion, nutrition, the pulse of the heart, and motion of all the muscles seem to be performed. Air therefore is a general agent, not only exerting its own, but calling forth the qualities or powers of all other bodies, by a division, comminution, and agitation of their particles, causing them to fly off and become volatile and active.

140. Nothing ferments, vegetates, or putrifies without air, which operates with all the virtues of the bodies included in it; that is, of all nature; there being no drug, salutary or poisonous, whose virtues are not breathed into the air. The air therefore is an active mass of numberless different principles, the general source of corruption and generation; on one hand dividing, abrading, and carrying off the particles of bodies, that is, corrupting or dissolving them; on the other, producing new ones into being; destroying and bestowing forms without intermission.

141. The seeds of things seem to lie latent in the air, ready to appear and produce their kind, whenever they light on a proper matrix. The extremely small seeds of fern, mosses, mushrooms, and some other plants are concealed and wafted about in the air, every part whereof seems replete with seeds of one kind or other. The whole atmosphere seems alive. There is everywhere acid to corrode, and seed to engender. Iron will rust, and mould will grow in all places. Virgin earth becomes fertile, crops of new plants ever and anon shew themselves; all which demonstrate the air to be a common seminary and receptacle of all vivifying principles.

141. Air may also be said to be the seminary of minerals and metals, as it is of vegetables. Mr. Boyle informs us that the exhausted ores of tin and iron being exposed to the air

become again impregnated with metal, and that ore of alum having lost its salt, recovers it after the same manner.[1] And numberless instances there are of salts produced by the air; that vast collection or treasury of active principles, from which all sublunary bodies seem to derive their forms, and on which animals depend for their life and breath.

143. That there is some latent vivifying spirit dispersed throughout the air common experience sheweth; insomuch as it is necessary both to vegetables and animals (sect. 138, 139), whether terrestrial or aquatic, neither beasts, insects, birds, nor fishes being able to subsist without air. Nor doth all air suffice, there being some quality or ingredient of which when air is deprived it becometh unfit to maintain either life or flame. And this even though the air should retain its elasticity; which, by the bye, is an argument that air doth not act only as an antagonist to the intercostal muscles. It hath both that and many other uses. It gives and preserves a proper tone to the vessels: this elastic fluid promotes all secretions: its oscillations keep every part in motion: it pervades and actuates the whole animal system, producing great variety of effects, and even opposite in different parts, cooling at the same time and heating, distending and contracting, coagulating and resolving, giving and taking, sustaining life and impairing it, pressing without and expanding within, abrading some parts, at the same time insinuating and supplying others, producing various vibrations in the fibres and ferments in the fluids; all which must needs ensue from such a subtle, active, heterogeneous and elastic fluid.

144. But there is, as we before observed, some one quality or ingredient in the air, on which life more immediately and principally depends. What that is, though men are not agreed, yet it is agreed it must be the same thing that supports the vital and the common flame; it being found that when air, by often breathing in it, is become unfit for the one, it will no longer serve for the other. The like is observable in poisonous damps or steams, wherein flame cannot be kindled, as is evident in the Grotto del Cane near Naples. And here it occurs, to recommend the plunging them in cold water, as an experiment to be tried on persons affected

[1] First edition has here, "The like is related of silver and iron ores."—ED.

by breathing a poisonous vapour in old vaults, mines, deep holes, or cavities under ground: which, I am apt to think, might save the lives of several, by what I have seen practised on a dog convulsed, and in all appearance dead, but instantly reviving on being taken out of the above-mentioned Grotto, and thrown into a lake adjacent.

145. Air, the general menstruum and seminary, seemeth to be only an aggregate of the volatile parts of all natural beings, which, variously combined and agitated, produce many various effects. Small particles in a near and close situation strongly act upon each other, attracting, repelling, vibrating. Hence divers fermentations, and all the variety of meteors, tempests, and concussions both of earth and firmament. Nor is the microcosm less affected thereby. Being pent up in the viscera, vessels, and membranes of the body, by its salts, sulphurs, and elastic power, it engenders cholics, spasms, hysteric disorders, and other maladies.

146. The specific quality of air is taken to be permanent elasticity. Mr. Boyle is expressly of this opinion. And yet whether there be any such thing as permanently elastic air may be doubted, there being many things which seem to rob the air of this quality, or at least lessen and suspend its exertion. The salts and sulphurs, for instance, that float in the air abate much of its elasticity by their attraction.

147. Upon the whole, it is manifest that air is no distinct element, but a mass or mixture of things the most heterogeneous and even opposite to each other (sect. 137, 145), which become air by acquiring an elasticity and volatility from the attraction of some active subtle substance—whether it be called fire, æther, light, or the vital spirit of the world; in like manner as the particles of antimony, of themselves not volatile, are carried off in sublimation, and rendered volatile by cohering with the particles of sal ammoniac. But action and reaction being equal, the spring of this ethereal spirit is diminished by being imparted. Its velocity and subtlety are also less from its being mixed with grosser particles. Hence sound moves slower than light, as mud than water.

148. Whether air be only freed and fixed, or generated and destroyed, it is certain that air begins and ceases to exert or shew itself. Much by experiments seems to be

generated, not only from animals, fruits, and vegetables, but also from hard bodies. And it is observed by Sir Isaac Newton, that air produced from hard bodies is most elastic. The transmutation of elements, each into other, hath been anciently held. In Plutarch we find it was the opinion of Heraclitus, that the death of fire was a birth to air, and the death of air a birth to water. This opinion is also maintained by Sir Isaac Newton. Though it may be questioned, whether what is thought a change be not only a disguise.

149. Fire seems the most elastic and expansive of all bodies. It communicates this quality to moist vapours and dry exhalations, when it heats and agitates their parts, cohering closely with them, overcoming their former mutual attraction, and causing them, instead thereof, reciprocally to repel each other, and fly asunder, with a force proportionable to that wherewith they had cohered,

150. Therefore in air we may conceive two parts; the one more gross, which was raised and carried off from the bodies of this terraqueous mass; the other a fine subtle spirit, by means whereof the former is rendered volatile and elastic. Together they compose a medium whose elasticity is less than that of pure æther, fire, or spirit, in proportion to the quantity of salts, vapours, and heterogeneous particles contained therein. Hence it follows that there is no such thing as the pure simple element of air. It follows also that on the highest mountains air should be more rare in proportion to the vulgar rule, of the spaces being reciprocally as the pressures: and so in fact it is said to have been found by the gentlemen of the French Academy of Sciences.

151. Æther, fire, or spirit, being attracted and clogged by heterogeneous particles, becometh less active; and the particles cohering with those of æther become more active than before. Air therefore is a mass of various particles, abraded and sublimated from wet and dry bodies of all sorts, cohering with particles of æther; the whole permeated by pure æther, or light, or fire: for these words are used promiscuously by ancient philosophers.

152. This Æther or pure invisible Fire, the most subtile and elastic of all bodies, seems to pervade and expand itself throughout the whole universe. If air be the immediate

agent or instrument in natural things, it is the pure invisible fire that is the first natural mover or spring from whence the air derives its power (sect. 139, 149, 151). This mighty agent is everywhere at hand, ready to break forth into action, if not restrained and governed with the greatest wisdom. Being always restless and in motion, it actuates and enlivens the whole visible mass, is equally fitted to produce and to destroy, distinguishes the various stages of nature, and keeps up the perpetual round of generations and corruptions, pregnant with forms which it constantly sends forth and resorbs. So quick in its motions, so subtle and penetrating in its nature, so extensive in its effects, it seemeth no other than the Vegetative Soul or Vital Spirit of the World.

153. The animal spirit in man is the instrumental or physical cause both of sense and motion. To suppose sense in the world would be gross and unwarranted. But locomotive faculties are evident in all its parts. The Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics held the world to be an animal; though some of them have chosen to consider it as a vegetable. However, the phænomena and effects do plainly shew there is a Spirit that moves, and a Mind or Providence that presides. This Providence, Plutarch saith, was thought to be in regard to the world what the soul is in regard to man.

154. The order and course of things, and the experiments we daily make, shew there is a Mind that governs and actuates this mundane system, as the proper real agent and cause; and that the inferior instrumental cause is pure æther, fire, or the substance of light (sect. 29, 37, 136, 149) which is applied and determined by an Infinite Mind in the macrocosm or universe, with unlimited power, and according to stated rules; as it is in the microcosm with limited power and skill by the human mind. We have no proof, either from experiment or reason, of any other agent or efficient cause than Mind or Spirit. When, therefore, we speak of corporeal agents or corporeal causes, this is to be understood in a different, subordinate, and improper sense.

155. The principles whereof a thing is compounded, the instrument used in its production, and the end for which it

was intended, are all in vulgar use termed *causes*, though none of them be, strictly speaking, agent or efficient. There is not any proof that an extended corporeal or mechanical cause doth really and properly act, even motion itself being in truth a passion. Therefore, though we speak of this fiery substance as acting, yet it is to be understood only as a mean or instrument, which indeed is the case of all mechanical causes whatsoever. They are, nevertheless, sometimes termed agents and causes, although they are by no means active in a strict and proper signification. When therefore force, power, virtue, or action is mentioned as subsisting in an extended and corporeal or mechanical being, this is not to be taken in a true, genuine, and real, but only in a gross and popular sense, which sticks in appearances, and doth not analyze things to their first principles. In compliance with established language and the use of the world, we must employ the popular current phrase. But then in regard to truth we ought to distinguish its meaning. It may suffice to have made this declaration once for all, in order to avoid mistakes.

156. The *calidum innatum*, the vital flame or animal spirit in man, is supposed the cause of all motions in the several parts of his body, whether voluntary or natural. That is, it is accounted the instrument, by means whereof the mind exerts and manifests herself in the motions of the body. In the same sense, may not fire be said to have force, to operate and agitate the whole system of the world, which is held together, and informed by one presiding mind, and animated throughout by one and the same fiery substance—as an instrumental and mechanical agent, not as a primary real efficient?

157. This pure spirit or invisible fire is ever ready to exert and shew itself in its effects (sect. 152), cherishing, heating, fermenting, dissolving, shining, and operating, in various manners, where a subject offers to employ or determine its force. It is present in all parts of the earth and firmament, though perhaps latent and unobserved, till some accident produceth it into act, and renders it visible in its effects.

158. There is no effect in nature, great, marvellous, or terrible, but proceeds from fire, that diffused and active

principle, which, at the same time that it shakes the earth and heavens, will enter, divide, and dissolve the smallest, closest, and most compacted bodies. In remote cavities of the earth it remains quiet, till perhaps an accidental spark, from the collision of one stone against another, kindles an exhalation that gives birth to an earthquake or tempest which splits mountains or overturns cities. This same fire stands unseen in the focus of a burning glass, till subjects for it to act upon come in its way, when it is found to melt, calcine, or vitrify the hardest bodies.

159. No eye could ever hitherto discern, and no sense perceive, the animal spirit in a human body, otherwise than from its effects. The same may be said of pure fire, or the spirit of the universe, which is perceived only by means of some other bodies, on which it operates, or with which it is joined. What the chemists say of pure acids being never found alone might as well be said of pure fire.

160. The mind of man acts by an instrument necessarily. The *τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν*, or mind presiding in the world, acts by an instrument freely. Without instrumental and second causes, there could be no regular course of nature. And without a regular course, nature could never be understood; mankind must always be at a loss, not knowing what to expect, or how to govern themselves, or direct their actions for the obtaining of any end. Therefore in the government of the world physical agents, improperly so called, or mechanical, or second causes, or natural causes, or instruments, are necessary to assist, not the governor, but the governed.

161. In the human body the mind orders and moves the limbs: but the animal spirit is supposed the immediate physical cause of their motion. So likewise in the mundane system, a mind presides: but the immediate, mechanical, or instrumental cause, that moves or animates all its parts, is the pure elementary fire or spirit of the world. The more fine and subtle part or spirit is supposed to receive the impressions of the First Mover, and communicate them to the grosser sensible parts of this world. Motion, though in metaphysical rigour and truth a passion or mere effect, yet

in physics passeth for an action. And by this action all effects are supposed to be produced. Hence the various communications, determinations, accelerations of motion, constitute the laws of nature.

162. The pure æther or invisible fire contains parts of different kinds, that are impressed with different forces, or subjected to different laws of motion, attraction, repulsion, and expansion, and endued with divers distinct habitudes towards other bodies. These seem to constitute the many various qualities (sect. 37, 40, 44), virtues, flavours, odours, and colours which distinguish natural productions. The different modes of cohesion, attraction, repulsion, and motion appear to be the source from whence specific properties are derived, rather than different shapes or figures. This, as hath been already observed, seems confirmed by the experiment of fixed salts operating one way, notwithstanding the difference of their angles. The original particles, productive of odours, flavours, and other properties, as well as of colours, are, one may suspect, all contained and blended together in that universal and original seminary of pure and elementary fire; from which they are diversely separated and attracted, by the various subjects of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms; which thereby become classed into kinds, and endued with those distinct properties which continue till their several forms, or specific proportions of fire, return into the common mass.

163. As the soul acts immediately on pure fire, so pure fire operates immediately on air; that is, the abrasions of all terrestrial things being rendered volatile and elastic by fire (sect. 149, 150, 152), and at the same time lessening the volatility and expansive force of the fire, whose particles they attract and adhere to (sect. 147), there is produced a new fluid, more volatile than water or earth, and more fixed than fire. Therefore, the virtues and operations imputed to air must be ultimately attributed to fire, as that which imparts activity to air itself.

164. The element of æthereal fire or light seems to comprehend, in a mixed state, the seeds, the natural causes and forms (sect. 43), of all sublunary things. The grosser bodies separate, attract, and repel the several constituent particles of that heterogeneous element; which, being

parted from the common mass, make distinct essences, producing and combining together such qualities and properties as are peculiar to the several subjects, and thence often extracted in essential oils or odoriferous waters, from whence they exhale into the open air, and return into their original element.

165. Blue, red, yellow, and other colours, have been discovered by Sir Isaac Newton to depend on the parted rays or particles of light. And, in like manner, a particular odour or flavour seemeth to depend on peculiar particles of light or fire (sect. 40); as appears from heats being necessary to all vegetation whatsoever, and from the extreme minuteness and volatility of those vegetable souls or forms, flying off from the subjects without any sensible diminution of their weight. These particles, blended in one common ocean, should seem to conceal the distinct forms, but, parted and attracted by proper subjects, disclose or produce them. As the particles of light, which, when separated, form distinct colours, being blended are lost in one uniform appearance.

166. Agreeably thereto an æthereal substance or fire was supposed by Heraclitus to be the seed of the generation of all things, or that from which all things drew their original. The Stoics also taught that all substance was originally fire, and should return to fire: that an active subtle fire was diffused or expanded throughout the whole universe; the several parts whereof were produced, sustained, and held together, by its force. And it was the opinion of the Pythagoreans, as Laertius informs us, that heat or fire was the principle of life, animating the whole system, and penetrating all the elements (sect. 152, 153). The Platonists, too, as well as the Pythagoreans, held fire to be the immediate natural agent, or animal spirit; to cherish, to warm, to heat, to enlighten, to vegetate, to produce the digestions, circulations, secretions, and organical motions, in all living bodies, vegetable or animal, being effects of that element, which, as it actuates the macrocosm, so it animates the microcosm. In the Timæus of Plato, there is supposed something like a net of fire and rays of fire in a human body. Doth not this seem to mean the animal spirit, flowing, or rather darting, through the nerves?

167. According to the Peripatetics, the form of heaven, or the fiery æthereal substance, contains the form of all inferior beings (sect. 43). It may be said to teem with forms, and impart them to subjects fitted to receive them. The vital force thereof in the Peripatetic sense is vital to all, but diversely received according to the diversity of the subjects. So all colours are virtually contained in the light; but their actual distinctions of blue, red, yellow, and the rest, depend on the difference of the objects which it illustrates. Aristotle, in the book "De Mundo," supposeth a certain fifth essence, an ethereal nature, unchangeable and impassive; and next in order a subtle flaming substance, lighted up or set on fire by that æthereal and Divine nature. He supposeth, indeed, that God is in heaven, but that his power, or a force derived from him, doth actuate and pervade the universe.

168. If we may credit Plutarch, Empedocles thought æther or heat to be Jupiter. Æther by the ancient philosophers was used to signify promiscuously sometimes fire and sometimes air. For they distinguish two sorts of air. Plato, in the Timæus, speaking of air, saith there are two kinds; the one more fine and subtile, called æther; the other more gross, and replete with vapours. This æther or purer medium seems to have been the air or principle from which all things, according to Anaximenes, derived their birth, and into which they were back again resolved at their death. Hippocrates, in his treatise "De Diæta," speaketh of a fire pure and invisible; and this fire, according to him, is that which, stirring and giving movement to all things, causes them to appear, or, as he styles it, come into evidence, that is, to exist, every one in its time, and according to its destiny.

169. This pure fire, æther, or substance of light was accounted in itself invisible and imperceptible to all our senses, being perceived only by its effects, such as heat, flame, and rarefaction. To which we may add, that the Moderns pretend farther to have perceived it by weight, inasmuch as the aromatic oils which most abound with fire, as being the most readily and vehemently inflamed, are above all others the heaviest. And by an experiment of Mr. Homberg's, four ounces of regulus of antimony, being

calcined by a burning-glass for an hour together, were found to have imbibed and fixed seven drachms of the substance of light.

170. Such is the rarefying and expansive force of this element, as to produce, in an instant of time, the greatest and most stupendous effects: a sufficient proof not only of the power of fire, but also of the wisdom with which it is managed, and withheld from bursting forth every moment to the utter ravage and destruction of all things. And it is very remarkable that this same element, so fierce and destructive, should yet be so variously tempered and applied as to be withal the salutary warmth, the genial, cherishing, and vital flame of all living creatures. It is not therefore to be wondered that Aristotle thought the heat of a living body to be somewhat Divine and celestial, derived from that pure æther to which he supposed the incorporeal Deity (χωριστὸν εἶδος) to be immediately united, or on which he supposed it immediately to act.

171. The Platonists held that intellect resided in soul, and soul in an æthereal vehicle. And that as the soul was a middle nature, reconciling intellect with æther, so æther was another middle nature, which reconciled and connected the soul with grosser bodies (sect. 152, 154). Galen likewise taught that, admitting the soul to be incorporeal, it hath for its immediate tegument or vehicle a body of æther or fire, by the intervention whereof it moveth other bodies, and is mutually affected by them. This interior clothing was supposed to remain upon the soul, not only after death, but after the most perfect purgation, which, in length of time, according to the followers of Plato and Pythagoras, cleansed the soul,

. . . . . "purumque reliquit
Æthereum sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem."

This tunicle of the soul, whether it be called pure æther, or luciform vehicle, or animal spirit, seemeth to be that which moves and acts upon the gross organs, as it is determined by the soul from which it immediately receives impression, and in which the moving force truly and properly resides. Some Moderns have thought fit to deride all that is said of æthereal vehicles, as mere jargon or words without a mean-

ing. But they should have considered that all speech concerning the soul is altogether, or for the most part, metaphorical; and that, agreeably thereunto, Plato speaketh of the mind or soul, as a driver that guides and governs a chariot, which is, not unfitly, styled *αὐγήειδες*, a luciform æthereal vehicle or *ὄχημα*—terms expressive of the purity, lightness, subtlety, and mobility of that fine celestial nature in which the soul immediately resides and operates.

172. It was a tenet of the Stoics that the world was an animal, and that Providence answered to the reasonable soul in man. But then the Providence or mind was supposed by them to be immediately resident or present in fire, to dwell therein, and to act thereby. Briefly, they conceived God to be an intellectual and fiery spirit, *πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρώδες*. Therefore, though they looked on fire (sect. 166) as the *τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν* or governing principle of the world, yet it was not simply fire, but animated with a mind.

173. Such are the bright and lively signatures of a Divine Mind, operating and displaying itself in fire and light throughout the world, that, as Aristotle observes, in his book "De Mundo," all things seem full of divinities, whose apparitions on all sides strike and dazzle our eyes. And it must be owned the chief philosophers and wise men of antiquity, how much soever they attributed to second causes and the force of fire, yet they supposed a Mind or Intellect always resident therein, active or provident, restraining its force, and directing its operations.

174. Thus Hippocrates, in his treatise "De Diæta," speaks of a strong but invisible fire (sect. 168), that rules all things without noise. Herein, saith he, reside soul, understanding, prudence, growth, motion, diminution, change, sleep, and waking. This is what governs all things, and is never in repose. And the same author, in his tract "De Carnibus," after a serious preface, setting forth that he is about to declare his own opinion, expresseth it in these terms:—"That which we call heat, *θερμὸν*, appears to me something immortal, which understands all things, which sees and knows both what is present and what is to come."

175. This same heat is also what Hippocrates calls nature, the author of life and death, good and evil. It is

farther to be noted of this heat, that he maketh it the object of no sense. It is that occult universal nature, and inward invisible force, which actuates and animates the whole world, and was worshipped by the ancients under the name of Saturn; which Vossius judges not improbably to be derived from the Hebrew word *satar*, to lie hidden or concealed. And what hath been delivered by Hippocrates agrees with the notions of other philosophers: Heraclitus (sect. 157), for instance, who held fire to be the principle and cause of the generation of all things, did not mean thereby an inanimate element, but, as he termed it, πῦρ ἀειζώον, an everlasting fire.

176. Theophrastus, in his book "De Igne," distinguisheth between heat and fire. The first he considers as a principle or cause; not that which appeareth to sense as a passion or accident existing in a subject, and which is in truth the effect of that unseen principle. And it is remarkable that he refers the treating of this invisible fire or heat to the investigation of the First Causes. Fire, the principle, is neither generated nor destroyed, is everywhere and always present (sect. 157); while its effects in different times and places shew themselves more or less, and are very various, soft and cherishing, or violent and destructive, terrible or agreeable, conveying good and evil, growth and decay, life and death, throughout the mundane system.

177. It is allowed by all that the Greeks derived much of their philosophy from the Eastern nations. And Heraclitus is thought by some to have drawn his principles from Orpheus, as Orpheus did from the Egyptians; or, as others write, he had been auditor of Hippasus, a Pythagorean, who held the same notion of fire, and might have derived it from Egypt by his master Pythagoras, who had travelled into Egypt, and been instructed by the sages of that nation. One of whose tenets it was, that fire was the principle of all action; which is agreeable to the doctrine of the Stoics, that the whole of things is administered by a fiery intellectual spirit. In the Asclepian Dialogue, we find this notion, that all parts of the world vegetate by a fine subtile æther, which acts as an engine or instrument, subject to the will of the supreme God.

178. As the Platonists held intellect to be lodged in soul,

and soul in æther (sect. 171); so it passeth for a doctrine of Trismegistus in the Pimander, that mind is clothed by soul, and soul by spirit. Therefore, as the animal spirit of man, being subtile and luminous, is the immediate tegument of the human soul, or that wherein and whereby she acts; even so the spirit of the world, that active fiery ethereal substance of light, that permeates and animates the whole system, is supposed to clothe the soul, which clothes the mind of the universe.

179. The Magi likewise said of God, that he had light for his body and truth for his soul. And in the Chaldaic oracles, all things are supposed to be governed by a πῦρ νοερὸν, or intellectual fire. And in the same oracles, the creative mind is said to be clothed with fire, ἐσσάμενος πυρὶ πῦρ, which oriental reduplication of the word fire seems to imply the extreme purity and force thereof. Thus also in the Psalms, "Thou art clothed with light as with a garment." Where the word rendered light might have been rendered fire; the Hebrew letters being the same with those in the word which signifies fire, all the difference being in the pointing, which is justly counted a late invention. That other Scripture sentence is remarkable: "Who maketh his ministers a flaming fire:" which might, perhaps, be rendered more agreeably to the context, as well as consistently with the Hebrew, after this manner: "Who maketh flaming fire his ministers:" and the whole might run thus: "Who maketh the winds his messengers, and flaming fire his ministers."

180. A notion of something Divine in fire, animating the whole world, and ordering its several parts, was a tenet of very general extent (sect. 156, 157, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, &c.), being embraced in the most distant times and places, even among the Chinese themselves; who make *tien*, æther, or heaven, the sovereign principle or cause of all things, and teach that the celestial virtue, by them called *li*, when joined to a corporeal substance, doth fashion, distinguish, and specificate all natural beings. This *li* of the Chinese seems to answer the forms of the Peripatetics, and both bear analogy to the foregoing philosophy of fire.

181. The heaven is supposed pregnant with virtues and

forms, which constitute and discriminate the various species of things. And we have more than once observed that, as the light, fire, or celestial æther, being parted by refracting or reflecting bodies, produceth variety of colours; even so, that same apparently uniform substance, being parted and secreted by the attracting and repelling powers of the divers secretory ducts of plants and animals, that is, by natural chemistry, produceth or imparteth the various specific properties of natural bodies. Whence the tastes, and odours, and medicinal virtues so various in vegetables.

182. The *tien* is considered and adored by the learned Chinese as living and intelligent æther, the πῦρ νοερὸν of the Chaldeans and the Stoics. And the worship of things celestial, the sun and stars, among the Eastern nations less remote, was on account of their fiery nature, their heat and light, and the influence thereof. Upon these accounts, the sun was looked on by the Greek theologers as the spirit of the world, and the power of the world. The cleansing quality, the light and heat of fire, are natural symbols of purity, knowledge, and power, or, if I may so say, the things themselves, so far as they are perceptible to our senses, or in the same sense as motion is said to be action. Accordingly, we find a religious regard was paid to fire, both by Greeks and Romans, and indeed by most, if not all, the nations of the world.

183. The worship of Vesta at Rome was, in truth, the worship of fire.

"Nec tu aliud Vestam quam vivam intellige flammam,"

saith Ovid in his Fasti. And as in old Rome the eternal fire was religiously kept by virgins, so in Greece, particularly at Delphi and Athens, it was kept by widows. It is well known that Vulcan or fire was worshipped with great distinction by the Egyptians. The Zabii or Sabeans are also known to have been worshippers of fire. It appears too, from the Chaldean oracles, that fire was regarded as Divine by the sages of that nation. And it is supposed that Ur of the Chaldeans was so called from the Hebrew word signifying fire, because fire was publicly worshipped in that city. That a religious worship was paid to fire by the ancient

Persians and their Magi is attested by all antiquity. And the sect of Persees, or old Gentiles, of whom there are considerable remains at this day both in the Mogul's country and in Persia, doth testify the same.

184. It doth not seem that their prostrations before the perpetual fires, preserved with great care in their Pyreia, or fire temples, were merely a civil respect, as Dr. Hyde would have it thought. Although he brings good proof that they do not invoke the fire on their altars, or pray to it, or call it God: and that they acknowledge a supreme invisible Deity. Civil respects are paid to things as related to civil power: but such relation doth not appear in the present case. It should seem, therefore, that they worship God as present in the fire, which they worship or reverence not ultimately or for itself, but relatively to the supreme Being. Which it is not unlikely was elsewhere the case at first, though the practice of men, especially of the vulgar, might in length of time degenerate from the original institution, and rest in the object of sense.

185. Doctor Hyde, in his History of the Religion of the Ancient Persians, would have it thought that they borrowed the use and reverence of perpetual fires, from the Jewish practice prescribed in the Levitical law of keeping a perpetual fire burning on the altar. Whether that was the case or not, thus much one may venture to say: it seems probable that, whatever was the original of this custom among the Persians, the like customs among the Greeks and Romans were derived from the same source.

186. It must be owned there are many passages in Holy Scripture (sect. 179) that would make one think the supreme Being was in a peculiar manner present and manifest in the element of fire. Not to insist that God is more than once said to be a consuming fire, which might be understood in a metaphorical sense, the Divine apparitions were by fire, in the bush, at Mount Sinai, on the tabernacle, in the cloven tongues. God is represented in the inspired writings, as descending in fire, as attended by fire, or with fire going before him. Celestial things, as angels, chariots, and such-like phænomena, are invested with fire, light, and splendour. Ezekiel in his visions beheld fire and brightness, lamps, burning coals of fire, and flashes of lightning.

In a vision of Daniel, the throne of God appeared like a fiery flame, and his wheels like burning fire. Also a fiery flame issued and came forth from before him.

187. At the transfiguration, the apostles saw our Saviour's face shining as the sun, and his raiment white as light, also a lucid cloud, or body of light, out of which the voice came; which visible light and splendour were, not many centuries ago, maintained by the Greek church to have been Divine, and uncreated, and the very glory of God; as may be seen in the History wrote by the Emperor John Cantacuzene. And of late years Bishop Patrick gives it as his opinion, that in the beginning of the world the Shechinah, or Divine presence, which was then frequent and ordinary, appeared by light or fire. In commenting on that passage, where Cain is said to have gone out from the presence of the Lord, the Bishop observes, that if Cain after this turned a downright idolater, as many think, it is very likely he introduced the worship of the sun, as the best resemblance he could find of the glory of the Lord, which was wont to appear in a flaming light. It would be endless to enumerate all the passages of Holy Scripture, which confirm and illustrate this notion, or represent the Deity as appearing and operating by fire; the misconstruction of which might possibly have misled the Gnostics, Basilidians, and other ancient heretics into an opinion that Jesus Christ was the visible corporeal sun.

188. We have seen that in the most remote ages and countries, the vulgar as well as the learned, the institutions of lawgivers as well as the reasonings of philosophers have ever considered the element of fire in a peculiar light, and treated it with more than common regard, as if it were something of a very singular and extraordinary nature. Nor are there wanting authors of principal account among the Moderns who entertain like notions concerning fire, especially among those who are most conversant in that element, and should seem best acquainted with it.

189. Mr. Homberg, the famous modern chemist, who brought that art to so great perfection, holds the substance of light or fire to be the true chemic principle sulphur (sect. 129), and to extend itself throughout the whole universe. It

is his opinion that this is the only active principle. That mixed with various things it formeth several sorts of natural productions: with salts making oil, with earth bitumen, with mercury metal. That this principle of sulphur, fire, or the substance of light, is in itself imperceptible, and only becomes sensible as it is joined with some other principle, which serves as a vehicle for it. That, although it be the most active of all things, yet it is at the same time the most firm bond and cement to combine and hold the principles together, and give form to the mixed bodies. And that in the analysis of bodies it is always lost, escaping the skill of the artist, and passing through the closest vessels.

190. Boerhaave, Nieuwentyt, and divers other moderns are in the same way of thinking. They with the ancients distinguish a pure elementary invisible fire from the culinary, or that which appears in ignited bodies (sect. 163, 166). This last they will not allow to be pure fire. The pure fire is to be discerned by its effects alone; such as heat, dilatation of all solid bodies, and rarefaction of fluids, the segregating heterogeneous bodies, and congregating those that are homogeneous. That therefore which smokes and flames is not pure fire, but that which is collected in the focus of a concave mirror or burning-glass. This fire seems the source of all the operations in nature: without it nothing either vegetates or putrefies, lives or moves or ferments, is dissolved or compounded or altered, throughout this whole natural world in which we subsist. Were it not for this, the whole would be one great stupid inanimate mass. But this active element is supposed to be everywhere, and always present, imparting different degrees of life, heat, and motion to the various animals, vegetables, and other natural productions, as well as to the elements themselves wherein they are produced and nourished.

191. As water acts upon salt, or aquafortis upon iron, so fire dissolves all other bodies. Fire, air, and water are all three menstruums: but the two last seem to derive all their force and activity from the first (sect. 149). And indeed there seems to be, originally or ultimately, but one menstruum in nature, to which all other menstruums may be reduced. Acid salts are a menstruum, but their force and distinct powers are from sulphur. Considered as pure, or in

themselves, they are all of the same nature. But, as obtained by distillation, they are constantly joined with some sulphur, which characterizeth and cannot be separated from them. This is the doctrine of Monsieur Homberg. But what is it that characterizeth or differenceth the sulphurs themselves? If sulphur be the substance of light, as that author will have it, whence is it that animal, vegetable, and metallic sulphurs impart different qualities to the same acid salt? Can this be explained upon Homberg's principles? And are we not obliged to suppose that light, separated by the attracting and repelling powers in the strainers, ducts, and pores of those bodies, doth form several distinct kinds of sulphur, all which, before such separation, were lost and blended together, in one common mass of light or fire, seemingly homogeneous?

192. In the analysis of inflammable bodies, the fire or sulphur is lost, and the diminution of weight sheweth the loss (sect. 169). Oil is resolved into water, earth, and salt, none of which is inflammable. But the fire or *vinculum* which connected those things, and gave the form of oil, escapes from the artist. It disappears but is not destroyed. Light or fire imprisoned made part of the compound, gave union to the other parts, and form to the whole. But, having escaped, it mingles with the general ocean of æther, till, being again parted and attracted, its enters and specificates some new subject of the animal, vegetable, or mineral kingdom. Fire, therefore, in the sense of philosophers, is always fire, though not always flame.

193. Solar fire or light, in calcining certain bodies, is observed to add to their weight. There is therefore no doubt but light can be fixed, and enter the composition of a body. And though it should lie latent for a long time, yet, being set free from its prison, it shall still shew itself to be fire. Lead, tin, or regulus of antimony, being exposed to the fire of a burning-glass, though they lose much in smoke and steam, are nevertheless found to be considerably increased in weight, which proves the introduction of light or fire into their pores. It is also observed that urine produceth no phosphorus unless it be long exposed to the solar light. From all which it may be concluded, that bodies attract and fix the light; whence it should seem, as some have observed,

that fire without burning is an ingredient in many things, as water without wetting.

194. Of this there cannot be a better proof than the experiment of Monsieur Homberg, who made gold of mercury by introducing light into its pores, but at such trouble and expense, that I suppose nobody will try the experiment for profit. By this junction of light and mercury, both bodies became fixed, and produced a third different from either, to wit, real gold. For the truth of which fact, I refer to the Memoirs of the French Academy of Sciences. From the foregoing experiment it appears that gold is only a mass of mercury penetrated and cemented by the substance of light, the particles of those bodies attracting and fixing each other. This seems to have been not altogether unknown to former philosophers; Marcilius Ficinus, the Platonist, in his commentary on the first book of the second Ennead of Plotinus, and others likewise before him, regarding mercury as the mother, and sulphur as the father of metals; and Plato himself, in his Timæus describing gold to be a dense fluid with a shining yellow light, which well suits a composition of light and mercury.

195. Fire or light mixeth with all bodies (sect. 157), even with water; witness the flashing lights in the sea, whose waves seem frequently all on fire. Its operations are various according to its kind, quantity, and degree of vehemence. One degree keeps water fluid, and another turns it into elastic air (sect. 149). And air itself seems to be nothing else but vapours and exhalations, rendered elastic by fire. Nothing flames but oil; and sulphur with water, salt, and earth compose oil, which sulphur is fire: therefore fire enclosed attracts fire, and causeth the bodies whose composition it enters to burn and blaze.

196. Fire collected in the focus of a glass operates in vacuo, and therefore is thought not to need air to support it. Calx of lead hath gone off with an explosion in vacuo, which Nieuwentyt and others take for a proof that fire can burn without air. But Mr. Hales attributes this effect to air enclosed in the red lead, and perhaps too in the receiver, which cannot be perfectly exhausted. When common lead is put into the fire in order to make red lead, a greater weight of this comes out than was put in of common lead. Therefore

acid. For, whatsoever strongly attracts and is attracted, may be called an acid, as Sir Isaac Newton informs us in his tract "De Acido." Hence it should seem that the sulphur of Homberg, and the acid of Sir Isaac are at bottom one and the same thing, to wit, pure fire or æther.

203. The vital flame or æthereal spirit, being attracted and imprisoned in grosser bodies, seemeth to be set free and carried off by the superior attraction of a subtle and pure flame. Hence, perhaps, it is, that lightning kills animals, and turns spirituous liquors vapid in an instant.

204. Hippocrates, in his book concerning the Heart, observeth that the soul of man is not nourished by meats and drinks from the lower belly, but by a pure and luminous substance darting its rays, and distributing a non-natural nourishment, as he terms it, in like manner as that from the intestines is distributed to all parts of the body. This luminous non-natural nourishment, though it be secreted from the blood, is expressly said not to come from the lower belly. It is plain, therefore, he thought it came into the blood, either by respiration, or by attraction through the pores. And it must be acknowledged that somewhat igneous or æthereal, brought by the air into the blood, seems to nourish, though not the soul itself, yet the interior tunicle of the soul, the *auraï simplicis ignem.*

205. That there is really such a thing as vital flame, actually kindled, nourished, and extinguished, like common flame, and by the same means, is an opinion of some moderns, particularly of Dr. Willis in his tract "De Sanguinis Accensione": that it requires constant eventilation, through the trachæa and pores of the body for the discharge of a fuliginous and excrementitious vapour; and that this vital flame, being extremely subtile, might not be seen any more than shining flies or *ignes fatui* by daylight. And yet it hath sometimes become visible on divers persons, of which there are undoubted instances. This is Dr. Willis's notion: and perhaps there may be some truth in this, if it be so understood as that light or fire might indeed constitute the animal spirit or immediate vehicle of the soul.

206. There have not been wanting those, who, not content to suppose Light the most pure and refined of all corporeal

beings, have gone farther, and bestowed upon it some attributes of a yet higher nature. Julianus, the Platonic philosopher, as cited by Ficinus, saith it was a doctrine in the theology of the Phœnicians, that there is diffused throughout the universe a pellucid and shining nature, pure and impassive, the act of a pure intelligence. And Ficinus himself undertakes to prove that light is incorporeal by several arguments: because it enlightens and fills a great space in an instant, and without opposition: because several lights meet without resisting each other: because light cannot be defiled by filth of any kind: because the solar light is not fixed in any subject: lastly, because it contracts and expands itself so easily without collision, condensation, rarefaction, or delay, throughout the vastest space. These reasons are given by Ficinus, in his comment on the first book of the second Ennead of Plotinus.

207. But it is now well known that light moves, and that its motion is not instantaneous: that it is capable of condensation, rarefaction, and collision: that it can be mixed with other bodies, enter their composition, and increase their weight (sect. 169, 192, 193). All which seems sufficiently to overthrow those arguments of Ficinus, and shew light to be corporeal. There appears indeed some difficulty at first sight, about the non-resistance of rays or particles of light occurring one to another, in all possible directions or from all points. Particularly, if we suppose the hollow surface of a large sphere studded with eyes looking inwards one at another, it may perhaps seem hard to conceive how distinct rays from every eye should arrive at every other eye without justling, repelling, and confounding each other.

208. But these difficulties may be got over by considering, in the first place, that visible points are not mathematical points, and consequently that we are not to suppose every point of space a radiating point. Secondly, by granting that many rays do resist and intercept each other, notwithstanding which the act of vision may be performed. Since as every point of the object is not seen, so it is not necessary that rays from every such point arrive at the eye. We often see an object, though more dimly, when many rays are intercepted by a gross medium.

209. Besides, we may suppose the particles of light to be

indefinitely small, that is, as small as we please, and their aggregate to bear as small a proportion to the void as we please, there being nothing in this that contradicts the phænomena. And there needs nothing more, in order to conceive the possibility of rays passing from and to all visible points, although they be not incorporeal. Suppose a hundred ports placed round a circular sea, and ships sailing from each port to every other; the larger the sea, and the smaller the vessels are supposed, the less danger will there be of their striking against each other. But, as there is by hypothesis no limited proportion between the sea and the ships, the void and solid particles of light, so there is no difficulty that can oblige us to conclude the sun's light incorporeal from its free passage; especially when there are so many clear proofs of the contrary. As for the difficulty, therefore, attending the supposition of a sphere studded with eyes looking at each other, this is removed only by supposing the particles of light exceeding small relatively to the empty spaces.

210. Plotinus supposeth that from the sun's light, which is corporeal, there springs forth another equivocal light which is incorporeal, and as it were the brightness of the former. Marcilius Ficinus also, observing it to be a doctrine in the "Timæus" of Plato, that there is an occult fire or spirit diffused throughout the universe, intimates that this same occult invisible fire or light is, as it were, the sight of the mundane soul. And Plotinus in his fourth Ennead sheweth it to be his opinion that the world seeth itself and all its parts. The Platonic philosophers do wonderfully refine upon light, and soar very high: from coal to flame; from flame to light; from this visible light to the occult light of the celestial or mundane soul, which they supposed to pervade and agitate the substance of the universe by its vigorous and expansive motion.

211. If we may believe Diogenes Laertius, the Pythagorean philosophers thought there was a certain pure heat or fire, which had somewhat Divine in it, by the participation whereof men became allied to the gods. And according to the Platonist, heaven is not defined so much by its local situation as by its purity. The purest and most excellent fire, that is heaven, saith Ficinus. And again, the hidden fire that everywhere exerts itself, he calls celestial. He repre-

sents fire as most powerful and active, dividing all things, abhorring all composition or mixture with other bodies. And, as soon as its gets free, relapsing instantly into the common mass of celestial fire, which is everywhere present and latent.

212. This is the general source of life, spirit, and strength, and therefore of health to all animals, who constantly receive its illapses clothed in air, through the lungs and pores of the body. The same spirit, imprisoned in food and medicines, is conveyed into the stomach, the bowels, the lacteals, circulated and secreted by the several ducts, and distributed throughout the system (sect. 37, 42, 44). Plato, in his "Timæus," enumerating the ignited juices, names wine in the first place, and tar in the second. But wine is pressed from the grape, and fermented by human industry. Therefore of all ignited juices purely natural, tar or resin must in his account be esteemed the first.

213. The vivifying luminous æther exists in all places, even the darkest caverns; as is evident from hence, that many animals see in those dark places, and that fire may be kindled in them by the collision or attrition of bodies. It is also known that certain persons have fits of seeing in the dark. Tiberius was said to have had this faculty or distemper. I myself knew an ingenious man who had experienced it several times in himself. And Dr. Willis, in his tract "De Sanguinis Accensione," mentions another of his own knowledge. This luminous æther or spirit is therefore said by Virgil to nourish or cherish the innermost earth, as well as the heavens and celestial bodies.

> "Principio cœlum ac terras, camposque liquentes,
> Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque astra
> Spiritus intus alit."

214. The principles of motion and vegetation in living bodies seem to be delibations from the invisible fire or spirit of the universe (sect. 43, 157, 164, 171): which though present to all things, is not nevertheless one way received by all; but variously imbibed, attracted, and secreted, by the fine capillaries, and exquisite strainers in the bodies of plants and animals, whereby it becomes mixed and detained in their juices.

215. It hath been thought by some observers of nature that the fine glandular vessels admit from the common mass of the blood only such juices as are homogeneous to those with which they were originally imbued. How they came to be so imbued doth not appear. But thus much is plain; that fine tubes attract fluids, that the glands are fine tubes, and that they attract very different juices from the common mass. The same holds also with regard to the capillary vessels of vegetables (sect. 30, 31, 33, 35), it being evident that, through the fine strainers in the leaves and all over the body of the plant, there be juices or fluids of a particular kind drawn in, and separated from the common mass of air and light. And that the most elaborate spirit, whereon the character or distinguishing virtue and properties of the plant depend, is of a luminous (sect. 37, 43) and volatile nature, being lost or escaping into air or æther, from essential oils and odoriferous waters, without any sensible diminution of them.

216. As different kinds of secreted light or fire produce different essences, virtues, or specific properties, so also different degrees of heat produce different effects. Thus, one degree of heat keeps the blood from coagulating, and another degree coagulates the blood. Thus, a more violent fire hath been observed to set free and carry off that very light, which a more moderate fire had introduced and fixed in the calcined regulus of antimony. In like manner, one kind or quantity of this æthereal fiery spirit may be congenial and friendly to the spirits of a man, while another may be noxious.

217. And experience sheweth this to be true. For, the fermented spirit of wine or other liquors produceth irregular motions, and subsequent depressions in the animal spirits. Whereas the luminous spirit lodged and detained in the native balsam of pines and firs is of a nature so mild, and benign, and proportioned to the human constitution, as to warm without heating, to cheer but not inebriate,[1] and to produce a calm and steady joy like the effect of good news, without that sinking of spirits which is a subsequent effect of all fermented cordials. I may add, without all other inconvenience, except that it may like any other medicine be

[1] We see here the original of the phrase made more famous by Cowper—to whom Berkeley's work must have been well-known.—ED.

taken in too great a quantity for a nice stomach. In which case it may be right to lessen the dose, or to take it only once in the four and twenty hours, empty, going to bed (when it is found to be least offensive), or even to suspend the taking of it for a time, till nature shall seem to crave it, and rejoice in its benign and comfortable spirit.

218. Tar-water, serving as a vehicle to this spirit, is both diuretic and diaphoretic, but seems to work its principal effect by assisting the *vis vitæ*, as an alterative and cordial, enabling nature, by an accession of congenial spirit, to assimilate that which could not be assimilated by her proper force, and so to subdue the *fomes morbi*. And this should seem in most cases the best and safest course. Great evacuations weaken nature as well as the disease. And it is to be feared that they who use salivations and copious bleedings, may, though they should recover of the distemper, in their whole life be never able to recover of the remedies.

219. It is true, indeed, that in chronical cases there is need of time to complete a curé; and yet I have known this tar-water in disorders of the lungs and stomach to prove a very speedy remedy, and to allay the anxiety and heat of a fever in an instant, giving ease and spirits to the patient. This I have often experienced, not without surprise at seeing these salutary effects follow so immediately in a fever on taking a glass of tar-water. Such is the force of these active vivifying principles contained in this balsam.

220. Force or power, strictly speaking, is in the Agent alone who imparts an equivocal force to the invisible elementary fire, or animal spirit of the world (sect. 153, 156, 157); and this to the ignited body or visible flame, which produceth the sense of light and heat. In this chain the first and last links are allowed to be incorporeal: the two intermediate are corporeal—being capable of motion, rarefaction, gravity, and other qualities of bodies. It is fit to distinguish these things, in order to avoid ambiguity concerning the nature of fire.

221. Sir Isaac Newton in his "Optics," asks, Is not fire a body heated so hot as to emit light copiously? for what else, adds he, is a red-hot iron than fire? Now, it should seem that to define fire by heat would be to explain a thing by

itself. A body heated so hot as to emit light is an ignited body; that is, hath fire in it, is penetrated and agitated by fire, but is not itself fire. And although it should in the third foregoing acceptation, or vulgar sense, pass for fire, yet it is not the pure elementary fire (sect. 190) in the second or philosophic sense—such as was understood by the sages of antiquity, and such as is collected in the focus of a burning-glass; much less is it the *vis*, force, or power of burning, destroying, calcining, melting, vitrifying, and raising the perceptions of light and heat: this is truly and really in the incorporeal Agent, and not in the vital spirit of the universe. Motion, and even power in an equivocal sense, may be found in this pure æthereal spirit, which ignites bodies, but is not itself the ignited body; being an instrument or medium by which the real agent (sect. 160) doth operate on grosser bodies.

222. It hath been shewed in Sir Isaac Newton's "Optics," that light is not reflected by impinging on bodies, but by some other cause. And to him it seems probable that as many rays as impinge on the solid parts of bodies are not reflected, but stifled and retained in the bodies. And it is certain the great porosity of all known bodies affords room for much of this light or fire to be lodged therein. Gold itself, the most solid of all metals, seems to have far more pores than solid parts, from water being pressed through it in the Florentine experiment, from magnetic effluvia passing, and from mercury entering, its pores so freely. And it is admitted that water, though impossible to be compressed, hath at least forty times more pores than solid parts. And, as acid particles, joined with those of earth in certain proportions, are so closely united with them as to be quite hid and lost to all appearance, as in *mercurius dulcis* and common sulphur, so also may we conceive the particles of light or fire to be absorbed and latent in grosser bodies.

223. It is the opinion of Sir Isaac Newton that somewhat unknown remains *in vacuo*, when the air is exhausted. This unknown medium he calls æther. He supposeth it to be more subtile in its nature, and more swift in its motion, than light, freely to pervade all bodies, and by its immense elasticity to be expanded throughout all the heavens. Its density is supposed greater in free and open spaces than within the pores of compact bodies. And in passing from the celestial

bodies to great distances, it is supposed to grow denser and denser continually; and thereby cause those great bodies to gravitate towards one another, and their respective parts towards their centres, every body endeavouring to pass from the denser parts of the medium towards the rarer.

224. The extreme minuteness of the parts of this medium, and the velocity of their motion, together with its gravity, density, and elastic force, are thought to qualify it for being the cause of all the natural motions in the universe. To this cause are ascribed the gravity and cohesion of bodies. The refraction of light is also thought to proceed from the different density and elastic force of this æthereal medium in different places. The vibrations of this medium, alternately concurring with, or obstructing the motions of the rays of light, are supposed to produce the fits of easy reflection and transmission. Light by the vibrations of this medium is thought to communicate heat to bodies. Animal motion and sensation are also accounted for by the vibrating motions of this æthereal medium, propagated through the solid capillaments of the nerves. In a word, all the phænomena and properties of bodies, that were before attributed to attraction, upon later thoughts seem ascribed to this æther, together with the various attractions themselves.

225. But, in the philosophy of Sir Isaac Newton, the fits (as they are called) of easy transmission and reflection seem as well accounted for by vibrations excited in bodies by the rays of light, and the refraction of light by the attraction of bodies. To explain the vibrations of light by those of a more subtle medium seems an uncouth explication. And gravity seems not an effect of the density and elasticity of æther, but rather to be produced by some other cause: which Sir Isaac himself insinuates to have been the opinion even of those ancients who took vacuum, atoms, and the gravity of atoms, for the principles of their philosophy; tacitly attributing (as he well observes) gravity to some other cause distinct from matter, from atoms, and consequently from that homogeneous æther or elastic fluid. The elasticity of which fluid is supposed to depend upon, to be defined and measured by, its density; and this by the quantity of matter in one particle, multiplied by the number of particles contained in a given space; and the quantity of matter in

any one particle[1] to be determined by its gravity. Should not therefore gravity seem the original property and first supposed? On the other hand, if force be considered as prescinded from gravity and matter, and as existing only in points or centres, what can this amount to but an abstract, spiritual, incorporeal force?

226. It doth not seem necessary, from the phænomena, to suppose any medium more active and subtle than light or fire. Light being allowed to move at the rate of about ten millions of miles in a minute, what occasion is there to conceive another medium of still smaller and more moveable parts? Light or fire seems the same with æther. So the ancients understood, and so the Greek word implies. It pervades all things (sect. 157), is everywhere present. And this same subtile medium, according to its various quantities, motions, and determinations, sheweth itself in different effects or appearances, and is æther, light, or fire.

227. The particles of æther fly asunder with the greatest force; therefore when united they must (according to the Newtonian doctrine) attract each other with the greatest force; therefore they are acids, or constitute the acid (sect. 130); but this united with earthly parts maketh alkali, as Sir Isaac teacheth in his tract "De Acido;" alkali, as appears in cantharides and lixivial salts, is a caustic; caustics are fire; therefore acid is fire; therefore æther is fire; and if fire, light. We are not therefore obliged to admit a new medium distinct from light, and of a finer and more exquisite substance, for the explication of phænomena which appear to be as well explained without it. How can the density or elasticity of æther account for the rapid flight of a ray of light from the sun, still swifter as it goes farther from the sun? Or how can it account for the various motions and attractions of different bodies? Why oil and water, mercury and iron, repel, or why other bodies attract each other? Or why a particle of light should repel on one side and attract on the other, as in the case of the Icelandic crystal? To explain cohesion by hamate atoms is accounted *ignotum per ignotius*. And is it not as much so to account for the gravity of bodies by the elasticity of æther?

[1] "Particle or body of a given size" in first and second editions.—ED.

228. It is one thing to arrive at general laws of nature from a contemplation of the phænomena; and another to frame an hypothesis, and from thence deduce the phænomena. Those who suppose epicyles, and by them explain the motions and appearances of the planets, may not therefore be thought to have discovered principles true in fact and nature. And, albeit we may from the premises infer a conclusion, it will not follow that we can argue reciprocally, and from the conclusion infer the premises. For instance, supposing an elastic fluid, whose constituent minute particles are equidistant from each other, and of equal densities and diameters, and recede one from another with a centrifugal force which is inversely as the distance of the centres; and admitting that from such supposition it must follow that the density and elastic force of such fluid are in the inverse proportion of the space it occupies when compressed by any force; yet we cannot reciprocally infer that a fluid endued with this property must therefore consist of such supposed equal particles: for it would then follow that the constituent particles of air were of equal densities and diameters; whereas it is certain that air is an heterogeneous mass, containing in its composition an infinite variety of exhalations, from the different bodies which make up this terraqueous globe.

229. The phænomena of light, animal spirit, muscular motion, fermentation, vegetation, and other natural operations, seem to require nothing more than the intellectual and artificial fire of Heraclitus, Hippocrates, the Stoics (sect. 166, 168), and other ancients. Intellect, superadded to æthereal spirit, fire, or light, moves, and moves regularly; proceeding in a method, as the Stoics, or increasing and diminishing by measure, as Heraclitus expressed it. The Stoics held that fire comprehended and included the spermatic reasons or forms (λόγους σπερματικοὺς) of all natural things. As the forms of things have their ideal existence in the intellect, so it should seem that seminal principles have their natural existence in the light (sect. 164); a medium consisting of heterogeneous parts, differing from each other in divers qualities that appear to sense, and not improbably having many original properties, attractions, repulsions, and motions, the laws and natures whereof are indiscernible to

us, otherwise than in their remote effects. And this animated heterogeneous fire should seem a more adequate cause, whereby to explain the phænomena of nature, than one uniform æthereal medium.

230. Aristotle, indeed, excepts against the elements being animated. Yet nothing hinders why that power of the soul styled by him κινητικὴ, or locomotive, may not reside therein, under the direction of an Intellect—in such sense and as properly as it is said to reside in animal bodies. It must nevertheless be owned, that albeit that philosopher acknowledgeth a Divine force or energy in fire, yet to say that fire is alive, or that having a soul it should not be alive, seem to him equally absurd. See his second book "De Partibus Animalium."

231. The laws of attraction and repulsion are to be regarded as laws of motion; and these only as rules or methods observed in the productions of natural effects, the efficient and final causes whereof are not of mechanical consideration. Certainly, if the explaining a phænomenon be to assign its proper efficient and final cause (sect. 154, 155, 160), it should seem the mechanical philosophers never explained any thing; their province being only to discover the laws of nature, that is, the general rules and methods of motion, and to account for particular phænomena by reducing them under, or shewing their conformity to, such general rules.

232. Some corpuscularian philosophers of the last age have indeed attempted to explain the formation of this world and its phænomena by a few simple laws of mechanism. But, if we consider the various productions of nature, in the mineral, vegetable, and animal parts of the creation, I believe we shall see cause to affirm, that not any one of them has hitherto been, or can be, accounted for on principles merely mechanical; and that nothing could be more vain and imaginary than to suppose with Descartes, that merely from a circular motion's being impressed by the supreme Agent on the particles of extended substance, the whole world, with all its several parts, appurtenances, and phænomena, might be produced, by a necessary consequence, from the laws of motion.

233. Others suppose that God did more at the beginning, having then made the seeds of all vegetables and animals, containing their solid organical parts in miniature, the gradual filling and evolution of which, by the influx of proper juices, doth constitute the generation and growth of a living body. So that the artificial structure of plants and animals daily generated requires no present exercise of art to produce it, having been already framed at the origin of the world, which with all its parts hath ever since subsisted; going like a clock or machine by itself, according to the laws of nature, without the immediate hand of the artist. But how can this hypothesis explain the blended features of different species in mules and other mongrels? or the parts added or changed, and sometimes whole limbs lost, by marking in the womb? or how can it account for the resurrection of a tree from its stump, or the vegetative power in its cuttings? in which cases we must necessarily conceive something more than the mere evolution of a seed.

234. Mechanical laws of nature or motion direct us how to act, and teach us what to expect. Where intellect presides there will be method and order, and therefore rules, which if not stated and constant would cease to be rules. There is therefore a constancy in things, which is styled the Course of Nature (sect. 160). All the phænomena in nature are produced by motion. There appears an uniform working in things great and small, by attracting and repelling forces. But the particular laws of attraction and repulsion are various. Nor are we concerned at all about the forces, neither can we know or measure them otherwise than by their effects, that is to say, the motions; which motions only, and not the forces, are indeed in the bodies (sect. 155). Bodies are moved to or from each other, and this is performed according to different laws. The natural or mechanic philosopher endeavours to discover those laws by experiment and reasoning. But what is said of forces residing in bodies, whether attracting or repelling, is to be regarded only as a mathematical hypothesis, and not as any thing really existing in nature.

235. We are not therefore seriously to suppose, with certain mechanic philosophers, that the minute particles of

bodies have real forces or powers, by which they act on each other, to produce the various phænomena in nature. The minute corpuscles are impelled and directed, that is to say, moved to and from each other, according to various rules or laws of motion. The laws of gravity, magnetism, and electricity are divers. And it is not known what other different rules or laws of motion might be established by the Author of nature. Some bodies approach together, others fly asunder, and perhaps some others do neither. When salt of tartar flows *per deliquium*, it is visible that the particles of water floating in the air are moved towards the particles of salt, and joined with them. And when we behold vulgar salt not to flow *per deliquium*, may we not conclude that the same law of nature and motion doth not obtain between its particles and those of the floating vapours? A drop of water assumes a round figure, because its parts are moved towards each other. But the particles of oil and vinegar have no such disposition to unite. And when flies walk in water, without wetting their feet, it is attributed to a repelling force or faculty in the flies' feet. But this is obscure, though the phænomenon be plain.

236. It is not improbable, and seems not unsupported by experiments, that as in algebra, where positive quantities cease there negative begin, even so in mechanics, where attracting forces cease there repelling forces begin: or (to express it more properly) where bodies cease to be moved towards, they begin to be moved from each other. This Sir Isaac Newton infers from the production of air and vapours, whose particles fly asunder with such vehement force. We behold iron move towards the loadstone, straws towards amber, heavy bodies towards the earth. The laws of these motions are various. And when it is said that all the motions and changes in the great world arise from attraction—the elasticity of the air, the motion of water, the descent of heavy, and the ascent of light bodies, being all ascribed to the same principle; when from insensible attractions of most minute particles at the smallest distance are derived cohesion, dissolution, coagulation, animal secretion, fermentation, and all chemical operations; and when it is said that without such principles there never would have been any motion in the world, and without the con-

tinuance thereof all motion would cease; in all this we know or understand no more than that bodies are moved according to a certain order, and that they do not move themselves.

237. So likewise, how to explain all those various motions and effects, by the density and elasticity of æther, seems incomprehensible (sect. 153, 162). For instance, why should the acid particles draw those of water and repel each other? Why should some salts attract vapours in the air, and others not? Why should the particles of common salt repel each other, so as not to subside in water? Why should the most repellent particles be the most attractive upon contact? Or why should the repellent begin where the attractive faculty leaves off? These, and numberless other effects, seem inexplicable on mechanical principles; or otherwise than by recourse to a mind or spiritual agent (sect. 154, 220). Nor will it suffice from present phænomena and effects, through a chain of natural causes and subordinate blind agents, to trace a Divine Intellect as the remote original cause, that first created the world, and then set it a-going. We cannot make even one single step in accounting for the phænomena, without admitting the immediate presence and immediate action of an incorporeal agent, who connects, moves, and disposes all things, according to such rules, and for such purposes, as seem good to him.

238. It is an old opinion, adopted by the moderns, that the elements and other natural bodies are changed each into other (sect. 148). Now, as the particles of different bodies are agitated by different forces, attracting and repelling, or, to speak more accurately, are moved by different laws, how can these forces or laws be changed, and this change accounted for by an elastic æther? Such a medium—distinct from light or fire—seemeth not to be made out by any proof, nor to be of any use in explaining the phænomena. But if there be any medium employed, as a subordinate cause or instrument in attraction, it would rather seem to be light (sect. 152, 156); since, by an experiment of Mr. Boyle's, amber, that shewed no sign of attraction in the shade, being placed where the sunbeams shone upon it, immediately attracted light bodies. Besides, it hath been

discovered by Sir Isaac Newton, and an admirable discovery it was, that light is an heterogeneous medium, consisting of particles endued with original distinct properties (sect. 40, 181). And upon these, if I may venture to give my conjectures, it seemeth probable the specific properties of bodies, and the force of specific medicines, may depend. Different sides of the same ray shall, one approach and the other recede from the Icelandic crystal; can this be accounted for by the elasticity of a fine medium, or by the general laws of motion, or by any mechanical principles whatever? And if not, what should hinder but there may be specific medicines, whose operation depends not upon mechanical principles, how much soever that notion hath been exploded of late years?

239. Why may we not suppose certain idiosyncrasies, sympathies, oppositions, in the solids, or fluids, or animal spirit of a human body, with regard to the fine insensible parts of minerals or vegetables, impregnated by rays of light of different properties; not depending on the different size, figure, number, solidity, or weight of those particles, nor on the general laws of motion, nor on the density or elasticity of a medium, but merely and altogether on the good pleasure of the Creator, in the original formation of things? From whence divers unaccountable and unforeseen motions may arise in the animal economy; from whence also various peculiar and specific virtues may be conceived to arise, residing in certain medicines, and not to be explained by mechanical principles. For, although the general known laws of motion are to be deemed mechanical, yet peculiar motions of the insensible parts, and peculiar properties depending thereon, are occult and specific.

240. The words attraction and repulsion may, in compliance with custom, be used where, accurately speaking, motion alone is meant. And in that sense it may be said that peculiar attractions or repulsions in the parts are attended with specific properties in the whole. The particles of light are vehemently moved to or from, retained, or rejected by, objects: which is the same thing as to say, with Sir Isaac Newton, that the particles of acids are endued with great attractive force (sect. 202), wherein their activity consists; whence fermentation and dissolution; and that

the most repellent are, upon contact, the most attracting particles.

241. Gravity and fermentation are received for two most extensive principles. From fermentation are derived the motion and warmth of the heart and blood in animals, subterraneous heat, fires, and earthquakes, meteors, and changes in the atmosphere. And that attracting and repelling forces operate in the nutrition and dissolution of animal and vegetable bodies is the doctrine both of Hippocrates and Sir Isaac Newton. The former of these celebrated authors, in his Treatise concerning Diet or Regimen, observes that in the nourishment of man, one part repels and another attracts. And again in the same Treatise, two carpenters, saith he, saw a piece of timber: one draws, the other pushes: these two actions tend to one and the same end, though in a contrary direction, one up, the other down: this imitates the nature of man: *πνεῦμα τὸ μὲν ἕλκει τὸ δὲ ὠθέει.*

242. It is the general maxim of Hippocrates, that the manner wherein nature acts consisteth in attracting what is meet and good, and in repelling what is disagreeable or hurtful. He makes the whole of the animal economy to be administered by the faculties or powers of nature. Nature alone, saith he, sufficeth for all things to animals. She knows of herself what is necessary for them. Whence it is plain he means a conscious intelligent nature, that presides and moves the æthereal spirit. And though he declares all things are accomplished on man by necessity, yet it is not a blind fate or chain of mere corporeal causes, but a Divine Necessity, as he himself expressly calls it. And what is this but an overruling intelligent power that disposeth of all things?

243 Attraction cannot produce, and in that sense account for, the phænomena, being itself one of the phænomena produced and to be accounted for (sect. 160, 235). Attraction is performed by different laws, and cannot therefore in all cases be the effect of the elasticity of one uniform medium. The phænomena of electrical bodies, the laws and variations of magnetism, and, not to mention other kinds, even gravity, are not explained by elasticity, a phænomenon not less obscure than itself. But then, although it shew not the agent, yet it sheweth a rule and analogy in

nature, to say, that the solid parts of animals are endued with attractive powers whereby from contiguous fluids they draw like to like; and that glands have peculiar powers attractive of peculiar juices (sect. 41). Nature seems better known and explained by attractions and repulsions, than by those other mechanical principles of size, figure, and the like; that is, by Sir Isaac Newton, than Descartes. And natural philosophers excel, as they are more or less acquainted with the laws and methods observed by the Author of nature.

244. The size and shape of particles and general laws of motion can never explain the secretions, without the help of attraction, obscure perhaps as to its cause, but clear as a law. Numberless instances of this might be given. Lemery the younger thought himself obliged to suppose the particles of light or fire (contrary to all reason) to be of a very gross kind, even greater than the pores of the burnt limestone, in order to account for their being detained or imprisoned therein; but this phænomenon is easily reduced to attraction. There would be no end of enumerating the like cases. The activity and force of æthereal spirit or fire, by the laws of attraction, is imparted to grosser particles (sect. 152, 163), and thereby wonderfully supports the economy of living bodies. By such peculiar compositions and attractions, it seems to be effected that denser fluids can pass where air itself cannot (as oil through leather), and therefore through the nicest and finest strainers of an animal or vegetable.

245. The ancients had some general conception of attracting and repelling powers (sect. 241, 242) as natural principles. Galilæi had particularly considered the attraction of gravity, and made some discovery of the laws thereof. But Sir Isaac Newton, by his singular penetration, profound knowledge in geometry and mechanics, and great exactness in experiments, hath cast a new light on natural science. The laws of attraction and repulsion were in many instances discovered, and first discovered, by him. He shewed their general extent, and therewith, as with a key, opened several deep secrets of nature, in the knowledge whereof he seems to have made a greater progress than all the sects of corpuscularians together had done before him. Nevertheless,

the principle of attraction itself is not to be explained by physical or corporeal causes.

246. The Cartesians attempted to explain it by the nisus of a subtle element, receding from the centre of its motion, and impelling grosser bodies towards it. Sir Isaac Newton in his later thoughts seems (as was before observed) to have adopted somewhat not altogether foreign from this notion, ascribing that to his elastic medium (sect. 237, 238) which Descartes did to his second element. But the great men of antiquity resolved gravity into the immediate action of an intelligent incorporeal being. To which also Sir Isaac Newton himself attests and subscribes: although he may perhaps sometimes be thought to forget himself, in his manner of speaking of physical agents, which in a strict sense are none at all; and in supposing real forces to exist in bodies, in which, to speak truly, attraction and repulsion should be considered only as tendencies or motions, that is, as mere effects, and their laws as laws of motion.

247. Though it be supposed the chief business of a natural philosopher to trace out causes from the effects, yet this is to be understood not of agents (sect. 155), but of principles; that is, of component parts, in one sense, or of laws or rules, in another. In strict truth, all agents are incorporeal, and as such are not properly of physical consideration. The astronomer, therefore, the mechanic, or the chemist, not as such, but by accident only, treat of real causes, agents, or efficients. Neither doth it seem, as is supposed by the greatest of mechanical philosophers, that the true way of proceeding in their science is, from known motions in nature to investigate the moving forces. Forasmuch as force is neither corporeal, nor belongs to any corporeal thing (sect. 220); nor yet to be discovered by experiments or mathematical reasonings, which reach no farther than discernible effects, and motions in things passive and moved.

248. *Vis* or force is to the soul what extension is to the body, saith St. Augustine, in his tract concerning the Quantity of the Soul; and without force there is nothing done or made, and consequently there can be no agent. Authority is not to decide in this case. Let any one consult his own notions and reason, as well as experience, concerning the

origin of motion, and the respective natures, properties, and differences of soul and body, and he will, if I mistake not, evidently perceive, that there is nothing active in the latter. Nor are they natural agents or corporeal forces which make the particles of bodies to cohere. Nor is it the business of experimental philosophers to find them out.

249. The mechanical philosopher, as hath been already observed, inquires properly concerning the rules and modes of operation alone, and not concerning the cause; forasmuch as nothing mechanical is or really can be a cause (sect. 236, 247). And although a mechanical or mathematical philosopher may speak of absolute space, absolute motion, and of force, as existing in bodies, causing such motion and proportional thereto; yet what these forces are, which are supposed to be lodged in bodies, to be impressed on bodies, to be multiplied, divided, and communicated from one body to another, and which seem to animate bodies like abstract spirits, or souls, hath been found very difficult, not to say impossible, for thinking men to conceive and explain; as may be seen by consulting Borellus "De Vi Percussionis," and Torricelli in his "Lezioni Academiche," among other authors.

250. Nor, if we consider the proclivity of mankind to realize their notions, will it seem strange that mechanic philosophers and geometricians should, like other men, be misled by prejudice, and take mathematical hypotheses for real beings existing in bodies, so far as even to make it the very aim and end of their science to compute or measure those phantoms; whereas it is very certain that nothing in truth can be measured or computed,[1] besides the very effects or motions themselves. Sir Isaac Newton asks, Have not the minute particles of bodies certain forces or powers by which they act on one another, as well as on the particles of light, for producing most of the phænomena in nature? But, in reality, those minute particles are only agitated according to certain laws of nature, by some other agent, wherein the force exists and not in them, which have only the motion; which motion in the body moved, the Peri-

[1] This subject is handled at large in my Latin tract, "De Motu," published about twenty years ago. (See vol. ii. for this tract.—Ed.)

patetics rightly judge to be a mere passion, but in the mover to be ἐνέργεια or act.

251. It passeth with many, I know not how, that mechanical principles give a clear solution of the phænomena. The Democritic hypothesis, saith Dr. Cudworth, doth much more handsomely and intelligibly solve the phænomena, than that of Aristotle and Plato. But, things rightly considered, perhaps it will be found not to solve any phænomenon at all: for all *phænomena* are, to speak truly, appearances in the soul or mind; and it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures, and motions, should produce an appearance in the mind. These principles, therefore, do not solve—if by solving is meant assigning the real, either efficient or final, cause of appearances, but only reduce them to general rules.

252. There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phænomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things. Plotinus observes, in his third Ennead, that the art of presaging is in some sort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that so far forth as analogy obtains in the universe, there may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretels the motions of the planets, or the effects of medicines, or the results of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be said to do it by natural vaticination.

253. We know a thing when we understand it; and we understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. Strictly, the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight. But we are not therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, the phænomena of nature are alike visible to all: but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them. There is no question, saith Socrates in Theæteto, concerning that which is agreeable to each person; but concerning what will in time to come be agreeable, of which all men are not equally judges. He who

foreknoweth what will be in every kind is the wisest. According to Socrates, you and the cook may judge of a dish on the table equally well, but while the dish is making, the cook can better foretel what will ensue from this or that manner of composing it. Nor is this manner of reasoning confined only to morals or politics; but extends also to natural science.

254. As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of Rational Discourse (sect. 152), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause. This is agreeable to the philosophy of Plato, and other ancients. Plotinus indeed saith, that which acts naturally is not intellection, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know but only do. And it must be owned that, as faculties are multiplied by philosophers according to their operations, the *will* may be distinguished from the *intellect*. But it will not therefore follow that the Will which operates in the course of nature is not conducted and applied by intellect, although it be granted that neither will understands, nor intellect wills. Therefore, the phænomena of nature, which strike on the senses and are understood by the mind, do form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining, and instructive Discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This Language or Discourse is studied with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of skill. But so far as men have studied and remarked its rules, and can interpret right, so far they may be said to be knowing in nature. A beast is like a man who hears a strange tongue but understands nothing.

255. Nature, saith the learned Doctor Cudworth, is not master of art or wisdom: nature is *ratio mersa et confusa*, reason immersed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it and confounded with it. But the formation of plants and animals, the motions of natural bodies, their various properties, appearances, and vicissitudes, in a word, the whole series of things in this visible world, which we call the Course of Nature, is so wisely managed and carried on that the most improved human reason cannot thoroughly comprehend even the least particle thereof;—so far is it

from seeming to be produced by fuddled or confounded reason.

256. Natural productions, it is true, are not all equally perfect. But neither doth it suit with the order of things, the structure of the universe, or the ends of Providence, that they should be so. General rules, we have seen (sect. 249, 252), are necessary to make the world intelligible: and from the constant observations of such rules, natural evils will sometimes unavoidably ensue: things will be produced in a slow length of time, and arrive at different degrees of perfection.

257. It must be owned, we are not conscious of the systole and diastole of the heart, or the motion of the diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be thence inferred, that unknowing nature can act regularly, as well as ourselves. The true inference is, that the self-thinking individual, or human person, is not the real author of those natural motions. And, in fact, no man blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right. The same may be said of the fingers of a musician, which some object to be moved by habit which understands not; it being evident that what is done by rule must proceed from something that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himself, from some other active intelligence, the same perhaps which governs bees and spiders, and moves the limbs of those who walk in their sleep.

258. Instruments, occasions, and signs (sect. 160) occur in, or rather make up, the whole visible Course of Nature. These, being no agents themselves, are under the direction of one Agent concerting all for one end, the supreme good. All those motions, whether in animal bodies, or in other parts of the system of nature which are not effects of particular wills, seem to spring from the same general cause with the vegetation of plants—an æthereal spirit actuated by a Mind.

259. The first poets and theologers of Greece and the East considered the generation of things as ascribed rather to a Divine cause, but the *physici* to natural causes, subordinate to, and directed still by a Divine; except some corporealists and mechanics, who vainly pretended to make a world without a God. The hidden force that unites,

adjusts, and causeth all things to hang together, and move in harmony—which Orpheus and Empedocles styled Love—this principle of union is no blind principle, but acts with intellect. This Divine Love and Intellect are not themselves obvious to our view, or otherwise discerned than in their effects. Intellect enlightens, Love connects, and the Sovereign Good attracts all things.

260. All things are made for the supreme good, all things tend to that end: and we may be said to account for a thing, when we show that it is so best. In the Phædon, Socrates declares it to be his opinion that he who supposed all things to have been disposed and ordered by a Mind (sect. 154, 160) should not pretend to assign any other cause of them. He blames physiologers for attempting to account for phænomena, particularly for gravity and cohesion, by vortexes and æther; overlooking the τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ δέον, the strongest bond and cement which holds together all the parts of the universe, and not discerning the cause itself from those things which only attend it.

261. As in the microcosm, the constant regular tenor of the motions of the viscera and contained juices doth not hinder particular voluntary motions to be impressed by the mind on the animal spirit; even so, in the mundane system, the steady observance of certain laws of nature, in the grosser masses and more conspicuous motions, doth not hinder but a voluntary agent may sometimes communicate particular impressions to the fine æthereal medium, which in the world answers the animal spirit in man. Which two (if they are two), although invisible and inconceivably small, yet seem the real latent springs whereby all the parts of this visible world are moved—albeit they are not to be regarded as a true cause, but only an instrument of motion; and the instrument not as a help to the Creator, but only as a sign to the creature.

262. Plotinus supposeth that the soul of the universe is not the original cause or author of the species, but receives them from Intellect, the true principle of order and distinction, the source and giver of forms. Others consider the vegetative soul only as some lower faculty of a higher soul which animates the fiery æthereal spirit (sect. 178). As for the blots and defects which appear in the course of this world—which

some have thought to proceed from a fatality or necessity in nature, and others from an evil principle—that same philosopher observes, that it may be the governing Reason produceth and ordaineth all those things; and, not intending that all parts should be equally good, maketh some worse than others by design; as all parts in an animal are not eyes; and in a city, comedy, or picture, all ranks, characters, and colours are not equal or alike; even so excesses, defects, and contrary qualities conspire to the beauty and harmony of the world.

263. It cannot be denied that, with respect to the universe of things, we in this mortal state are like men educated in Plato's cave, looking on shadows with our backs turned to the light. But though our light be dim, and our situation bad, yet if the best use be made of both, perhaps something may be seen. Proclus, in his Commentary on the Theology of Plato, observes there are two sorts of philosophers. The one placed Body first in the order of beings, and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, supposing that the principles of all things are corporeal: that Body most really or principally exists, and all other things in a secondary sense, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon Soul or Mind, think this to exist in the first place and primary sense, and the being of Bodies to be altogether derived from, and presuppose that of the Mind.

264. Sense and experience acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reason, intellect introduce us into the knowledge of their causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the mind, they do by an early prevention render the aftertask of thought more difficult; and, as they amuse the eyes and ears, and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth of the human mind arrived to maturity and perfection, but, not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought to be so far deficient in point of solidity and reality—sensible and real, to common apprehensions, being the same thing. Although it be certain that the principles of science are neither objects of sense nor

imagination; and that intellect and reason are alone the sure guides to truth.

265. The successful curiosity of the present age, in arts, and experiments, and new systems, is apt to elate men, and make them overlook the Ancients. But, notwithstanding that the encouragement and purse of princes, and the united endeavours of great societies in these later ages, have extended experimental and mechanical knowledge very far, yet it must be owned that the ancients too were not ignorant of many things (sect. 166, 167, 168, 241, 242, &c.), as well in physics as metaphysics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first, known in these modern times.

266. The Pythagoreans and Platonists had a notion of the true system of the world. They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by soul or mind: they distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary, making the former to be physical causes, and they understood physical causes in a right sense: they saw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invisible, immortal, governed, connected, and contained all things: they saw there was no such thing as real absolute space: that mind, soul, or spirit truly and really exists: that bodies exist only in a secondary and dependent sense: that the soul is the place of forms: that the sensible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the cause, and as passions in us: they accurately considered the differences of intellect, rational soul, and sensitive soul, with their distinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and sensation, points wherein the Cartesians and their followers, who consider sensation as a mode of thinking, seem to have failed. They knew there was a subtle æther pervading the whole mass of corporeal beings, and which was itself actually moved and directed by a mind: and that physical causes were only instruments, or rather marks and signs.

267. Those ancient philosophers understood the generation of animals to consist in the unfolding and distending of the minute imperceptible parts of pre-existing animalcules, which passeth for a modern discovery; this they took for the work of nature, but nature animate and intelligent (sect. 172): they understood that all things were alive and in

motion: they supposed a concord and discord, a union and disunion, in particles, some attracting, others repelling each other; and that those attractions and repulsions, so various, regular, and useful, could not be accounted for, but by an intelligence presiding and directing all particular motions, for the conservation and benefit of the whole.

268. The Egyptians, who impersonated nature, had made her a distinct principle, and even deified her under the name of Isis. But Osiris was understood to be Mind or Reason, chief and sovereign of all. Osiris, if we may believe Plutarch, was the first, pure, unmixed, and holy principle, not discernible by the lower faculties; a glimpse whereof, like lightning darting forth, irradiates the understanding; with regard to which Plutarch adds, that Plato and Aristotle termed one part of philosophy ἐποπτικὸν; to wit, when having soared above common mixed objects, and got beyond the precincts of sense and opinion, they arrive to contemplate the first and most simple Being free from all matter and composition. This is that οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα of Plato which employeth mind alone; which alone governs the world. And the soul is that which immediately informs and animates nature.

269. Although the Egyptians did symbolically represent the supreme Divinity sitting on a lotus, and that gesture hath been interpreted to signify the most holy and venerable Being to be utterly at rest reposing within himself; yet, for any thing that appears, this gesture might denote dignity as well as repose. And it cannot be denied, that Jamblichus, so knowing in the Egyptian notions, taught that there was an intellect that proceeded to generation, drawing forth the latent powers into light in the formation of things. Nor was this to be understood of an external world, subsisting in real absolute space; for it was a doctrine of those ancient sages, that soul was the place of forms, as may be seen in the twelfth book of the arcane part of divine wisdom, according to the Egyptians. This notion was embraced by divers philosophers of Greece, who may be supposed to have derived it from the same source from whence many of their other opinions were drawn.

270. The doctrine of real, absolute, external Space in-

duced some modern philosophers to conclude it was a part or attribute of God, or that God himself was space; inasmuch as incommunicable attributes of the Deity appeared to agree thereto, such as infinity, immutability, indivisibility, incorporeity, being uncreated, impassive, without beginning or ending—not considering that all these negative properties may belong to nothing. For, nothing hath no limits, cannot be moved, or changed, or divided, is neither created nor destroyed. A different way of thinking appears in the Hermaic as well as other writings of the ancients. With regard to absolute space, it is observed in the Asclepian Dialogue, that the word *space* or *place* hath by itself no meaning; and again, that it is impossible to understand what space alone or pure space is. And Plotinus acknowledgeth no place but soul or mind, expressly affirming that the soul is not in the world, but the world in the soul. And farther, the place of the soul, saith he, is not body, but soul is in mind, and body in the soul. See the third chapter of the fifth book of the fifth Ennead.

271. Concerning absolute space, that phantom of the mechanic and geometrical philosophers (sect. 250), it may suffice to observe that it is neither perceived by any sense, nor proved by any reason, and was accordingly treated by the greatest of the ancients as a thing merely visionary. From the notion of absolute space springs that of absolute motion;[1] and in these are ultimately founded the notions of external existence, independence, necessity, and fate. Which Fate, the idol of many moderns, was by old philosophers differently understood, and in such a sense as not to destroy the *αὐτεξούσιον* of God or man. Parmenides, who thought all things to be made by necessity or fate, understood justice and Providence to be the same with fate; which, how fixed and cogent soever with respect to man,

[1] Our judgment in these matters is not to be overborne by a presumed evidence of mathematical notions and reasonings, since it is plain the mathematicians of this age embrace obscure notions, and uncertain opinions, and are puzzled about them, contradicting each other and disputing like other men: witness their doctrine of Fluxions, about which, within these ten years, I have seen published about twenty tracts and dissertations, whose authors being utterly at variance, and inconsistent with each other, instruct by-standers what to think of their pretensions to evidence.

may yet be voluntary with respect to God. Empedocles declared fate to be a cause using principles and elements. Heraclitus taught that fate was the general reason that runs through the whole nature of the universe; which nature he supposed to be an æthereal body, the seed of the generation of all things. Plato held fate to be the eternal reason or law of nature. Chrysippus supposed that fate was a spiritual power which disposed the world in order; that it was the reason and law of those things which are administered by Providence.

272. All the foregoing notions of fate, as represented by Plutarch, do plainly shew that those ancient philosophers did not mean by fate, a blind, headlong, unintelligent principle, but an orderly settled course of things, conducted by a wise and provident Mind. And as for the Egyptian doctrine, it is indeed asserted in the Pimander, that all things are produced by fate. But Jamblichus, who drew his notions from Egypt, affirms that the whole of things is not bound up in fate; but that there is a principle of the soul higher than nature, whereby we may be raised to a union with the gods, and exempt ourselves from fate. And in the Asclepian Dialogue it is expressly said that fate follows the decrees of God. And indeed, as all the motions in nature are evidently the product of reason (sect. 154), it should seem there is no room for necessity in any other sense than that of a steady regular course.

273. Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the same thing, and one no more intelligible than the other. Such is the mutual relation, connexion, motion, and sympathy of the parts of this world, that they seem as it were animated and held together by one soul: and such is their harmony, order, and regular course, as sheweth the soul to be governed and directed by a Mind. It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the World was an Animal (sect. 153, 172). If we may trust the Hermaic writings, the Egyptians thought all things did partake of life. This opinion was also so general and current among the Greeks that Plutarch asserts all others held the world to be an animal, and governed by Providence, except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal containing all bodies within itself could not be touched or sensibly affected from

without, yet it is plain they attributed to it an inward sense and feeling, as well as appetites and aversions; and that from all the various tones, actions, and passions of the universe, they suppose one symphony, one animal act and life to result.

274. Jamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in which the parts, however distant each from other, are nevertheless related and connected by one common nature. And he teacheth, what is also a received notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonics, that there is no chasm in nature, but a Chain or Scale of beings rising by gentle uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the highest, each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. As air becomes igneous, so the purest fire becomes animal, and the animal soul becomes intellectual: which is to be understood not of the change of one nature into another, but of the connexion of different natures; each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, as it were a receptacle or subject for the next above it to reside and act in.

275. It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that Intellect is the very life of living things, the first principle and exemplar of all, from whence by different degrees are derived the inferior classes of life: first the rational, then the sensitive, after that the vegetal; but so as in the rational animal there is still somewhat intellectual, again in the sensitive there is somewhat rational, and in the vegetal somewhat sensitive, and lastly, in mixed bodies, as metals and minerals, somewhat of vegetation. By which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doctrine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their several respective subordinations, are derived from, and depend upon Mind and Intellect.

276. Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive; though sometimes it be mentioned as a sentient animal, sometimes as a plant or vegetable. But in this, notwithstanding what hath been surmised by some learned men, there seems to be no Atheism. For, so long as the world is supposed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which is itself animated by soul, and directed by understanding, it follows that all parts thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced unto the same indivisible stem or principle,

to wit, a Supreme Mind which is the concurrent doctrine of Pythagoreans, Platonics, and Stoics.

277. There is, according to those philosophers, a life infused throughout all things: the πῦρ νοερὸν, πῦρ τεχνικὸν, an intellectual and artificial fire (sect. 166, 168, 174, 175, etc.) an inward principle, animal spirit, or natural life, producing and forming within as art doth without; regulating, moderating, and reconciling the various motions, qualities, and parts of this mundane system. By virtue of this life the great masses are held together in their orderly courses, as well as the minutest particles governed in their natural motions, according to the several laws of attraction, gravity, electricity, magnetism, and the rest. It is this gives instincts, teaches the spider her web, and the bee her honey. This it is that directs the roots of plants to draw forth juices from the earth, and the leaves and corticle vessels to separate and attract such particles of air, and elementary fire, as suit their respective natures.

278. Nature seems to be not otherwise distinguished from the *anima mundi* than as life is from soul, and, upon the principles of the oldest philosophers, may not improperly or incongruously be styled the life of the world. Some Platonics, indeed, regard life as the act of nature, in like manner as intellection is of the mind or intellect. As the First Intellect acts by understanding, so nature according to them acts or generates by living. But life is the act of the soul, and seems to be very nature itself, which is not the principle but the result of another and higher principle, being a life resulting from soul, as cogitation from intellect.

279. If nature be supposed the life of the world, animated by one soul, compacted into one frame, and directed or governed in all parts by one mind: this system cannot be accused of Atheism; though perhaps it may of mistake or impropriety. And yet, as one presiding mind gives unity to the infinite aggregate of things, by a mutual communion of actions and passions, and an adjustment of parts, causing all to concur in one view to one and the same end—the ultimate and supreme good of the whole, it should seem reasonable to say, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that as life holds together the bodies of animals, the cause whereof is the soul; and as a city is held together by

concord, the cause whereof is law, even so the world is held together by harmony, the cause whereof is God. And in this sense the world or universe may be considered either as one animal or one city (sect. 172, 277).

280. Aristotle disapproves the opinion of those who hold a soul to be diffused throughout the world; and for this reason, because the elements are not alive. Though perhaps it may not be easy to prove that blood and animal spirit are more alive in man, than water and fire in the world. That philosopher, in his books of the Soul, remarks upon an opinion set forth in the Orphics, of the soul's entering from the universe into living creatures being borne by winds—that this cannot be true of plants, or of certain animals which do not breathe. But air vessels are by later experiments allowed to be found in all plants and animals. And air may in some sort not improperly be said to be the carrier or vehicle of the soul, inasmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, which is the spirit immediately moved and animated by the soul (sect. 163, 171).

281. The living fire, the living, omniform seminary of the world, and other expressions of the like nature, occurring in the Ancient and Platonic philosophy, how can they be understood exclusive of light or elemental fire, the particles of which are known to be heterogeneous, and, for aught we know, may some of them be organised, and, notwithstanding their wonderful minuteness, contain original seeds which, being formed and sown in a proper matrix, do gradually unfold and manifest themselves, still growing to a just proportion of the species.

282. May not this æthereal seminary, consistently with the notions of that philosophy which ascribed much of generation to celestial influence, be supposed to impregnate plants and animals with the first principles, the stamina, or those animalcules which Plato, in his "Timæus," saith are invisible for their smallness, but, being sown in a proper matrix, are therein gradually distended and explicated by nourishment, and at length the animals brought forth to light? Which notion hath been revived and received of late years by many, who perhaps are not aware of its antiquity, or that it was to be found in Plato. Timæus Locrensis, in his book of the Soul of the World, supposeth even souls to

be derived from the celestial luminaries, excepting only the rational or intellectual part. But what influence or influx is there from the celestial bodies which hath not light for its vehicle? (sect. 43).

283. What other nature there should be intermediate between the soul of the world (sect. 171) and this gross corporeal system, which might be the vehicle of life, or, to use the language of philosophers, might receive or be impressed with the forms of things, is difficult to comprehend. It is a vulgar remark, that the works of art do not bear a nice microscopical inspection, but the more helps are used, and the more nicely you pry into natural productions, the more do you discover of the fine mechanism of nature, which is endless or inexhaustible; new and other parts, more subtle and delicate than the precedent, still continuing to offer themselves to view. And these microscopical observations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, delivered in the "Timæus" of Plato. But that theory or hypothesis, how agreeable soever to modern discoveries, is not alone sufficient to explain the phænomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what himself and other Platonics say of a plastic nature, is obliged to own that with the mundane force or soul it is to be understood there is joined an intelligence, upon which the seminal nature constantly depends, and by which it is governed.

284. Alcinous, in his tract of the Doctrine of Plato, saith that God hath given the world both mind and soul: others include both in the word soul, and suppose the soul of the world to be God. Philo appears to be of this opinion in several parts of his writings. And Virgil, who was no stranger to the Pythagorean and Platonic tenets, writes to the same purpose:

> Deum namque ire per omnes
> Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.
> Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
> Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.

Thus much the schools of Plato and Pythagoras seem agreed in, to wit, that the Soul of the World (sect. 153, 172), whether having a distinct mind of its own, or directed

by a superior mind (sect. 154, 279), doth embrace all its parts, connect them by an invisible and indissoluble Chain, and preserve them ever well adjusted and in good order.

285. Naturalists, whose proper province it is to consider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the visible frame of things or corporeal world, supposing soul to be contained in body. And this hypothesis may be tolerated in physics, as it is not necessary in the arts of dialling or navigation to mention the true system or earth's motion. But those who, not content with sensible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true causes (the object of theology, metaphysics, or the *philosophia prima*), will rectify this error, and speak of the world as contained by the soul, and not the soul by the world.

286. Aristotle hath observed there were indeed some who thought so grossly as to suppose the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature: but in the first book of his Metaphysics he justly remarks they were guilty of a great mistake; forasmuch as they took into their account the elements of corporeal beings alone, whereas there are incorporeal beings also in the universe; and while they attempted to assign the causes of generation and corruption, and account for the nature of all things, they did at the same time destroy the very cause of motion.

287. It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hermaic writings that all things are One. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion of Τὸ Ἕν, THE ONE, from Egypt. Though that subtle metaphysician Parmenides, in his doctrine of ἓν ἕστως, seems to have added something of his own. If we suppose that one and the same Mind is the universal principle of order and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all its parts, and giving unity to the system, there seems to be nothing atheistical or impious in this supposition.

288. Number is no object of sense: it is an act of the mind. The same thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may say that all things together make

one universe, or τὸ πᾶν. But if we should say that all things make one God;—this would, indeed, be an erroneous notion of God, but would not amount to Atheism, so long as mind or intellect was admitted to be the τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, the governing part. It is, nevertheless, more respectful, and consequently the truer notion of God, to suppose him neither made up of parts, nor to be himself a part of any whole whatsoever.

289. All those who conceived the universe to be an animal must, in consequence of that notion, suppose all things to be one. But to conceive God to be the sentient soul of an animal is altogether unworthy and absurd. There is no sense nor sensory, nor any thing like a sense or sensory, in God. Sense implies an impression from some other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion: and passions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect; but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory. Therefore to suppose a sensory of any kind—whether space or any other—in God, would be very wrong, and lead us into false conceptions of His nature. The presuming there was such a thing as real, absolute, uncreated space seems to have occasioned that modern mistake. But this presumption was without grounds.

290. Body is opposite to spirit or mind. We have a notion of spirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from resistance. So far forth as there is real power, there is spirit. So far forth as there is resistance, there is inability or want of power: that is, there is a negation of spirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by resistance. But in respect of a perfect spirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no resistance to the Deity: nor hath he any body: nor is the supreme Being united to the world as the soul of an animal is to its body; which necessarily implieth defect, both as an instrument, and as a constant weight and impediment.

291. Thus much it consists with piety to say—that a Divine Agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the elementary fire or light (sect. 157, 172), which serves as animal spirit to enliven and actuate the whole mass, and all the members of this visible world. Nor is this doctrine less

philosophical than pious. We see all nature alive or in motion. We see water turned into air, and air rarefied and made elastic (sect. 149, 152, 200) by the attraction of another medium, more pure indeed, more subtle, and more volatile, than air. But still, as this is a moveable, extended, and consequently a corporeal being (sect. 207), it cannot be itself the principle of motion, but leads us naturally and necessarily to an incorporeal spirit or agent. We are conscious that a spirit can begin, alter, or determine motion; but nothing of this appears in body. Nay, the contrary is evident, both to experiment and reflection.

292. Natural phænomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the same; passive without anything active, fluent and changing without anything permanent in them. However, as these make the first impressions, and the mind takes her first flight and spring, as it were, by resting her foot on these objects, they are not only first considered by all men, but most considered by most men. They and the phantoms that result from those appearances, the children of imagination grafted upon sense—such for example as pure space (sect. 270)—are thought by many the very first in existence and stability, and to embrace and comprehend all other beings.

293. Now, although such phantoms as corporeal forces, absolute motions, and real spaces do pass in physics for causes and principles (sect. 220, 249, 250), yet are they in truth but hypotheses; nor can they be the objects of real science. They pass nevertheless in physics, conversant about things of sense, and confined to experiments and mechanics. But when we enter the province of the *philosophia prima*, we discover another order of beings, mind and its acts, permanent being, not dependent on corporeal things, nor resulting, nor connected, nor contained; but containing, connecting, enlivening the whole frame; and imparting those motions, forms, qualities, and that order and symmetry, to all those transient phænomena, which we term the Course of Nature.

294. It is with our faculties as with our affections: what first seizes holds fast (sect. 264). It is a vulgar theme, that man is a compound of contrarieties, which breed a restless

struggle in his nature, between flesh and spirit, the beast and the angel, earth and heaven, ever weighed down and ever bearing up. During which conflict the character fluctuates: when either side prevails, it is then fixed for vice or virtue. And life from different principles takes a different issue. It is the same in regard to our faculties. Sense at first besets and overbears the mind. The sensible appearances are all in all: our reasonings are employed about them: our desires terminate in them: we look no farther for realities or causes; till intellect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on this shadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence. Those things that before seemed to constitute the whole of Being, upon taking an intellectual view of things, prove to be but fleeting phantoms.

295. From the outward form of gross masses which occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward structure and minute parts, and, from observing the motions in nature, to discover the laws of those motions. By the way, he frames his hypothesis and suits his language to this natural philosophy. And these fit the occasion and answer the end of a maker of experiments or mechanic, who means only to apply the powers of nature, and reduce the phænomena to rules. But if, proceeding still in his analysis and inquiry, he ascends from the sensible into the intellectual world, and beholds things in a new light and a new order, he will then change his system, and perceive that what he took for substances and causes are but fleeting shadows: that the mind contains all, and acts all, and is to all created beings the source of unity and identity, harmony and order, existence and stability.

296. It is neither acid, nor salt, nor sulphur, nor air, nor æther, nor visible corporeal fire (sect. 155)—much less the phantom fate or necessity—that is the real agent, but, by a certain analysis, a regular connexion and climax, we ascend through all those mediums to a glimpse of the First Mover, invisible, incorporeal, unextended, intellectual source of life and being. There is, it must be owned, a mixture of obscurity and prejudice in human speech and reasonings. This is unavoidable, since the veils of prejudice and error are slowly and singly taken off one by one. But, if there are many links in the Chain which connects the two extremes of

what is grossly sensible and purely intelligible, and it seem a tedious work, by the slow helps of memory, imagination, and reason—oppressed and overwhelmed, as we are, by the senses, through erroneous principles, and long ambages of words and notions—to struggle upwards into the light of truth, yet, as this gradually dawns, farther discoveries still correct the style and clear up the notions.

297. The Mind, her acts and faculties, furnish a new and distinct class of objects (sect. 163, 266), from the contemplation whereof arise certain other notions, principles, and verities, so remote from, and even so repugnant to, the first prejudices which surprise the sense of mankind that they may well be excluded from vulgar speech and books, as abstract from sensible matters, and more fit for the speculation of truth, the labour and aim of a few, than for the practice of the world, or the subjects of experimental or mechanical inquiry. Nevertheless, though, perhaps, it may not be relished by some modern readers, yet the treating in physical books concerning metaphysical and divine matters can be justified by great authorities among the ancients: not to mention that he who professedly delivers the elements of a science is more obliged to method and system, and tied down to more rigorous laws, than a mere essay writer. It may, therefore, be pardoned if this rude Essay doth, by insensible transitions, draw the reader into remote inquiries and speculations, that were not, perhaps, thought of either by him or by the author at first setting out.

298. There are traces of profound thought as well as primeval tradition in the Platonic, Pythagorean, Egyptian, and Chaldaic philosophy (sect. 179, 266). Men in those early days were not overlaid with languages and literature. Their minds seem to have been more exercised, and less burdened, than in later ages; and, as so much nearer the beginning of the world, to have had the advantage of patriarchal lights handed down through a few hands. It cannot be affirmed indeed (how probable soever it may seem) that Moses was that same Mochus, with whose successors, priests and prophets, Pythagoras is said to have conversed at Sidon. Yet the study of philosophy appears to be of very

great antiquity and remote original; inasmuch as Timæus Locrensis, that ancient Pythagorean, author of the book concerning the Soul of the World, speaks of a most ancient philosophy, even in his time, ἀ πρεσβύστα φιλοσοφία, stirring up and recovering the soul from a state of ignorance to the contemplation of Divine things. And, though the books attributed to Mercurius Trismegistus were none of them wrote by him, and are allowed to contain some manifest forgeries, yet it is also allowed that they contain tenets of the ancient Egyptian philosophy, though dressed, perhaps, in a more modern garb. To account for which, Jamblichus observes that the books under his name contain indeed mercurial opinions, though often expressed in the style of the Greek philosophers; as having been translated from the Egyptian tongue into Greek.

299. The difference of Isis from Osiris (sect. 268) resembles that of the moon from the sun, of the female from the male, of *natura naturata* (as the schoolmen speak) from *natura naturans*. But Isis, though mostly taken for nature, yet (as the Pagan divinities were very fluctuating things) it sometimes signified τὸ πᾶν. And we find in Montfauçon an Isis of the ordinary form with this inscription, Θεου παντός. And in the *mensa Isiaca*, which seems to exhibit a general system of the religion and superstition of the Egyptians, Isis on her throne possesseth the centre of the table. Which may seem to signify that the universe or τὸ πᾶν was the centre of the ancient secret religion of the Egyptians; their Isis or τὸ πᾶν comprehending both Osiris the Author of nature and his work.

300. Plato and Aristotle considered God as abstracted or distinct from the natural world. But the Egyptians considered God and nature as making one whole, or all things together as making one universe. In doing which they did not exclude the intelligent mind, but considered it as containing all things. Therefore, whatever was wrong in their way of thinking, it doth not, nevertheless, imply or lead to Atheism.

301. The human mind is so much clogged and borne downward, by the strong and early impressions of sense (sect. 264), that it is wonderful how the ancients should have made even such a progress, and seen so far into intel-

lectual matters, without some glimmering of a divine tradition. Whoever considers a parcel of rude savages left to themselves, how they are sunk and swallowed up in sense and prejudice, and how unqualified by their natural force to emerge from this state, will be apt to think that the first spark of philosophy was derived from heaven; and that it was (as a heathen writer expresseth it) *θεοπαράδοτος φιλοσοφία*.

302. The lapsed state of human kind is a thing to which the ancient philosophers were not strangers. The *λύσις*, the *φυγή*, the *παλιγγενεσία*, shew that the Egyptians and Pythagoreans, the Platonists and Stoics, had all some notion of this doctrine, the outlines of which seem to have been sketched out in those tenets. Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments that chain the soul down to the earth, and assist her flight towards the sovereign Good. There is an instinct or tendency of the mind upwards, which sheweth a natural endeavour to recover and raise ourselves from our present sensual and low condition, into a state of light, order, and purity.

303. The perceptions of sense are gross: but even in the senses there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof she may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual (sect. 275) evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to work upon. Reason considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects to the understanding. In this scale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity; which is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive. There runs a Chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this Chain one link drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest. The calamity therefore is neither strange nor much to be complained of, if a low sensual reader shall, from mere love of the animal life, find himself drawn on,

surprised and betrayed, into some curiosity concerning the intellectual.

304. There is, according to Plato, properly no knowledge, but only opinion concerning things sensible and perishing (sect. 263, 264); not because they are naturally abstruse and involved in darkness, but because their nature and existence are uncertain, ever fleeting and changing. Or rather, because they do not in strict truth exist at all, being always generating or *in fieri*, that is, in a perpetual flux, without any thing stable or permanent in them to constitute an object of real science. The Pythagoreans and Platonics distinguish between τὸ γιγνόμενον and τὸ ὄν, that which ever generated and that which exists. Sensible things and corporeal forms are perpetually producing and perishing, appearing and disappearing, never resting in one state, but always in motion and change; and therefore, in effect, not one being but a succession of beings: while τὸ ὄν is understood to be somewhat of an abstract or spiritual nature, and the proper object of intellectual knowledge. Therefore, as there can be no knowledge of things flowing and unstable, the opinion of Protagoras and Theætetus, that sense was science, is absurd. And indeed nothing is more evident than that the apparent sizes and shapes, for instance, of things are in a constant flux, ever differing as they are viewed at different distances, or with glasses more or less accurate. As for those absolute magnitudes and figures, which certain Cartesians and other moderns suppose to be in things; that must seem a vain supposition, to whoever considers it is supported by no argument of reason, and no experiment of sense.

305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not: and although the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly observed in the "Theætetus" of Plato, science consists not in the passive perceptions, but in the reasoning upon them—τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.

306. In the ancient philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, we find distinguished three sorts of objects:—In the first place, a form or species that is neither generated nor destroyed, unchangeable, invisible, and altogether imperceptible

to sense, being only understood by the Intellect. A second sort there is, ever fluent and changing (sect. 292, 293), generating and perishing, appearing and vanishing; this is comprehended by Sense and Opinion. The third kind is Matter, which, as Plato teacheth, being neither an object of understanding nor of sense, is hardly to be made out by a certain spurious way of reasoning—λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ μόγις πιστόν. (See his "Timæus.") The same doctrine is contained in the Pythagoric treatise "De Anima Mundi," which, distinguishing ideas, sensible things, and matter, maketh the first to be apprehended by Intellect, the second by Sense, and the last, to wit, Matter, λογισμῷ νόθῳ. Whereof Themistius the Peripatetic assigns the reason. For, saith he, that act is to be esteemed spurious, whose object hath nothing positive, being only a mere privation, as silence or darkness. And such he accounteth Matter.

307. Aristotle maketh a threefold distinction of objects, according to the three speculative sciences. Physics he supposeth to be conversant about such things as have a principle of motion in themselves; Mathematics about things permanent but not abstracted; and Theology about Being abstracted and immoveable; which distinction may be seen in the ninth book of his "Metaphysics." Where by abstracted, χωριστὸν, he understands separable from corporeal beings and sensible qualities.

308. That philosopher held that the mind of man was a *tabula rasa*, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary, held original ideas in the mind; that is, notions which never were or can be in the sense, such as being, beauty, goodness, likeness, parity. Some, perhaps, may think the truth to be this:—that there are properly no *ideas*, or passive objects, in the mind but what were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations; such are *notions*.

309. It is a maxim of the Platonic philosophy, that the soul of man was originally furnished with native inbred notions, and stands in need of sensible occasions, not absolutely for producing them, but only for awakening, rousing, or exciting, into act what was already pre-existent, dormant, and latent in the soul; as things are said to be laid up in the memory, though not actually perceived until they happen to

be called forth and brought into view by other objects. This notion seemeth somewhat different from that of innate ideas, as understood by those moderns who have attempted to explode them. To understand and to be are, according to Parmenides, the same thing. And Plato in his seventh Letter makes no difference between *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη*, mind and knowledge. Whence it follows that mind, knowledge, and notions, either in habit or in act, always go together.

310. And albeit Aristotle considered the soul in its original state as a blank paper, yet he held it to be the proper place of forms—*τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν* (sect. 269). Which doctrine, first maintained by others, he admits, under this restriction, that it is not to be understood of the whole soul, but only of the *νοητικὴ*; as is to be seen in his third book "De Anima." Whence, according to Themistius in his commentary on that treatise, it may be inferred that all beings are in the soul. For, saith he, the forms are the beings. By the form every thing is what it is. And he adds, it is the soul that imparteth forms to matter; *τὴν ὕλην μορφῶσα ποικίλαις μορφαῖς*. Therefore they are first in the soul. He farther adds that the mind is all things, taking the forms of all things it becomes all things by intellect and sense. Alexander Aphrodisæus saith as much, affirming the mind to be all things, *κατά τε τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι*. And this in fact is Aristotle's own doctrine, in his third book "De Anima," where he also asserts, with Plato, that actual knowledge and the thing known are all one. *Τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι*. Whence it follows, that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to say, in the mind. Or, as it is otherwise expressed, that the soul is all things. More might be said to explain Aristotle's notion, but it would lead too far.

311. As to an absolute actual existence of sensible or corporeal things (sect. 264, 292, 294), it doth not seem to have been admitted either by Plato or Aristotle. In the "Theætetus" we are told that if any one saith a thing is, or is made, he must withal say, for what, or of what, or in respect of what, it is, or is made; for, that any thing should exist in itself or absolutely is absurd. Agreeably to which doctrine it is also farther affirmed by Plato, that it is im-

possible a thing should be sweet and sweet to nobody. It must, nevertheless, be owned with regard to Aristotle, that even in his "Metaphysics" there are some expressions which seem to favour the absolute existence of corporeal things. For instance, in the eleventh book, speaking of corporeal sensible things, what wonder, saith he, if they never appear to us the same, no more than to sick men, since we are always changing and never remain the same ourselves? And again, he saith, sensible things, although they receive no change in themselves, do nevertheless in sick persons produce different sensations and not the same. These passages would seem to imply a distinct and absolute existence of the objects of sense.

312. But it must be observed, that Aristotle distinguisheth a twofold existence, potential and actual. It will not therefore follow that, according to Aristotle, because a thing is, it must actually exist. This is evident from the eighth book of his "Metaphysics," where he animadverts on the Megaric philosophers, as not admitting a possible existence distinct from the actual: from whence, saith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold, or hot, or sweet, or any sensible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds that, in consequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no sense but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not see, and therefore both blind and deaf several times in a day.

313. The ἐντελέχειαι πρῶται of the Peripatetics, that is, the sciences, arts, and habits, were by them distinguished from the acts or ἐντελέχειαι δεύτεραι, and supposed to exist in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This seems to illustrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers, conceive innate notions to be in the soul of man (sect. 309). It was the Platonic doctrine, that human souls or minds descended from above, and were sowed in generation; that they were stunned, stupified, and intoxicated by this descent and immersion into animal nature; and that the soul, in this ὀνείρωξις or slumber, forgets her original notions, which are smothered and oppressed by many false tenets and prejudices of sense. Insomuch that Proclus compares the soul, in her descent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the

sea, and there contracting divers coats of seaweed, coral, and shells, which stick close to him, and conceal his true shape.

314. Hence, according to this philosophy, the mind of man is so restless to shake off that slumber, to disengage and emancipate herself from those prejudices and false opinions that so straitly beset and cling to her, to rub off those covers that disguise her original form, and to regain her primeval state and first notions: hence that perpetual struggle to recover the lost region of light, that ardent thirst and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which she would neither seek to attain, or rejoice in, nor know when attained, except she had some prenotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant, like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and roused by recollection or reminiscence. So that learning seemeth in effect reminiscence.

315. The Peripatetics themselves distinguish between reminiscence and mere memory. Themistius observes that the best memories commonly go with the worst parts; but that reminiscence is most perfect in the most ingenious minds. And, notwithstanding the *tabula rasa* of Aristotle (sect. 308), yet some of his followers have undertaken to make him speak Plato's sense. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth, as agreeable to his master's doctrine, that learning is reminiscence, and that the νοῦς καθ' ἕξιν is in children. Simplicius also, in his commentary on the third book of Aristotle, περὶ ψυχῆς, speaketh of a certain interior reason in the soul, acting of itself, and originally full of its own proper notions, πλήρης ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν οἰκείων γνωσίων.

316. And, as the Platonic philosophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexistent, or innate in the soul (sect. 309, 314), so likewise it supposed sensible qualities to exist (though not originally) in the soul, and there only. Socrates saith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you see is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes, or in any place at all. And in the "Timæus," Plato teacheth that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce that painful sensation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the sixth book of his second Ennead, observes that heat and other qualities

are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act in the fire: that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities, light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain that whatever real things they suppose to exist independent of the soul, those were neither sensible things nor clothed with sensible qualities.

317. Neither Plato nor Aristotle by Matter, ὕλη, understood corporeal substance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it signified no positive actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity, nor quality, nor essence. And not only the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known, neither by sense, nor by any direct and just reasoning, but only by some spurious or adulterine method, as hath been observed before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the sixteenth century, denies it to be any substance at all, for, saith he, *Nequit per se subsistere, quia sequeretur, id quod non est in actu esse in actu.* If Jamblichus may be credited, the Egyptians supposed Matter so far from including aught of substance or essence, that, according to them, God produced it by a separation from all substance, essence, or being, ἀπὸ οὐσιότητος ἀποχισθείσης ὑλότητος. That Matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the ancient Peripatetics.

318. According to those philosophers, Matter is only a *pura potentia*, a mere possibility. But Anaximander, successor to Thales, is represented as having thought the supreme Deity to be infinite Matter. Nevertheless, though Plutarch calleth it Matter, yet it was simply τὸ ἄπειρον, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although the moderns teach that Space is real and infinitely extended, yet, if we consider that it is no intellectual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our senses, we shall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his "Timæus," that this also is the result of λογισμὸς νόθος, or spurious reasoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato observes that we dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it necessary that whatever exists should exist in some place. Which place or space (sect. 250, 270), he also observes, is μετ' ἀναισθησίας

ἀπτὸν, that is, to be felt as darkness is seen, or silence heard, being a mere privation.

319. If any one should think to infer the reality or actual being of Matter from the modern tenet—that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly scan the modern demonstration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no more than this—that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is, to itself. Since Matter is conceived only as defect and mere possibility; and since God is absolute perfection and act; it follows there is the greatest distance and opposition imaginable between God and Matter. Insomuch that a material God would be altogether inconsistent.

320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that perfects all things is the supreme Being. Evil, defect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power. From motion the Peripatetics trace out a first immoveable Mover. The Platonics make God author of all good, author of no evil, and unchangeable. According to Anaxagoras there was a confused mass of all things in one chaos; but mind supervening, ἐπελθὼν, distinguished and divided them. Anaxagoras, it seems, ascribed the motive faculty to mind; which mind some subsequent philosophers have accurately discriminated from soul and life, ascribing to it the sole faculty of intellection.

321. But still God was supposed the first agent, the source and original of all things; which he produceth, not occasionally or instrumentally, but with actual and real efficacy. Thus the treatise "De Secretiore Parte Divinæ Sapientiæ secundum Ægyptios," in the tenth book, saith of God, that he is not only the first Agent, but also that he it is who truly acts or creates, *qui vere efficit.*

322. Varro, Tully, and St. Augustin, understand the soul to be *vis*, the power or force that acts, moves, enlivens. Now although, in our conception, *vis*, or spirit, might be distinguished from mind, it would not thence follow that it acts blindly or without mind, or that it is not closely connected with intellect. If Plutarch is to be trusted in his account of the opinions of philosophers, Thales held the mind of the world to be God; Democritus held the soul of

the world to be an igniform deity (sect. 166, 168, 277); Pythagoras taught that God was the monad and the good, or τ' ἀγαθὸν; Socrates also and Plato pronounced him to be τὸ ἓν (sect. 287), the single, self-originate one, essentially good. Each of which appellations and forms of speech directly tends to and determines in Mind, εἰς τὸν νοῦν σπεύδει, saith Plutarch.

323. Whence that author concludes, that, in the sense of those philosophers, God is a Mind, χωριστὸν εἶδος—not an abstract idea compounded of inconsistencies, and prescinded from all real things, as some moderns understand abstraction; but a really existing Spirit, distinct or separate from all sensible and corporeal beings. And although the Stoics are represented as holding a corporeal deity, or that the very system of the world is God, yet it is certain they did not, at bottom, dissent from the forementioned doctrine; inasmuch as they supposed the world to be an animal (sect. 276, 279), consisting of soul or mind, as well as body.

324. This notion was derived from the Pythagoreans, who held the world, as Timæus Locrus teacheth, to be one perfect animal, endued with soul and reason: but then they believed it to have been generated: whereas the Stoics looked on the world as the supreme God, including therein mind or intellect. For the elementary fire, or, if one may so speak, the animal spirit of the world, seemeth, according to them, to have been the vehicle of the soul (sect. 277, 284), the vehicle of intellect, or νοῦς;[1] since they styled the Divinity πῦρ νοερὸν (sect. 272), or intellectual fire.

325. The Egyptians, if we may credit the Hermaic writings, maintained God to be all things, not only actual, but possible. He is styled by them, That which is made and that which is unmade. And therein it is said, Shall I praise thee for those things thou hast made manifest, or for the things thou hast hidden? Therefore, in their sense, to manifest was to create; the things created having been before hidden in God.

326. Now, whether the νοῦς be abstracted from the sensible world, and considered by itself, as distinct from, and presiding over, the created system; or whether the whole

[1] In the first edition this phrase stood thus, "the vehicle of the soul of the world, and soul itself the vehicle of intellect or νοῦς."—ED.

Universe, including mind together with the mundane body, is conceived to be God (sect. 300), and the creatures to be partial manifestations of the Divine essence—there is no Atheism in either case, whatever misconceptions there may be; so long as mind or intellect is understood to preside over, govern, and conduct, the whole frame of things. And this was the general prevailing opinion among the philosophers.

327. Nor if any one, with Aristotle in his "Metaphysics," should deny that God knows anything without himself—seeing that God comprehends all things—could this be justly pronounced an atheistical opinion. Nor even was the following notion of the same author to be accounted Atheism, to wit that there are some things beneath the knowledge of God, as too mean, base, and vile; however wrong this notion may be, and unworthy of the Divine perfection.

328. Might we not conceive that God may be said to be All in divers senses; as he is the cause and origin of all beings; as the νοῦς is the νοητὰ, a doctrine both of Platonics and Peripatetics (sect. 309, 310); as the νοῦς is the place of all forms; and as it is the same which comprehends and orders (sect. 320) and sustains the whole mundane system. Aristotle declares that the Divine force or influence permeates the entire universe (sect. 173), and that what the pilot is in a ship, the driver in a chariot, the precentor in a choir, the law in a city, the general in an army, the same God is in the world. This he amply sets forth in his book "De Mundo;" a treatise which, having been anciently ascribed to him, ought not to be set aside from the difference of style; which (as Patricius rightly observes), being in a letter to a king, might well be supposed to differ from the other dry and crabbed parts of his writings.

329. And, although there are some expressions to be met with in the philosophers, even of the Platonic and Aristotelic sects, which speak of God as mixing with, or pervading all nature and all the elements; yet this must be explained by force and not by extension, which was never attributed to the mind (sect. 290, 293, 297, 319), either by Aristotle or Plato. This they always affirmed to be incorporeal: and, as Plotinus remarks, incorporeal things are distant each from other not by place, but (to use his expression) by *alterity*.

330. These disquisitions will probably seem dry and useless to such readers as are accustomed to consider only sensible objects. The employment of the mind on things purely intellectual is to most men irksome; whereas the sensitive powers, by constant use, acquire strength. Hence, the objects of sense more forcibly affect us (sect. 264, 294), and are too often counted the chief good. For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble. Therefore, in order to tame mankind, and introduce a sense of virtue, the best human means is to exercise their understanding, to give them a glimpse of another world, superior to the sensible, and, while they take pains to cherish and maintain the animal life, to teach them not to neglect the intellectual.

331. Prevailing studies are of no small consequence to a state, the religion, manners, and civil government of a country ever taking some bias from its philosophy, which affects not only the minds of its professors and students, but also the opinions of all the better sort, and the practice of the whole people, remotely and consequentially indeed, though not inconsiderably. Have not the polemic and scholastic philosophy been observed to produce controversies in law and religion? And have not Fatalism and Sadducism gained ground, during the general passion for the corpuscularian and mechanical philosophy, which hath prevailed for about a century? This, indeed, might usefully enough have employed some share of the leisure and curiosity of inquisitive persons. But when it entered the seminaries of learning as a necessary accomplishment, and most important part of education, by engrossing men's thoughts, and fixing their minds so much on corporeal objects, and the laws of motion, it hath, however undesignedly, indirectly, and by accident, yet not a little indisposed them for spiritual, moral, and intellectual matters. Certainly had the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras prevailed in this age, among those who think themselves too wise to receive the dictates of the Gospel, we should not have seen interest take so general and fast hold on the minds of men, nor public spirit reputed to be γενναῖαν εὐήθειαν, a generous folly, among those who are reckoned to be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of mankind.

332. It might very well be thought serious trifling to tell my readers that the greatest men had ever a high esteem for Plato; whose writings are the touchstone of a hasty and shallow mind; whose philosophy has been the admiration of ages; which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to the most flourishing states, as well as fathers to the Church, and doctors to the schools. Albeit in these days the depths of that old learning are rarely fathomed; and yet it were happy for these lands if our young nobility and gentry, instead of modern maxims, would imbibe the notions of the great men of antiquity. But, in these freethinking times, many an empty head is shook at Aristotle and Plato, as well as at the Holy Scriptures. And the writings of those celebrated ancients are by most men treated on a foot with the dry and barbarous lucubrations of the schoolmen. It may be modestly presumed there are not many among us, even of those who are called the better sort, who have more sense, virtue, and love of their country than Cicero, who in a Letter to Atticus could not forbear exclaiming, *O Socrates et Socratici viri! nunquam vobis gratiam referam.* Would to God many of our countrymen had the same obligations to those Socratic writers! Certainly, where the people are well educated, the art of piloting a state is best learned from the writings of Plato. But among bad men, void of discipline and education, Plato, Pythagoras, and Aristotle themselves, were they living, could do but little good. Plato hath drawn a very humorous and instructive picture of such a state; which I shall not transcribe for certain reasons. But whoever has a mind may see it, in the seventy-eighth page of the second tome of Aldus his edition of Plato's works.

333. Proclus, in the first book of his Commentary on the Theology of Plato, observes that, as in the mysteries, those who are initiated, at first meet with manifold and multiform gods, but being entered and thoroughly initiated they receive the Divine illumination and participate the very Deity; in like manner, if the soul looks abroad, she beholds the shadows and images of things: but returning into herself she unravels and beholds her own essence: at first she seemeth only to behold herself; but having penetrated farther she discovers the mind. And again, still farther advancing into

the innermost sanctuary of the soul, she contemplates the θεῶν γένος. And this, he saith, is the most excellent of all human acts, in the silence and repose of the faculties of the soul to tend upwards to the very Divinity; to approach and be closely joined with that which is ineffable and superior to all beings. When come so high as the first principle, she ends her journey and rests. Such is the doctrine of Proclus.

334. But Socrates in the First Alcibiades teacheth, on the other hand, that the contemplation of God is the proper means to know or understand our own soul. As the eye, saith he, looking steadfastly at the visive part or pupil of another eye, beholds itself, even so the soul beholds and understands herself, while she contemplates the Deity, which is wisdom and virtue, or like thereunto. In the Phædon, Socrates speaks of God as being τ' ἀγαθὸν and τὸ δέον, the good and the decent (sect. 260, 322); Plotinus represents God as order; Aristotle as law.

335. It may seem, perhaps, to those who have been taught to discourse about substratums, more reasonable and pious, to attribute to the Deity a more substantial being than the notional entities of wisdom, order, law, virtue, or goodness, which being only complex ideas, framed and put together by the understanding, are its own creatures, and have nothing substantial, real, or independent in them. But it must be considered that, in the Platonic system, order, virtue, law, goodness, and wisdom are not creatures of the soul of man, but innate and originally existent therein, not as an accident in a substance, but as light to enlighten, and as a guide to govern. In Plato's style, the term *idea* doth not merely signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is used as synonymous with αἴτιον and ἀρχὴ, cause and principle. According to that philosopher, goodness, beauty, virtue, and such like are not figments of the mind, nor mere mixed modes, nor yet abstract ideas in the modern sense, but the most real beings, intellectual and unchangeable: and therefore more real than the fleeting, transient objects of sense (sect. 306), which, wanting stability, cannot be subjects of science (sect. 264, 266, 297), much less of intellectual knowledge.

336. By Parmenides, Timæus, and Plato a distinction was made as hath been observed already, between *genitum* and *ens*.

The former sort is always generating or *in fieri* (sect. 304, 306), but never exists; because it never continues the same, being in a constant change, ever perishing and producing. By *entia* they understand things remote from sense, invisible and intellectual, which never changing are still the same, and may therefore be said truly to exist: *οὐσία*, which is generally translated substance, but more properly essence, was not thought to belong to things sensible and corporeal, which have no stability; but rather to intellectual ideas, though discerned with more difficulty, and making less impression on a mind stupefied and immersed in animal life, than gross objects that continually beset and solicit our senses.

337. The most refined human intellect, exerted to its utmost reach, can only seize some imperfect glimpses of the Divine Ideas (sect. 313, 330), abstracted from all things corporeal, sensible, and imaginable. Therefore Pythagoras and Plato treated them in a mysterious manner, concealing rather than exposing them to vulgar eyes; so far were they from thinking that those abstract things, although the most real, were the fittest to influence common minds, or become principles of knowledge, not to say duty and virtue, to the generality of mankind.

338. Aristotle and his followers have made a monstrous representation of the Platonic ideas; and some of Plato's own school have said very odd things concerning them. But if that philosopher himself was not read only, but studied also with care, and made his own interpreter, I believe the prejudice that now lies against him would soon wear off (sect. 309, 313), or be even converted into a high esteem for those exalted notions and fine hints that sparkle and shine throughout his writings; which seem to contain not only the most valuable learning of Athens and Greece, but also a treasure of the most remote traditions and early science of the East.

339. In the "Timæus" of Plato mention is made of ancient persons, authors of traditions, and the offspring of the gods. It is very remarkable that, in the account of the creation contained in the same piece, it is said that God was pleased with his work, and that the night is placed before the day. The more we think, the more difficult shall we find it to conceive, how mere man, grown up in the vulgar habits

of life, and weighed down by sensuality, should ever be able to arrive at science, without some tradition (sect. 298, 301, 302) or teaching, which might either sow the seeds of knowledge, or call forth and excite those latent seeds that were originally sown in the soul.

340. Human souls in this low situation, bordering on mere animal life, bear the weight and see through the dusk of a gross atmosphere, gathered from wrong judgments daily passed, false opinions daily learned, and early habits of an older date than either judgment or opinion. Through such a medium the sharpest eye cannot see clearly (sect. 292, 293, 294). And if by some extraordinary effort the mind should surmount this dusky region, and snatch a glimpse of pure light, she is soon drawn backwards, and depressed by the heaviness of the animal nature to which she is chained. And if again she chanceth, amidst the agitation of wild fancies and strong affections, to spring upwards, a second relapse speedily succeeds into this region of darkness and dreams.

341. Nevertheless, as the mind gathers strength by repeated acts, we should not despond, but continue to exert the prime and flower of our faculties, still recovering, and reaching on, and struggling, into the upper region, whereby our natural weakness and blindness may be in some degree remedied, and a taste attained of truth and intellectual life. Beside the constant prevailing opinion of the greatest men of antiquity, that there is both an universal Spirit, author of life and motion, and an universal Mind, enlightening and ordering all things, it was a received tenet among them, that there is also τὸ ἓν or τὸ ἀγαθὸν (sect. 322), which they looked on as the *Fons Deitatis*, the first hypostasis in the Divinity.

342. THE ONE, or τὸ ἓν, being immutable and indivisible, always the same and entire, was therefore thought to exist truly and originally, and other things only so far as they are one and the same, by participation of τὸ ἓν. This gives unity, stability, and reality, to things (sect. 264, 306). Plato describes God, as Moses, from his being. According to both, God is He who truly is, ὁ ὄντως ὤν. Change and division were esteemed defects or bad. Evil scatters, divides,

destroys. Good, on the contrary, produceth concord and union, assembles, combines, perfects, and preserves entire. The several beings which compose the universe are parts of the same system; they combine to carry on one end, and perfect one whole. And this aptness and concurrence thereunto furnishes the partial particular idea of Good in the distinct creatures. Hence it might have come to pass that τ' ἀγαθὸν and τὸ ἓν were regarded as one and the same.

343. Light and sight (saith Plato in the sixth book of his Republic) are not the sun: even so truth and knowledge are not the good itself, although they approach thereunto. And again, what the sun is in a visible place with respect to sight and things seen, that same is τὸ ἀγαθὸν or Good in an intelligible place, with respect to understanding and things understood. Therefore the Good or One is not the light that enlightens, but the source of that light.

344. Every moment produceth some change in the parts of this visible creation. Something is added, or diminished, or altered, in essence, quantity, quality, or habitude. Wherefore all generated beings were said by the ancients to be in a perpetual flux (sect. 304, 336). And that which, on a confused and general view, seems one single constant being, shall upon a nearer inspection appear a continued series of different beings. But God remains for ever one and the same. Therefore God alone exists. This was the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, and other ancients.

345. It is the opinion of Plato and his followers that in the soul of man, prior and superior to intellect, there is somewhat of a higher nature, by virtue of which we are one; and that by means of our one or unit, we are most closely joined to the Deity. And, as by our intellect we touch the Divine Intellect, even so by our τὸ ἓν or unit, the very flower of our essence, as Proclus expresseth it, we touch the first One.

346. According to the Platonic philosophy, *ens* and *unum* are the same. And consequently our minds participate so far of existence as they do of unity. But it should seem that *personality* is the indivisible centre of the soul or mind, which is a monad so far forth as she is a person. Therefore Person is really that which exists, inasmuch as it participates the Divine unity. In man the monad or indivisible is the αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ, the self-same self, or very self; a thing in the opinion

of Socrates, much and narrowly to be inquired into and discussed, to the end that, knowing ourselves, we may know what belongs to ourselves and to our happiness.

347. Upon mature reflection, the person or mind of all created beings seemeth alone indivisible, and to partake most of unity. But sensible things are rather considered as one than truly so, they being in a perpetual flux or succession, ever differing and various. Nevertheless, all things together may be considered as one universe (sect. 287, 288), one by the connection, relation, and order of its parts, which is the work of mind, whose unit is, by Platonics, supposed a participation of the first τὸ ἕν.

348. Socrates, in the "Theætetus" of Plato, speaketh of two parties of philosophers—the ῥέοντες, and οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται—the flowing philosophers who held all things to be in a perpetual flux, always generating and never existing; and those others who maintained the universe to be fixed and immovable. The difference seems to have been this, that Heraclitus, Protagoras, Empedocles, and in general those of the former sect, considered things sensible and natural; whereas Parmenides and his party considered τὸ πᾶν, not as the sensible but as the intelligible world (sect. 293, 294, 295), abstracted from all sensible things.

349. In effect, if we mean by *things* the sensible objects, these, it is evident, are always flowing; but if we mean things purely intelligible, then we may say on the other hand, with equal truth, that they are immovable and unchangeable. So that those who thought the Whole, or τὸ πᾶν, to be ἓν ἑστὼς, a fixed or permanent One, seem to have understood the Whole of real beings; which in their sense was only the intellectual world, not allowing reality of being to things not permanent.

350. The displeasure of some readers may perhaps be incurred, by surprising them into certain reflections and inquiries for which they have no curiosity. But perhaps some others may be pleased to find a dry subject varied by digressions, traced through remote inferences, and carried into ancient times, whose hoary maxims (sect. 298, 301), scattered in this Essay, are not proposed as principles, but barely as hints to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader,

on points not beneath the attention of the ablest men. Those great men, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, the most consummate in politics, who founded states, or instructed princes, or wrote most accurately on public government, were at the same time most acute at all abstracted and sublime speculations; the clearest light being ever necessary to guide the most important actions. And, whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum*, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman.

351. According to the nice metaphysics of those ancient philosophers, τὸ ἓν, being considered as what was first and simplest in the Deity, was prescinded even from entity, to which it was thought prior and superior; and is therefore by the Platonics styled super-essential. And in the Parmenides it is said, τὸ ἓν doth not exist; which might seem to imply a negation of the Divine Being. The truth is Zeno, and Parmenides argued that a thing existing in time was older and younger than itself; therefore the constant immutable τὸ ἓν did not exist in time: and if not in time, then in none of the differences of time past, present, or to come; therefore we cannot say that it was, is, or will be. But, nevertheless, it is admitted, in the same Parmenides, that τὸ νῦν is everywhere present to τὸ ἓν; that is, instead of a temporary succession of moments, there is one eternal now, or *punctum stans*, as it is termed by the schoolmen.

352. The simplicity of τὸ ἓν (the Father in the Pythagoric and Platonic Trinity) is conceived such as to exclude intellect or mind, to which it is supposed prior; and that hath created a suspicion of Atheism in this opinion: for, saith the learned Doctor Cudworth, shall we say that the first Hypostasis or Person is ἄνους and ἄλογος, senseless and irrational, and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? or would not this be to introduce a kind of mysterious Atheism? To which it may be answered, that whoever acknowledgeth the universe to be made and governed by an eternal mind cannot be justly deemed an Atheist (sect. 154, 276, 279, 287). And this was the tenet of those ancient philosophers. In the Platonic doctrine, the generation of the νοῦς or λόγος

was not contingent but necessary, not temporary but from everlasting. There never was a time supposed wherein τὸ ἕν subsisted without intellect; the priority having been understood only as a priority of order or conception, but not a priority of age. Therefore, the maintaining a distinction of priority between τὸ ἕν and νοῦς doth not infer that the one ever existed without the other. It follows, therefore, that the Father or τὸ ἕν may, in a certain sense, be said to be ἄνους without Atheism, or without destroying the notion of a Deity; any more than it would destroy the notion of a human soul, if we should conceive a distinction between self and intellect, or intellect and life. To which we may farther add, that it is a doctrine of Platonics, and agrees with their master's tenets, to say that τὸ ἕν or the first Hypostasis contains all Excellence and Perfection, whereof it is the original source, and is *eminenter*, as the schools speak, intellect and life, as well as goodness; while the second Hypostasis is essentially Intellect, and, by participation, goodness, and life; and the third, Life essentially, and, by participation, goodness, and intellect.

353. Therefore, the whole being considered, it will not seem just to fix the imputation of Atheism upon those philosophers who held the doctrine of τὸ ἕν (sect. 287, 288); whether it be taken in an abstracted or collective, a metaphysical or merely vulgar meaning (sect. 300): that is, whether we prescind Unity from essence and intellect, since metaphysical distinctions of the divine attributes do not in reality divide them; or whether we consider the universal system of beings as One, since the union, connexion, and order of its members do manifestly infer a mind or intellect to be cause thereof.

354. The One, or τὸ ἕν, may be conceived either by composition or division. For as, on the one hand, we may say the world or universe is one whole, or one animal; so we may, on the other hand, consider τὸ ἕν by division or abstraction, as somewhat in the order of things prior to mind. In either sense there is no Atheism, so long as mind is admitted to preside and direct the animal; and so long as the *Unum*, or τὸ ἕν, is supposed not to exist without mind (sect. 287, 288). So that neither Heraclitus, nor Parmenides, nor Pythagoras, nor Plato; neither the Egyptians, nor Stoics,

with their doctrine of a Divine Whole or Animal; nor Xenophanes with his ἓν καὶ πᾶν, are justly to be accounted Atheists. Therefore, modern Atheism, be it of Hobbes, Spinoza, Collins, or whom you will, is not to be countenanced by the learning and great names of antiquity.

355. Plato teacheth that the doctrine concerning the One or Unit is a means to lead and raise the mind to the knowledge of him who truly is (sect. 294, 295). And it is a tenet both of Aristotle and Plato, that identity is a certain unity. The Pythagoreans also, as well as the Platonic philosophers, held *unum* and *ens* to be the same. Consistently with which, that only can be said to exist which is one and the same. In things sensible and imaginable, as such, there seems to be no unity, nothing that can be called one, prior to all act of the mind; since they, being in themselves aggregates, consisting of parts or compounded of elements, are in effect many. Accordingly, it is remarked by Themistius, the learned interpreter of Aristotle, that to collect many notions into one, and to consider them as one, is the work of intellect and not of sense or fancy.

356. Aristotle himself, in his third book of the Soul, saith it is the mind that maketh each thing to be one—τὸ δὲ ἓν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. How this is done, Themistius is more particular observing that, as being conferreth essence, the mind, by virtue of her simplicity, conferreth simplicity upon compounded beings. And, indeed, it seemeth that the mind, so far forth as person, is individual (sect. 345, 346, 347); therein resembling the divine One by participation, and imparting to other things what itself participates from above. This is agreeable to the doctrine of the ancients; however the contrary opinion of supposing number to be an original primary quality in things, independent of the mind, may obtain among the moderns.

357. The Peripatetics taught that in all divisible things there was somewhat indivisible, and in all compound things somewhat simple. This they derived from an act of the mind. And neither this simple indivisible unit, nor any sum of repeated units, consequently no number can be separated from the things themselves, and from the operation of the mind. Themistius goeth so far as to affirm that it cannot be separated from the words or signs; and, as it

cannot be uttered without them, so, saith he, neither can it be conceived without them. Thus much upon the whole may be concluded, that, distinct from the mind and her operations, there is in created beings neither unit nor number.

358. Of inferior beings the human mind, self, or person, is the most simple and undivided essence (sect. 347). And the supreme Father is the most perfect One. Therefore the flight of the mind towards God is called by the Platonics φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον. The supreme Being, saith Plotinus, as he excludes all diversity, is ever alike present. And we are then present to him, when, recollected and abstracted from the world and sensible objects, we are most free and disengaged from all variety (sect. 268). He adds that in the intuition of the Supreme Deity the soul finds her wished-for end and repose; which that philosopher calls awaking out of his body into himself.

359. In the tenth book of the "Arcane," or "Divine Wisdom of the Egyptians," we are taught that the supreme Being is not the cause of any created thing; but that he produced or made the Word; and that all created beings were made by the Word, which is accordingly styled the Cause of all causes: and that this was also the doctrine of the Chaldeans. Plato, likewise, in his Letter to Hermias, Erastus, and Coriscus, speaks of God, the ruler and cause of all things, as having a Father: and, in his "Epinomis," he expressly teacheth that the Word or λόγος made the world. Accordingly, Saint Augustine, in his Commentary on the beginning of Saint John's Gospel, having declared that Christ is the wisdom of God by which all things were made, observes that this doctrine was also found in the writings of philosophers, who taught that God had an only begotten Son by whom are all things.

360. Now, though Plato had joined with an imagination the most splendid and magnificent, an intellect not less deep and clear; yet it is not to be supposed that either he or any other philosophers of Greece or the East had by the light of nature obtained an adequate notion of the holy Trinity; nor even that their imperfect notion, so far as it went, was exactly just; nor perhaps that those sublime hints, which dart forth like flashes of light in the midst

of a profound darkness, were originally struck from the hard rock of human reason; but rather derived, at least in part, by a Divine tradition, from the author of all things (sect. 298, 301). It seems a remarkable confirmation of this, what Plotinus observed in his fifth Ennead, that this doctrine of a Trinity—Father, Mind, and Soul—was no late invention, but an ancient tenet.

361. Certain it is that the notion of a Trinity is to be found in the writings of many old heathen philosophers —that is to say, a notion of Three Divine Hypostases. Authority, Light, and Life did, to the eye of reason, plainly appear to support, pervade, and animate the mundane system or macrocosm. The same appeared in the microcosm, preserving soul and body, enlightening the mind, and moving the affections. And these were conceived to be necessary universal principles, co-existing and co-operating in such sort as never to exist asunder, but on the contrary to constitute one Sovereign of all things. And, indeed, how could power or authority avail or subsist without knowledge? or either without life and action?

362. In the administration of all things, there is Authority to establish, Law to direct, and Justice to execute. There is first the source of all perfection, or *Fons Deitatis;* secondly, the supreme reason, order, or λόγος; and lastly, the Spirit which quickens and inspires. We are sprung from the Father, irradiated or enlightened by the Son, and moved by the Spirit. Certainly, that there is Father, Son, and Spirit; that these bear analogy to the sun, light, and heat; and are otherwise expressed by the terms Principle, Mind, and Soul; by One or τὸ ἓν, Intellect, and Life; by Good, Word, and Love; and that generation was not attributed to the second Hypostasis, the νοῦς or λόγος, in respect of time, (sect. 352), but only in respect of origin and order, as an eternal necessary emanation;—these are the express tenets of Platonists, Pythagoreans, Egyptians, and Chaldeans.

363. Though it may be well presumed there is nothing to be found on that sublime subject in human writings which doth not bear the sure signatures of humanity; yet it cannot be denied that several Fathers of the Church have thought fit to illustrate the Christian doctrine of the holy Trinity, by similitudes and expressions borrowed from the most eminent

heathens, whom they conceived to have been no strangers to that mystery; as hath been plainly proved by Bessarion, Eugubinus, and Dr. Cudworth.

364. Therefore, how unphilosophical soever that doctrine may seem to many of the present age, yet it is certain that men of greatest fame and learning among the ancient philosophers held a Trinity in the Godhead. It must be owned, that upon this point some later Platonists of the Gentile world seem to have bewildered themselves (as many Christians have also done), while they pursued the hints derived from their predecessors with too much curiosity.

365. But Plato himself considered that doctrine as a venerable mystery, not to be lightly treated of, or rashly divulged. Wherefore in a Letter to Dionysius, he writes (as he himself professeth) enigmatically and briefly in the following terms, which he giveth for a summary of his notion concerning the supreme Being, and which, being capable of divers senses, I leave to be deciphered by the learned reader: *Περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν. δεύτερον δὲ, περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα.* Plato enjoins Dionysius, over and over, with great earnestness, not to suffer what he communicates concerning the mysteries of the Divine nature to fall into illiterate or vulgar hands, giving it withal as a reason for this caution, that nothing would seem more ridiculous or absurd to the common run of mankind. He adds that, in regard writings might miscarry, the prudent way was to write nothing at all on those matters, but to teach and learn them by word of mouth: for which reason, saith he, I have never wrote anything thereon; nor is there, nor shall there ever be, anything of Plato's extant on the subject. He farther adds, as for what hath been now said, it belongs all to Socrates.

366. And, indeed, what this philosopher in his "Phædrus" speaketh of the super-celestial region, and the Divinity resident therein, is of a strain not to be relished or comprehended by vulgar minds; to wit, essence really existent, object of intellect alone, without colour, without figure, without any tangible quality. He might very justly conceive that such a description must seem ridiculous to sensual men.

367. As for the perfect intuition of divine things, that he supposeth to be the lot of pure souls, beholding by a pure light, initiated, happy, free and unstained from those bodies, wherein we are now imprisoned like oysters. But, in this mortal state, we must be satisfied to make the best of those glimpses within our reach (sect. 335, 337). It is Plato's remark, in his "Theætetus," that while we sit still we are never the wiser, but going into the river, and moving up and down, is the way to discover its depths and shallows. If we exercise and bestir ourselves, we may even here discover something.

368. The eye by long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern: and there is no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth by long poring on it. Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a few. Certainly, where it is the chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views; nor is it contented with a little ardour in the early time of life; active, perhaps, to pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of Truth.

Cujusvis est errare; nullius nisi insipientis in errore perseverare.
CICERO.

NOTE.—Those curious about this linking together of ideas in a "chain" may be referred to a long contribution to "Notes and Queries," second ser. iii., pp. 63, 81, 104; second ser. xii., pp. 161, 181. (I am indebted to Professor Fraser for these references.) The letter is primarily concerned with a book of Hermetic lore, "Aurea Catena Homeri," mentioned by Goethe in the "Dichtung und Wahrheit;" but is further interesting as a short essay on this notion of chains in other writers. The work itself, the "Aurea Catena Homeri" (probably by Ant. Jos. Kirchweger), is described as a very rare work. The first German edition, 1723 (not known to the "Notes and Queries" contributor) is in the British Museum (1033. a. 27), together with a Latin translation (8905. aa. 26). A study of the book was published by Hermann Kopp (Brunswick, 1880).—ED.

TWO LETTERS

IN THE

"DUBLIN JOURNAL,"

ON THE OCCASION OF THE

REBELLION,

1745.

[On the occasion of the Rebellion of 1745, the Irish bishops addressed open letters to their clergy through the pages of the "Dublin Journal." The two following letters appeared in the "Dublin Journal," No. 1942 (Tuesday, October 15th—Saturday, October 19th), 1745. Berkeley, with a characteristic delicacy and tact, not only addressed his clergy, but wrote also to the Roman Catholics of his diocese. He was the only bishop who did so; and that his graceful action was appreciated is shown in that the letter appeared again in the next number of the "Dublin Journal" with the following head-note: "There having been a great demand for the following letter, it is again reprinted at the earnest request of several Protestants as well as Roman Catholics." In 1746 was published a tract entitled "An Impartial History of the Life and Death of James the Second, . . . to which is added a Letter from the Right Reverend Dr. Berkeley, Lord Bishop of Cloyne, to the Roman Catholicks of his Diocese." The "letter" is the present one simply reprinted. The anonymous historian apologizes for its use by saying, "I can produce nothing myself of half its efficacy." As far as I can discover, the first of the two letters has never been reprinted. Berkeley included the second in the Miscellany of 1752, but omitted the first, and has been followed in this by all editors. This is surely a mistake; for the letter to the Roman Catholics gets an added interest when it is placed as it originally stood, side by side with the letter to the Protestant clergy.]

TWO LETTERS IN THE "DUBLIN JOURNAL."

I.

THE BISHOP OF CLOYNE'S LETTER TO HIS CLERGY.

MY REVEREND BRETHREN,

YOU are, I doubt not, sufficiently apprised of the calamities that must attend our being governed by a Popish prince, as well as of the steps that are now taken to bring this about. If there be in some other part of his Majesty's dominions, any Protestant subjects so infatuated to flatter themselves with hopes of enjoying their religious and civil rights under such a head, I dare say there are none such to be found among the Protestants of this Kingdom, and least of all among the Clergy whose sure ruin is involved in that of the established Church, which whatever quarter she may hope for elsewhere can, most assuredly hope for none in Ireland.

To confirm this (could it be supposed to want confirmation) I can assure you from a very credible and unsuspected authority, that upon an invasion in the late reign, when those who drew up the Pretender's manifesto had inserted a clause for securing the Churches of England and Ireland as by law established, the Church of Ireland was struck out by his own hand. I say not this as if I suspected your loyalty, for whatever some prejudiced enemies to your order may suggest, no candid person will suppose you to be wicked without temptation.

I am persuaded no part of his Majesty's subjects are more loyal than our brethren of the established Church in this

kingdom, and they have every motive spiritual and temporal to make them peculiarly so. It may not, nevertheless, be improper to stir up your apprehensions at the present critical juncture for yourselves and your flocks, who on this southern coast are most exposed to an invasion and (as our enemies too well know) least prepared against it. You will not therefore be wanting to excite the people under your care to make proper remonstrances where they may be likeliest to take effect and to concert measures for their common safety.

The worse we are provided with others, the better should we provide ourselves with spiritual weapons, humiliation, repentance, prayer, and trust in God. For, be assured we never had, humanly speaking, so bad a chance for our religious liberties as at this time, if we should be so unhappy as to see the present enterprise succeed and a Popish prince, nursed and brought up in the very bosom of spiritual blindness and superstition placed on the throne.

The reign of the late King James produced few converts to his religion. But the great number of infidels which have since sprung up, how clamorous and vehement soever they may seem against Popery may yet be presumed ready for a temporal interest to embrace it. Nor is it uncharitable to suppose that those who are inwardly of none will be outwardly of the Court religion. From this quarter as I know our adversaries conceive the greatest hopes, so I apprehend we have most to fear.

It behoveth us, therefore, my brethren, in this critical and dangerous conjuncture, not to behave (in the Prophet's phrase) like dumb dogs, but to be earnest and instant in calling on our people to exert themselves with prudence and fortitude, and in putting up our prayers to Almighty God, that he would avert the evils which threaten us, and that he would not deal with us according to our merits, but his mercies, nor suffer the glorious light and liberty of the Reformation to be quenched or withdrawn, for the sins of those who by abusing them have shewed themselves unworthy of such inestimable blessings. I am,

Your faithful and affectionate brother,

G. CLOYNE.

II.

THE BISHOP OF CLOYNE'S LETTER TO THE ROMAN CATHOLICS OF HIS DIOCESE.

MY COUNTRYMEN AND FELLOW-SUBJECTS,

NOTWITHSTANDING the differences of our religious opinions, I should be sorry to be wanting in any instance of humanity or good neighbourhood to any of you. For which reason I find myself strongly inclined, at this critical juncture, to put you in mind that you have been treated with a truly Christian lenity under the present government; that your persons have been protected, and your properties secured by equal laws: and that it would be highly imprudent as well as ungrateful to forfeit these advantages, by making yourselves tools to the ambition of foreign princes, who fancy it expedient to raise disturbances among us at present, but, as soon as their own ends are served, will not fail to abandon you, as they have always done.

Is it not evident that your true interest consists in lying still, and waiting the event, since Ireland must necessarily follow the fate of England; and that therefore prudence and policy prescribe quiet to the Roman Catholics of this kingdom, who, in case a change of hands should not succeed after your attempting to bring it about, must then expect to be on a worse foot than ever?

But we will suppose it succeeds to your wish. What then? Would not this undermine even your own interests and fortune, which are often interwoven with those of your neighbours? Would not all those who have debts or money, or other effects in the hands of Protestants, be fellow-sufferers with them? Would not all those who hold under the Acts of Settlement be as liable as Protestants themselves to be dispossessed by the old proprietors? Or, can even those who are styled proprietors flatter themselves with hopes of possessing the estates which they claim, which, in all likelihood, would be given to favourites (perhaps to foreigners), who are near the person, or who fought the battles of their master.

Under Protestant governments, those of your communion have formerly enjoyed a greater share of the lands of this kingdom, and more ample privileges. You bore your part in the magistracy and the legislature, and could complain of no hardships on the score of your religion. If these advantages have been since impaired or lost, was it not by the wrong measures yourselves took to enlarge them, in several successive attempts, each of which left you weaker and in a worse condition than you were before? And this notwithstanding the vaunted succours of France and Spain, whose vain efforts in conjunction with yours constantly recoiled on your own heads, even when your numbers and circumstances were far more considerable than they now are?

You all know these things to be true. I appeal to your own breasts. Dear-bought experience hath taught you, and past times instruct the present. But perhaps you follow conscience rather than interest. Will any man amongst you pretend to plead conscience against being quiet, or against paying allegiance and peaceable submission to a Protestant prince, which the first Christians paid even to heathen, and which those of your communion, at this day, pay to Mahometan and to idolatrous princes in Turkey and China, and which you yourselves have so often professed to pay to our present gracious Sovereign? Conscience is quite out of the case. And what man in his senses would engage in a dangerous course, to which neither interest doth invite, nor conscience oblige him?

I heartily wish that this advice may be as well taken as it is meant, and that you may maturely consider your true interest, rather than rashly repeat the same errors which you have so often repented of. So, recommending you to the merciful guidance of Almighty God, I subscribe myself,

Your real well-wisher,

GEORGE CLOYNE.

FOUR LETTERS

ON

TAR WATER,

ARISING OUT OF

SIRIS,

1744-1747.

[IT has been mentioned in the introduction to "Siris," that though the extraordinary speculative nature of that work attracted little contemporary attention, the advocacy of tar-water as a sort of universal healer had aroused a host of opposers and defenders. A list of the chief contributions to this controversy is given by Professor Fraser in his valuable introduction to "Siris." The list could easily be extended. Among the most zealous advocates of the new panacea was Berkeley's friend and correspondent, Thomas Prior of Rathdowney, a founder of the Dublin Society, and a man full of zeal for the prosperity of Ireland. To him Berkeley addressed three open letters, containing further advice for the preparation and use of the famous water. One other letter—to Dr. Hales—completes the share which Berkeley had in the contemporary controversy. As the letters are chiefly concerned with the practical application of tar-water, and not with the speculations arising therefrom, their interest is much less than that of the parent work.]

A

LETTER

TO

T----- *P*----, Eſq;

FROM THE

AUTHOR of *SIRIS.*

CONTAINING SOME

FARTHER REMARKS on the VIRTUES of

TAR-WATER,

AND

The METHODS for Preparing and Uſing of it.

Non ſibi, ſed toti.

To which is added,

An ANSWER

To a ſuppoſed Phyſician's LETTER *to the Right Reverend the Biſhop of* CLOYNE, *occaſioned by his Lordſhip's Treatiſe on the* VIRTUES *of* TAR-WATER.

DUBLIN Printed,
LONDON Re-printed,
For M. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-noſter-row.*
MDCCXLIV.
[Price Six-pence.]

THE FIRST

LETTER

TO THOMAS PRIOR

ON TAR WATER.[1]

Non sibi, sed toti.

"Nothing is more difficult and disagreeable than to argue men out of their prejudices; I shall not, therefore, enter into controversies on this subject, but, if men dispute and object, shall leave the decision to Time and Trial."—*Siris*, Sect. 68.

1

AMONG the great numbers who drink Tar-water in Dublin, your letter informs me, there are some that make or use it in an undue manner. To obviate these inconveniences, and render this water as generally useful as possible, you desire I would draw up some rules and remarks in a small compass, which accordingly I here send you.

2. Pour a gallon of cold water on a quart of liquid tar in a glazed earthen vessel; stir, mix, and work them thoroughly together, with a wooden ladle, or flat stick, for the space of

[1] This first letter was published in 1744, and the little pamphlet concludes with a reply by Prior to a hostile criticism of the medicine. An affidavit appeared in the "Dublin Journal" for 2nd June, 1744, stating that after a long use of tar-water among the patients of Dr. Stephen's Hospital, "none found themselves in anywise better, but many of them much worse." After replying in the "Dublin Journal," Prior industriously collected all the cases of cures he could, and published them as "An Authentic Narrative of the Success of Tar-Water," etc. (first edition, 1746, second, 1746). Appended to this Narrative were two letters from Berkeley; the first was a reprint of this present letter with considerable additions and emendations; the second was the letter next printed.—ED.

five or six minutes. Then let the vessel stand close covered three days and nights, that the tar may have full time to subside. After which, having first carefully skimmed it without moving the vessel, pour off the clear water, and keep it in bottles, well corked for use. This method will produce a liquor stronger than that first published in "Siris," but not offensive, if carefully skimmed. It is a good general rule, but, as stomachs and constitutions are various, it may admit of some latitude. Less water or more stirring makes it stronger, as more water or less stirring makes it weaker. It is to be noted that if several gallons are made at once in the same vessel, you must add five or six minutes' stirring for every gallon. Thus two gallons of water and two quarts of tar require ten or twelve minutes' stirring.[1]

3. The same tar will not do so well a second time, but may serve for other common uses: the putting off tar that hath been used for fresh tar would be a bad fraud. To prevent which, it is to be noted that tar already used is of a lighter brown than other tar. The only tar that I have used is that from our northern Colonies in America, and that from Norway; the latter, being thinner, mixeth easier with water, and seems to have more spirit. If the former be made use of (as I have known with good success), the tar-water will require longer stirring to make it.

4. Tar-water, when right, is not paler than French, nor deeper colour than Spanish white wine, and full as clear; if there be not a spirit very sensibly perceived in drinking, you may conclude the tar-water is not good; if you would have it good, see it made yourself. Those who begin with it little and weak may by habit come to drink more and stronger. According to the season, or the humour of the patient, it may be drank either cold or warm; in [2] colics, I

[1] In the first edition this section was as follows: "Put a gallon of cold water to a quart of tar, stir and work them strongly together for about four minutes; let the vessel stand close covered for eight and forty hours that the tar may subside; then pour off the clear water, and keep it in bottles well corked, for use; this is a good general rule, but as stomachs and constitutions are so various it may admit of some latitude, the less water or more stirring makes it stronger, as more water or less stirring makes it weaker."—ED.

[2] From this point to "small trouble" (seven lines) is not contained in the first edition.—ED.

take it to be best warm. If it disgusts a patient warm, let him try it cold, and *vice versâ*. If at first it creates to some squeamish persons a little sickness at the stomach, or nauseating, it may be reduced both in quality and quantity. In general, small inconveniences are either removed, or borne with small trouble; it lays under no restraint as to air, exercise, clothes, or diet, and may be taken at all times in the year.

5. As to the quantity in common chronical indispositions, one pint of tar-water a day may suffice, taken on an empty stomach, at two or four times, to wit, night and morning, and about two hours after dinner and breakfast; more may be taken by strong stomachs. Alteratives in general, taken in small doses, and often, mix best with the blood—how oft or how strong each stomach can bear, experience will shew. But those who labour under great and inveterate maladies must drink a greater quantity; at least one quart every twenty-four hours taken at four, six, or eight glasses, as best suits the circumstances and case of the drinker. All of this class must have much patience, and perseverance in the use of this as well as of all other medicines, which, if sure and safe, must yet, from the nature of things, be slow in the cure of inveterate chronical disorders. In acute cases, fevers of all kinds, it must be drank in bed, warm, and in great quantity, the fever still enabling the patient to drink perhaps a pint every hour, which I have known to work surprising cures.[1]. But it works so quick, and gives such spirits, that the patients often think themselves cured before the fever hath quite left them. Such, therefore, should not be impatient to rise, or apply themselves too soon to business, or their usual diet.

6. To some, perhaps, it may seem, that a slow alterative in chronical cases cannot be depended on in fevers and acute distempers, which demand immediate relief. But I affirm that this same medicine, which is a slow alterative in chronical cases, I have found to be also a most immediate remedy, when copiously taken, in acute and inflammatory cases. It might indeed be thought rash to have tried it in the most threatening fevers and pleurisies without bleeding, which in the

[1] From here to the end of the section 7 was added to the second edition.—ED.

common practice would have been held necessary. But for this I can say, that I had patients who would not be bled, and this obliged me to make trials of tar-water without bleeding, which trials I never knew unsuccessful. The same tar-water I found a slow alterative, and a sudden febrifuge. If the reader is surprised, I own myself to be so too. But truth is truth, and from whatever hand it comes should be candidly received. If physicians think they have a right to treat of religious matters, I think I have an equal right to treat of medicine.

7. Authority I have no pretence to. But reason is the common birthright of all. My reasons I have given in "Siris." My motives every one will interpret from his own breast. But he must own himself a very bad man, who in my case (that is, after long experience, and under full conviction of the virtues and innocence of tar-water) would not have done as much. All men are, I will not say allowed, but obliged, to promote the common benefit. And, for this end, what I could not in conscience conceal, that I do and shall publicly declare, maugre all the spleen and raillery of a world which cannot treat me worse than it hath done my betters.

8. As the morning's draught is most difficult to nice stomachs, such may lessen, or even omit it at the beginning, or rather postpone it till after breakfast, and take a larger dose at night: the distance from meal-time need not be more than one hour,[1] for common stomachs, when the liquor is well clarified and skimmed. The oil that floated on the top and was skimmed off should be carefully laid by, and kept for outward sores. In the variety of cases and constitutions, it is not amiss that there should be different manners of preparing and taking tar-water. Trial will direct to the best. Whether there be any difference between old tar and new tar, or which of all the various tars, produced

[1] In the first edition the section continues thus: "more than one hour when the stomach is strong or the glasses small: the oil that swims on the top may either be drank with the rest of the liquor, or skimmed off and kept for outward sores. Whether there be," etc. The section here numbered 9 is in the first edition a continuation of the preceding, the whole forming section 6. See the foot-note on p. 349. — ED.

from different trees, or in different parts of the world, is most medicinal, future trials must determine.

9. I have made a second sort of tar-water to be used externally as a wash or lotion for the itch, scabs, ulcers, evil, leprosy, and all such foul cases, which I have tried with very good success, and recommend it to the trial of others. For inveterate cases of that kind, tar-water should be drank,[1] a quart every twenty-four hours, at four, six, or eight glasses: and, after this hath been done at least for a fortnight, the lotion is to be applied outwardly and warm, by bathing, fomenting, and steeping, and this several times in the twenty-four hours, to heal and dry up the sores, the drinking being still continued. This water, for external use, is made in the following manner: Pour two quarts of boiling water on a quart of tar; stir and work it strongly with a flat stick or ladle, a full quarter of an hour: let it stand six hours, then pour it off, and keep it close covered for use. It may be made weaker or stronger as there is occasion.

10.[2] From what I have observed of the lotion, I am inclined to think it may be worth while, in obstinate cutaneous ailments, leprosy, and weakness of limbs, to try a bath of tar-water; allowing a gallon of tar to every ten gallons of boiling-hot water; stirring the ingredients a full half hour; suffering the vessel to stand eight or ten hours, before the water is poured off; and using the bath a little more than milk warm. This experiment may be made in different proportions of tar and water. In Dublin many cases occur for trial which are not to be met with here in the country.

11. My experiments have been made in various cases, and on many persons; and I make no doubt its virtues will soon be more fully discovered; as tar-water is now growing into general use, though not without that opposition which usually attends upon novelty. The great objection I find

[1] The section continues thus in the first edition: "a quart every day, at six or eight glasses; and at the same time the wash applied outwardly, and warm, by bathing, fomenting, and steeping, to heal and dry up the sores, and this several times in the twenty-four hours. This water," etc. There are several other alterations of single words in this section.—ED.

[2] The whole of section 10 was added to the second edition. Section 11 here is thus section 7 in the first edition, and so throughout the rest of the tract.—ED.

made to this medicine is that it promises too much. What, say the objectors, do you pretend to a *panacea*, a thing strange, chimerical, and contrary to the opinion and experience of all mankind? Now, to speak out, and give this objection or question a plain and direct answer, I freely own that I suspect tar-water is a panacea. I may be mistaken, but it is worth trial: for the chance of so great and general benefit, I am willing to stand the ridicule of proposing it. And, as the old philosopher cried aloud from the house-tops to his fellow-citizens, Educate your children, so, I confess, if I had a situation high enough, and a voice loud enough, I would cry out to all the valetudinarians upon earth, Drink tar-water.

12. Having thus frankly owned the charge, I must explain to you, that by a panacea is not meant a medicine which cures all individuals (this consists not with mortality), but a medicine that cures or relieves all the different species of distempers. And, if God hath given us so great a blessing, and made a medicine so cheap and plenty as tar to be withal so universal in its effects, to ease the miseries of human life, shall men be ridiculed or bantered out of its use, especially when they run no risk in the trial?[1] For I can truly affirm, that I never knew any harm attend it, more than sometimes a little nausea, which, if the liquor be well cleared, skimmed, and bottled, need not, I think, be apprehended.

13. It must be owned I have not had opportunities of trying it myself in all cases; neither will I undertake to demonstrate *a priori* that tar-water is a panacea. But yet methinks I am not quite destitute of probable reasons, which, joined to what facts I have observed, induced me to entertain such a suspicion.

14. I knew tar was used to preserve cattle from contagion; and this may be supposed to have given rise to that practice of drinking tar-water for a preservative against the small-pox. But, as the tar-water used for that purpose was made by mixing equal quantities of tar and water, it proved a most offensive potion: besides, as a fresh glass of water was put in for each glass that was taken out, and this for many days

[1] From here to the end of the section (four lines) was not contained in the first edition.—ED.

on the same tar, it follows that the water was not equally impregnated with the fine volatile spirit, though all alike strongly saturated with gross particles.

15. Having found this nauseous draught very useful against the small-pox to as many as could be prevailed on to take it, I began to consider the nature of tar. I reflected that tar is a balsam flowing from the trunks of aged evergreens; that it resists putrefaction; that it hath the virtues of turpentine, which in medicine are known to be very great and manifold; but I observed withal that turpentines or balsams are very offensive in the taking. I therefore considered distinctly the several constituent parts of balsams; which were those wherein the medicinal virtues resided, and, which were to be regarded rather as a viscous matrix to receive, arrest, and retain the more volatile and active particles; and, if these last could be so separated and disengaged from the grosser parts as to impregnate a clear and potable liquor, I concluded that such liquor must prove a medicine of great force and general use. I considered that nature was the best chemist and preparer of medicines, and that the fragrance and flavour of tar argued very active qualities and virtues.

16. I had, of a long time, entertained an opinion, agreeable to the sentiments of many ancient philosophers, *That Fire may be regarded as the Animal Spirit of this visible world.* And it seemed to me that the attracting and secreting of this fire, in the various pores, tubes, and ducts of vegetables, did impart their specific virtues to each kind; that this same light or fire was the immediate instrumental or physical cause of sense and motion, and consequently of life and health to animals; that, on account of this solar light or fire, Phœbus was in the ancient mythology reputed the god of medicine. Which light, as it is leisurely introduced, and fixed in the viscid juice of old firs and pines, so the setting it free in part, that is, the changing its viscid for a volatile vehicle, which may mix with water, and convey it throughout the habit copiously and inoffensively, would be of infinite use in physic, extending to all cases whatsoever, inasmuch as all distempers are in effect a struggle between the *vis vitæ* and the peculiar miasma or *fomes morbi;* and nothing strengthens nature, or lends such aid and vigour to life, as a cordial which doth not heat.

17. The solar light, in great quantity during the space of many successive years, being attracted and detained in the juice of ancient evergreens, doth form and lodge itself in an oil so fine and volatile as shall mix well with water, and lightly pass the *primæ viæ*, and penetrate every part and capillary of the organical system, when once exempt and freed from the grosser nauseous resin. It will not, therefore, seem unreasonable to whoever is acquainted with the medicinal virtues of turpentine in so many different distempers, for which it hath been celebrated both by ancient and modern physicians, and withal reflects on the nausea or clog that prevents their full operation and effect on the human body; it will not, I say, seem unreasonable to such a one to suppose that, if this same clog were removed, numberless cures might be wrought in a great variety of cases.

18. The *desideratum* was, how to separate the active particles from the heavy viscid substance which served to attract and retain them; and so to order matters that the vehicle of the spirit should not on the one hand be volatile enough to escape, nor on the other gross enough to offend. For the performing of this, I have found a most easy, simple, and effectual method, which furnisheth a potable inoffensive liquor, clear and fine as the best white wine, cordial and stomachic, to be kept bottled, as being endued with a very sensible spirit, though not fermented.

19. I tried many experiments as to the quantity of water, and the time of stirring and standing, in order to impregnate and clarify it, and after all, fixed on the forementioned receipt, as the most generally useful for making this salutiferous liquor well impregnated, and not offensive to common stomachs, and even drank with pleasure by many; in which the most medicinal and active particles, that is, the native [1] salts and volatile oil of the balsam, being disentangled and separated from its gross oil and viscous resin do, combined together, form a fine balsamic and vegetable soap, which not only can pass the stomach and *primæ viæ*, but also insinuate

[1] The section continues thus in the first edition: "the native salts, pirits, and volatile oil being disentangled from the gross oil and viscous resin can freely pass the *Primæ Viæ*, insinuate themselves into the smallest ducts, and pervade the whole animal machine," etc.—ED.

itself into the minutest capillaries, and pervade the whole animal system; and that in such full proportion and measure as suiteth every case and constitution.

20. The foregoing general considerations put me upon making experiments in many various and unlike cases, which otherwise I should never have thought of doing, and the success answered my hopes. Philosophical principles led me to make safe trials, and on those trials is founded my opinion of the salutary virtues of tar-water; which virtues are recommended from, and depend on, experiments and matters of fact, and neither stand nor fall with any theories or speculative principles whatever. Howbeit, those theories, as I said, enlarged my views of this medicine, led me to a greater variety of trials, and thereby engendered and nourished my suspicion—that it is a panacea. I have been the more prolix in these particulars, hoping that, to as many as shall candidly weigh and consider them, the high opinion I conceive of this medicine will not seem altogether an effect of vain prepossession, or blind empiric rashness, but rather the result of free thought and inquiry, and grounded on my best reason, judgment, and experience.[1]

21. Those who have only the good of mankind at heart will give this medicine fair play; if there be any who act from other motives, the public will look sharp and beware. To do justice to tar-water, as well as to those who drink it, regard must be had to the particular strength and case of the patients. Grievous or inveterate maladies must not be treated as common cases. I cured a horrible case, a gangrene in the blood, which had broke out in several sores, and threatened speedy death, by obliging the person to drink nothing but this liquor for several weeks, as much and as often as his stomach would bear. Common sense will direct a proportionable conduct in other cases. But this

[1] In all collected editions (including Professor Fraser's) this paragraph concludes the section: "Much complaint is indeed made of the iniquity of the times: however, it is hoped they will not condemn one man's tar-water for another's pill or drop, any more than they would hang one man for another's having stolen a horse." I can find find no trace of it in any edition of this letter. As far as I can discover, it first appears in Berkeley's works in the quarto edition of 1784.—ED.

must be left to the conscience and discretion of the givers and takers.

22. After all that can be said, it is most certain that a panacea sounds odd, and conveys somewhat shocking to the ear and sense of most men, who are wont to rank the Universal Medicine with the philosopher's stone, and the squaring of the circle; whereof the chief if not sole reason I take to be, that it is thought to be incredible the same things should produce contrary effects, as it must do if it cures opposite distempers. And yet this is no more than every day's experience verifies. Milk, for instance, makes some costive and others laxative. This regards the possibility of a panacea in general; as for tar-water in particular, I do not say it is a panacea, I only suspect it to be so; time and trial will shew.

23. But I am most sincerely persuaded, from what I have already seen and tried, that tar-water may be drank with great safety and success, for the cure or relief of most if not all diseases—of ulcers, itch, scald-heads, leprosy, the foul disease, and all foul cases, scurvies of all kinds, disorders of the lungs, stomach, and[1] bowels, in rheumatic, gouty and nephritic ailments, megrims, inveterate head-aches, pleurisies, peripneumonies, erysipelas, small-pox, and all kinds of fevers, colics, hysteric and all nervous cases, dropsies, decays, and other maladies. Note that for agues it should be drank warm and often, in small glasses, both in and out of the fit, and continued for several days to prevent a relapse. Nor is it of use only in the cure of sickness; it is also useful to preserve health, and guard against infection; and in some measure even against old age, as it gives lasting spirits, and invigorates the blood. I am even induced, by the nature and analogy of things, and its wonderful success in fevers of all kinds, to think that tar-water may be very useful against the plague, both as a preservative and a cure.

24. But I doubt no medicine can withstand that execrable plague of distilled spirits, which do all, without exception, (the fire of the hot still imparting a caustic and coagulating

[1] In the first edition the section continues thus: "and bowels, gouty and nephritic ailments, pleurisies, peripneumonies, erysipelas, and all kinds of fevers, hysteric and all nervous cases, dropsies, decays and other maladies. Nor is it of use," etc.—ED.

quality to all distilled spirits, whatever the subject or ingredients may be), operate as a slow poison, preying on the vitals, and wasting the health and strength of body and soul; which pest of human kind is, I am told, gaining ground in this country, already too thin of inhabitants.

A SECOND

LETTER[1]

FROM THE

AUTHOR of *SIRIS*

TO

Thomas Prior, Esq;

1.

YOUR attention to whatever promotes the public good of your country, or the common benefit of mankind, having engaged you in a particular inquiry concerning the virtues and effects of Tar-water, you are entitled to know what farther discoveries, observations, and reflections I have made on the subject.

2. Tar-water, in the several editions of "Siris," hath been directed to be made by stirring three, four, five, or six minutes, for a gallon of water and a quart of tar. But, although it seem best made, for general use, within those limits, yet the stomach of the patient is the best rule whereby to direct the strength of the water; with a little more stirring, six quarts of good tar-water may be made from one of tar; and with eight minutes' stirring, I have known a gallon of tar-water produced from second-hand tar, which proved a good remedy in a very bad fever, when better tar could not be had. For the use of travellers, a tar-water may be made very strong,

[1] This letter was not published separately. It was the second of the two letters appended to Prior's "Narrative." See the previous introductory foot-note.

for instance, with one quart of water, and a quart of tar, stirred together for the space of five minutes. A bottle of this may serve long on a road, a little being put to each glass of common water, more or less, as you would have it stronger or weaker. Near two years ago, a quart of about this strength was given to an old woman, to be taken at one draught by direction of a young lady, who had consulted one in my family, about the method of preparing and giving tar-water, which yet she happened to mistake. But even thus, it did service in the main, though it wrought the patient violently all manner of ways: which shews that errors and excesses in tar-water are not so dangerous as in other medicines.

3. The best tar I take to be that which is most liquid, or first running from the billets of fir or pine which grew on the mountains: it hath a greater share of those antiscorbutic vegetable juices, which are contained not only in the leaves and tender tops, but in all parts of the wood: and these, together with the salts of wood-soap, being in the composition of tar superadded to turpentine, render tar-water a medicine, if I am not mistaken, much more extensive and efficacious than any that can be obtained from turpentine alone.

4. The virtues of the wood-juices shew themselves in spruce-beer, made of molasses, and the black spruce-fir in the northern parts of America; and the young shoots of our common spruce-fir have been put to malt liquor in my own family, and make a very wholesome drink.

5. Tar-water seldom fails to cure, or relieve, when rightly made of good tar, and duly taken. I say, of good tar, because the vile practice of adulterating tar, and of selling the dregs of tar, or used tar for fresh, is grown frequent, to the great wrong of those who take it. Whoever hath been used to good tar-water can readily discern the bad by its flat taste, void of that warm cordial quality found in the former; it may also be expedient, for knowing fresh tar, to observe whether a fat oily scum floats on the top of the water, which is found to be much less, if any at all, on the second making of tar-water. This scum was directed to be taken off, not from its being apt to do harm when drank, but to render the tar-water more palatable to nice stomachs. Great quantities of tar are produced in Germany, Italy, and other parts

of the world. The different qualities or virtues of these it may be worth while to try, and I wish the trial were made principally by observing, which giveth most sense of a lively cordial spirit upon drinking the water.

6. This medicine of tar-water worketh various ways, by urine, by perspiration, as a sudorific, carminative, cardiac, astringent, detergent, restorative, alterative, and sometimes as a gentle purgative or emetic, according to the case or constitution of the patient, or to the quantity that is taken; and its operation should not be disturbed. I knew two brothers ill of a fever about the same time; it wrought on the one by copious sweating, on the other altogether by urine; and I have known it to act at different times differently, even on the same person, and in the same disorder; one while as a diaphoretic, or sudorific, another as a diuretic. Its general character is diuretic, which shews that it cleanseth the urinary passages, preventing thereby both stone and gravel, against which it hath been found very useful, and much safer than mineral waters, by reason of its balsamic healing quality.

7. Tar-water doth recover and impart vital heat, but imparts no inflaming heat. I have seen a wonderful cure wrought on a child about eight years old, and past all hopes, by pouring several spoonsful of tar-water down his throat, as he lay quite subdued by a most violent fever, without any appearance of sense or motion, the nostrils drawn back, the eyes fixed, the complexion deadly wan. And yet tar-water, forced down by spoonsful, seemed to kindle up life anew; and this after sage-tea, saffron, milk-water, Venice treacle, etc. had been used without any success.

8. This is of itself a sufficient cordial, friendly and congenial to the vital heat and spirits of a man. If, therefore, strong liquors are in the accustomed quantity superadded, the blood being already, by tar-water, sufficiently warmed for vital heat, the strong liquors superadded will be apt to overheat it, which overheating is not to be imputed to the tar-water, since, taken alone, I could never observe it attended with that symptom.

9. And, though it may be no easy matter to persuade such as have long indulged themselves in the free use of strong fermented liquors and distilled spirits to forsake their pernicious habits, yet I am myself thoroughly persuaded

that, in the weakness or fatigue of body, or in low spirits, tar-water alone doth far surpass all those vulgarly-esteemed cordials, which heat and intoxicate, and which coagulate the fluids, and, by their caustic force, dry up, stiffen, and destroy the fine vessels and fibres of the unhappy drinkers, obstructing the secretions, impairing the animal functions, producing various disorders, and bringing on the untimely symptoms of old age. Nothing doth so much obstruct the good effects of tar-water as the abuse of strong liquors. Where this is avoided, it seems no chronical malady can keep its ground or stand before tar-water, constantly and regularly taken, not even hereditary distempers, as the most inveterate king's evil, nor even the most confirmed gout; provided it be drank a quart a day, at six or eight glasses, and at all seasons, both in and out of the fit, and that for a great length of time, the longer the better. It is to be noted that in fits of the gout, colic, or fever, it should be always drank warm. On other occasions, warm or cold, as the patient likes.

10. The inference I make is, that those who expect health from tar-water have less need of any other cordial, and would do well to sacrifice some part of their pleasure to their health. At the same time, I will venture to affirm that a fever produced either from hard drinking, or any other cause, is most effectually and speedily subdued, by abstaining from all other cordials, and plentifully drinking of tar-water: for it warms the cold, and cools the hot; simple water may cool, but this, at the same time that it cools, gives life and spirit. It is, in truth, a specific for all kinds of fevers; the same medicine, which is a leisurely alterative in chronical disorders, being taken in larger quantities, is a speedy cure in acute ones.

11. Those who, without knowledge or experience of tar-water, have been so active and earnest to discredit its virtues, have much to answer for, especially with regard to acute inflammatory distempers, in which it doth wonders. It is in those disorders, so fatal and frequent, that I have had most opportunities of observing its virtues; nor can the world ever know the just value of this medicine, but by trying it in the like cases.

12. When patients are given over, and all known methods

fail, it is allowed to try new remedies. If tar-water was tried in such cases, I do verily believe, that many patients might thereby be rescued from the jaws of death: particularly, I would recommend the trial of it in the most malignant and desperate fevers or small-pox, attended with purple, livid, or black spots. It is my sincere opinion that warm tar-water, drank copiously, may often prove salutary, even in those deplorable cases.

13. My opinion is grounded on its singular virtues in correcting, sweetening, and invigorating the blood, and in curing cancers and gangrenes, or beginning mortifications, such as those spots do indicate. I have lately known it drunk with good success in a very painful and unpromising wound; and am persuaded that if it were drank plentifully, during the dressing of all sorts of dangerous wounds, it might assuage the anguish, and forward the cure; as it abates feverish symptoms, and, by rendering the blood balsamic and disposing the parts to heal, prevents a gangrene.

14. Tar itself is an excellent medicine, being spread on a cloth, and applied warm to an ulcer or wound. I have known the same applied to a very large and painful tumour, caused by a sprain or bruise, speedily assuage the pain, and reduce the swelling. I may add that tar (mixed with honey to make it less offensive, and) taken inwardly, is an admirable balsam for the lungs; and a little of this, taken together with tar-water, hastens its effect in curing the most obstinate and wasting coughs; and an egg-shell full of tar, swallowed and washed down with a quart of tar-water, night and morning, hath been found very useful for the same disorder in horses.

15. Sitting over the vapour of the heated lotion, described in my former letter, is excellent in the case of piles or fistula; especially if fomenting with the same lotion be added, as also anointing with the oil scummed from the top of tar-water. Tar-water hath been snuffed up the nostrils, with good success, for a great heaviness of the head and drowsiness. It is a very useful wash for weak, dry, or itching eyes; an excellent preservative for the teeth and gums; also a good drink and gargle for a throat: I may add that I have known it succeed in cases where it has been

tried without hopes of success, particularly in deafness. I have known life sustained many days together only by drinking of tar-water, without any other nourishment, and without any remarkable diminution of strength or spirits; it may therefore be of singular use, and save many lives in the distress of famine at sea, or in sieges, and in seasons of great scarcity The virtue of tar-water, flowing like the Nile[1] from a secret and occult source, brancheth into innumerable channels, conveying health and relief, wherever it is applied; nor is it more easy and various in its use than copious in quantity. How great havoc, nevertheless, is made by the small-pox, raging like a plague in New England, and other parts of America, which yet abound with tar! And how many thousand sailors, in all parts of the world, are rotting by the scurvy with their remedy at hand!

16. Many in this town of Cloyne have, by the copious drinking of tar-water alone, been recovered of the most violent fevers, attended with the most threatening symptoms, and much heightened by relapses from mismanagement. It would be tedious to enumerate all the cases of this kind which have happened at Cloyne and in my own family; where many fevers, pleuritic as well as others, attended with violent stitches, difficulty of breathing, and spitting of blood, have been cured by tar-water: and this I can with truth affirm, that I never knew it regularly tried, in any inflammatory case, without success: but then it must be given in bed warm, and very copiously, with all due caution against cold, noise, and improper diet.

17. I have often observed, when a patient, on the first attack of a fever, hath betaken himself to his bed, and drank tar-water regularly and constantly, that he hath had such favourable symptoms, so good appetite, and so sound sleep, that the fever passed almost as nothing; nor was to be distinguished otherwise than by a quickness of pulse, a little feverish heat, and thirst. The more that patients in a fever drink, the better they find themselves; and their liking to tar-water grows with their want of it, by a certain instinct or

[1] The Nile was by the ancient Egyptians called *Siris*, which word also signifies, in Greek, a chain, though not so commonly used as *Sira*.

dictate of nature; insomuch that I have known children in very high fevers, who, at other times, could hardly be prevailed on to drink a single glass, drink six or eight in an hour.

18. I can truly affirm that, for the cases within my own observation, inflammatory acute distempers cured by tar-water have been at least ten times the number of any other. These indeed oftenest occur, as causing the chief destruction and general ravage of mankind: who are consequently debarred from the principal use and benefit of this medicine, so long as they give ear to the suggestions of those who, without any experience thereof, would persuade them it is of a heating or inflaming nature; which suggestion, as I am convinced myself, by long and manifold experience, that it is absolutely false, so may all others also be sufficiently convinced of its falsehood, by the wonderful fact, attested by a solemn affidavit[1] of Captain Drape at Liverpool; whereby it appears that of 170 negroes seized at once by the small-pox on the coast of Guinea one only died, who refused to drink tar-water; and the remaining 169 all recovered, by drinking it, without any other medicine, notwithstanding the heat of the climate, and the incommodities of the vessel. A fact so well vouched must, with all unbiassed men, outweigh the positive assertions of those who have declared themselves adversaries of tar-water, on the score of its pretended heating or inflaming quality.

19. The skill and learning of those gentlemen, in their profession, I shall not dispute; but yet it seems strange that they should, without experience, pronounce at once concerning the virtues of tar-water, and ascribe to it pernicious qualities, which I, who have watched its workings and effects for years together, could never discover. These three last years I have taken it myself without one day's intermission; others in my family have taken it near the same time, and those of different ages and sexes; several in the neighbourhood have done as much, all without any injury, and much benefit.

20. It is to be noted, the skin and the belly are antagon-

[1] Berkeley here gives a reference to sections 41-44, of Prior's "Authentic Narrative," to which this letter was appended.—ED.

ists; that is, the more passeth by perspiration, the less will pass another way. Medicines, therefore, which cause the patient to perspire will be apt to make him costive. Therefore, when tar-water worketh much by perspiration, the body may chance to be bound. But such symptom, though it should be attended with a little more than ordinary warmth, need not be dreaded by the patient; it being only a sign that his cure is carried on by driving the peccant matter through the skin; which is one of the ways whereby tar-water worketh its effect. And, when this effect or cure is wrought, the body of itself returneth to its former natural state; and, if some have been bound in their bodies, I have known others affected in a contrary manner upon drinking tar-water, as it hath happened to operate either in the shape of a diaphoretic, or of a gentle opening medicine. I have even known a costive habit more than once removed by it, and that when the case was inveterate, and other methods had failed.

21. I mentioned the foregoing article, upon calling to mind, that two or three patients had, for a time, complained of a binding quality in tar-water. I likewise remember that one in a high degree of the scurvy was discouraged from the use of tar-water, by its having caused an uneasy itching all over his body. But this was a good symptom, which shewed the peccant humours to be put in motion, and in a fair way of being discharged through the skin.

22. An humour or flatus put in motion, and dislodged from one part, often produceth new pains in some other part; and an efficacious medicine, as it produceth a change in the economy, may be attended with some uneasiness, which yet is not to be accounted a distemper, but only an effect or symptom of the cure.

23. The salts of tar-water have nothing of the fiery and corrosive nature of lixivial salts produced by the incineration of the subject; they not being fixed salts, made by the extreme force of fire, but volatile salts, such as pre-existed in the vegetable, and would have ascended in smoke, if not prevented by the sods or covering of the billet piles. This, though already hinted in "Siris," and plain from the manner of making tar, I have thought fit to repeat and inculcate, because, if duly attended to, it may obviate suspicions

about tar-water, proceeding only from an ignorance of its nature.

24. Every step that I advanced in discovering the virtues of tar-water, my own wonder and surprise increased, as much as theirs to whom I mentioned them. Nor could I, without great variety and evidence of facts, ever have been induced to suspect that all sorts of ailments whatsoever it might relieve or cure, which at first sight may seem incredible and unaccountable; but, on maturer thought, will perhaps appear to agree with, and follow from, the nature of things. For, it is to be noted that the general notion of a disease seemeth to consist in this—that what is taken in is not duly assimilated by the force of the animal economy; therefore it should seem whatever assists the *vis vitæ* may be of general use in all diseases, enabling nature either to assimilate or discharge all unsubdued humours and particles whatsoever. But the light or æther detained in the volatile oil which impregnates tar-water, being of the same nature with the animal spirit, is an accession of so much strength to the constitution, which it assists to assimilate or expel whatever is alien or noxious.

TWO LETTERS

From the Right Reverend

Dr. GEORGE BERKELEY,

Lord Biſhop of CLOYNE,

The one to *Thomas Prior*, Eſq;

Concerning the

Uſefulneſs of Tar-water in the PLAGUE.

(Wherein alſo it is conſidered,

Whether Tar-Water, prepared with the diſtilled Acid of Tar, ſhould be preferred to that made in the common Way, by mixing Tar with Water, and ſtirring them together.)

The other to the Rev. Dr *Hales*,

ON THE

Benefit of Tar-water in FEVERS,

for *Cattle* as well as the Human Species.

Publiſhed at his LORDSHIP's Deſire, on Occaſion of the preſent Diſtemper among the Cattle, and for the general Good of Mankind.

DUBLIN Printed,

LONDON Re-printed

For W. INNYS, C. HITCH, and M. COOPER, in *Paternoſter-row*; and C. DAVIS in *Holbourn*. MDCCXLVII.

[Price Six Pence.]

"They provoked Him to anger with their own inventions, and the Plague brake in upon them."—Ps. cvi. 29.

A THIRD LETTER

TO THOMAS PRIOR

ON TAR-WATER.[1]

YOU observe, in a late letter of yours, that I had formerly hinted Tar-water might be useful in the Plague; and desire to know the reasons whereon my opinion was grounded, and that I would communicate my thoughts at large on the subject. I am the more willing to satisfy you in this particular, as the plague now raging in Barbary hath in some measure alarmed the public, and I think it may not be amiss to contribute my mite of advice towards averting or lessening the present danger; and, as fear begets caution, to possess my countrymen with an apprehension of this, the greatest of all temporal calamities, sufficient to put them on their guard, and prepare them against the worst that can happen.

A learned physician of our own observes that the plague does not visit these Britannic islands oftener that once in thirty or forty years, and it is now above twice that time since we felt the hand of the destroying angel.

It is also the opinion of physicians that the infection cannot spread except there is a suitable disposition in the air to receive it; the signs of which are wet summers, leaves and fruits blasted, an unusual quantity of insects, epidemical distempers among the cattle, to which I presume may be added long easterly winds—all which signs seem to have

[1] This letter and the next were published as one pamphlet in the year 1747. A cattle plague was raging at the time, and there was some dread that this might be the forerunner of the Plague amongst human kind. The letter prescribes tar-water as a preventive.

discovered themselves pretty plainly in the course of this present year.

Besides these natural forerunners of a plague or pestilence in the air, it is worth observing that a prognostic may be also made from the moral and religious disposition of the inhabitants. Certainly that the *digitus Dei* (the τὸ θεῖον of Hippocrates) doth manifest itself in the plague was not only the opinion of mankind in general, but also in particular of the most eminent physicians throughout all ages down to our own. How far we of these islands have reason to expect this messenger of Divine vengeance will best appear if we take a view of the prevailing principles and practices of our times, which many think have long called aloud for punishment or amendment.

Analogy and probability prevail in medicine: these are the proper guides where experience hath not gone before. I knew that tar-water was useful to prevent catching the small-pox, and consequently that its nature was contrary to the taint or venom producing that distemper; and therefore I concluded that it might be usefully applied to cure the same, though I never heard nor knew that it had been applied to that purpose, and the success answered my hopes.

In like manner, having known the virtue of tar-water in preserving from epidemical infection, I conceive in general it may be useful for the cure of distempers caused by such infection. Besides, being very well assured that tar-water was sovereign in the cure of all sorts of fevers, I think it not unreasonable to infer that it may prove a successful medicine for the plague, although I have never known it used in that distemper, forasmuch as the plague with all its symptoms may be considered as a species of fever, and hath been actually considered as such both by Hippocrates and Sydenham, not to mention others.

Having observed surprising effects of tar-water in the most deplorable cases, for instance, pleurisies, small-pox, spotted and erysipelatous fevers, I am induced to entertain great hopes of its success in pestilential fevers or plagues; which are also confirmed by its operating as a powerful diaphoretic and sudorific, when given warm and in great quantities. Add to this, that it frequently throws out pustules and ulcers, is

apt to terminate the worst of fevers by an irruption of boils in various parts of the body; that it raises the spirits, is a great alexipharmacum and cordial, and must therefore be of the greatest use in malignant cases.

In cachexy, scurvy, gout, as well as in the close of fevers, I have often known tar-water cause troublesome eruptions or boils (the very method taken by nature in casting forth the venom of the plague) to break out in the surface of the body, expelling the morbific humours, the cause and relics of the disease, to the signal benefit of the patients; except such who, being frightened at the symptons, have supposed the tar-water to produce those humours which it only drives out, and, in consequence of such their groundless suspicion, laid it aside, or perhaps took other medicines to hinder its effect, and thereby deprive themselves of the benefit they might otherwise have received.

In the plague are observed head-ache, drowsiness, anxiety, vigils, sinking of spirits, and weakness, for all which tar-water hath been found an effectual remedy. Bloody urine and spitting blood, which are also dangerous symptoms observed in the plague, have been often removed by the same medicine, which from numberless experiments I have found to be peculiarly fitted for purifying and strengthening the blood, and for giving it a due consistence, as well as a proper motion.

In the plague, pleurisies are esteemed mortal symptoms, and in the cure of these I never knew tar-water fail, if given warm in bed, a pint or more an hour, though the patient was neither bled nor blistered. The carbuncles and spots which shew themselves in the plague are of a gangrenous nature, tending to mortification. And gangrenes I have known effectually cured by copious drinking of tar-water.

An erysipelas, which sheweth a degree of malignity nearest to the plague, is easily cured by plentiful drinking of tar-water. I knew a person who had been six weeks ill of an erysipelas under the care of a celebrated physician, during which time she struggled with many dangerous symptoms, and hardly escaped with life. This person was a year after seized again in the same manner, and recovered in a week, by the sole use of tar-water. Costiveness is reckoned a very hopeful prognostic in the plague; and it is also a symptom

which often attends the drinking of tar-water, when it throws out the venom of a distemper through the skin.

Diseases of the same season generally bear some affinity to each other in their nature and their cure; and it may not be improper on this occasion to observe that the reigning distemper of the black cattle hath been often cured by tar-water, and would (I am persuaded) have done much less mischief, if the practice had been general to have given each distempered beast three gallons the first, two the second, and one the third day, in warm doses (from a pint to a quart), and at equal intervals.

Diemerbroeck recommends in the first appearance of a plague the use of sudorifics, putting the patient to bed, and covering him warm, till a copious sweat be raised, the very method I constantly follow in the beginning of fevers, using no other medicine than tar-water; which, after numberless experiments, I take to be the best sudorific that is known, inasmuch as it throws out the morbific miasma, without either heating the patient or weakening him, the common effects of other sudorifics, whereas this, at the same time that it allays the feverish heat, proves a most salutary cordial, giving great and lasting spirits.

Upon the whole, I am sincerely persuaded that for the cure of the plague there cannot be a better method followed, more general for use, more easy in practice, and more sure in effect, than to cover the patient warm in bed, and to make him drink every hour one quart of warm tar-water, of such strength as his stomach is able to bear; a thing not so impracticable as it may seem at first sight, since I have known much more drank in fevers, even by children, and that eagerly and by choice, the distemper calling for drink, and the ease it gave encouraging to go on. This for the cure; but I conceive that one quart *per diem* may suffice for prevention; especially if there be added an even temper of mind, and an exact regimen, which are both highly useful against the plague. For carbuncles and buboes I would recommend a liniment of the oil of tar, or a plaster of pitch mixed with water, which last was used by the vulgar in the Dutch plague described by Diemerbroeck.

It has pleased divine Providence to visit us not long since, first with famine, then with the sword; and if it should please

the same good Providence yet farther to visit us for our sins, with the third and greatest of human woes, this, by God's blessing, is the course I mean to take for myself and family; and if generally practised, it would, I doubt not (under God), save the lives of many thousands; whereof being persuaded in my own mind, both from the many trials I have made of tar-water, and the best judgment and reasonings I could form thereupon, I think myself obliged to declare to the world what I am convinced of myself.

And I am the rather moved to this by the great uncertainty and disagreement among physicians, in their methods of treating the plague. Diemerbroeck, for instance, a physician of great experience in the Dutch plague that raged about eighty years ago, dissuades by all means from bleeding in that distemper. On the other hand, Sydenham recommends what the other disapproves. If we believe Dr. Sydenham, the free use of wine, as a preservative, hath thrown many into the plague who otherwise might have escaped. Dr. Willis, on the contrary, avers that he knew many who, being well fortified by wine, freely entered amongst the infected without catching the infection.

Bleeding cools, but at the same time weakens nature. Wine gives spirits, but heats withal. They are both, therefore, to be suspected; whereas tar-water cools without weakening, and gives spirit without heating, a sure indication of its sovereign virtue in all inflammatory and malignant cases; which is confirmed by such numbers of instances that matter of fact keeps pace (at least) with reason and argument in recommending this medicine.

Plagues as well as fevers are observed to be of different kinds: and it is observed of fevers that, as they change their genius in different seasons, so they must be treated differently, that very method that succeeded in one season often proving hurtful in another. Now it is very remarkable, that tar-water has been known to vary in its working, and wonderfully adapt itself to the particular case of the patient, a thing I frequently have experienced.

Last spring two children, a boy and a girl, the former ten years old, the latter eight years old, were seized with fevers; the boy had an inflammation in his breast. In less than two hours they drank each above five quarts of warm tar-water,

which wrought them very differently, the girl as an emetic, the boy as a gentle purge, but both alike immediately recovered, without the use of any other medicine: of this I was an eye-witness, and I have found by frequent experience that the best way is, to let this medicine take its own course, not hindered nor interrupted by any other medicines; and, this being observed, I never knew it to fail so much as once, in above a hundred trials in all sorts of fevers.

Nevertheless, there are not wanting those who would insinuate that tar-water made in the common way contains noxious oils or particles of tar, which render it dangerous to those who drink it, a thing contrary to all my experience. This was the old objection made by those who opposed it from the beginning. But I am convinced, by innumerable trials, that tar-water is so far from doing hurt by any caustic or fiery quality, that it is, on the contrary, a most potent medicine for the allaying of heat, and curing of all inflammatory distempers. The perpetually returning to the same objection makes it necessary to repeat the same answer.

And yet some who are not afraid to argue against experience would still persuade us that the common tar-water is a dangerous medicine, and that the acid freed from the volatile oil is much more safe and efficacious: but I am of opinion that, being robbed of its fine volatile oil (which neither sinks to the bottom, nor floats at the top, but is throughout and intimately united with it, and appears to the eye only in the colour of tar-water); being robbed, I say, of this oil, it is my opinion it can be no cordial; which opinion (not to mention the reason of the thing) I ground on my own experience, having observed that the most acid water is the least cordial, so far am I from imputing the whole virtue to the acid, as some seem to think.

It seems not very reasonable to suppose that the caustic quality of tar-water (if such there was) should be removed or lessened by distillation, or that a still should furnish a cooler and better medicine than that which is commonly prepared by the simple affusion and stirring of cold water. However the ends of chemists or distillers may be served thereby, yet it by no means seemeth calculated for the benefit of mankind in general to attempt to make people suspect, and frighten them from the use of a medicine, so

easily and so readily made, and everywhere at hand, of such approved and known safety, and, at the same time, recommended by cures the most extraordinary, on persons of all sexes and ages, in such variety of distempers, and in so many distant parts of Christendom.

By most men, I believe, it will be judged, at best, a needless undertaking, instead of an easy-tried medicine to introduce one more operose and expensive, unsupported by experiments, and recommended by wrong suppositions that all the virtue is in the acid; and that the tar-water, being impregnated with volatile oil, is caustic, which are both notorious mistakes.

Though it be the character of resin not to dissolve or mix with water as salts do, yet it attracts some fine particles of essential oil, which serves as a vehicle for such acid salts; and the colour of the tar-water sheweth the fine oil, in which the vegetable salts are lodged, to be dissolved and mixed therein. The combination of two such different substances as oil and salt constitutes a very subtle and active medicine, fitted to mix with all humours, and resolve all obstructions, and which may properly be called an acid soap.

Tar-water operates more gently and safely, as the acid salts are sheathed in oil, and, thereby losing their acrimony, approach the nature of neutral salts, and so become more friendly to the animal system. By the help of a smooth insinuating oil, these acid salts are more easily and safely introduced into the fine capillaries. I may add, that the crasis of the blood is perfected by tar-water, being good against too great a solution and fluidity as a balsam, and against viscidity as a soap, all which entirely depends upon the mixture of oil with the acid, without which it could neither operate as a balsam nor a soap. Briefly, it was not mere acid or distilled water, or tincture of tar, but tar-water, as commonly made, by affusion and stirring of cold water upon tar, which hath wrought all those great cures and salutary effects, which have recommended it as a medicine to the general esteem of the world.

The mixture of volatile oil, which is or contains the spirit, is so far from noxious that it is the very thing that makes tar-water a cordial; this gives it a grateful warmth, and raiseth the spirits of the hysteric and hypochondriacal; this

also, rendering the blood balsamic, disposeth wounds of all sorts to an easy cure; this also it is that fortifies the vitals, and invigorates nature, driving the gout to the extremities, and shortening the fits, till it entirely subdues that obstinate and cruel enemy, as it hath been often known to do; but acid alone is so far from being able to do this, that, on the contrary, the free use of acids is reckoned amongst the causes of the gout.

I never could find that the volatile oil drawn from tar by the affusion of cold water produced any inflammation, or was otherwise hurtful, not even though the water by longer stirring had imbibed far more of the oil than in the common manner, having been assured, that some of strong stomachs have drank it after twenty minutes' stirring, without any the least harm, and with very great benefit.

It hath been indeed insinuated that the oil was ordered to be skimmed off, because it is caustic and dangerous; but this is a mistake. I myself, among many others, drank the tar-water for two years together, with its oil upon it; which never proved hurtful, otherwise than, as being somewhat gross, and floating on the top, it rendered the water less palatable, for which reason alone it was ordered to be skimmed.

It hath also been hinted that making tar-water the second time of the same tar was cautioned against, for that it was apprehended such water would prove too heating; which is so far from being true that, when I could not get fresh tar, I used the second water without difficulty, by means whereof it pleased God to recover from the small-pox two children in my own family, who drank it very copiously, a sufficient proof that it is not of that fiery caustic nature which some would persuade us.

The truth is, my sole reason for advising the tar not to be used a second time was, because I did not think it would sufficiently impregnate the water, or render it strong enough, after so much of the fine volatile parts had been carried off by the former infusion. Truth obligeth me to affirm that there is no danger (for as much as I could ever observe) to be apprehended from tar-water, as commonly made; the fine volatile oil, on which I take its cordial quality to depend, is, in its own nature, so soft and gentle,

and so tempered by the acid, and both so blended and diluted with so great a quantity of water, as to make a compound, cherishing and cordial, producing a genial kindly warmth without any inflaming heat, a thing I have often said, and still find it necessary to inculcate.

Some medicines indeed are so violent that the least excess is dangerous; these require an exactness in the dose, where a small error may produce a great mischief. But tar is, in truth, no such dangerous medicine, not even in substance; as I have more than once known it taken innocently, mixed with honey, for a speedy cure of a cold.

But, notwithstanding all that hath been said on that subject, it is still sometimes asked, What precise quantity or degree of strength is required? To which I answer (agreeably to what hath been formerly and frequently observed), The palate, the stomach, the particular case and constitution of the patient, the very climate or season of the year, will dispose and require him to drink more or less in quantity, stronger or weaker in degree; precisely to measure its strength, by a scrupulous exactness, is by no means necessary. Every one may settle that matter for himself, with the same safety that malt is proportioned to water in making beer, and by the same rule, to wit, the palate.

Only in general thus much may be said, that the proportions I formerly recommended will be found agreeable to most stomachs, and withal of sufficient strength, as many thousands have found, and daily find, by experience. I take this opportunity to observe, that I use tar-water made in stone ware or earthen very well glazed, earthen vessels unglazed being apt to communicate a nauseous sweetness to the water.

Tar-water is a diet-drink, in the making whereof there is great latitude, its perfection not consisting in a point, but varying with the constitution and palate of the patient, being, nevertheless, at times, taken by the same person, weaker or stronger, with much the same effect, provided it be proportionably in greater or lesser quantity. It may indeed be so very weak as to have little or no effect; and, on the other hand, so very strong as to offend the stomach; but its degree of strength is easily discerned by the colour smell, and taste, which alone are the natural and proper

guides whereby to judge thereof: which strength may be easily varied, in any proportion, by changing the quantity either of tar or water, or the time of stirring. As for setting tar-water to stand, this is not to make it stronger, but more clear and palatable.

I found myself obliged to assert the innocence and safety, as well as usefulness, of the tar-water, as it is commonly made by the methods laid down in my former writings on this subject; and this not only in regard to truth, but much more in charity to a multitude, which may otherwise perhaps be influenced by the authority of some who endeavour to put them out of conceit with a medicine so cheap, so efficacious, and so universal, by suggesting and propagating scruples about a caustic quality arising from the volatile oily particles of tar, or resin imbibed together with the acid in making tar-water; an apprehension so vain that the reverse thereof is true, for which I appeal to the experience of many thousands, who can answer for the innocence and safety, as well as efficacy, of this medicine, of which there are such ample and numerous certificates published to the world.

I shall finish my essay on the Plague and its Cure with observing that, in case God should withhold his hand for the present, yet these reflections will not be altogether fruitless, if they dispose men to a proper temper of mind, and a cautious regimen, avoiding all extremes (which things are justly reckoned among the chief preservatives against infection), but especially if the apprehension of this destroyer shall beget serious thoughts on the frailty of human life, and, in consequence thereof, a reformation of manners; advantages that would sufficiently repay the trouble of writing and reading this Letter, even though the trial of tar-water, as a remedy for the plague, should be postponed (as God grant it may) to some future and distant opportunity.

A LETTER

TO THE REVEREND DR. HALES

ON THE

BENEFIT OF TAR-WATER IN FEVERS, FOR CATTLE AS WELL AS THE HUMAN SPECIES.[1]

TO one gallon of fresh tar, pour six gallons of cold water; stir and work them strongly together, with a large flat stick, for the space of one full hour; let the whole stand six or eight hours, that the tar may subside; then scum it, and pour off the water, whereof three gallons warm are to be given the first day, two the second, and one the third day, at equal intervals, the dose not being less than a pint, nor more than a quart; and the beast being all that time, and for two or three days after, kept warm and nourished, if it will not eat hay, with mash or gruel.

I believe this course will rarely fail of success, having often observed fevers in human kind to have been cured by a similar method. But, as in fevers it often throws out

[1] This letter (published with the preceding) was addressed to the famous Stephen Hales, botanist, physiologist, and inventor. Hales had been one of the earliest critics of "Siris;" and in 1745 he published "An Account of some Experiments and Observations on Tar-Water," etc. (second edition, 1747). This was a paper read before the Royal Society, and alone of the tracts of the tar-water controversy, it discusses the question on the basis of scientific experiment. The letter recommends the use of tar-water as a cure for the murrain among cattle, and was appropriately addressed to the author of the "Hæmastaticks." Neither of these letters was published separately.

pustules or ulcers on the surface of the body, so in beasts it may be presumed to do the like; which ulcers, being anointed with a little tar, will, I doubt not, in a short time, dry up and disappear.

By this means the lives of infected cattle may be preserved at the expense of a gallon of tar for each. A thing which I repeat and inculcate, not only for the sake of the cattle and their owners, but also for the benefit of mankind in general, with regard to a fever; which terrible subduer and destroyer of our species, I have constantly found to be itself easily subdued by tar-water. Nevertheless, though in most other cases I find that the use of this medicine hath generally obtained, yet in this most dangerous and frequent case, where its aid is most wanted, and at the same time most sure, I do not find that the use thereof has equally obtained abroad in the world.

It grieves me to think that so many thousands of our species should daily perish, by a distemper which may be easily cured by a remedy so ready at hand, so easy to take, and so cheap to purchase, as Tar-water, which I never knew to fail when copiously drank in any sort of fever. All this I say after more than a hundred trials, in my own family and neighbourhood.

But, whatever backwardness people may have to try experiments on themselves or their friends, yet it is hoped they may venture to try them on their cattle, and that the success of such trials in fevers of brutes (for a fever it plainly is) may dispose them to probable hopes of the same success in their own species.

Experiments, I grant, ought to be made with caution, and yet they may be made, and actually are made every day on probable reasons and analogy. Thus, for instance, because I knew that tar-water was cordial and diaphoretic, and yet no inflamer, I ventured to give it in every stage of the small-pox, though I had never heard of its being given otherwise than as a preservative against that distemper; and the success answered my expectation.

If I can but introduce the general use of tar-water for this murrain, which is in truth a fever, I flatter myself this may pave the way for its general use in all fevers whatever.

A murrain among cattle hath been sometimes observed

to be the forerunner of the Plague among men. If that should prove the present case (which God forbid) I would earnestly recommend the copious drinking of warm tar-water, from the very first appearance of the symptoms of such plague. I do also recommend it to be tried in like manner against the bite of a mad dog, when other approved remedies are not at hand.

[This tract was published at Dublin in 1749. It was reprinted with the compressed editions of the "Querist" in 1750 and 1751; issued separately in 1752, and was included in the "Miscellany" during the same year. An edition, described as the fourth, was issued at Boston in 1750. As Professor Fraser did not see the first edition when preparing his volumes of 1871, it may be of interest to state that the "Word to the Wise" underwent no revision. The final paragraph, as indicated in the text, was merely appended to the reprint in the "Miscellany," otherwise the several editions are identical.

In this earnest and beautiful work we see once again a revelation of Berkeley's lovable character. It was like Berkeley in times when the Protestant clergy of Ireland were inclined to despise the Roman Catholic priests, to acknowledge the greater influence of the latter, and to make the state of the country an occasion of reconciliation and co-operation. As on a previous occasion the Roman Catholic clergy gave a certain expression of their gratitude and good-will towards the large-minded and large-hearted bishop.]

A

Word to the Wife:

OR, AN

EXHORTATION

TO THE

ROMAN CATHOLIC Clergy

OF

IRELAND.

BY A

Member of the Eſtabliſhed Church.

Homo ſum humani nihil a me alienum puto

DUBLIN:
Printed by GEORGE FAULKNER in *Eſſex-ſtreet*,
M DCC XLIX

A WORD TO THE WISE.

BE not startled, Reverend Sirs, to find yourselves addressed to by one of a different Communion. We are indeed (to our shame be it spoken) more inclined to hate for those articles wherein we differ, than to love one another for those wherein we agree. But, if we cannot extinguish, let us at least suspend our animosities, and, forgetting our religious feuds, consider ourselves in the amiable light of countrymen and neighbours. Let us for once turn our eyes on those things in which we have one common interest. Why should disputes about faith interrupt the duties of civil life? or the different roads we take to heaven prevent our taking the same steps on earth? Do we not inhabit the same spot of ground, breathe the same air, and live under the same government? Why, then, should we not conspire in one and the same design, to promote the common good of our country.

We are all agreed about the usefulness of meat, drink, and clothes, and, without doubt, we all sincerely wish our poor neighbours were better supplied with them. Providence and nature have done their part; no country is better qualified to furnish the necessaries of life, and yet no people are worse provided. In vain is the earth fertile, and the climate benign, if human labour be wanting. Nature supplies the materials, which art and industry improve to the use of man, and it is the want of this industry that occasions all our other wants.

The public hath endeavoured to excite and encourage this most useful virtue. Much hath been done; but whether it be from the heaviness of the climate, or from the Spanish or Scythian blood that runs in their veins, or whatever else may be the cause, there still remains in the natives of this

island a remarkable antipathy to labour. You, gentlemen, can alone conquer their innate hereditary sloth. Do you then, as you love your country, exert yourselves.

You are known to have great influence on the minds of your people; be so good as to use this influence for their benefit. Since other methods fail, try what *you* can do. "Be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort" (2 Tim. iv. 2). Make them thoroughly sensible of the sin and folly of sloth. Shew your charity in clothing the naked and feeding the hungry, which you may do by the mere breath of your mouths. Give me leave to tell you that no set of men upon earth have it in their power to do good on easier terms, with more advantage to others, and less pains or loss to themselves. Your flocks are of all others most disposed to follow directions, and of all others want them most; and indeed what do they not want?

The house of an Irish peasant is the cave of poverty; within, you see a pot and a little straw; without, a heap of children tumbling on the dunghill. Their fields and gardens are a lively counterpart of Solomon's description in the Proverbs: "I went (saith that wise king) by the field of the slothful, and by the vineyard of the man void of understanding; and, lo, it was all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof, and the stone wall thereof was broken down" (Prov. xxiv. 30, 31). In every road the ragged ensigns of poverty are displayed; you often meet caravans of poor, whole families in a drove, without clothes to cover, or bread to feed them, both which might be easily procured by moderate labour. They are encouraged in this vagabond life by the miserable hospitality they meet with in every cottage, whose inhabitants expect the same kind reception in their turn when they become beggars themselves; beggary being the last refuge of these improvident creatures.

If I seem to go out of my province, or to prescribe to those who must be supposed to know their own business, or to paint the lower inhabitants of this land in no very pleasing colours, you will candidly forgive a well-meant zeal, which obligeth me to say things rather useful than agreeable, and to lay open the sore in order to heal it.

But whatever is said must be so taken as not to reflect on persons of rank and education, who are no way inferior to their neighbours; nor yet to include all even of the lowest sort, though it may well extend to the generality of those especially in the western and southern parts of the kingdom, where the British manners have less prevailed. We take our notions from what we see, mine are a faithful transcript from originals about me.

The Scythians were noted for wandering, and the Spaniards for sloth and pride; our Irish are behind neither of these nations from which they descend, in their respective characteristics. "Better is he that laboureth and aboundeth in all things, than he that boasteth himself and wanteth bread," saith the son of Sirach (x. 27); but so saith not the Irishman. In my own family a kitchen-wench refused to carry out cinders, because she was descended from an old Irish stock. Never was there a more monstrous conjunction than that of pride with beggary; and yet this prodigy is seen every day in almost every part of this kingdom. At the same time these proud people are more destitute than savages, and more abject than negroes. The negroes in our Plantations have a saying—"If negro was not negro, Irishman would be negro." And it may be affirmed with truth that the very savages of America are better clad and better lodged than the Irish cottagers throughout the fine fertile counties of Limerick and Tipperary.

Having long observed and bewailed this wretched state of my countrymen, and the insufficiency of several methods set on foot to reclaim them, I have recourse to your Reverences as the *dernier ressort*. Make them to understand that you have their interest at heart, that you persuade them to work for their own sakes, and that God hath ordered matters so as that they who will not work for themselves must work for others. The terrors of debt, slavery, and famine should, one would think, drive the most slothful to labour. Make them sensible of these things, and that the ends of Providence and order of the world require industry in human creatures. "Man goeth forth to his work and to his labour until the evening," saith the Psalmist (Ps. civ. 23), when he is describing the beauty, order, and

perfection of the works of God. But what saith the slothful person? "Yet a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep" (Prov. vi. 10). But what saith the wise man? "So shall thy poverty come as one that travelleth, and thy want as an armed man" (Prov. vi. 11).

All nature will furnish you with arguments and examples against sloth: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard," cries Solomon. The ant, the bee, the beetle, and every insect but the drone, read a lesson of industry to man. But the shortest and most effectual lesson is that of St. Paul: "If any man will not work, neither should he eat" (2 Thess. iii. 10), This command was enjoined the Thessalonians, and equally respects all Christians, and indeed all mankind; it being evident by the light of nature that the whole creation works together for good, and that no part was designed to be useless. As therefore the idle man is of no use, it follows that he hath no right to a subsistence. "Let them work (saith the apostle), and eat their own bread" (2 Thess. iii. 12); not bread got by begging, nor bread earned by the sweat of other men; but their own bread, that which is got by their own labour. "Then shalt thou eat the labour of thine hands," saith the Psalmist; to which he adds, "Happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with thee" (Ps. cxxviii. 2), intimating that to work and enjoy the fruits thereof is a great blessing.

A slothful man's imagination is apt to dress up labour in a horrible mask; but, horrible as it is, idleness is more to be dreaded, and a life of poverty (its necessary consequence) is far more painful. It was the advice of Pythagoras, to choose the best kind of life; for that use would render it agreeable, reconciling men even to the roughest exercise. By practice, pains become at first easy, and in the progress pleasant; and this is so true, that whoever examines things will find there can be no such thing as happy life without labour, and that whoever doth not labour with his hands, must, in his own defence, labour with his brains.

Certainly, planting and tilling the earth is an exercise not less pleasing than useful; it takes the peasant from his smoky cabin into the fresh air and the open field, rendering his lot far more desirable than that of the sluggard, who lies in the straw, or sits whole days by the fire.

Convince your people that not only pleasure invites but necessity also drives them to labour. If you have any compassion for these poor creatures, put them in mind how many of them perished in a late memorable distress, through want of that provident care against a hard season, observable not only in all other men, but even in irrational animals. Set before their eyes, in lively colours, their own indigent and sordid lives, compared with those of other people, whose industry hath procured them hearty food, warm clothes, and decent dwellings. Make them sensible what a reproach it is that a nation which makes so great pretensions to antiquity, and is said to have flourished many ages ago in arts and learning, should in these our days turn out a lazy, destitute, and degenerate race.

Raise your voices, Reverend Sirs, exert your influence, shew your authority over the multitude, by engaging them to the practice of an honest industry, a duty necessary to all, and required in all, whether Protestants, or Roman Catholics, whether Christians, Jews, or Pagans. Be so good, among other points, to find room for *this*, than which none is of more concern to the souls and bodies of your hearers, nor consequently deserves to be more amply or frequently insisted on.

Many and obvious are the motives that recommend this duty. Upon a subject so copious you can never be at a loss for something to say. And while, by these means, you rescue your countrymen from want and misery, you will have the satisfaction to behold your country itself improved. What pleasure must it give you, to see these waste and wild scenes, these naked ditches, and miserable hovels, exchanged for fine plantations, rich meadows, well-tilled fields, and neat dwellings; to see people well fed, and well clad, instead of famished, ragged scarecrows; and those very persons tilling the fields that used to beg in the streets.

Neither ought the difficulty of the enterprise to frighten you from attempting it. It must be confessed, a habit of industry is not at once introduced; neighbour, nevertheless, will emulate neighbour, and the contagion of good example will spread as surely as of bad, though perhaps not so speedily. It may be hoped there are many that would be allured by a plentiful and decent manner of life to take

pains, especially when they observe it to be attained by the industry of their neighbours, in no sort better qualified than themselves.

If the same gentle spirit of sloth did not soothe our squires as well as peasants, one would imagine there should be no idle hands among us. Alas! how many incentives to industry offer themselves in this island, crying aloud to the inhabitants for work? Roads to be repaired, rivers made navigable, fisheries on the coasts, mines to be wrought, plantations to be raised, manufactures improved, and, above all, lands to be tilled, and sowed with all sorts of grain.

When so many circumstances provoke and animate your people to labour; when their private wants, and the necessities of the public; when the laws, the magistrates, and the very country calls upon them; you cannot think it becomes you alone to be silent, or hindmost in every project for promoting the public good. Why should you, whose influence is greatest, be least active? Why should you, whose words are most likely to prevail, say least in the common cause?

Perhaps it will be said, the discouragements attending those of your Communion are a bar against all endeavours for exciting them to a laudable industry. Men are stirred up to labour by the prospect of bettering their fortunes, by getting estates, or employments; but those who are limited in the purchase of estates, and excluded from all civil employments, are deprived of those spurs to industry.

To this it may be answered, that, admitting these considerations do, in some measure, damp industry and ambition in persons or a certain rank, yet they can be no let to the industry of poor people, or supply an argument against endeavouring to procure meat, drink, and clothes. It is not proposed that you should persuade the better sort to acquire estates, or qualify themselves for becoming magistrates; but only that you should set the lowest of the people at work, to provide themselves with necessaries, and supply the wants of nature.

It will be alleged in excuse of their idleness, that the country people want encouragement to labour, as not having a property in the lands. There is small encouragement, say you, for them to build or plant upon another's land, wherein

they have only a temporary interest. To which I answer, that life itself is but temporary; that all tenures are not of the same kind; that the case of our English and the original Irish is equal in this respect; and that the true Aborigines, or natural Irish, are noted for want of industry in improving even on their own lands, whereof they have both possession and property.

How many industrious persons are there in all civilized countries, without any properties in lands, or any prospects of estates, or employments! Industry never fails to reward her votaries. There is no one but can earn a little, and little added to little makes a heap. In this fertile and plentiful island, none can perish for want but the idle and improvident. None who have industry, frugality, and foresight but may get into tolerable, if not wealthy, circumstances. Are not all trades and manufactures open to those of your Communion? Have you not the same free use, and may you not make the same advantage, of fairs and markets as other men? Do you pay higher duties, or are you liable to greater impositions, than your fellow-subjects? And are not the public premiums and encouragements given indifferently to artists of all Communions?[1] Have not, in fact, those of your Communion a very great share of the commerce of this kingdom in their hands? And is not more to be got by this than by purchasing estates, or possessing civil employments, whose incomes are often attended with large expenses?

A tight house, warm apparel, and wholesome food, are sufficient motives to labour. If all had them, we should be a flourishing nation. And if those who take pains may have them, those who will not take pains are not to be pitied; they are to be looked on and treated as drones, the pest and disgrace of society.

It will be said, the hardness of the landlord cramps the industry of the tenant. But if rent be high, and the landlord rigorous, there is more need of industry in the tenant. It is well known that in Holland taxes are much higher, and rent both of land and houses far dearer, than in Ireland. But this is no objection or impediment to the industry of

[1] This refers to the premiums for excellence in agriculture and handicrafts, offered by the Dublin Society.—ED.

the people, who are rather animated and spurred on to earn a livelihood by labour, that is not to be got without it.

You will say, it is an easy matter to make a plausible discourse on industry, and its advantages; but what can be expected for poor creatures, who are destitute of all conveniences for exerting their industry, who have nothing to improve upon, nothing to begin the world with? I answer, they have their four quarters, and five senses. Is it nothing to possess the bodily organs sound and entire? That wonderful machine, the hand, was it formed to be idle?

Was there but will to work, there are not wanting in this island either opportunities or encouragements. Spinning alone might employ all idle hands (children as well as parents), being soon learned, easily performed, and never failing of a market, requiring neither wit nor strength, but suited to all ages and capacities. The public provides utensils, and persons for teaching the use of them; but the public cannot provide a heart and will to be industrious. These, I will not deny, may be found in several persons in some other parts of the kingdom, and wherever they are found, the comfortable effects shew themselves. But seldom, very seldom, are they found in these southern people, whose indolence figureth a lion in the way, and is proof against all encouragement.

But you will insist, how can a poor man, whose daily labour goes for the payment of his rent, be able to provide present necessaries for his family, much less to lay up a store for the future? It must be owned, a considerable share of the poor man's time and labour goes towards paying his rent. But how are his wife and children employed, or how doth he employ himself the rest of his time? The same work tires, but different works relieve. Where there is a true spirit of industry, there will never be wanting something to do, without doors or within, by candle-light if not by day-light. *Labor ipse voluptas*, saith the poet, and this is verified in fact.

In England, when the labour of the field is over, it is usual for men to betake themselves to some other labour of a different kind. In the northern parts of that industrious land, the inhabitants meet, a jolly crew, at one another's houses, where they merrily and frugally pass the long and

dark winter evenings; several families, by the same light and the same fire, working at their different manufactures of wool, flax, or hemp; company, meanwhile, mutually cheering and provoking to labour. In certain other[1] parts you may see, on a summer's evening, the common labourers sitting along the streets of a town or village, each at his own door, with a cushion before him making bone-lace, and earning more in an evening's pastime than an Irish family would in a whole day. Those people, instead of closing the day with a game on greasy cards, or lying stretched before the fire, pass their time much more cheerfully in some useful employment, which custom hath rendered light and agreeable.

But admitting, for the various reasons above alleged, that it is impossible for our cottagers to be rich, yet it is certain they may be clean. Now, bring them to be cleanly, and your work is half done. A little washing, scrubbing, and rubbing, bestowed on their persons and houses, would introduce a sort of industry; and industry in any one kind is apt to beget it in another.

Indolence in dirt is a terrible symptom, which shews itself in our lower Irish more, perhaps, than in any people on this side the Cape of Good Hope. I will venture to add that look throughout the kingdom, and you shall not find a clean house inhabited by cleanly people, and yet wanting necessaries; the same spirit of industry that keeps folk clean, being sufficient to keep them also in food and raiment.

But, alas! our poor Irish are wedded to dirt upon principle. It is with some of them a maxim that the way to make children thrive is to keep them dirty. And I do verily believe that the familiarity with dirt, contracted and nourished from their infancy, is one great cause of that sloth which attends them in every stage of life. Were children but brought up in an abhorrence of dirt, and obliged to keep themselves clean, they would have something to do, whereas they now do nothing.

It is past all doubt that those who are educated in a supine neglect of all things, either profitable or decent, must needs

[1] *E.g.* Newport Pagnel in Buckinghamshire.

contract a sleepiness and indolence, which doth necessarily lead to poverty, and every other distress that attends it. "Love not sleep (cries Solomon), lest thou come to poverty; open thine eyes and thou shalt be satisfied with bread" (Prov. xx. 13). It is therefore greatly to be wished, that you would persuade parents to inure their children betimes to a habit of industry, as the surest way to shun the miseries that must otherwise befal them.

An early habit, whether of sloth or diligence, will not fail to shew itself throughout the whole course of a man's life. "Train up a child (saith a wise man) in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it" (Prov. xxii. 6). The first tincture often leaves so deep a stain as no afterthought or endeavour can wash out. Hence sloth in some minds is proof against all arguments and examples whatsoever, all motives of interest and duty, all impressions even of cold and hunger. This habit, rooted in the child, grows up and adheres to the man, producing a general listlessness, and aversion from labour. This I take to be our great calamity.

For, admitting that some of our squires and landlords are vultures with iron bowels, and that their hardness and severity are a great discouragement to the tenant, who will naturally prefer want and ease before want and toil; it must at the same time be admitted that neither is the landlord, generally speaking, so hard, nor the climate so severe, nor the soil so ungrateful, as not to answer the husbandman's labour, where there is a spirit of industry; the want of which is the true cause of our national distress. Of this there are many evident proofs.

I have myself known a man, from the lowest condition of life, without friends or education, not knowing so much as to write or read, bred to no trade or calling, by pure dint of day-labour, frugality, and foresight, to have grown wealthy, even in this island, and under all the above-mentioned disadvantages. And what is done by one, is possible to another.

In Holland a child five years old is maintained by its own labour; in Ireland many children of twice that age do nothing but steal, or encumber the hearth and dunghill. This shameful neglect of education shews itself through the

whole course of their lives, in a matchless sloth bred in the very bone, and not to be accounted for by any outward hardship or discouragement whatever. It is the native colour, if we may so speak, and complexion of the people. Dutch, English, French, or Flemish cannot match them.

Mark an Irishman at work in the field; if a coach or horseman go by, he is sure to suspend his labour, and stand staring until they are out of sight. A neighbour of mine made it his remark in a journey from London to Bristol, that all the labourers of whom he inquired the road constantly answered without looking up, or interrupting their work, except one who stood staring and leaning on his spade, and him he found to be an Irishman.

It is a shameful thing, and peculiar to this nation, to see lusty vagabonds strolling about the country, and begging without any pretence to beg. Ask them why they do not labour to earn their own livelihood, they will tell you, They want employment; offer to employ them, and they shall refuse your offer; or, if you get them to work one day, you may be sure not to see them the next. I have known them decline even the lightest labour, that of haymaking, having at the same time neither clothes for their backs, nor food for their bellies.

A sore leg is an estate to such a fellow; and this may be easily got, and continued with small trouble. Such is their laziness, that rather than work they will cherish a distemper. This I know to be true, having seen more than one instance wherein the second nature so far prevailed over the first, that sloth was preferred to health. To these beggars, who make much of their sores, and prolong their diseases, you cannot do a more thankless office than cure them, except it be to shave their beards, which conciliate a sort of reverence to that order of men.

It is indeed a difficult task to reclaim such fellows from their slothful and brutal manner of life, to which they seem wedded with an attachment that no temporal motives can conquer; nor is there, humanly speaking, any hopes they will amend, except their respect for your lessons and fear of something beyond the grave be able to work a change in them.

Certainly, if I may advise, you should, in return for the lenity and indulgence of the government, endeavour to make yourselves useful to the public; and this will best be performed, by rousing your poor countrymen from their beloved sloth. I shall not now dispute the truth or importance of other points, but will venture to say, that you may still find time to inculcate this doctrine of an *honest industry*; and that this would by no means be time thrown away, if promoting your country's interest, and rescuing so many unhappy wretches of your Communion from beggary or the gallows, be thought worthy of your pains.

It should seem you cannot in your sermons do better than inveigh against idleness, that extensive parent of many miseries and many sins; idleness, the mother of hunger and sister of theft: "idleness," which, the Son of Sirach assures us, "teacheth many vices."

The same doctrine is often preached from the gallows. And indeed the poverty, nakedness, and famine which idleness entaileth on her votaries, do make men so wretched, that they may well think it better to die than to live such lives. Hence a courage for all villanous undertakings, which, bringing men to a shameful death, do then open their eyes when they are going to be closed for ever.

If you have any regard (as it is not to be doubted) either for the souls or bodies of your people, or even for your own interest and credit, you cannot fail to inveigh against this crying sin of your country. Seeing you are obnoxious to the laws, should you not in prudence try to reconcile yourselves to the favour of the public; and can you do this more effectually, than by co-operating with the public spirit of the legislature, and men in power?

Were this but done heartily, would you but "be instant in season, and out of season, reprove, rebuke, exhort" (2 Tim. iv. 2), such is the ascendant you have gained over the people that we might soon expect to see the good effects thereof. We might hope "that our garners would be soon full, affording all manner of store, that our sheep would bring forth thousands, that our oxen would be strong to labour, that there would be no breaking in, nor going out (no robbery, nor migration for bread), and that there would be no complaining in our streets" (Ps. cxliv. 13).

It stands upon you to act with vigour in this cause, and shake off the shackles of sloth from your countrymen, the rather, because there be some who surmise that yourselves have put them on. Right or wrong, men will be apt to judge of your doctrines by their fruits. It will reflect small honour on their teachers, if, instead of honesty and industry, those of your Communion are peculiarly distinguished by the contrary qualities, or if the nation converted by the great and glorious St. Patrick should, above all other nations, be stigmatized and marked out as good for nothing.

I can never suppose you so much your own enemies as to be friends to this odious sloth. But, were this once abolished, and a laudable industry introduced in its stead, it may perhaps be asked, who are to be gainers? I answer, your Reverences are like to be great gainers; for every penny you now gain you will gain a shilling: you would gain also in your credit: and your lives would be more comfortable.

You need not be told how hard it is to rake from rags and penury a tolerable subsistence; or how offensive to perform the duties of your function amidst stench and nastiness; or how much things would change for the better, in proportion to the industry and wealth of your flocks. Duty as well as interest calls upon you to clothe the naked, and feed the hungry, by persuading them to "eat (in the apostle's phrase) their own bread;" or, as the Psalmist expresseth it, "the labour of their own hands." By inspiring your flocks with a love of industry, you will at once strike at the root of many vices, and dispose them to practise many virtues. This therefore is the readiest way to improve them.

Consult your superiors. They shall tell you the doctrine here delivered is a sound Catholic doctrine, not limited to Protestants, but extending to all, and admitted by all, whether Protestants or Roman Catholics, Christians or Mahometans, Jews or Gentiles. And as it is of the greatest extent, so it is also of the highest importance. St. Paul expressly saith that "if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel" (1 Tim. v. 8).

In vain, then, do you endeavour to make men orthodox

in points of faith, if, at the same time, in the eyes of Christ and His apostles, you suffer them to be worse than infidels, than those who have no faith at all. There is something it seems worse than even infidelity; and to incite and stimulate you to put away that cursed thing from among you is the design and aim of this Address. The doctrine we recommend is an evident branch of the Law of Nature; it was taught by prophets, inculcated by apostles, encouraged and enforced by philosophers, legislators, and all wise states, in all ages and in all parts of the world. Let me therefore entreat you to exert yourselves, "to be instant in season, and out of season, rebuke, reprove, exhort." Take all opportunities to drive the lion out of the way; raise your voices, omit no occasion, public or private, of awakening your wretched countrymen from their sweet dream of sloth.

Many suspect your religion to be the cause of that notorious idleness which prevails so generally among the natives of this island, as if the Roman Catholic faith were inconsistent with an honest diligence in a man's calling. But whoever considers the great spirit of industry that reigns in Flanders and France, and even beyond the Alps, must acknowledge this to be a groundless suspicion. In Piedmont and Genoa, in the Milanese and the Venetian state, and indeed throughout all Lombardy, how well is the soil cultivated, and what manufactures of silk, velvet, paper, and other commodities, flourish? The king of Sardinia will suffer no idle hands in his territories, no beggar to live by the sweat of another's brow; it has even been made penal at Turin to relieve a strolling beggar. To which I might add that the person whose authority will be of the greatest weight with you, even the Pope himself, is at this day endeavouring to put new life into the trade and manufactures of his country.

Though I am in no secret of the Court of Rome, yet I will venture to affirm, that neither Pope, nor cardinals, will be pleased to hear that those of their Communion are distinguished, above all others, by sloth, dirt, and beggary; or be displeased at your endeavouring to rescue them from the reproach of such an infamous distinction.

The case is as clear as the sun; what we urge is enforced by every motive that can work on a reasonable mind. The

good of your country, your own private interest, the duty of your function, the cries and distresses of the poor, do with one voice call for your assistance. And, if it is on all hands allowed to be right and just, if agreeable both to reason and religion, if coincident with the views both of your temporal and spiritual superiors, it is to be hoped this Address may find a favourable reception, and that a zeal for disputed points will not hinder your concurring to propagate so plain and useful a doctrine, wherein we are all agreed.

When a leak is to be stopped, or a fire extinguished, do not all hands co-operate without distinction of sect or party? Or if I am fallen into a ditch, shall I not suffer a man to help me out, until I have first examined his creed? Or when I am sick, shall I refuse the physic, because my physician doth or doth not believe the pope's supremacy?

Fas est et ab hoste doceri. But, in truth, I am no enemy to your persons, whatever I may think of your tenets. On the contrary, I am your sincere well-wisher. I consider you as my countrymen, as fellow-subjects, as professing belief in the same Christ. And I do most sincerely wish, there was no other contest between us but *who shall most completely practise the precepts of him by whose name we are called, and whose disciples we all profess to be.*

Soon[1] after the preceding Address was published, the Printer hereof received the following "Letter from the Roman Catholic Clergy of the Diocese of Dublin," desiring it to be inserted in the "Dublin Journal" of November 18th, 1749:—

"You will very much oblige many of your constant readers, if you acquaint the public that the Address you lately published, entitled, 'A Word to the Wise; or an Exhortation to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland,' was received by the Roman Catholic clergy of Dublin with the highest sense of gratitude; and they take the liberty, in this public manner, to return their sincere and hearty thanks to the worthy Author, assuring him that they are determined to comply with every particular recommended in it, to the

[1] From this point to the end was added by Berkeley to the reprint in the "Miscellany" of 1752.—ED.

utmost of their power. In every page it contains a proof of the author's extensive charity. His views are only towards the public good. The means he prescribeth are easily complied with, and his manner of treating persons in their circumstances so very singular that they plainly shew the good man, the polite gentleman, and the true patriot. All this hath so great an effect upon them, that they have already directed circular Letters to the parish priests of this Diocese, recommending, in the most earnest manner, the perusal and zealous execution of what is contained in the said Address; and it is hoped that by publishing this in your Journal, the Roman Catholic clergy of other parts of this Kingdom will be induced to follow their example, which must promote the laudable views of that great and good man. At the same time, he may be assured that the Roman Catholic clergy of this city have frequently taken considerable pains to recommend to their respective flocks, industry, and a due application to their respective trades and callings, as an indispensable duty, and the means of avoiding the many vices and bad consequences which generally attend criminal poverty and want. But the more effectually to prevent these evils, and remove all excuses for sloth and idleness, they have, several months ago, pursuant to the example of many bishoprics in Lombardy, Spain, Naples, &c., taken the steps most proper and expedient, in their opinion, to lessen considerably the number of Holidays in this Kingdom; and they make no doubt but their expectations will, in a short time, be fully answered, to the great advantage of the public."

"We are, &c."

MAXIMS

CONCERNING

PATRIOTISM.

1750.

[THIS little work was issued in 1750, and reprinted with slight alterations in the "Miscellany" of 1752. As will be noticed, the title-page bears the words, "By a Lady." Professor Fraser thinks that the "Maxims" might be the work of Mrs. Berkeley; yet the tract was included by the Bishop in his "Miscellany" without this curious assignation of authorship. It is possible that we have here crumbs of the table-talk at Cloyne. The "Maxims" are probably various chance expressions of Mrs. Berkeley, expanded and written down by her husband. Thus, on the first publication, Berkeley would not claim the authorship; but when collecting his shorter pieces he may have reflected that, after all, his wife's share in the little book was small, and so included it as his own work. Berkeley's hand is plainly seen in all of it.]

MAXIMS

CONCERNING

PATRIOTISM.

By a LADY.

DUBLIN:
Printed in the Year MDCCL.

MAXIMS CONCERNING PATRIOTISM.

1.

EVERY man, by consulting his own heart, may easily know whether he is or is not a patriot. But it is not so easy for the by-standers.

2. Being loud and vehement either against a court, or for a court, is no proof of patriotism.

3. A man whose passion for money runs high bids fair for being no patriot. And he likewise whose appetite is keen for power.

4. A native than a foreigner, a married man than a bachelor, a believer than an infidel, has a better chance for being a patriot.

5. It is impossible an epicure should be a patriot.

6. It is impossible a man who cheats at cards, or cogs the dice, should be a patriot.

7. It is impossible a man who is false to his friends and neighbours should be true to the public.

8. Every knave is a thorough knave. And a thorough knave is a knave throughout.

9. A man who hath no sense of God or conscience: would you make such a one guardian to your child? If not, why guardian to the state?

10. A sot, a beast, benumbed and stupefied by excess, is good for nothing, much less to make a patriot of.

11. A fop or man of pleasure makes but a scurvy patriot.

12. A sullen, churlish man, who loves nobody, will hardly love his country.

13. The love of praise and esteem may do something:

but to make a true patriot there must be an inward sense of duty and conscience.

14. Honesty (like other things) grows from its proper seed, good principles early laid in the mind.

15. To be a real patriot, a man must consider his countrymen as God's creatures, and himself as accountable for his acting towards them.

16. If *pro aris et focis* be the life of patriotism, he who hath no religion or no home makes a suspected patriot.[1]

17.[2] No man perjures himself for the sake of conscience.

18. There is an easy way of reconciling malcontents.—*Sunt verba et voces quibus hunc lenire dolorem*, &c.

19. A good groom will rather stroke than strike.

20. He who saith there is no such thing as an honest man, you may be sure is himself a knave.

21. I have no opinion of your bumper patriots. Some eat, some drink, some quarrel, for their country. MODERN PATRIOTISM!

22. Ibycus is a carking, griping, closefisted fellow. It is odds that Ibycus is not a patriot.

23. We are not to think every clamorous haranguer, or every splenetic repiner against a court, is therefore a patriot.

24. A patriot is one who heartily wisheth the public prosperity, and doth not only wish, but also study and endeavour to promote it.

25. Gamesters, fops, rakes, bullies, stockjobbers: alas! what patriots!

26. Some writers have thought it impossible that men should be brought to laugh at public spirit. Yet this hath been done in the present age.[3]

27. The patriot aims at his private good in the public. The knave makes the public subservient to his private interest. The former considers himself as part of a whole, the latter considers himself as the whole.

28. There is and ever will be a natural strife between court and country. The one will get as much, and the

[1] The first edition has "bad patriot."

[2] Maxims 17, 18, and 19 are not in the first edition.

[3] This Maxim (numbered, of course, 16) has the "present merry age" in the first edition.

other give as little as it can. How must the patriot behave himself?

29. He gives the necessary. If he gives more, it is with a view of gaining more to his country.

30. A patriot will never barter the public money for his private gain.

31. Moral evil is never to be committed; physical evil may be incurred, either to avoid a greater evil, or to procure a good.

32. Where the heart is right, there is true patriotism.

33. In your man of business, it is easier to meet with a good head than a good heart.

34.[1] A patriot will admit there may be honest men, and that honest men may differ.

35. He that always blames, or always praises is no patriot.

36. Were all sweet and sneaking courtiers, or were all sour malcontents;[2] in either case the public would thrive but ill.

37. A patriot would hardly wish there was no contrast in the state.

38. Ferments of the worst kind succeed to perfect inaction.

39. A man rages, rails, and raves; I suspect his patriotism.

40. The fawning courtier and the surly squire often mean the same thing, each his own interest.

41. A patriot will esteem no man for being of his party.

42. The factious man is apt to mistake himself for a patriot.

[1] In first edition, "But a patriot," etc.

[2] In first edition, "snarling sour malcontents."

FARTHER THOUGHTS

ON

TAR-WATER.

1752.

[THE "Miscellany" of 1752 contained two pieces printed for the first time. One was the poem which I have transferred to what seems its proper place in Berkeley's works (see vol. ii., p. 125); the other was this present tract. It was Berkeley's last work; he died early in the following year. It will be seen that a lapse of eight years from the publication of "Siris" had not weakened Berkeley's belief in the versatile efficacy of his remedy; indeed on p. 414 he suggests new and surprising uses of it as a tonic for weak minds. The tract has none of the speculation of "Siris"; it is more "matter-of fact," and less interesting.]

FARTHER THOUGHTS ON TAR-WATER.

AS the many experiments that are daily made of the virtues of Tar-water furnish new discoveries and reflections, some of these I have thrown together, and offer to the public in hopes they may prove useful.

It is a frequent complaint that tar-water is made of bad tar, being of a reddish colour, sweetish, or disagreeably insipid. But, though the dregs of tar are often foul, and make foul tar-water, and though the tar already used is often made use of by unfair dealers a second, if not a third time, which produceth a vile potion, void of the genuine flavour and virtue of tar-water; yet I apprehend these defects may sometimes be ascribed rather to the vessel wherein the tar-water is made than to the tar itself.

Tar-water being made in an earthen vessel unglazed, or that hath lost part of its glazing, may extract (as it is a strong menstruum) from the clay a fade sweetishness, offensive to the palate. It should seem, therefore, that the best way of making tar-water is in a stone jug, or earthen vessel, throughout well glazed; and, as it will not fail to extract a tincture from any metallic vessel, it should be warmed in a well-glazed pipkin, rather than a saucepan.

By increasing the proportion of tar to the water, and by stirring it longer, tar-water may be made strong enough for a spoonful to impregnate a large glass, a thing very useful on a road.

Those who in chronical disorders, or as a preservative, have for a long time drank tar-water, must in acute cases drink the more.

Tar-water must be drank warm in agues, small-pox,

measles, and fevers, in colic, and disorders of the bowels, in gout also, and rheumatism; in most other ailments cold or warm, at the choice of the patient.

In fevers the patient cannot begin too soon, or drink too much. By undoubted experience it is found to cool the hot, and warm the cold, and to be a most successful medicine in fevers, notwithstanding its great virtue in palsies and dropsies.

When not long since an inflammation attacked the throat, breast, and lungs of children, and became general in my neighbourhood, numbers were recovered by the use of tar-water; nor did I hear that any miscarried who used it, though many perished who did not.

Nor is it a medicine less proper and efficacious in old age. At the same time that this inflammatory distemper raged among the children, a woman in her sixty-eighth year, from violent cold, was seized at once with ague, colic, and jaundice, of all which maladies she was cured in a fortnight, by drinking three pints of warm tar-water every day. Numberless such instances daily occur, which shew it to be a safe and efficacious medicine for old and young.

Evacuations by sweat, which usually render patients very weak and dispirited, have not the same bad effects when produced by tar-water, which I have frequently known to give high spirits in all the stages of a fever, and under the lowest regimen; therefore old people and weak persons, who cannot well bear common evacuations, are best cured by tar-water, which in some sort seemeth to renew those who are worn out with age and infirmities.

Tar-water is of singular use in strengthening the stomach and bowels, and agrees particularly well with infants, taken either by themselves or by the nurse, and best by both. Though, as it throws the ill humours out into the surface of the skin, it may render them for a time, perhaps, unseemly with eruptions, but withal healthy and lively. And I wi l venture to say that it lays in them the principles of good constitution for the rest of their lives.

Nor is it only useful to the bodies of infants; it hath also a good effect on their minds, as those who drink it are observed to be remarkably forward and sprightly. Even the most heavy, lumpish, and unpromising infants appear to be

much improved by it. A child there is in my neighbourhood, of fine parts, who at first seemed stupid and an idiot, but, by constant use of tar-water, grew lively and observing, and is now noted for understanding beyond others of the same age.

Infants are easily brought to take it by a spoon, and even grow to a liking of it; and, as their disorders arise chiefly from indigestion, they receive the greatest benefit from a medicine so well calculated to strengthen the intestines, and preserve them from fits. In a word, if it were the common practice to accustom infants from the beginning to take tar-water, this would greatly conduce to the health both of their minds and bodies. There is, I am verily persuaded, no one thing in the power of art or nature that would so generally and effectually contribute to repair the constitutions of our gentry and nobility, by strengthening the children, and casting off in their infancy those impurities and taints which they often bring into the world.

An infant may take one quarter of a pint in the day, warm, by spoonfuls; less may do good, and there is no fear of excess. When I consider the private woe of families, as well as the public loss occasioned by the death of such an incredible number of infants under two years of age, I cannot but insist on recommending tar-water, both as a remedy and preservative in that tender age, which cannot bear the common treatment and methods of physic, or with safety take those drugs which are fitter for grown persons.

Another reason which recommends tar-water, particularly to infants and children, is the great security it brings against the small-pox to those that drink it, who are observed, either never to take that distemper, or to have it in the gentlest manner.

There is no distemper more contagious and destructive than the small-pox, or more generally dreaded, attended with worse symptoms, or that leaves behind it worse effects. I observe, at the same time, that tar-water is in no other case a more safe and sure remedy than in this; of which Captain Drape's certificate,[1] sworn to before the Mayor of

[1] See Prior's "Authentic Narrative," sects. 41-44; also the second letter to Prior in this volume, sect. 18.—ED.

Liverpool, in the presence of several principal persons of that town, is a most evident proof.

That one hundred and seventy persons, seized at once with the small-pox, deprived of all conveniences, and in the worst circumstances in a narrow ship and hot climate, should all recover by the single medicine of tar-water, except one who would not drink it, is a matter of fact so plain and convincing, and so well attested, as to leave no doubt, in minds free from prepossession, about the usefulness and efficacy of tar-water in the small-pox, a point I had been before sufficiently convinced of, by many instances in my own neighbourhood.

It hath been surmised by some celebrated physicians that one day a specific may be discovered for the peculiar venom of the small-pox. There seems to be some reason for thinking that tar-water is such a specific. I say this on good grounds, having by many experiments observed its virtue in curing, as well as in preventing, that cruel distemper; during the whole course of which, it is to be drank warm; a moderate glass (about half a pint) every hour, in common cases, may suffice; in bad cases more may be given; there is no fear of excess.

Those who endeavour to discredit this cooling, cordial, and salutary medicine, as an inflamer of the blood, do very consistently decry its use in the small-pox; but there can be nothing more clear, full, and satisfactory than Captain Drape's affidavit, to convince reasonable people of the great and surprising efficacy of tar-water in the cure of the small-pox; and consequently of the groundlessness of that report which ascribes a heating or inflaming quality to it. And yet that groundless report hath hindered many from reaping the benefit they might otherwise have done from the use of this water, which is of excellent virtue in all kinds of inflammatory disorders, fevers, quinsies, pleurisies, and suchlike, of the hot and inflamed kind, whereof the public as well as myself have known a multitude of examples.

I ask whether the fact sworn before the magistrates of Liverpool be not a sufficient answer to all that is objected, from an inflaming quality, to tar-water? Can any instance be produced in the whole materia medica, or history of physic, of the virtue of a medicine tried on greater numbers,

or under greater disadvantages, or with greater success, or more credibly attested? I wish, for the common good of mankind, that the same experiment was tried in our hospitals. Probably the world would soon be relieved from that great and general terror of the small-pox.

When I hear of the devastations made by this distemper in great cities and populous towns, how many lives are lost, or as may be said thrown away, which might have been in all likelihood easily preserved, by the use of a medicine so cheap and obvious, and in every one's power, it seems matter of great concern and astonishment, and leaves one at a loss to guess at the motives that govern human actions in affairs of the greatest moment. The experiment may be easily made if an equal number of poor patients in the small-pox were put into two hospitals at the same time of the year, and provided with the same necessaries of diet and lodging; and, for farther care, let the one have a tub of tar-water and an old woman; the other hospital, what attendance and drugs you please.

In all obstinate sores and ulcers, I very much recommend the drinking of tar-water; and washing them with a strong lotion of it will hasten the cure.

One of the most painful and dangerous cases is that of a woman's sore breast. How many poor creatures, after long languishing in misery, are obliged to suffer the most severe chirurgical operations, often the cutting off the entire breast? The use of tar-water in those cases hath been attended with such success that I do earnestly recommend the drinking thereof, both as a cure and preservative, as a most effectual medicine to remove the shooting pains that precede a cancer, and also to cure the cancer itself, without amputation. Cancerous and sore breasts are such cruel cases, occasioned by so many internal causes, as well as outward accidents, that it is a necessary piece of humanity, to contribute all we can to the prevention and cure thereof.

In the king's evil, leprosy, and foulest cases, tar-water cannot be too much recommended. The poor vagabonds of Ireland are many of them infected and eaten up with the foul disease, which with them passeth for a canker as they call it. Several instances of extraordinary cures have been performed on such persons, by drinking tar-water copiously,

for some weeks or months together, without confinement or other restraint than that of a regular cool diet. It is indeed a specific both for this and all other taints and impurities of the blood.

An extract of "Siris" was made, and accounts of the effects of tar-water were reprinted in America, in which continent, as well as in the islands, much use hath been made thereof, particularly by those who possess great numbers of slaves. Of this I have been informed by letters, and by word of mouth, from persons belonging to those parts, who have assured me of the extensive and successful use of this medicine in many cases, and more especially in the most inveterate kinds of the foul disease.

I need not say how dearly they purchase health who obtain it by salivation, and yet, long and severe as that course is, it is often unsuccessful. There are instances of such as having passed through it with much misery and patience have been afterwards cured by the simple use of tar-water.

The king's evil, so loathsome in its symptoms and effects, and withal so difficult if at all possible to cure by any other method, is most surely and easily cured by the tar-water, even when the patient is far gone, even when he derives it from his ancestors. A quart *per diem* for a few months, I have known to cure the most deplorable and abandoned cases.

How many wealthy families, otherwise at their ease, are corrupted with this taint in their blood! How many want heirs and husbands through this odious malady! A specific for this disease alone would be justly esteemed a most valuable secret, and the plenty and cheapness of the medicine ought not in reason to make it less esteemed.

Salivating, bleeding, and purging are attended with great hardships and inconveniences even where the patient recovers, reducing the strength and spirits of those who use them, whereas tar-water greatly adds to both.

In fractures and wounds, a quart or two drank daily while the patient is under cure doth very much assuage the pain and promote his recovery, both as by its balsamic nature it disposeth the parts to heal, and also as it lessens, if not totally prevents, the fever.

A poor boy in Cloyne, having fallen from a tree, broke

both arm and wrist. This accident was concealed or neglected for two or three weeks; he was then put under the care of a skilful bone-setter, who, finding the bones knit and grown crooked, and that it would be necessary to break them again, in order to set them right, and withal considering the hot season of the year (in July), he apprehended his patient's being thrown into a fever that might prove fatal. But the boy being made to drink copiously of tar-water, this prevented or lessened the fever in such sort that the bones were broke and set again, and the cure proceeded as easily and speedily as could be wished.

I have known several instances of bruises and wounds cured by tar-water. A person in my neighbourhood ran over by a horse was much bruised, and cured only by drinking tar-water. Another knocked down with a mallet, thereupon thrown into a violent fever and given for dead; another wounded with an axe so that his life was thought in danger, were both recovered by the use of tar-water; which, as it is sovereign against gangrenes and fevers, hath great success in all sorts of wounds, contusions, and fractures, being taken throughout the whole chirurgical process, along with whatsoever other methods or remedies are applied.

Tar-water operates variously. In dropsies and bruises it hath been known to work by purging. The stronger kind being used as a wash is good against ulcerous eruptions. But, in all cases where the lotion is used, I believe the drinking of tar-water might alone suffice, albeit the sores may be longer withering and dying away.

There is a certain age or time of life when the female sex runs no small risk from the ceasing of their natural evacuations. In this case tar-water is a good preservative, purifying the blood, and clearing it from that cancerous tendency, which it is sometimes subject to about that time. I take it to be a specific in all cancerous cases, even the bleeding cancer, esteemed incurable by physicians, hath been cured by tar-water.

In diseases peculiar to women it is of no small use. Several who had suffered much by accidents in child-bearing have found themselves relieved by tar-water. In all sorts of tumours, wens, and preternatural excrescences, it hath been found an excellent remedy.

Many dangerous symptoms, and even sudden death, are often owing to a polypus, in some or other of the vessels through which the blood circulates, than which it seems there is no inward cause of death or disease more to be dreaded and guarded against. How many drop down dead in our streets, or at table, or in the midst of business, or diversions? How many are found dead in their beds?

Tremors, palpitations of the heart, irregular pulses, apoplexies, sudden deaths, often proceed from a slow stagnating, interrupted motion, or stoppage of the blood in its circulation through the body; and there seemeth to be no cause so certainly productive of obstructed circulation as the polypus, a case, perhaps, much more frequent than is commonly imagined. Morgagni, the celebrated professor at Padua, and most eminent anatomist, who was supposed to have dissected more human bodies than any man living, assured me, above thirty years ago, that in the far greater part of such bodies, he found polypuses, if not in the ventricles of the heart or larger vessels, yet in some other vessel or cavity; to which he attributes many disorders, and which he supposed to be formed by the obstructed motion of the blood. To prevent this, he dissuaded from all tight ligatures, especially in sleep, unbuttoning the neck and wristbands of his shirt every night, a practice he had learned (as he said) from his master the famous Malpighi.

When the circulation is once quite stopped nothing can restore it, which would be the same thing as restoring a dead man to life; and in proportion as the circulation of the blood is obstructed, the body is disordered. Total obstruction is death; partial obstruction is disease. The polypus therefore is always hurtful, if not mortal. It is, indeed, matter of serious reflection, that we may probably carry about with us a principle of death, always at work within, and of a nature so violent and sudden in its effects, so hard to come at, and so difficult to subdue.

It may well be thought, at first view, a vain undertaking, to attempt to dissolve a fleshy or membranous substance, so latent and inaccessible, by common means or medicines. But, as tar-water hath been undoubtedly known to dissolve and disperse wens, and other fleshy or membranous tumours,

in the outward parts of the body,[1] having been drank and circulated with the blood, it should seem, by a parity of reason, that it may also dissolve and put an end to those concretions that are formed in the ventricles of the heart or blood vessels, and so remove one great cause of apoplexies and sudden death: and what cures may prevent. I have been the longer on this subject, for the sake of many who lead sickly lives, as well as several who are snatched away by untimely death.

Universally, in all cases where other methods fail, I could wish this of tar-water was tried. It hath been sometimes known that the most inveterate head-aches, and other nervous disorders, that would yield to no other medicine, have been cured by a course of tar-water regularly and constantly pursued.

Wheresoever pure blood or plenty of spirits are wanting, it may be concluded from manifold experience that tar-water is of singular benefit. Several persons have acknowledged themselves to be much fitter to go through business or study from the use of it.

Nor is it only medicinal to human kind: it is also of no small use in the curing of brute animals. It hath been tried on several kinds, particularly with great success in the late epidemical distemper of our horses. And I have been credibly informed that, being drank in plenty, it hath recovered even a glandered horse that was thought incurable.

And, as it is of such extensive use both to man and beast, it should seem that a tub of tar-water constantly supplied in a market town, would serve, in some sort, for an hospital. Many other drugs are not easily got, this is everywhere plenty and cheap; many are of a doubtful nature, this of known innocence; others soon perish, this lasts for years, and it is not the worse for keeping. This, in short, is a medicine for the common people, being a safe and cheap remedy for such as cannot afford to be long sick, or to make use of costly medicines.

A patient who drinks tar-water must not be alarmed at pustules or eruptions in the skin; these are good symptoms, and shew the impurities of the blood to be cast out. It is

[1] See "The Effects of Tar-water," sect. 228, 229 (*i.e.* Prior's "Narrative" before mentioned.—ED.).

also not amiss to observe that, as tar-water, by its active qualities, doth stir the humours, entering the minutest capillaries, and dislodging obstructions, it may happen that this working shall sometimes be felt in the limbs, or discharge itself in a fit of the gout, which, however disagreeable, proves salutary.

I am credibly informed of several strange conveyances, which tar-water hath found out, whereby to discharge impurities from the human constitution. A person who had been in a bad state of health above twenty years, upon a course of tar-water was thrown into a most extraordinary fit of an ague, and from that time recovered a good state of health. An old gentleman in the county of Cork, who, for a long time, had been a valetudinarian, afflicted with many infirmities, being advised to drink tar-water, found himself relieved; but it produced and soon cured a phtheiriasis or lousy distemper, in which the putrid humours having discharged themselves left him quite sound and healthy.

In a course of tar-water, if any disorder happens from some other cause, as from cold, from the use of strong liquors, from a surfeit, or suchlike accident, it would not be fair to impute it to tar-water: and yet this hath been sometimes done.

The effects of vomiting occasioned by tar-water are not to be apprehended. Some are discouraged from drinking because their stomachs cannot bear it. But, when it takes a turn towards working upwards, nature, by that very way, hath been often known to carry on the cure. A worthy gentleman, member of Parliament, came into my neighbourhood in the autumn of the year 1750: he was cachetic and extremely reduced, so that his friends thought him near his end. Upon his entering into a course of tar-water, it produced a prodigious vomiting, which weakened him much for the present; but, persisting to continue the use thereof for about two months, he was restored to his health, strength, and spirits.

Tar-water is very diuretic, thereby preventing stone and gravel, and carrying off by urine those salts that might otherwise occasion fevers, rheumatisms, dropsies, headaches, and many other disorders, if retained in the blood. Hence some have apprehended a diabetes, from the continued use thereof, but

it is so far from causing a diabetes that it hath been known to cure that disorder.

The constitution of a patient sometimes requireth, during a course of tar-water, that he take water and honey, also roasted apples, stewed prunes, and other diet of an opening kind. A hint of this is sufficient. If the reader now and then meets with some remarks contained in my former writings on this subject, he may be pleased to consider I had rather repeat than forget what I think useful to be known.

Some, endeavouring to discourage the use of tar-water in England, have given out that it may indeed be serviceable in Ireland, where people live on such low diet as sour milk and potatoes, but it cannot be of the same service in England, where men are accustomed to a more liberal and hearty food; and indeed it must be owned that the peasants in this island live but poorly, but no people in Europe live better (in the sense of eating and drinking) than our gentry and citizens; and from these the instances of cures by tar-water have been chiefly taken. Those who would confine its use to the moist air and poor diet of Ireland may be assured that all over Europe, in France, and Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Holland, tar-water works the same effects. In both North and South, in West and East Indies, it hath been used and continues to be used with great success. It hath reached all our Colonies both on the Continent and the Islands, and many barrels of tar-water have been sent from Amsterdam to Batavia; of all which I have had authentic accounts. But its use is nowhere more conspicuous than at sea, in curing that plague of seafaring persons, the scurvy, as was found in the late attempt to discover a north-west passage; and (as I doubt not) will be found as oft as it is tried. Every ship in his Majesty's navy should always have a vessel of tar-water upon deck, for the use of the sailors, both in the scurvy and other maladies.

It is indeed a medicine equally calculated for all climates, for sea and land, for rich and poor, high and low livers; being, as hath been elsewhere mentioned, a cordial which doth not heat; a peculiar privilege this, and of excellent use. That it is a cordial is manifest from its cheering and

enlivening quality; and that it is not heating is as manifest, from its singular use in all cases where the blood is inflamed. As this medicine imparts a friendly genial warmth, suited to the human constitution, those who pass through a course of tar-water would do well not to increase such friendly warmth to an inflaming heat, by a wrong regimen of high-seasoned food and strong liquors, which are not wanted by the drinkers of tar-water. There is a certain degree of heat necessary to the wellbeing and life of man. More than this will be uneasy, and this uneasiness indicates a proper choice of diet.

I have myself drank above a gallon of tar-water in a few hours, and been cooled and recovered from a fever by it. So many instances of the same nature I have known as would make it evident, to any unprejudiced person, that tar-water is a cooling medicine; of which truth I am as thoroughly convinced as it is possible to be of any theorem in physic or natural science.

The unsuccessfulness of other methods should rather be an encouragement than a bar to the trial of tar-water. A young lady, daughter to a worthy gentleman near Cork, had been long afflicted with a grievous pain in her side, and, having had the best advice that could be got, was not relieved until she drank tar-water, which quite removed her pain. Some time after she was again seized with the same disorder, but, returning to the use of tar-water, she grew well, and still continues so.

A woman turned out of the infirmary at Cork as incurable, because she would not submit to the cutting off her leg, came to Cloyne, where she continued half a year drinking tar-water, and living upon bread and milk, by which course she recovered and went to service.

There is at present, while I am writing, a most remarkable case here at Cloyne, of a poor soldier in a dropsy, whose belly was swollen to a most immoderate size. He said he had been five months in an hospital at Dublin, and, having tried other methods in vain, left it, to avoid being tapped. It is a fortnight since he came to Cloyne, during which time he hath drank two quarts of tar-water every day. His belly is now quite reduced: his appetite and sleep which were gone are restored: he gathers strength every moment: and he who was despaired of seems to be quite out of danger,

both to himself, and to all who see him. It is remarkable that, upon drinking the tar-water, he voided several worms of a very extraordinary size. This medicine, which is observed to make some persons costive, is to hydropic patients a strong purge. The present is but one of several instances wherein the dropsy hath been cured by tar-water; which I never knew to fail in any species of that malady.

I am very credibly informed that an aged clergyman of Maidstone in Kent, being reduced to the last extremity by the gout in his stomach, after having tried strong liquors and the methods usual in that case without success, betook himself to drink a vast quantity of warm tar-water, still replenishing and letting it take its course; by which it pleased God to deliver him from the jaws of death.

A gentleman in the county of Clare, near Ennis, had a fever and pleurisy, and inflammation of the lungs; being at the last extremity, and given over by two physicians, he was advised to drink tar-water, which he did, eight quarts. Next morning one of the doctors asking at what hour his patient died? to his great surprise found he was recovered. This I had from a parliament man, his neighbour.

When the yellow fever (as it was called) raged in the West Indies, the negroes, with a tub of tar-water in their quarters, did well: but some of the better sort miscarried, among whom the physician himself lay at the point of death; his brother recovered him by pouring down his throat in spoonfuls some of the same liquor that recovered the negroes. The fact was related to me by a gentleman who was then in the island of St. Christopher's, and knew it to be true.

A physician himself not long since assured me he had cured an ulcer in the bladder, by ordering his patient to drink tar-water, when he had tried all other methods in vain, and thought the case incurable.

But it would be endless to relate the effects of tar-water in desperate cases. The recovery of Mrs. Wilson, daughter of the late Bishop of London, from a lingering hopeless disorder, was a noted case, and attested to by his Lordship. I have even been informed, upon good authority, of two or three instances wherein persons have been recovered by tar-water after they had rattles in the throat.

In certain cases, a smaller quantity of tar-water hath proved ineffectual, when a larger hath perfected the cure. A woman of Cloyne got cold after child bearing, which occasioned a great pain in her thigh, swelling also and redness; she continued in great torment above three weeks. She then began to drink tar-water, but not drinking much she did not perceive much good; and when there was not any hopes of her life, she was persuaded to try what a gallon a day might do; upon this she grew better, the swelling broke and ran; no dressing was used but tar, and no washing but tar-water, until she was quite recovered.

In ailments of an odd and untried nature, it may be worth while to try tar-water. In proof of this many instances might be given. A gentleman with a withered arm had it restored by drinking tar-water. Another who, by running his head against a post, had a concussion of the brain attended with very bad symptoms, recovered by drinking tar-water after other medicines had failed. In my own neighbourhood, one had lost the use of his limbs by poison, another had been bitten by a mad ass; these persons drank tar-water, and their cure was attributed to it,

When tar-water is copiously drank in fevers, the great danger to be guarded against is an excessive flow of spirits, which excites the patient to talk and divert himself with company, which may produce a relapse; of this I have known fatal effects.

If in a course of tar-water the patient should find himself heated, let him abstain from or lessen his dose of spirituous and fermented liquors; for tar-water alone never heats.

In chronical disorders it is not advisable to break off a course of tar-water at once, but rather to diminish the quantity by degrees.

The acid alone hath not the medicinal virtues of tar-water. This is agreeable to reason and experience, as well as the opinion of the ablest judges. Doctor Linden justly observes, "that when the empyreumatic oil is entirely separated from the acid, it is not in any shape superior to any other distilled acids or vinegars whatsoever."—"Treatise on Selter Water," p. 307.

That[1] extraordinary virtues should be contained in tar-water will not seem strange, if we consider that pitch is nothing else but hardened tar, or tar drained of its moisture; and that an extraordinary quantity of light is retained in the substance of pitch, as appears from certain electrical experiments, which, having been made since, seem not a little to confirm what had before been suggested in "Siris."

[1] Something of this nature hath been long expected and hoped for, if we may credit that learned chemist Doctor Linden. "At last (saith he) the long delayed wishes of the most eminent men of the faculty are fulfilled in the Bishop of Cloyne's discovery." See "Treatise on Selter Water," p. 303. Again (speaking of empyreumatic oils of plants) he hath these words—"There has always prevailed a notion among the chemists, and particularly with Paracelsus and his followers, that in those oils there lay a great secret undiscovered. This notion was occasioned by the strange effects which a small quantity thereof hath upon the human machine. Several have been very diligent to discover this secret, and to find out a method to administer these oils with safety. Yet nothing was performed salutary on this inquiry, until the Bishop of Cloyne discovered to us the tar-water; to him alone we are indebted for rendering the empyreumatic oils a safe medicine in every respect."—*Ibid.*, p. 302.



APPENDIX A.

THE QUERIST.

FIRST EDITION, PARTS I. II. AND III.

1735, 1736, 1737.

[THE three original parts of the "Querist" are now printed for the first time since the first issue. A general note on the work will be found on page 112. Any query prefixed by an asterisk was omitted from the revised edition of 1750. I have thought it worth while to call attention to slight variations in the reading of queries common to both texts.]

THE

QUERIST,

CONTAINING

Several *QUERIES*,

Propoſed to the

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

PUBLIC

DUBLIN:

Printed by R. Reilly, on Cork-Hill,

for G. Risk, G. Ewing, and W. Smith, Bookſellers in *Dames-Street*, M,DCC,LXXXV.

THE QUERIST.

Qu. 1.

WHETHER there ever was, is, or will be, an industrious nation poor, or an idle rich?

2. Whether a people can be called poor, where the common sort are well fed, clothed, and lodged?

3. Whether the drift and aim of every wise state should not be, to encourage industry in its members? And whether those, who employ neither heads nor hands for the common benefit, deserve not to be expelled like drones out of a well-governed state?

4. Whether the four elements, and man's labour therein, be not the true source of wealth?

5. Whether money be not only so far useful, as it stirreth up industry, enabling men mutually to participate the fruits of each other's labour?

6. Whether any other means, equally conducing to excite and circulate the industry of mankind, may not be as useful as money?

7. Whether the real end and aim of men be not power? And whether he who could have every thing else at his wish or will, would value money?

8. Whether the public aim in every well-governed state be not, that each member, according to his just pretensions and industry, should have power?

9. Whether power be not referred to action; and whether action doth not follow appetite or will?

10. Whether fashion doth not create appetites; and whether the prevailing will of a nation is not the fashion?

11. Whether the current of industry and commerce be not determined by this prevailing will?

12. Whether it be not owing to custom, that the fashions are agreeable?

13. Whether it may not concern the wisdom of the legislature to interpose in the making of fashions; and not leave an affair of so great influence, to the management of women and fops, tailors, and vintners?

14. Whether reasonable fashions are a greater restraint on freedom than those which are unreasonable?

15. Whether a general good taste in a people would not greatly conduce to their thriving? And whether an uneducated gentry be not the greatest of national evils?

16. Whether customs and fashions do not supply the place of reason in the vulgar of all ranks? Whether, therefore, it doth not very much import that they should be wisely framed?

17. Whether the imitating those neighbours in our fashions, to whom we bear no likeness in our circumstances, be not one cause of distress to this nation?

18. Whether frugal fashions in the upper rank, and comfortable living in the lower, be not the means to multiply inhabitants?

19. Whether the bulk of our Irish natives are not kept from thriving, by that cynical content in dirt and beggary, which they possess to a degree beyond any other people in Christendom?

20. Whether the creating of wants be not the likeliest way to produce industry in a people? And whether, if our peasants were accustomed to eat beef and wear shoes, they would not be more industrious?

21. Whether other things being given, as climate, soil, &c., the wealth be not proportioned to the industry, and this to the circulation of credit, be the credit circulated or transferred by what marks or tokens soever?

22. Whether, therefore, less money, swiftly circulating, be not, in effect, equivalent to more money slowly circulating? Or, whether, if the circulation be reciprocally as the quantity of coin, the nation can be a loser?

23. Whether money is to be considered as having an intrinsic value, or as being a commodity, a standard, a measure, or a pledge, as is variously suggested by writers? And whether the true idea of money, as such, be not altogether that of a ticket or counter?

24. Whether the value or price of things be not a compounded proportion, directly as the demand, and reciprocally as the plenty?

25. Whether the terms crown, livre, pound sterling, &c., are not to be considered as exponents or denominations of such proportion? And whether gold, silver, and paper, are not tickets or counters for reckoning, recording, and transferring thereof?

26. Whether the denominations being retained, although the bullion were gone, things might not nevertheless be rated, bought and sold, industry promoted, and a circulation of commerce maintained?

27. Whether an equal raising of all sorts of gold, silver,

and copper coin, can have any effect in bringing money into the kingdom? And whether altering the proportions between the several sorts can have any other effect, but multiplying one kind and lessening another, without any increase of the sum total?

28. Whether arbitrary changing the denomination of coin be not a public cheat?

*29. Whether, nevertheless, the damage would be very considerable, if by degrees our money were brought back to the English value there to rest for ever?

*30. Whether the English crown did not formerly pass with us for six shillings? And what inconvenience ensued to the public upon its reduction to the present value, and whether what hath been may not be?

31. What makes a wealthy people? and whether mines of gold and silver are capable of doing this? Whether the negroes, amidst the gold sands of Africa, are not poor and destitute?

32. Whether there be any virtue in gold or silver, other than as they set people at work, or create industry?

33. Whether it be not the opinion or will of the people, exciting them to industry, that truly enricheth a nation? And whether this doth not principally depend on the means for counting, transferring, and preserving power, that is, property of all kinds?

34. Whether if there was no silver or gold in the kingdom, our trade might not nevertheless supply bills of exchange, sufficient to answer the demands of absentees in England, or elsewhere?

35. Whether current bank-notes may not be deemed money? And whether they are not actually the greater part of the money of this kingdom?

36. Provided the wheels move, whether it is not the same thing, as to the effect of the machine, be this done by the force of wind, or water, or animals?

37. Whether power to command the industry of others be not real wealth? And whether money be not, in truth, tickets or tokens for conveying and recording such power? And whether it be of great consequence what materials the tickets are made of?

38. Whether trade, either foreign or domestic, be in truth any more than this commerce of industry?

39. Whether to promote, transfer, and secure this commerce, and this property in human labour, or, in other words, this power, be not the sole means of enriching a people; and how far this may be done independently of gold and silver?

40. Whether it were not wrong to suppose land itself to be wealth? And whether the industry of the people is not first to

be considered as that which constitutes wealth, which makes even land and silver to be wealth, neither of which would have any value but as means and motives to industry?

41. Whether in the wastes of America a man might not possess twenty miles square of land, and yet want his dinner, or a coat to his back?

42. Whether a fertile land, and the industry of its inhabitants, would not prove inexhaustible funds of real wealth, be the counters for conveying and recording thereof what you will, paper, gold, or silver?

43. Whether a single hint be sufficient to overcome a prejudice? And whether even obvious truths will not sometimes bear repeating?

44. Whether if human labour be the true source of wealth, it doth not follow that idleness should of all things be discouraged in a wise state?

45. Whether even gold, or silver, if they should lessen the industry of its inhabitants, would not be ruinous to a country? And whether Spain be not an instance of this?

46. Whether the opinion of men, and their industry consequent thereupon, be not the true wealth of Holland, and not the silver supposed to be deposited in the bank at Amsterdam?

47. Whether there is in truth any such treasure lying dead? And whether it be of great consequence to the public that it should be real, rather than notional?

48. Whether, in order to understand the true nature of wealth and commerce, it would not be right to consider a ship's crew cast upon a desert island, and by degrees forming themselves to business and civil life, while industry begot credit, and credit moved to industry?

49. Whether such men would not all set themselves to work? Whether they would not subsist by the mutual participation of each other's industry? Whether when one man had in his way procured more than he could consume, he would not exchange his superfluities to supply his wants? Whether this must not produce credit? Whether to facilitate these conveyances, to record and circulate this credit, they would not soon agree on certain tallies, tokens, tickets, or counters?

50. Whether reflection in the better sort might not soon remedy our evils? And whether our real defect be not a wrong way of thinking?

51. Whether it would not be an unhappy turn in our gentlemen, if they should take more thought to create an interest to themselves in this or that county, or borough, than to promote the real interest of their country?

*52. Whether it be not a bull to call that making an interest, whereby a man spendeth much and gaineth nothing?

53. Whether if a man builds a house he doth not in the first place provide a plan which governs his work? And shall the public act without an end, a view, a plan?

54. Whether by how much the less particular folk think for themselves, the public be not so much the more obliged to think for them?

*55. Whether cunning be not one thing and good sense another? and whether a cunning tradesman doth not stand in his own light?

56. Whether small gains be not the way to great profit? And if our tradesmen are beggars, whether they may not thank themselves for it?

57. Whether some way might not be found for making criminals useful in public works, instead of sending them either to America or to the other world?

58. Whether we may not, as well as other nations, contrive employment for them? And whether servitude, chains, and hard labour, for a term of years, would not be a more discouraging, as well as a more adequate punishment for felons, than even death itself?

59. Whether there are not such things in Holland as bettering houses, for bringing young gentlemen to order? And whether such an institution would be useless among us?

60. Whether it be true that the poor in Holland have no resource but their own labour, and yet there are no beggars in their streets?

61. Whether he whose luxury consumeth foreign products, and whose industry produceth nothing domestic to exchange for them, is not so far forth injurious to his country?

*62. Whether, consequently, the fine gentlemen, whose employment is only to dress, drink, and play, be not a public nuisance?

63. Whether necessity is not to be hearkened to before convenience, and convenience before luxury?

64. Whether to provide plentifully for the poor be not feeding the root, the substance whereof will shoot upwards into the branches, and cause the top to flourish?

65. Whether there be any instance of a state wherein the people, living neatly and plentifully, did not aspire to wealth?

66. Whether nastiness and beggary do not, on the contrary, extinguish all such ambition, making men listless, hopeless, and slothful?

67. Whether a country inhabited by people well fed, clothed, and lodged, would not become every day more populous? And whether a numerous stock of people in such circumstances would not constitute a flourishing nation? And how far the product of our own country may suffice for the compassing of this end?

68. Whether a people, who had provided themselves with the necessaries of life in good plenty, would not soon extend their industry to new arts and new branches of commerce?

69. Whether those same manufactures which England imports from other countries, may not be admitted from Ireland? And if so, whether lace, carpets, and tapestry, three considerable articles of English importation, might not find encouragement in Ireland? And whether an Academy for design might not greatly conduce to the perfecting those manufactures among us?

70. Whether France and Flanders could have drawn so much money from England, for figured silks, lace, and tapestry, if they had not had academies for designing?

71. Whether when a room was once prepared, and models in plaster of Paris, the annual expense of such an academy need stand the public in above two hundred pounds a year?

72. Whether our linen manufacture would not find the benefit of this institution? And whether there be anything that makes us fall short of the Dutch, in damasks, diapers, and printed linen, but our ignorance in design?

*73. Whether those specimens of our own manufacture, hung up in a certain public place, do not sufficiently declare such our ignorance? and whether for the honour of the nation they ought not to be removed?

74. Whether those, who may slight this affair as notional, have sufficiently considered the extensive use of the art of design, and its influences in most trades and manufactures, wherein the forms of things are often more regarded than the materials?

75. Whether there be any art sooner learned than that of making carpets? And whether our women, with little time and pains, may not make more beautiful carpets than those imported from Turkey? And whether this branch of the woollen-manufacture be not open to us? *See Qu.* 69.

76. Whether human industry can produce, from such cheap materials, a manufacture of so great value, by any other art, as by those of sculpture and painting?

77. Whether pictures and statues are not in fact so much treasure? And whether Rome and Florence would not be poor towns without them?

78. Whether they do not bring ready money, as well as jewels? Whether in Italy, debts are not paid, and children portioned with them, as with gold and silver?

79. Whether it would not be more prudent to strike out and exert ourselves in permitted branches of trade, than to fold our hands and repine, that we are not allowed the woollen?

80. Whether it be true, that two millions are yearly expended by England in foreign lace and linen?

81. Whether immense sums are not drawn yearly into the Northern countries, for supplying the British navy with hempen manufactures?

82. Whether there be any thing more profitable than hemp? And whether there should not be great premiums for encouraging our hempen trade? What advantages may not Great Britain make of a country where land and labour are so cheap?

83. Whether Ireland alone might not raise hemp sufficient for the British navy? And whether it would not be vain to expect this from the British colonies in America, where hands are so scarce, and labour so excessively dear?

84. Whether if our own people want will or capacity for such an attempt, it might not be worth while for some undertaking spirits in England to make settlements, and raise hemp in the counties of Clare and Limerick, than which, perhaps, there is not fitter land in the world for that purpose? And whether both nations would not find their advantage therein?

85. Whether if all the idle hands in this kingdom where employed on hemp and flax, we might not find sufficient vent for these manufactures?

86. How far it may be in our own power to better our affairs, without interfering with our neighbours?

87. Whether the prohibition of our woollen-trade, ought not naturally to put us on other methods which give no jealousy?

88. Whether paper be not a valuable article of commerce? And whether it be not true, that one single bookseller in London yearly expends above four thousand pounds in that foreign commodity?

89. How it comes to pass that the Venetians and Genoese, who wear so much less linen, and so much worse than we do, should yet make very good paper, and in great quantity, while we make very little and very bad?[1]

90. How long it will be before my countrymen find out, that it is worth while to spend a penny, in order to get a groat?

91. If all the land were tilled that is fit for tillage, and all that sown with hemp and flax that is fit for raising them, whether we should have much sheep-walk beyond what was sufficient to supply the necessities of the kingdom?

92. Whether other countries have not flourished without the woollen-trade?

93. Whether it be not a sure sign, or effect of a country's thriving, to see it well cultivated and full of inhabitants? And if so, whether a great quantity of sheep-walk be not ruinous to a country, rendering it waste, and thinly inhabited?

[1] "and very bad" not in second edition.

94. Whether the employing so much of our land under sheep, be not in fact an Irish bull?[1]

95. Whether our hankering after our woollen-trade be not the true and only reason which hath created a jealousy in England towards Ireland? And whether any thing can hurt us more than such jealousy?

96. Whether it be not the true interest of both nations to become one people? And whether either be sufficiently apprised of this?

97. Whether the upper part of this people are not truly English by blood, language, religion, manners, inclination, and interest?

98. Whether we are not as much Englishmen, as the children of old Romans born in Britain, were still Romans?

99. Whether it be not our true interest, not to interfere with them; and, in every other case, whether it be not their true interest to befriend us?

100. Whether a mint in Ireland might not be of great convenience to the kingdom; and whether it could be attended with any possible inconvenience to Great Britain? And whether there were not mints in Naples and in Sicily, when those kingdoms were provinces to Spain, or the house of Austria?

101. Whether any thing can be more ridiculous, than for the North of Ireland to be jealous of a linen manufacture in the South?

102. Whether the county of Tipperary be not much better land than the county of Armagh: and yet whether the latter is not much better improved and inhabited than the former?

103. Whether every landlord in the kingdom doth not know the cause of this? And yet how few are the better for such their knowledge?

104. Whether large farms under few hands, or small ones under many, are likely to be made most of? And whether flax and tillage do not naturally multiply hands, and divide land into small holdings, and well-improved?

105. Whether, as our exports are lessened, we ought not to lessen our imports? And whether these will not be lessened as our demands, and these as our wants, and these as our customs or fashions? Of how great consequence therefore are fashions to the public? *See Qu.* 10, 11, 16.

106. Whether it would not be more reasonable to mend our state than to complain of it; and how far this may be in our own power?

107. What the nation gains by those who live in Ireland upon the produce of foreign countries?

[1] "Irish blunder" in second edition.

108. How far the vanity of our ladies in dressing, and of our gentlemen in drinking, contributes to the general misery of the people?

109. Whether nations as wise and opulent as ours, have not made sumptuary laws; and what hinders us from doing the same?

110. Whether those who drink foreign liquors, and deck themselves and their families with foreign ornaments, are not so far forth to be reckoned absentees?

111. Whether as our trade is limited, we ought not to limit our expenses; and whether this be not the natural and obvious remedy?

112. Whether the dirt, and famine, and nakedness of the bulk of our people, might not be remedied, even although we had no foreign trade? And whether this should not be our first care; and whether, if this were once provided for, the conveniences of the rich would not soon follow?

113. Whether comfortable living doth not produce wants, and wants industry, and industry wealth? *See Qu.* 20, 65.

114. Whether there is not a great difference between Holland and Ireland? And whether foreign commerce, without which the one could not subsist, be so necessary for the other?

115. Might we not put a hand to the plough, or the spade, although we had no foreign commerce?

116. Whether the exigencies of nature are not to be answered by industry on our own soil? And how far the conveniences and comforts of life may be procured, by a domestic commerce between the several parts of this kingdom?

117. Whether the women may not sew, spin, weave, embroider, sufficiently for the embellishment of their persons, and even enough to raise envy in each other, without being beholden to foreign countries?

118. Suppose the bulk of our inhabitants had shoes to their feet, clothes to their backs, and beef in their bellies? Might not such a state be eligible for the public, even though the squires were condemned to drink ale and cider?

119. Whether if drunkenness be a necessary evil, men may not as well get drunk with[1] the growth of their own country?

120. Whether a nation within itself might not have real wealth, sufficient to give its inhabitants power and distinction, without the help of gold and silver?

121. Whether, if the arts of sculpture and painting were encouraged among us, we might not furnish our houses in a much nobler manner with our own manufacture? *See Qu.* 76.

[1] "as well drink the growth" in second edition.

122. Whether we have not, or may not have, all the necessary materials for building at home?

123. Whether tiles and plaster may not supply the place of Norway fir for flooring and wainscot?

124. Whether plaster be not warmer, as well as more secure, than deal? And whether a modern fashionable house, lined with fir, daubed over with oil and paint, be not like a fire-ship, ready to be lighted up by all accidents?

125. Whether larger houses, better built and furnished, a greater train of servants, the difference with regard to equipage and table, between finer and coarser, more or less elegant and impolite[1] may not be sufficient to feed a reasonable share of vanity, or support all proper distinctions? And whether all these may not be procured by domestic industry out of the four elements, without ransacking the four quarters of the globe?

126. Whether any thing is a nobler ornament, in the eye of the world, than an Italian palace, that is, stone and mortar skilfully put together, and adorned with sculpture and painting; and whether this may not be compassed without foreign trade?

177. Whether an expense in gardens and plantations would not be an elegant distinction for the rich, a domestic magnificence, employing many hands within, and drawing nothing from abroad?

178. Whether the apology which is made for foreign luxury in England, to wit, that they could not carry on their trade without imports as well as exports, will hold in Ireland?

129. Whether one may not be allowed to conceive and suppose a society, or nation of human creatures, clad in woollen cloths and stuffs, eating good bread, beef and mutton, poultry and fish in great plenty, drinking ale, mead and cider, inhabiting decent houses built of brick and marble, taking their pleasure in fair parks and gardens, depending on no foreign imports either for food or raiment? And whether such people ought much to be pitied?

130. Whether Ireland be not as well qualified for such a state as any nation under the sun?

131. Whether in such a state the inhabitants may not contrive to pass the twenty-four hours with tolerable ease and cheerfulness? And whether any people upon earth can do more?

132. Whether they may not eat, drink, play, dress, visit, sleep in good beds, sit by good fires, build, plant, raise a name, make estates, and spend them?

133. Whether upon the whole, a domestic trade may not suffice in such a country as Ireland, to nourish and clothe its

[1] "and impolite" not in second edition.

inhabitants, and provide them with the reasonable conveniences, and even comforts of life?

134. Whether a general habit of living well would not produce numbers and industry; and whether, considering the tendency of human kind, the consequence thereof would not be foreign trade and riches, how unnecessary soever?

135. Whether, nevertheless, it be a crime to inquire how far we may do without foreign trade, and what would follow on such a supposition?

136. Whether the number and welfare of the subjects be not the true strength of the crown?

137. Whether in all public institutions, there should not be an end proposed, which is to be the rule and limit of the means? Whether this end should not be the well-being of the whole? And whether, in order to this, the first step should not be to clothe and feed our people?

138. Whether there be upon earth any Christian, or civilized people, so beggarly, wretched, and destitute, as the common Irish?

139. Whether, nevertheless, there is any other people whose wants may be more easily supplied from home?

140. Whether, if there was a wall of brass a thousand cubits high, round this kingdom, our natives might not nevertheless live cleanly and comfortably, till the land and reap the fruits of it?

141. What should hinder us from exerting ourselves, using our hands and brains, doing something or other, man, woman, and child, like the other inhabitants of God's earth?

142. Be the restraining our trade well or ill advised in our neighbours, with respect to their own interest, yet whether it be not plainly ours to accommodate ourselves to it?

143. Whether it be not vain to think of persuading other people to see their interest, while we continue blind to our own?

144. Whether there be any other nation possessed of so much good land, and so many able hands to work it, which yet is beholden for bread to foreign countries?

145. Whether if it be true, that we import corn to the yearly value of two hundred thousand pounds?[1]

146. Whether we are not undone by fashions made for other people? And whether it be not madness in a poor nation to imitate a rich one?

147. Whether a woman of fashion ought not to be declared a public enemy?

148. Whether it be not certain, that from the single town of

[1] "value . . . . in some years" in the second edition.

Cork were exported, last year,[1] no less than one hundred and seven thousand one hundred and sixty-one barrels of beef; seven thousand three hundred and seventy-nine barrels of pork; thirteen thousand four hundred and sixty-one casks, and eighty-five thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven firkins of butter? And what hands were employed in this manufacture?

149. Whether a foreigner could imagine, that one half of the people were starving, in a country which sent out such plenty of provisions?

150. Whether an Irish lady, set out with French silks, and Flanders lace, may not be said to consume more beef and butter than fifty[2] of our labouring peasants?

151. Whether nine tenths of our foreign trade be not carried on singly to support the article of vanity?

152. Whether it can be hoped, that private persons will not indulge this folly, unless restrained by the public?

153. How vanity is maintained in other countries? Whether in Hungary, for instance, a proud nobility are not subsisted with small imports from abroad?

154. Whether there be a prouder people upon earth than the noble Venetians, although they all wear plain black clothes?

155. Whether a people are to be pitied that will not sacrifice their little particular vanities to the public good? And yet, whether each part would not accept their own foible from this public sacrifice, the squire his bottle, the lady her lace?

156. Whether claret be not often drank rather for vanity than for health or pleasure?

157. Whether it be true, that men of nice palates have been imposed on, by elder wine for French claret, and by mead for palm sack?

158. Do not Englishmen abroad purchase beer and cider at ten times the price of wine?

159. How many gentlemen are there in England of a thousand pounds per annum, who never drink wine in their own houses? Whether the same may be said of any in Ireland who have even one hundred pounds per annum?

160. What reason have our neighbours in England for discouraging French wines, which may not hold with respect to us also?

161. How much of the necessary sustenance of our people is yearly exported for brandy?

162. Whether, if people must poison themselves, they had not better do it with their own growth?

[1] "in one year" in the second edition.
[2] "a hundred" in the second edition.

163. If we imported neither claret from France, nor fir from Norway, what the nation would save by it?

164. When the root yieldeth insufficient nourishment, whether men do not top the tree to make the lower branches thrive?

165. Whether, if our ladies drank sage or balm tea out of Irish ware, it would be an insupportable national calamity?

166. Whether it be really true that such wine is best as most encourages drinking, *i.e.* that must be given in the largest dose to produce its effect? And whether this holds with regard to any other medicine?

167. Whether that trade should not be accounted most pernicious, wherein the balance is most against us? And whether this be not the trade with France?

168. Whether it be not even madness to encourage trade with a nation that takes nothing of our manufacture?

169. Whether Ireland can hope to thrive, if the major part of her patriots shall be found in the French interest? *See Qu.* 155.

170. Why, if a bribe by the palate or the purse be in effect the same thing, they should not be alike infamous?

171. Whether the vanity and luxury of a few ought to stand in competition with the interest of a nation?

172. Whether national wants ought not to be the rule of trade? And whether the most pressing wants of the majority ought not to be first considered?

173. Whether it is possible the country should be well improved, while our beef is exported, and our labourers live upon potatoes?

174. If it be resolved that we cannot do without foreign trade, whether, at least, it may not be worth while to consider what branches thereof deserve to be entertained, and how far we may be able to carry it on under our present limitations?

175. What foreign imports may be necessary, for clothing and feeding the families of persons not worth above one hundred pounds a year? And how many wealthier there are in the kingdom, and what proportion they bear to the other inhabitants?

176. Whether trade be not then on a right foot, when foreign commodities are imported in exchange only for domestic superfluities?

177. Whether the quantities of beef, butter, wool and leather, exported from this island, can be reckoned the superfluities of a country, where there are so many natives naked and famished?

178. Whether it would not be wise so to order our trade, as to export manufactures rather than provisions, and of those such as employ most hands?

179. Whether she would not be a very vile matron, and justly thought either mad or foolish, that should give away the necessaries of life from her naked and famished children, in exchange for pearls to stick in her hair, and sweet meats to please her own palate?

180. Whether a nation might not be considered as a family?

181. Whether other methods may not be found for supplying the funds, besides the custom on things imported?

182. Whether any art or manufacture be so difficult as the making of good laws?

183. Whether our peers and gentlemen are born legislators? Or, whether that faculty be acquired by study and reflection?

184. Whether to comprehend the real interest of a people, and the means to procure it, doth not imply some fund of knowledge, historical, moral, and political, with a faculty of reason improved by learning?

185. Whether every enemy to learning be not a Goth? And whether every such Goth among us be not an enemy to the country?

186. Whether, therefore, it would not be an omen of ill presage, a dreadful phenomenon in the land, if our great men should take it in their heads to deride learning and education?

187. Whether, on the contrary, it should not seem worth while to erect a mart of literature in this kingdom, under wiser regulations and better discipline than in any other part of Europe? And whether this would not be an infallible means of drawing men and money into the kingdom?

188. Whether the governed be not too numerous for the governing part of our college? And whether it might not be expedient to convert thirty natives' places into twenty fellowships?

189. Whether if we had two colleges, there might not spring a useful emulation between them? And whether it might not be contrived, so to divide the fellows, scholars, and revenues between both, as that no member should be a loser thereby?

190. Whether ten thousand pounds, well laid out, might not build a decent college, fit to contain two hundred persons; and whether the purchase money of the chambers would not go a good way towards defraying the expense?

191. Where this college should be situated?

192. Whether it is possible a state should not thrive, whereof the lower part were industrious, and the upper wise?

193. Whether the collected wisdom of ages and nations be not found in books,[1] improved and applied by study?

194. Whether it was not an Irish professor who first opened

[1] Qy. 193 ended here in the second edition.

the public schools at Oxford? Whether this island hath not been anciently famous for learning? And whether at this day it hath any better chance for being considerable?

195. Whether we may not with better grace sit down and complain when we have done all that lies in our power to help ourselves?

196. Whether the gentleman of estate hath a right to be idle; and whether he ought not to be the great promoter and director of industry among his tenants and neighbours?

197. Whether the real foundation for wealth must not be laid in the numbers, the frugality, and the industry of the people? And whether all attempts to enrich a nation by other means, as raising the coin, stock-jobbing and such arts, are not vain?

198. Whether a door ought not to be shut against all other methods of growing rich, save only by industry and merit? And whether wealth got otherwise would not be ruinous to the public?

199. Whether the abuse of banks and paper-money is a just objection against the use thereof? And whether such abuse might not easily be prevented?

200. Whether national banks are not found useful in Venice, Holland, and Hamburg? And whether it is not possible to contrive one that may be useful also in Ireland?

*201. Whether any nation ever was in greater want of such an expedient than Ireland?

202. Whether the banks of Venice and Amsterdam are not in the hands of the public?

203. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves in the nature of those banks? And what reason can be assigned, why Ireland should not reap the benefit of such public banks, as well as other countries?

204. Whether a bank of national credit, supported by public funds, and secured by Parliament, be a chimera or impossible thing; and if not, what would follow from the supposal of such a bank?

205. Whether the currency of a credit so well secured, would not be of great advantage to our trade and manufactures?

206. Whether the notes of such public bank would not have a more general circulation than those of private banks, as being less subject to frauds and hazards?

207. Whether it be not agreed that paper hath, in many respects, the advantage above coin, as being of more dispatch in payments, more easily transferred, preserved, and recovered when lost?

208. Whether, besides these advantages, there be not an evident necessity for circulating credit by paper, from the defect of coin in this kingdom?

*209. Whether the public may not as well save the interest which it now pays?

*210. What would happen if two of our banks should break at once? And whether it be wise to neglect providing against an event which experience hath shewn us not to be impossible?

*211. Whether such an accident would not particularly affect the bankers? And therefore whether a national bank would not be a security even to private bankers?

*212. Whether we may not easily avoid the inconveniences attending the paper-money of New England, which were incurred by their issuing too great a quantity of notes, by their having no silver in bank to exchange for notes, by their not insisting upon repayment of the loans at the time prefixed, and especially by their want of manufactures to answer their imports from Europe?

*213. Whether a combination of bankers might not do wonders, and whether bankers know their own strength?

*214 Whether a bank in private hands might not even overturn a government? and whether this was not the case of the Bank of St. George in Genoa?[1]

*215. Whether we may not easily prevent the ill effects of such a bank as Mr. Law proposed for Scotland, which was faulty in not limiting the quantum of bills, and permitting all persons to take out what bills they pleased, upon the mortgage of lands, whence by a glut of paper, the prices of things must rise? Whence also the fortunes of men must increase in denomination, though not in value; whence pride, idleness, and beggary?

*216. Whether such banks as those of England and Scotland might not be attended with great inconveniences, as lodging too much power in the hands of private men, and giving handle for monopolies, stock-jobbing, and destructive schemes?

*217. Whether the national bank, projected by an anonymous writer in the latter end of Queen Anne's reign, might not on the other hand be attended with as great inconvenience by lodging too much power in the Government?

*218. Whether the bank projected by Murray, though it partake, in many useful particulars, with that of Amsterdam, yet, as it placeth too great power in the hands of a private society, might not be dangerous to the public?

219. Whether it be rightly remarked by some, that, as banking brings no treasure into the kingdom like trade, private wealth must sink as the bank riseth? And whether, whatever causeth industry to flourish and circulate, may not be said to increase our treasure?

[1] See "The Vindication and Advancement of our National Constitution and Credit." Printed in London, 1710.

220. Whether the ruinous effects of Mississippi, South Sea, and such schemes, were not owing to an abuse of paper-money or credit, in making it a means for idleness and gaming, instead of a motive and help to industry?

*221. Whether those effects could have happened had there been no stock-jobbing? And whether stock-jobbing could at first have been set on foot, without an imaginary foundation of some improvement to the stock by trade? Whether, therefore, when there are no such prospects, or cheats, or private schemes proposed, the same effects can be justly feared?

*222. Whether by a national bank, be not properly understood a bank, not only established by public authority as the Bank of England, but a bank in the hands of the public, wherein there are no shares: whereof the public alone is proprietor, and reaps all the benefit?

*223. Whether, having considered the conveniences of banking and paper-credit in some countries, and the inconveniences thereof in others, we may not contrive to adopt the former, and avoid the latter?

*224. Whether great evils, to which other schemes are liable, may not be prevented, by excluding the managers of the bank from a share in the legislature?

225. Whether the rise of the bank of Amsterdam was not purely casual, for the security and dispatch of payments? And whether the good effects thereof, in supplying the place of coin, and promoting a ready circulation of industry and commerce, may not be a lesson to us, to do that by design, which others fell upon by chance?

*226. Whether the bank proposed to be established in Ireland, under the notion of a national bank, by the voluntary subscription of three hundred thousand pounds, to pay off the national debt, the interest of which sum to be paid the subscribers, subject to certain terms of redemption, be not in reality a private bank, as those of England and Scotland, which are national only in name, being in the hands of particular persons, and making dividends on the money paid in by subscribers?[1]

227. Whether plenty of small cash be not absolutely necessary for keeping up a circulation among the people; that is, whether copper be not more necessary than gold?

*228. Whether it is not worth while to reflect on the expedients made use of by other nations, paper-money, bank-notes, public funds, and credit in all its shapes, to examine what hath been done and devised to add to our own animadversions, and

[1] See "A Proposal for the relief of Ireland," &c. Printed in Dublin, A.D. 1734.

upon the whole offer such hints as seem not unworthy the attention of the public?

229. Whether that which increaseth the stock of a nation be not a means of increasing its trade? And whether that which increaseth the current credit of a nation, may not be said to increase its stock?

*230. Whether it may not be expedient to appoint certain funds or stock for a national bank, under direction of certain persons, one-third whereof to be named by the Government, and one-third by each House of Parliament?

*231. Whether the directors should not be excluded from sitting in either House, and whether they should not be subject to the audit and visitation of a standing committee of both Houses?

*232. Whether such committee of inspectors should not be changed every two years, one-half going out, and another coming in by ballot?

*233. Whether the notes ought not to be issued in lots, to be let at interest on mortgaged lands, the whole number of lots to be divided among the four provinces, rateably to the number of hearths in each?

*234. Whether it may not be expedient to appoint four counting-houses, one in each province, for converting notes into specie?

*235. Whether a limit should not be fixed, which no person might exceed, in taking out notes?

*236. Whether, the better to answer domestic circulation, it may not be right to issue notes as low as twenty shillings?

*237. Whether all the bills should be issued at once, or rather by degrees, that so men may be gradually accustomed and reconciled to the bank?

*238. Whether the keeping of the cash, and the direction of the bank, ought not to be in different hands, and both under public control?

*239 Whether the same rule should not alway be observed, of lending out money or notes, only to half the value of the mortgaged land? and whether this value should alway be rated at the same number of years' purchase as at first?

*240. Whether care should not be taken to prevent an undue rise of the value of land?

*241. Whether the increase of industry and people will not of course raise the value of land? And whether this rise may not be sufficient?

*242. Whether land may not be apt to rise on the issuing too great plenty of notes?

*243. Whether this may not be prevented by the gradual and slow issuing of notes, and by frequent sales of lands?

*244. Whether interest doth not measure the true value of land; for instance, where money is at five per cent., whether land is not worth twenty years' purchase?

*245. Whether too small a proportion of money would not hurt the landed man, and too great a proportion the monied man? And whether the quantum of notes ought not to bear proportion to the public demand? And whether trial must not shew what this demand will be?

*246. Whether the exceeding this measure might not produce divers bad effects, one whereof would be the loss of our silver?

*247. Whether interest paid into the bank ought not to go on augmenting its stock?

*248. Whether it would or would not be right to appoint that the said interest be paid in notes only?[1]

*249. Whether the notes of this national bank should not be received in all payments into the exchequer?

*250. Whether on supposition that the specie should fail, the credit would not, nevertheless, still pass, being admitted in all payments of the public revenue?

*251. Whether the public can become bankrupt so long as the notes are issued on good security?

*252. Whether mismanagement, prodigal living, hazards by trade, which often affect private banks, are equally to be apprehended in a public one?

*253. Whether as credit became current, and this raised the value of land, the security must not of course rise? *See Qu.* 233.

254. Whether, as our current domestic credit grew, industry would not grow likewise; and if industry, our manufactures; and if these, our foreign credit?

*255. Whether by degrees, as business and people multiplied, more bills may not be issued, without augmenting the capital stock, provided still, that they are issued on good security; which further issuing of new bills, not to be without consent of Parliament?

*256. Whether such bank would not be secure? Whether the profits accruing to the public would not be very considerable? And whether industry in private persons would not be supplied, and a general circulation encouraged?

*257. Whether such bank should, or should not, be allowed to issue notes for money deposited therein? And, if not, whether the bankers would have cause to complain?

*258. Whether, if the public thrives, all particular persons must not feel the benefit thereof, even the bankers themselves?

*259. Whether, beside the bank company, there are not in

[1] See Mr. John Laws "On Money and Trade."

England many private wealthy bankers, and whether they were more before the erecting of that company?

260. Whether, as industry increased, our manufactures would not flourish; and as these flourished, whether better returns would not be made from estates to their landlords, both within and without the kingdom?

*261. Whether we have not paper money circulating among us already; whether, therefore, we might not as well have that which is secured by the public, and whereof the public reaps the benefit?

*262. Whether there are not two general ways of circulating money, to wit, play and traffic? and whether stock-jobbing is not to be ranked under the former?

*263. Whether there are more than two things that might draw silver out of the bank, when its credit was once well established, to wit, foreign demands and small payments at home?

*264. Whether, if our trade with France were checked, the former of these causes could be supposed to operate at all? and whether the latter could operate to any great degree? *See Qu.* 34.

265. Whether the sure way to supply people with tools and materials, and to set them at work, be not a free circulation of money, whether silver or paper?

266. Whether in New England, all trade and business is not as much at a stand, upon a scarcity of paper money, as with us from the want of specie?

*267. Whether paper-money or notes may not be issued from the national bank, on the security of hemp, of linen, or other manufactures whereby the poor might be supported in their industry?

268. Whether it be certain, that the quantity of silver in the bank of Amsterdam, be greater now than at first; but whether it be not certain, that there is a greater circulation of industry and extent of trade, more people, ships, houses and commodities of all sorts, more power by sea and land?

269. Whether money, lying dead in the bank of Amsterdam, would not be as useless as in the mine?

270. Whether our visible security in land could be doubted? And whether there be any thing like this in the bank of Amsterdam?

271. Whether it be just to apprehend danger from trusting a national bank with power to extend its credit, to circulate notes which it shall be felony to counterfeit, to receive goods on loans, to purchase lands, to sell also or alienate them, and to deal in bills of exchange; when these powers are no other than have been trusted for many years with the bank of England, although in truth but a private bank? *See Qu.* 222.

272. Whether the objection from monopolies and an overgrowth of power, which are made against private banks, can possibly hold against a national one?

*273. Whether banks raised by private subscription would be as advantageous to the public as to the subscribers? and whether risks and frauds might not be more justly apprehended from them?

274. Whether the evil effects, which of late years have attended paper-money and credit in Europe, did not spring from subscriptions, shares, dividends, and stock-jobbing.

275. Whether the great evils attending paper-money in the British plantations of America have not sprung from the overrating their lands, and issuing paper without discretion, and from the legislators breaking their own rules in favour of themselves, thus sacrificing the public to their private benefit? And whether a little sense and honesty might not easily prevent all such inconveniences? *See Qu.* 212.

*276. Whether an argument from the abuse of things, against the use of them, be conclusive?

*277. Whether he who is bred to a part be fitted to judge of the whole?

*278. Whether interest be not apt to bias judgment? and whether traders only are to be consulted about trade, or bankers about money?

279. Whether the subject of free thinking in religion be not exhausted? And whether it be not high time for our free thinkers to turn their thoughts to the improvement of their country?

*280. Whether any man hath a right to judge, that will not be at the pains to distinguish?

*281. Whether there be not a wide difference between the profits going to augment the national stock, and being divided among private sharers? And whether, in the former case, there can possibly be any gaming or stock-jobbing?

282. Whether it must not be ruinous for a nation to sit down to game, be it with silver or with paper?

283. Whether, therefore, the circulating paper, in the late ruinous schemes of France and England, was the true evil, and not rather the circulating thereof, without industry? And whether the bank of Amsterdam, where industry had been for so many years substituted and circulated by transfers on paper, doth not clearly decide this point?

284. Whether there are not to be seen in America fair towns, wherein the people are well lodged, fed, and clothed, without a beggar in their streets, although there be not one grain of gold or silver current among them?

285. Whether these people do not exercise all arts and trades,

build ships and navigate them to all parts of the world, purchase lands, till and reap the fruits of them, buy and sell, educate and provide for their children? Whether they do not even indulge themselves in foreign vanities?

286. Whether, whatever inconveniencies those people may have incurred from not observing either rules or bounds in their paper-money, yet it be not certain that they are in a more flourishing condition, have larger and better built towns, more plenty, more industry, more arts and civility, and a more extensive commerce, than when they had gold and silver current among them?

287. Whether a view of the ruinous effects of absurd schemes and credit mismanaged, so as to produce gaming and madness instead of industry, can be any just objection against a national bank calculated purely to promote industry?

288. Whether a scheme for the welfare of this nation should not take in the whole inhabitants? And whether it be not a vain attempt to project the flourishing of our Protestant gentry, exclusive of the bulk of the natives?

*289. Whether, therefore, it doth not greatly concern the State, that our Irish natives should be converted, and the whole nation united in the same religion, the same allegiance, and the same interest? and how this may most probably be effected?

290. Whether an oath, testifying allegiance to the king and disclaiming the Pope's authority in temporals, may not be justly required of the Roman Catholics? And whether, in common prudence or policy, any priest should be tolerated who refuseth to take it?

*291. Whether there have not been Popish recusants? and, if so, whether it would be right to object against the foregoing oath, that all would take it, and none think themselves bound by it?

*292. Whether those of the Church of Rome, in converting the Moors of Spain or the Protestants of France, have not set us an example which might justify a similar treatment of themselves, if the laws of Christianity allowed thereof?

*293. Whether compelling men to a profession of faith is not the worst thing in Popery; and, consequently, whether to copy after the Church of Rome therein, were not to become Papists ourselves in the worst sense?

*294. Whether, nevertheless, we may not imitate the Church of Rome, in certain places, where Jews are tolerated, by obliging our Irish Papists, at stated times, to hear Protestant sermons? and whether this would not make missionaries in the Irish tongue useful?

*295. Whether the mere act of hearing, without making any profession of faith, or joining in any part of worship, be a religious

act; and, consequently, whether their being obliged to hear, may not consist with the toleration of Roman Catholics?

*296. Whether, if penal laws should be thought oppressive, we may not at least be allowed to give premiums? And whether it would be wrong, if the public encouraged Popish families to become hearers, by paying their hearth-money for them?

*297. Whether in granting toleration, we ought not to distinguish between doctrines purely religious, and such as affect the State?

*298. Whether the case be not very different in regard to a man who only eats fish on Fridays, says his prayers in Latin, or believes transubstantiation, and one who professeth in temporals a subjection to foreign powers, who holdeth himself absolved from all obedience to his natural prince and the laws of his country? who is even persuaded, it may be meritorious to destroy the powers that are?

*299. Whether, therefore, a distinction should not be made between mere Papists and recusants? And whether the latter can expect the same protection from the Government as the former?

*300. Whether our Papists in this kingdom can complain, if they are allowed to be as much Papists as the subjects of France or of the Empire?

301. Whether there is any such thing as a body of inhabitants in any Roman catholic country under the sun, that profess an absolute submission to the Pope's orders in matters of an indifferent nature, or that in such points do not think it their duty to obey the civil government?

302. Whether, since the peace of Utrecht, mass was not celebrated, and the sacraments administered in divers dioceses of Sicily, notwithstanding the Pope's interdict?

*303. Whether every plea of conscience is to be regarded? Whether, for instance, the German Anabaptists, Levellers, or Fifth Monarchy men would be tolerated on that pretence?

*304. Whether Popish children bred in charity schools, when bound out in apprenticeship to Protestant masters, do generally continue Protestants?

305. Whether a sum, which would go but a little way towards erecting hospitals for maintaining and educating the children of the native Irish, might not go far in binding them out apprentices to Protestant masters, for husbandry, useful trades, and the service of families?

*306. Whether if the parents are overlooked, there can be any great hopes of success in converting the children?

307. Whether there be any instance of a people's being converted in a Christian sense, otherwise than by preaching to them and instructing them in their own language?

308. Whether catechists in the Irish tongue may not easily be procured and subsisted? And whether this would not be the most practicable means for converting the natives?

309. Whether it be not of great advantage to the church of Rome that she hath clergy suited to all ranks of men, in gradual subordination, from cardinals down to mendicants?

310. Whether her numerous poor clergy are not very useful in missions, and of much influence with the people?

311. Whether, in defect of able missionaries, persons conversant in low life, and speaking the Irish tongue, if well instructed in the first principles of religion and in the Popish controversy, though for the rest on a level with the parish clerks, or the schoolmasters of charity-schools, may not be fit to mix with, and bring over our poor illiterate natives to the Established Church? Whether it is not to be wished that some parts of our liturgy and homilies were publicly read in the Irish language? And whether, in these views, it may not be right to breed up some of the better sort of children in the charity-schools, and qualify them for missionaries, catechists, and readers?

*312. Whether there be any nation of men governed by reason? And yet, if there was not, whether this would be a good argument against the use of reason in public affairs?

313. Whether, as others have supposed an Atlantis or Utopia, we also may not suppose an hyperborean island inhabited by reasonable creatures?

314. Whether an indifferent person, who looks into all hands, may not be a better judge of the game than a party who sees only his own?

*315. Whether one, whose end is to make his countrymen think, may not gain his end, even though they should not think as he doth?

*316. Whether he, who only asks, asserts? and whether any man can fairly confute the querist?

*317. Whether the interest of a part will not always be preferred to that of the whole?

THE

QUERIST,

CONTAINING

Several *QUERIES*,

Propoſed to the

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

PUBLIC.

PART II.

DUBLIN:
Printed by R. Reilly, on Cork-Hill,
For G. Risk, G. Ewing, and W. Smith, Book ſellers in *Dames-Street*, M,DCC,XXXVI.

THE QUERIST.

PART II.

Qu. 1.

WHETHER there be any country in Christendom more capable of improvement than Ireland?

2. Whether we are not as far before other nations with respect to natural advantages, as we are behind them with respect to arts and industry?

3. Whether we do not live in a most fertile soil and temperate climate, and yet whether our people in general do not feel great want and misery?

4. Whether my countrymen are not readier at finding excuses than remedies?

*5. Whether it can be reasonably hoped, that our state will mend, so long as property is insecure among us?

*6. Whether in that case the wisest government, or the best laws can avail us?

*7. Whether a few mishaps to particular persons may not throw this nation into the utmost confusion?

*8. Whether the public is not even on the brink of being undone by private accidents?

9. Whether the wealth and prosperity of our country do not hang by a hair, the probity of one banker, the caution of another, and the lives of all?

10. Whether we have not been sufficiently admonished of this by some late events?

*11. Whether therefore it be not high time to open our eyes?

12. Whether a national bank would not at once secure our properties, put an end to usury, facilitate commerce, supply the want of coin, and produce ready payments in all parts of th kingdom? *See Qu.* 206, 207, *etc.*, *Part I.*

13. Whether the use or nature of money, which all men so eagerly pursue, be yet sufficiently understood or considered by all?

14. Whether mankind are not governed by imitation rather than by reason?

15. Whether there be not a measure or limit within which gold and silver are useful, and beyond which they may be hurtful?

16. Whether that measure be not the circulating of industry?

17. Whether a discovery of the richest gold mine, that ever was in the heart of this kingdom, would be a real advantage to us?

18. Whether it would not tempt foreigners to prey upon us?

19. Whether it would not render us a lazy, proud, and dastardly people? *See Qu.* 45, *Part I.*

20. Whether every man who had money enough, would not be a gentleman? And whether a nation of gentlemen would not be a wretched nation?

21. Whether all things would not bear a high price? And whether men would not increase their fortunes without being the better for it?

22. Whether the same evils would be apprehended from paper-money under an honest and thrifty regulation?

23. Whether, therefore, a national bank would not be more beneficial than even a mine of gold?

*24. Whether private ends are not prosecuted with more attention and vigour than the public? and yet, whether all private ends are not included in the public?

*25. Whether banking be not absolutely necessary to the public weal?

*26. Whether even our private banks, though attended with such hazards as we all know them to be, are not of singular use in defect of a national bank?

27. Whether without them [1] what little business and industry there is would not stagnate? But whether it be not a mighty privilege for a private person, to be able to create an hundred pounds with a dash of his pen?

*28. Whether the mystery of banking did not derive its original from the Italians? Whether this acute people were not, upon a time, bankers all over Europe? Whether that business was not practised by some of their noblest families who made immense profits by it, and whether to that the house of Medici did not originally owe its greatness?

29. Whether the state [2] of Venice was not the first that conceived the advantage of a national bank?

*30. Whether at Venice all payments of bills of exchange and merchants' contracts are not made in the national or public bank, the greatest affairs being transacted only by writing the names of the parties, one as debtor the other as creditor in the bank-book?

[1] "without private banks" in the second edition.
[2] "wise state" in the second edition.

*31. Whether nevertheless it was not found expedient to provide a chest of ready cash for answering all demands that should happen to be made on account of payments in detail?

*32. Whether this offer of ready cash, instead of transfers in the bank, hath not been found to augment rather than diminish the stock thereof?

*33. Whether at Venice, the difference in the value of bank-money above other money be not fixed at twenty per cent.?

*34. Whether the bank of Venice be not shut up four times in the year twenty days each time?

*35. Whether by means of this bank the public be not mistress of a million and a half sterling?

36. Whether the great exactness and integrity with which this bank is managed, be not the chief support of that Republic?

*37. Whether we may not hope for as much skill and honesty in a Protestant Irish Parliament as in a Popish Senate of Venice?

38. Whether the bank of Amsterdam was not begun about one hundred and thirty years ago, and whether at this day, its stock be not conceived to amount to three thousand tons of gold, or thirty millions sterling?

*39. Whether besides coined money, there be not also great quantities of ingots or bars of gold and silver lodged in this bank?

40. Whether all payments of contracts for goods in gross and letters of exchange, must not be made by transfers in the bank books, provided the sum exceed three hundred florins?

*41. Whether it be not true, that the bank of Amsterdam never makes payments in cash?

*42. Whether, nevertheless, it be not also true, that no man who hath credit in the bank can want money from particular persons, who are willing to become creditors in his stead?

*43. Whether any man thinks himself the poorer, because his money is in the bank?

*44. Whether the creditors of the bank of Amsterdam are not at liberty to withdraw their money when they please, and whether this liberty doth not make them less desirous to use it?

*45. Whether this bank be not shut up twice in the year for ten or fifteen days, during which time the accounts are balanced?

46. Whether it be not owing to this bank that the city of Amsterdam, without the least confusion, hazard, or trouble, maintains and every day promotes so general and quick a circulation of industry?

47. Whether it be not the greatest help and spur to commerce, hat property can be so readily conveyed and so well secured by a *compte en banc*, that is, by only writing one man's name for another's in the bank book?

48. Whether at the beginning of the last century, those who had lent money to the public during the war with Spain, were not satisfied by the sole expedient of placing their names in a *compte en banc*, with liberty to transfer their claims?

49. Whether the example of those easy transfers in the *compte en banc*, thus casually erected, did not tempt other men to become creditors to the public, in order to profit by the same secure and expeditious method of keeping and transferring their wealth?

50. Whether this *compte en banc* hath not proved better than a mine of gold to Amsterdam?

51. Whether that city may not be said to owe her greatness to the unpromising accident of her having been in debt more than she was able to pay?

52. Whether it be known that any state from such small beginnings, in so short a time, ever grew to so great wealth and power as the province of Holland hath done; and whether the bank of Amsterdam hath not been the real cause of such extraordinary growth?

*53. Whether we are by nature a more stupid people than the Dutch? And yet whether these things are sufficiently considered by our patriots?

*54. Whether anything less than the utter subversion of those Republics can break the banks of Venice and Amsterdam?

*55. Whether at Hamburg the citizens have not the management of the bank, without the meddling or inspection of the Senate?

*56. Whether the directors be not four principal burghers chosen by plurality of voices, whose business is to see the rules observed, and furnish the cashiers with money?

*57. Whether the book-keepers are not obliged to balance their accounts every week, and exhibit them to the controllers or directors?

*58. Whether any besides the citizens are admitted to have *compte en banc* at Hamburg?

*59. Whether there be not a certain limit, under which no sum can be entered into the bank?

*60. Whether each particular person doth not pay a fee in order to be admitted to a *compte en banc* at Hamburg and Amsterdam?

*61. Whether the effects lodged in the bank at Hamburg are liable to be seized for debt or forfeiture?

*62. Whether this bank doth not lend money upon pawns at low interest and only for half a year, after which term, in default of payment, the pawns are punctually sold by auction?

*63. Whether the book-keepers of the bank of Hamburg are not obliged upon oath never to reveal what sums of money are

paid in or out of the bank, or what effects any particular person has therein?

*64. Whether, therefore, it be possible to know the state or stock of this bank; and yet whether it be not of the greatest reputation and most established credit throughout the North?

65. Whether the success of those public banks in Venice, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, would not naturally produce in other states an inclination to the same methods?

*66. Whether an absolute monarchy be so apt to gain credit, and whether the vivacity of some humours could so well suit with the slow steps and discreet management which a bank requires?

*67. Whether the bank called the general bank of France, contrived by Mr. Law, and established by letters patent in May, 1716, was not in truth a particular and not a national bank, being in the hands of a particular company privileged and protected by the Government?

*68. Whether the Government did not order that the notes of this bank should pass on a par with ready money in all payments of the revenue?

*69. Whether this bank was not obliged to issue only such notes as were payable at sight?

*70. Whether it was not made a capital crime to forge the notes of this bank?

*71. Whether this bank was not restrained from trading either by sea or land, and from taking up money upon interest?

*72. Whether the original stock thereof was not six millions of livres, divided into actions of a thousand crowns each?

*73. Whether the proprietors were not to hold general assemblies twice a year, for the regulating their affairs?

*74. Whether the accompts of this bank were not balanced twice every year?

*75. Whether there were not two chests belonging to this bank, the one called the general chest containing their specie, their bills and their copper plates for the printing of those bills, under the custody of three locks, whereof the keys were kept by the director, the inspector and treasurer; also another called the ordinary chest, containing part of the stock not exceeding two hundred thousand crowns, under the key of the treasurer?

*76. Whether out of this last mentioned sum, each particular cashier was not to be intrusted with a share not exceeding the value of twenty thousand crowns at a time, and that under good security?

*77. Whether the Regent did not reserve to himself the power of calling this bank to account, so often as he should think good, and of appointing the inspector?

*78. Whether in the beginning of the year 1719 the French

King did not convert the general bank of France into a *Banque Royale*, having himself purchased the stock of the company and taken it into his own hands, and appointed the Duke of Orleans chief manager thereof?

*79. Whether from that time, all matters relating to the bank were not transacted in the name, and by the sole authority, of the king?

*80. Whether his Majesty did not undertake to receive and keep the cash of all particular persons, subjects, or foreigners in his said *Royale Banque*, without being paid for that trouble? And whether it was not declared, that such cash should not be liable to seizure on any pretext, not even on the king's own account?

*81. Whether the treasurer alone did not sign all the bills, receive all the stock paid into the bank, and keep account of all the in-goings, and out-goings?

*82. Whether there were not three registers for the enregistering of the bills kept in the *Banque Royale*, one by the inspector, and the other by the controller, and a third by the treasurer?

*83. Whether there was not also a fourth register, containing the profits of the bank, which was visited, at least once a week, by the inspector and controller?

*84. Whether, beside the general bureau or compter in the city of Paris, there were not also appointed five more in the towns of Lyons, Tours, Rochelle, Orleans, and Amiens, each whereof was provided with two chests, one of specie for discharging bills at sight, and another of bank bills to be issued as there should be demand?

*85. Whether, in the above mentioned towns, it was not prohibited to make payments in silver, exceeding the sum of six hundred livres?

*86. Whether all creditors were not empowered to demand payment in bank bills instead of specie?

*87. Whether, in a short compass of time, this bank did not undergo many new changes and regulations by several successive acts of council?

*88. Whether the untimely, repeated, and boundless fabrication of bills did not precipitate in the ruin of this bank?

*89. Whether it be not true, that before the end of July, 1719, they had fabricated four hundred millions of livres in bank-notes, to which they added the sum of one hundred and twenty millions more on the twelfth of September following, also the same sum of one hundred and twenty millions on the twenty-fourth of October, and again on the twenty-ninth of December, in the same year, the farther sum of three hundred and sixty millions, making the whole, from an original stock of six millions, mount, within the compass of one year, to a thousand millions of livres?

*90. Whether on the twenty-eighth of February, 1720, the king did not make an union of the bank with the united company of East and West Indies, which from that time had the administration and profits of the *Banque Royale*?

*91. Whether the king did not still profess himself responsible for the value of the bank bills, and whether the company were not responsible to his Majesty for their management?

*92. Whether sixteen hundred millions of livres, lent to his majesty by the company, was not a sufficient pledge to indemnify the king?

*93. Whether the new directors were not prohibited to make any more bills without an act of council?

*94. Whether the chests and books of the Banque were not subjected to the joint inspection of a counsellor of state, and the Prêvot des Marchands, assisted by two Echevins, a judge, and a consul, who had power to visit when they would and without warning?

*95. Whether in less than two years the actions or shares of the Indian Company (first established for Mississippi, and afterwards increased by the addition of other companies and further privileges) did not rise to near 2000 per cent.? and whether this must be ascribed to real advantages of trade, or to mere frenzy?

*96. Whether, from first to last, there were not fabricated bank bills, of one kind or other, to the value of more than two thousand and six hundred millions of livres, or one hundred and thirty millions sterling?

*97. Whether the credit of the bank did not decline from its union with the Indian Company?

*98. Whether, notwithstanding all the above-mentioned extraordinary measures, the bank bills did not still pass at par with gold and silver to May, 1720, when the French king thought fit, by a new act of council, to make a reduction of their value, which proved a fatal blow, the effects whereof, though soon retracted, no subsequent skill or management could ever repair?

*99. Whether, what no reason, reflection, or foresight could do, this simple matter of fact (the most powerful argument with the multitude) did not do at once, to wit, open the eyes of the people?

*100. Whether the dealers in that sort of ware had ever troubled their heads with the nature of credit, or the true use and end of banks, but only considered their bills and actions as things, to which the general demand gave a price?

*101. Whether the Government was not in great perplexity to contrive expedients for the getting rid of those bank bills, which had been lately multiplied with such an unlimited passion?

*102. Whether notes to the value of about ninety millions were not sunk by being paid off in specie, with the cash of the *Compagnie des Indes* with that of the bank, and that of the *Hôtels des Monnoyes*? Whether five hundred and thirty millions were not converted into annuities at the royal treasury? Whether several hundred millions more in bank bills were not extinguished and replaced by annuities on the City of Paris on taxes throughout the provinces, &c., &c.

*103. Whether, after all other shifts, the last and grand resource for exhausting that ocean, was not the erecting of a *compte en banc* in several towns of France?

*104. Whether, when the imagination of a people is thoroughly wrought upon and heated by their own example, and the arts of designing men, this doth not produce a sort of enthusiasm which takes place of reason, and is the most dangerous distemper in a state?

*105. Whether this epidemical madness should not be always before the eyes of a legislature, in the framing of a national bank?

*106. Whether, therefore, it may not be fatal to engraft trade on a national bank, or to propose dividends on the stock thereof? *See Qu.* 274, *Part I.*

107. Whether it be possible, for a national bank to subsist and maintain its credit under a French government?

*108. Whether it may not be as useful a lesson to consider the bad management of some as the good management of others?

*109. Whether the rapid and surprising success of the schemes of those who directed the French bank did not turn their brains?

*110. Whether the best institutions may not be made subservient to bad ends?

*111. Whether, as the aim of industry is power, and the aim of a bank is to circulate and secure this power to each individual, it doth not follow that absolute power in one hand is inconsistent with a lasting and a flourishing bank?

112. Whether our natural appetites, as well as powers, are not limited to their respective ends and uses? But whether artificial appetites may not be infinite?

113. Whether the simple getting of money, or passing it from hand to hand without industry, be an object worthy of a wise government?

114. Whether, if money be considered as an end, the appetite thereof be not infinite? But whether the ends of money itself be not bounded?

*115. Whether the mistaking of the means for the end was not a fundamental error in the French councils?

116. Whether the total sum of all other powers, be it of enjoyment or action, which belong to man, or to all mankind together, is not in truth a very narrow and limited quantity? But whether fancy is not boundless?

117. Whether this capricious tyrant, which usurps the place of reason, doth not most cruelly torment and delude those poor men, the usurers, stock-jobbers, overseers,[1] and projectors, of content to themselves from heaping up riches, that is, from gathering counters, from multiplying figures, from enlarging denominations, without knowing what they would be at, and without having a proper regard to the use, or end, or nature of things?

118. Whether the *ignis fatuus* of fancy doth not kindle immoderate desires, and lead men into endless pursuits and wild labyrinths?

119. Whether counters be not referred to other things, which so long as they keep pace and proportion with the counters, it must be owned the counters are useful, but whether beyond that to value or covet counters, be not direct folly? *See Qu.* 215, *Part I.*

120. Whether the public aim ought not to be that men's industry should supply their present wants, and the overplus be converted into a stock of power?

121. Whether the better this power is secured, and the more easily it is transferred, industry be not so much the more encouraged?

122. Whether money, more than is expedient for those purposes, be not upon the whole hurtful, rather than beneficial to a state? *See Qu.* 215, *Part I.*

*123. Whether there should not be a constant care to keep the bills at par?

*124. Whether, therefore, bank bills should at any time be multiplied but as trade and business were also multiplied?

*125. Whether it was not madness in France to mint bills and actions, merely to humour the people and rob them of their cash?

*126. Whether we may not profit by their mistakes, and as some things are to be avoided, whether there may not be others worthy of imitation in the conduct of our neighbours?

*127. Whether the way be not clear and open and easy, and whether anything but the will is wanting to our legislature?

*128. Whether jobs and tricks are not detested on all hands, but whether it be not the joint interest of prince and people to promote industry?

*129. Whether, all things considered, a national bank be not

[1] "Overseers" not in second edition.

the most practicable, sure, and speedy method to mend our affairs, and cause industry to flourish among us? *See Qu.* 12, *sup.*, *and Qu.* 206, 207, *Part I.*

*130. Whether a *compte en banc* or current bank bills would best answer our occasions?

*131. Whether a public *compte en banc*, where effects are received, and accounts kept with particular persons, be not an excellent expedient for a great city? *See Qu.* 47 *and* 50.

*132. What effect a general *compte en banc* would have in the metropolis of this kingdom with one in each province subordinate thereunto?

*133. Whether it may not be proper for a great kingdom to unite both expedients, to wit, bank notes and a *compte en banc?*

*134. Whether, nevertheless, it would be advisable to begin with both at once, or rather to proceed first with the bills, and afterwards, as business multiplied, and money or effects flowed in, to open the *compte en banc?*

*135. Whether, for greater security, double books of *compte en banc* should not be kept in different places and hands?

*136. Whether it would not be right to build the compters and public treasuries, where books and bank notes are kept, without wood, all arched and floored with brick or stone, having chests also and cabinets of iron?

*137. Whether divers registers of the bank notes should not be kept in different hands?

*138. Whether there should not be great discretion in the uttering of bank notes, and whether the attempting to do things *per saltum* be not often the way to undo them?

*139. Whether the main art be not by slow degrees and cautious measures to reconcile the bank to the public, to wind it insensibly into the affections of men, and interweave it with the constitution?

140. Whether the promoting of industry should not be always in view, as the true and sole end, the rule and measure of a national bank? And whether all deviations from that object should not be carefully avoided?

*141. Whether a national bank may not prevent the drawing of specie out of the country (where it circulates in small payments), to be shut up in the chests of particular persons?

142. Whether it may not be useful, for supplying manufactures and trade with stock, for regulating exchange, for quickening commerce, for putting spirit into the people?

*143. Whether tenants or debtors could have cause to complain of our monies being reduced to the English value if it were withal multiplied in the same, or in a greater proportion? and whether this would not be the consequence of a national bank? *See Qu.* 29 *and* 30, *Part I.*

*144. If there be an open sure way to thrive, without hazard to ourselves or prejudice to our neighbours, what should hinder us from putting in practice?

*145. Whether in so numerous a Senate, as that of this kingdom, it may not be easier to find men of pure hands and clear heads fit to contrive and model a public bank?

*146. Whether a view of the precipices be not sufficient, or whether we must tumble headlong before we are roused? *See Qu.* 210, *Part I.*

*147. Whether in this drooping and dispirited country, men are quite awake?

148. Whether we are sufficiently sensible of the peculiar security there is in having a bank, that consists of land and paper, one of which cannot be exported, and the other is in no danger of being exported?

149. Whether it be not delightful to complain? And whether there be not many who had rather utter their complaints than redress their evils?

150. Whether, if "the crown of the wise be their riches,"[1] we are not the foolishest people in Christendom?

151. Whether we have not all the while great civil as well as natural advantages?

152. Whether there be any people who have more leisure to cultivate the arts of peace and study the public weal?

153. Whether other nations who enjoy any share of freedom, and have great objects in view, be not unavoidably embarrassed and distracted by factions? But whether we do not divide upon trifles, and whether our parties are not a burlesque upon politics?

154. Whether it be not an advantage that we are not embroiled in foreign affairs; that we hold not the balance of Europe; that we are protected by other fleets and armies; that it is the true interest of a powerful people, from whom we are descended, to guard us on all sides?

155. Whether England doth not really love us and wish well to us, as bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh? And whether it be not our part to cultivate this love and affection all manner of ways?

*156. Whether, if we do not reap the benefits that may be made of our country and government, want of will in the lower people, or want of wit in the upper, be most in fault?

157. What sea-ports or foreign trade have the Swiss? And yet how warm are those people, and how well provided!

158. Whether there may not be found a people who so contrive as to be impoverished by their trade? And whether we are not that people?

[1] Prov. xiv. 24.

159. Whether it would not be better for this island, if all our fine folk of both sexes were shipped off, to remain in foreign countries, rather than that they should spend their estates at home in foreign luxury, and spread the contagion thereof through their native land?

160. Whether our gentry understand or have a notion of magnificence, and whether for want thereof they do not affect very wretched distinctions?

161. Whether there be not an art or skill in governing human pride, so as to render it subservient to the public aim?

162. Whether the great and general aim of the public should not be to employ the people?

163. What right an eldest son hath to the worst education?

164. Whether men's counsels are not the result of their knowledge and their principles?

*165. Whether an assembly of freethinkers, *petit maitres*, and smart fellows, would not make an admirable Senate?

166. Whether there be not labour of the brains as well as of the hands, and whether the former is beneath a gentleman?

167. Whether the public be more interested to protect the property acquired by mere birth than that which is the immediate fruit of learning and virtue?

168. Whether it would not be a poor and ill-judged project to attempt to promote the good of the community, by invading the rights of one part thereof, or of one particular order of men?

169. Whether the public happiness be not proposed by the legislature, and whether such happiness doth not contain that of the individuals?

170. Whether, therefore, a legislator should be content with a vulgar share of knowledge? Whether he should not be a person of reflection and thought, who hath made it his study to understand the true nature and interest of mankind, how to guide men's humours and passions, how to incite their active powers, how to make their several talents co-operate to the mutual benefit of each other, and the general good of the whole? *See Qu.* 183 *and* 184, *Part I.*

171. Whether it doth not follow, that above all things a gentleman's care should be to keep his own faculties sound and entire?

172. Whether the natural phlegm of this island needs any additional stupifier?

173. Whether all spirituous liquors are not, in truth, opiates?

174. Whether our men of business are not generally very grave by fifty?

*175. Whether there be really among us any persons so silly as to encourage drinking in their children?

*176. Whence it is, that our ladies are more alive, and bear age so much better than our gentlemen?

177. Whether all men have not faculties of mind or body which may be employed for the public benefit?

178. Whether the main point be not to multiply and employ our people?

179. Whether hearty food and warm clothing would not enable and encourage the lower sort to labour?

180. Whether, in such a soil as ours, if there was industry, there could be want?

181. Whether the way to make men industrious be not to let them taste the fruits of their industry? And whether the labouring ox should be muzzled? *See Qu.* 173, *Part I.*

182. Whether our landlords are to be told, that industry and numbers would raise the value of their lands, or that one acre about the Tholsel is worth ten thousand acres in Connaught?

183. Whether our old native Irish are not the most indolent and supine people in Christendom?

184. Whether they are yet civilized, and whether their habitations and furniture are not more sordid than those of the savage Americans?

*185. Whether this be altogether their own fault?

186. Whether it be not a sad circumstance to live among lazy beggars? And whether, on the other hand, it would not be delightful to live in a country swarming, like China, with busy people?

187. Whether we should not cast about, by all manner of means, to excite industry, and to remove whatever hinders it? And whether every one should not lend an helping hand? *See Qu.* 3, 4.

188. Whether vanity itself should not be engaged in this good work? And whether it is not to be wished, that the finding of employment for themselves and others, were a fashionable distinction among the ladies?

189. Whether idleness be the mother or the daughter of spleen?

190. Whether it may not be worth while to publish the conversation of Ischomachus and his wife, in Xenophon, for the use of our ladies?

191. Whether it is true, that there have been, upon a time, one hundred millions of people employed in China, without the woollen-trade, or any foreign commerce?

192. Whether the natural inducements to sloth are not greater in the Mogul's country than in Ireland, and yet whether in that suffocating and dispiriting climate, the Banyans are not all, men, women, and children, constantly employed?

193. Whether it be not true, that the Great Mogul's subjects

might undersell us even in our own markets, and clothe our people with their stuffs and calicoes, if they were imported duty free?

194. Whether there can be a greater reproach on the leading men and the patriots of a country, than that the people should want employment?[1]

195. Whether much may not be expected from a biennial consultation of so many wise men about the public good?

196. Whether a tax upon dirt would not be one way of encouraging industry?

*197. Whether it may not be right to appoint censors in every parish to observe and make returns of the idle hands?

*198. Whether a register or history of the idleness and industry of a people would be an useless thing?

*199. Whether we are apprized, of all the uses that may be made of political arithmetic?

200. Whether it would be a great hardship, if every parish were obliged to find work for their poor?

201. Whether children especially, should not be inured to labour betimes?

202. Whether there should not be erected, in each province, an hospital for orphans and foundlings at the expense of old bachelors?

203. Whether it be true, that in the Dutch workhouses, things are so managed, that a child four years old, may earn its own livelihood?

204. What a folly is it to build fine houses, or establish lucrative posts and large incomes, under the notion of providing for the poor?

205. Whether the poor grown up and in health need any other provision, but their own industry under public inspection?

206. Whether the poor-tax in England hath lessened or increased the number of the poor?

*207. Why the workhouse in Dublin, with so good an endowment, should yet be of so little use? and whether this may not be owing to that very endowment?

*208. Whether that income might not, by this time, have gone through the whole kingdom, and erected a dozen workhouses in every county?

209. Whether workhouses should not be made at the least expense, with clay-floors and walls of rough stone, without plastering, ceiling, or glazing.

*210. Whether the tax on chairs or hackney coaches be not paid, rather by the country gentlemen, than the citizens of Dublin?

[1] See Query 367 in the second edition for a passage added to this query. —ED.

211. Whether it be an impossible attempt to set our people at work, or whether industry be a habit which like other habits, may by time and skill be introduced among any people?

212. Whether all manner of means should not be employed to possess the nation in general, with an aversion and contempt for idleness and all idle folk? *See Qu.* 3, *Part I.*

213. Whether it would be a hardship on people destitute of all things, if the public furnished them with necessaries which they should be obliged to earn by their labour?

214. Whether other nations have not found great benefit from the use of slaves in repairing high roads, making rivers navigable, draining bogs, erecting public buildings, bridges and manufactures?

215. Whether temporary servitude would not be the best cure for idleness and beggary?

216. Whether the public hath not a right to employ those who cannot, or who will not find employment for themselves?

217. Whether all sturdy beggars should not be seized and made slaves to the public for a certain term of years?

218. Whether he who is chained in a jail or dungeon hath not for the time lost his liberty? And if so, whether temporary slavery be not already admitted among us?

219. Whether a state of servitude, wherein he should be well worked, fed and clothed, would not be a preferment to such a fellow?

220. Whether criminals in the freest country may not forfeit their liberty, and repair the damage they have done the public by hard labour?

221. What the word servant signifies in the New Testament?

222. Whether the view of criminals chained in pairs and kept at hard labour, would not be very edifying to the multitude? *See Qu.* 58, *Part I.*

223. Whether the want of such an institution be not plainly seen in England, where the disbelief of a future state hardeneth rogues against the fear of death, and where, through the great growth of robbers and house-breakers it becomes every day more necessary?

224. Whether it be not easier to prevent than to remedy, and whether we should not profit by the example of others?

225. Whether felons are not often spared, and therefore encouraged, by the compassion of those who should prosecute them?

226. Whether many that would not take away the life of a thief, may not nevertheless be willing to bring him to a more adequate punishment?

*227. Whether there should not be a difference between the treatment of criminals and that of other slaves?

228. Whether the most indolent would be fond of idleness, if they regarded it as the sure road to hard labour?

229. Whether the industry of the lower part of our people doth not much depend on the expense of the upper?

230. What would be the consequence, if our gentry affected to distinguish themselves by fine houses rather than fine clothes?

231. Whether any people in Europe are so meanly provided with houses and furniture in proportion to their incomes, as the men of estates in Ireland?

232. Whether building would not peculiarly encourage all other arts in this kingdom?

233. Whether smiths, masons, bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, joiners, tilers, plumbers, and glaziers, would not all find employment if the humour of building prevailed?

234. Whether the ornaments and furniture of a good house do not employ a number of all sorts of artificers, in iron, wood, marble, brass, pewter, copper, wool, flax, and divers other materials?

235. Whether in buildings and gardens, a great number of day-labourers do not find employment?

236. Whether by these means much of that sustenance and wealth of this nation which now goes to foreigners would not be kept at home, and nourish and circulate among our own people?

237. Whether as industry produced good living, the number of hands and mouths would not be increased; and in proportion thereunto, whether there would not be every day more occasion for agriculture? And whether this article alone would not employ a world of people?

238. Whether such management would not equally provide for the magnificence of the rich, and the necessities of the poor? *See Qu.* 125, 126, *Part I.*

239. Whether an expense in building and improvements doth not remain at home, pass to the heir, and adorn the public? And whether any of these things can be said of claret?

240. Whether fools do not make fashions, and wise men follow them? *See Qu.* 13, *Part I.*

241. Whether, for one who hurts his fortune by improvements, twenty do not ruin themselves by foreign luxury?

242. Whether in proportion as Ireland was improved and beautified by fine seats, the number of absentees would not decrease?

243. Whether he who employs men in buildings and manufactures doth not put life in the country, and whether the neighbourhood round him be not observed to thrive?

244. Whether money circulated on the landlord's own lands, and among his own tenants, doth not return into his own pocket?

245. Whether every squire that made his domain swarm with busy hands, like a bee-hive or ant-hill, would not serve his own interest, as well as that of his country?

246. Whether a gentleman, who hath seen a little of the world and observed how men live elsewhere, can contentedly sit down in a cold, damp, sordid habitation, in the midst of a bleak country, inhabited by thieves and beggars?

247. Whether on the other hand, a handsome seat amidst well-improved lands, fair villages, and a thriving neighbourhood, may not invite a man to dwell on his own estate, and quit the life of an insignificant saunterer about town, for that of an useful country-gentleman?

248. Whether it would not be of use and ornament, if the towns throughout this kingdom were provided with decent churches, town-houses, workhouses, market-places and paved streets, with some order taken for cleanliness? *See Qu.* 196.

249. Whether if each of these towns were addicted to some peculiar manufacture, we should not find, that the employing many hands together on the same work was the way to perfect our workmen? And whether all these things might not soon be provided by a domestic industry, if money were not wanting?

250. Whether money could ever be wanting to the demands of industry, if we had a national bank?

*251. Whether when a motion was once upon a time to establish a private bank in this kingdom by public authority, divers gentlemen did not shew themselves forward to embark in that design?

*252. Whether it may not now be hoped that our patriots will be as forward to examine and consider the proposal of a public bank calculated only for the public good?

*253. Whether any people upon earth shew a more early zeal for the service of their country, greater eagerness to bear a part in the Legislature, or a more general parturiency with respect to politics and public counsels?

*254. Whether, nevertheless, a light and ludicrous vein be not the reigning humour; but whether there was ever greater cause to be serious?

THE

QUERIST,

CONTAINING

Several *QUERIES*,

Propoſed to the

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

PUBLIC.

PART III.

Conſult not with a Merchant concerning Exchange.
Eccluſ. c. xxxvii. v. 11.

DUBLIN:
Printed by R. Reilly, on Cork-Hill,
For Jos. Leathley, Bookſeller, in *Dames-Street*.
M, DCC, XXXVII.

THE QUERIST.

PART III.

Qu. 1.

WHETHER the fable of Hercules and the carter, ever suited any nation like this nation of Ireland?

2. Whether it be not a new spectacle under the sun, to behold in such a climate and such a soil, and under such a gentle government, so many roads untrodden, fields untilled, houses desolate and hands unemployed?

3. Whether there is any country in Christendom, either kingdom or republic, depending or independent, free or enslaved, which may not afford us an useful lesson?

4. Whether the frugal Swiss have any other commodities, but their butter and cheese and a few cattle, for exportation; whether, nevertheless, the single canton of Bern hath not in her public treasury two millions sterling?

5. Whether that small town of Bern, with its scanty, barren territory, in a mountainous corner, without sea-ports, without manufactures, without mines, be not rich by mere dint of frugality?

6. Whether the Swiss in general have not sumptuary laws, prohibiting the use of gold, jewels, silver, silk, and lace in their apparel, and indulging the women only to wear silk on festivals, weddings, and public solemnities?

7. Whether there be not two ways of growing rich, sparing and getting? But whether the lazy spendthrift must not be doubly poor?

8. Whether money circulating be not the life of industry; and whether the want thereof doth not render a state gouty and inactive?

9. But, whether if we had a national bank, and our present cash (small as it is) were put into the most convenient shape, men should hear any public complaints for want of money?

10. Whether all circulation be not alike a circulation of credit, whatsoever medium (metal or paper) is employed, and whether

gold be any more than credit for so much power? *See Qu.* 37, *Part I.*

11. Whether the wealth of the richest nations in Christendom doth not consist in paper, vastly more than in gold and silver.

12. Whether Lord Clarendon doth not aver of his own knowledge, that the Prince of Orange, with the best credit, and the assistance of the richest men in Amsterdam, was above ten days endeavouring to raise twenty thousand pounds in specie, without being able to raise half the sum in all that time? See Clarendon's History, b. 12.

*13. Whether the whole city of Amsterdam would not have been troubled to have brought together twenty thousand pounds in one room? *Ibid.*

*14. Whether it be not absolutely necessary that there must be a bank and must be a trust? And, if so, whether it be not the most safe and prudent course to have a national bank and trust the legislature? *See Qu.* 25 *and* 26, *Part II.*

*15. Whether objections against trust in general avail, when it is allowed there must be a trust, and the only question is where to place this trust, whether in the legislature or in private hands?

*16. Whether it can be expected that private persons should have more regard to the public than the public itself?

*17. Whether, if there be hazards from mismanagement, those may not be provided against in the framing of a public bank; but whether any provision can be made against the mismanagement of private banks that are under no check, control, or inspection?

*18. Whatever may be said for the sake of objecting, yet whether it be not false in fact, that men would prefer a private security to a public security?

*19. Whether a national bank ought to be considered as a new experiment; and whether it be not a motive to try this scheme that it hath been already tried with success in other countries? *See Qu.* 200, *Part I.*, *and Qu.* 52, *Part II.*

*20. If power followeth money, whether this can be anywhere more properly and securely placed, than in the same hands wherein the supreme power is already placed?

*21. Whether there be more danger of abuse in a private than in a public management?

*22. Whether the proper usual remedy for abuses of private banks be not to bring them before Parliament, and subject them to the inspection of a committee; and whether it be not more prudent to prevent than to redress an evil?

23. Supposing there had been hitherto no such thing as a bank, and the question were now first proposed, whether it would be safer to circulate unlimited bills in a private credit, or bills to

a limited value on the public credit of the community, what would men think?

*24. Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof; and whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath not been attended with great advantage to the public?

*25. Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not much more to be apprehended from private banks; but whether men by custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers, which are therefore thought less than they really are?

*26. Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense, honesty, and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few private men, and the public was not fit to be trusted?

*27. Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should be afraid to trust itself?

*28. But, whether a private interest be not generally supported and pursued with more zeal than a public?

29. Whether the maxim, "What is everybody's business is nobody's," prevails in any country under the sun more than in Ireland?

*30. Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public?

*31. Whether there be not less security where there are more temptations and fewer checks?

*32. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great assembly of the nation?

*33. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and inspected by Parliament?

*34. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not increase the danger?

*35. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed and inspected by the legislature?

*36. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as well feared without it?

*37. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become an instrument of oppression?

*38. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the demands upon it are unknown?

*39. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?

*40. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the public, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?

*41. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power?

*42. What should tempt the public to defraud itself?

*43. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be *felo de se;* and whether it be not reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction?

*44. Whether the objection to a public national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?

*45. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without, that there could have been of late so many sufferers?

*46. Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises?

*47. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job?

*48. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?

*49. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?

*50. If it be not ridiculous to question whether the public can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?

51. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security? And whether anything but the ruin of the state can produce a national bankruptcy?

52. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people?

*53. Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?

*54. Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind?

*55. Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful?

*56. Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the less subject to abuse?

*57. Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?

*58. Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit? *See Qu.* 208 *and* 261, *Part I.*

*59. Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side?

*60. Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniences on each side and considering neither absolutely?

*61. Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than arguments?

*62. Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones?

*63. Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity?

*64. If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear?

*65. Suppose a power in the government to hurt the public by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this? Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?

*66. Whether even a wicked will intrusted with power can be supposed to abuse it for no end?

*67. Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh such objections do not believe them?

*68. Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow-subjects of Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own?

*69. Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the dirt and nakedness and famine of our people, or envy them shoes for their feet and beef for their bellies?

*70. What possible handle or inclination could our having a national bank give other people to distress us?

*71. Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to England?

*72. Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of spleen?

73. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate through London, and throughout all England, as freely as that of any part of his Majesty's dominions?

74. Whether, therefore, it be not evidently the interest of the people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our wealth, which shall not impair their own?

75. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of their good offices? *See Qu.* 95 *and* 99, *Part I.*

76. Whether we can propose to thrive, so long as we entertain a wrongheaded distrust of England?

77. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry and that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as some accession to our own?

*78. Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever forget what they owe to England?

*79. Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in such wretched circumstances, and which, at the same time could be so easily remedied, and nevertheless the remedy not applied?

*80. What must become of a people that can neither see the plainest things nor do the easiest?

*81. Be the money lodged in the bank what it will, yet whether an Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples?

*82. If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest, and therefore hurt the monied man, whether the same objection would not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver?

*83. But whether a bank that utters bills, with the sole view of promoting the public weal, may not so proportion their quantity as to avoid several inconveniences which might attend private banks?

84. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank? And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit? *See Qu.* 51 *and* 52.

*85. Whether anything be more reasonable than that the public, which makes the whole profit of the bank, should engage to make good its credit?

86. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong, but whether they are not still prejudices?

87. Whether paper doth not, by its stamp and signature

acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold?

*88. Whether, in order to make men see and feel, it be not often necessary to inculcate the same thing, and place it in different lights?

89. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket, entitling to power and fitted to record and transfer such power?

*90. Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought to be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of private banks? whether they are not in effect as little trusted, have as little power, are as much limited by rules, and as liable to inspection?

*91. Whether the mistaking this point may not create some prejudice against a national bank, as if it depended on the credit, or wisdom, or honesty, of private men, rather than on the public, which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof, and as such obliged to support it?

92. Whether though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all, pay out money, yet whether every man possessed of specie be not ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank?

*93. Whether a national bank would not be the great means and motive for employing our poor in manufactures? *See Qu.* 212 *and* 250, *Part II.*

*94. Whether money, though lent out only to the rich, would not soon circulate among the poor? And whether any man borrows but with an intent to circulate?

*95. Whether both government and people would not in the event be gainers by a national bank? And whether anything but wrong conceptions of its nature can make those that wish well to either averse from it?

*96. Whether it may not be right to think, and to have it thought, that England and Ireland, prince and people, have one and the same interest?

*97. Whether, if we had more means to set on foot such manufactures and such commerce as consists with the interest of England, there would not of course be less sheep-walks and less wool exported to foreign countries? And whether a national bank would not supply such means? *See Qu.* 250, *Part II.*

98. Whether we may not obtain that as friends, which it is in vain to hope for as rivals?

99. Whether in every instance by which we prejudice Eng-

land, we do not, in a greater degree, prejudice ourselves? *See Qu.* 153 *and* 154, *Part II.*

100. Whether, in the rude original of society, the first step was not the exchanging of commodities, the next a substituting of metals by weight as the common medium of circulation, after this the making use of coin, lastly a further refinement by the use of paper with proper marks and signatures? And whether this, as it is the last, so it be not the greatest improvement?

101. Whether we are not in fact the only people who may be said to starve in the midst of plenty?

*102. Whether business in general doth not languish among us? Whether our land is not untilled? Whether its inhabitants are not upon the wing?

103. Whether there can be a worse sign than that people should quit their country for a livelihood? Though men often leave their country for health, or pleasure, or riches, yet to leave it merely for a livelihood? Whether this be not exceeding bad, and showeth some peculiar mismanagement?

*104. Whether our circumstances do not call aloud for some present remedy? And whether that remedy be not in our power?

105. Whether, in order to redress our evils, artificial helps are not most wanted in a land where industry is most against the natural grain of the people?

*106. Whether, of all the helps to industry that ever were invented, there be any more secure, more easy, and more effectual than a national bank?

*107. Whether medicines do not recommend themselves by experience, even though their reasons be obscure? But whether reason and fact are not equally clear in favour of this political medicine?

108. Whether, although the prepossessions about gold and silver have taken deep root, yet the example of our colonies in America doth not make it as plain as daylight, that they are not so necessary to the wealth of a nation as the vulgar of all ranks imagine? *See Qu.* 284, 285, *Part I.*

109. Whether it be not evident that we maintain a much greater inward and outward commerce, and be five times richer than we are; nay, and our bills abroad be of far greater credit, though we had not one ounce of gold or silver in the whole island?

110. Whether wrongheaded maxims, customs, and fashions, are not sufficient to destroy any people which hath so few resources as the inhabitants of Ireland?

111. Whether it would not be a horrible thing to see our matrons make dress and play their chief concern?

112. Whether our ladies might not as well endow monasteries

as wear Flanders lace? And whether it be not true that Popish nuns are maintained by Protestant contributions?

113. Whether England, which hath a free trade, whatever she remits for foreign luxury with one hand, doth not with the other receive much more from abroad? Whether, nevertheless, this nation would not be a gainer, if our women would content themselves with the same moderation in point of expense as the English ladies?

114. But whether it be not a notorious truth, that our Irish ladies are on a foot, as to dress, with those of three times [1] their fortune in England?

115. Whether it be not even certain, that the matrons of this forlorn country send out a greater proportion of its wealth for fine apparel, than any other females on the whole surface of this terraqueous globe?

116. Whether the expense, great as it is, be the greatest evil; but whether this folly may not produce many other follies, an entire derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption in both sexes?

*117. Whether therefore a tax on all gold and silver in apparel, on all foreign laces and silks, may not raise a fund for the bank, and at the same time have other salutary effects on the public?

*118. But, if gentlemen had rather tax themselves in another way, whether an additional tax of ten shillings the hogshead on wines may not supply a sufficient fund for the national bank, all defects to be made good by Parliament?

*119. Whether upon the whole it may not be right to appoint a national bank?

*120. Whether the stock and security of such bank would not be, in truth, the national stock, or the total sum of the wealth of this kingdom? *See Qu.* 84.

*121. Whether, nevertheless, there should not be a particular fund for present use in answering bills and circulating credit?

*122. Whether for this end any fund may not suffice, provided an Act be passed for making good deficiencies?

*123. Whether the sole proprietor of such bank should not be the public, and the sole director the legislature?

*124. Whether the managers, officers, and cashiers should not be servants of the public, acting by orders and limited by rules of the legislature?

*125. Whether there should not be a standing number of inspectors, one-third men in great office, the rest members of both houses, half whereof to go out, and half to come in every session?

[1] "Five times" in the second edition.

*126. Whether those inspectors should not, all in a body, visit twice a year, and three as often as they pleased?

*127. Whether the general bank should not be in Dublin, and subordinate banks or compters one in each province of Munster, Ulster, and Connaught?

*128. Whether there should not be such provisions of stamps, signatures, checks, strong boxes, and all other measures for securing the bank notes and cash, as are usual in other banks?

*129. Whether these ten or a dozen last queries may not easily be converted into heads of a bill? *See Parts I. and II.*

*130. Whether any one concerns himself about the security or funds of the bank of Venice or Amsterdam? And whether in a little time the case would not be the same as to our bank?

131. Whether nevertheless the first beginning of expedients do not always meet with prejudices? And whether even the prejudices of a people ought not to be respected?

132. Whether a national bank be not the true philosopher's stone in a state? *See Qu.* 23, *Part II.*

*133. Whether it be not the most obvious remedy for all the inconveniences we labour under with regard to our coin?

*134. Whether it be not agreed on all hands that our coin is on very bad foot, and calls for some present remedy?

*135. Whether the want of silver hath not introduced a sort of traffic for change, which is purchased at no inconsiderable discount to the great obstruction of our domestic commerce?

*136. Whether, though it be evident silver is wanted, it be yet so evident which is the best way of providing for this want? Whether by lowering the gold, or raising the silver, or partly one, partly the other?

*137. Whether a partial raising of one species be not, in truth, granting a premium to our bankers for importing such species? And what that species is which deserves most to be encouraged?

*138. Whether it be not just that all gold should be alike rated according to its weight and fineness?

*139. Whether this may be best done by lowering some certain species of gold, or by raising others, or by joining both methods together?

140. Whether all regulations of coin should not be made, with a view to encourage industry and a circulation of commerce, throughout the kingdom?

*141. Whether the North and the South have not, in truth, one and the same interest in this matter?

142. Whether to oil the wheel of commerce be not a common benefit? And whether this be not done by avoiding fractions and multiplying small silver?

*143. But, whether a public benefit ought to be obtained by

unjust methods, and therefore, whether any reduction of coin should be thought of which may hurt the properties of private men?

*144. Whether those parts of the kingdom where commerce doth most abound would not be the greatest gainers by having our coin placed on a right foot?

*145. Whether, in case a reduction of coin be thought expedient, the uttering of bank bills at the same time may not prevent the inconveniences of such a reduction?

*146. But, whether any public expediency could countervail a real pressure on those who are least able to bear it, tenants and debtors?

*147. Whether, nevertheless, the political body, as well as the natural, must not sometimes be worse in order to be better?

148. Whether, all things considered, a general raising the value of gold and silver be not so far from bringing greater quantities thereof into the kingdom, that it would produce a direct contrary effect, inasmuch as less, in that case, would serve, and therefore less be wanted? And whether men do not import a commodity, in proportion to the demand or want of it?

149. Whether the lowering of our gold would not create a fever in the state? And whether a fever be not sometimes a cure, but whether it be not the last cure a man would choose?

*150. What if our other gold were raised to a par with Portugal gold, and the value of silver in general raised with regard to that of gold?

*151. Whether the public ends may or may not be better answered by such argumentation, than by a reduction of our coin?

*152. Provided silver is multiplied, be it by raising or diminishing the value of our coin, whether the great end is not answered?

153. Whether raising the value of a particular species will not tend to multiply such species, and to lessen others in proportion thereunto? And whether a much less quantity of cash in silver would not, in reality, enrich the nation more than a much greater in gold?

*154. Whether, if a reduction be thought necessary, the obvious means to prevent all hardships and injustice be not a national bank?

*155. Upon supposition that the cash of this kingdom was five hundred thousand pounds, and by lowering the various species each one-fifth of its value the whole sum was reduced to four hundred thousand pounds, whether the difficulty of getting money, and consequently of paying rents, would not be increased in the proportion of five to four?

*156. Whether such difficulty would not be a great and unmerited distress on all the tenants in the nation? But if at the same time with the aforesaid reduction there were uttered one hundred thousand pounds additional to the former current stock, whether such difficulty or inconvenience would then be felt?

157. Whether, *cæteris paribus*, it be not true that the prices of things increase as the quantity of money increaseth, and are diminished as that is diminished? And whether, by the quantity of money, is not to be understood the amount of the denominations, all contracts being nominal for pounds, shillings, and pence, and not for weights of gold or silver?

*158. Whether in any foreign market, twopence advance in a kilderkin of corn could greatly affect our trade?

*159. Whether in regard of the far greater changes and fluctuations of price from the difference of seasons and other accidents, that small rise should seem considerable?

160. Whether our exports do not consist of such necessaries as other countries cannot well be without?

161. Whether upon the circulation of a national bank more land would not be tilled, more hands employed, and consequently more commodities exported?

*162. Whether, setting aside the assistance of a national bank, it will be easy to reduce or lower our coin without some hardship (at least for the present) on a great number of particular persons?

*163. Whether, nevertheless, the scheme of a national bank doth not entirely stand clear of this question; and whether such bank may not completely subsist and answer its ends, although there should be no alteration at all made in the value of our coin?

*164. Whether, if the ill state of our coin be not redressed, that scheme would not be still more necessary, inasmuch as a national bank, by putting new life and vigour into our commerce, may prevent our feeling the ill effects of the want of such redress?

*165. Whether men united by interest are not often divided by opinion; and whether such difference in opinion be not an effect of misapprehension?

*166. Whether two things are not manifest, first, that some alteration in the value of our coin is highly expedient, secondly, that whatever alteration is made, the tenderest care should be had of the properties of the people, and even a regard paid to their prejudices?

*167. Whether our taking the coin of another nation for more than it is worth be not, in reality and in event, a cheat upon ourselves?

*168. Whether a particular coin over-rated will not be sure to flow in upon us from other countries beside that where it is coined?

*169. Whether, in case the wisdom of the nation shall think fit to alter our coin, without erecting a national bank, the rule for lessening or avoiding present inconvenience should not be so to order matters, by raising the silver and depressing the gold, as that the total sum of coined cash within the kingdom shall, in denomination, remain the same, or amount to the same nominal value, after the change it did before?

*170. Whether all inconvenience ought not to be lessened as much as may be; but after, whether it would be prudent, for the sake of a small inconvenience, to obstruct a much greater good? And whether it may not sometimes happen that an inconvenience which in fancy and general discourse seems great shall, when accurately inspected and cast up, appear inconsiderable?

*171. Whether in public councils the sum of things, here and there, present and future, ought not to be regarded?

172. Whether silver and small money be not that which circulates the quickest, and passeth through all hands, on the road, in the market, at the shop?

173. Whether, all things considered, it would not be better for a kingdom that its cash consisted of half a million in small silver than of two millions in gold?[1] *See Qu. 22, Part I.*

174. Whether there be not every day five hundred lesser payments made for one that requires gold?

175. Whether Spain, where gold bears the highest value, be not the laziest; and China, where it bears the lowest, be not the most industrious country in the known world?

*176. Money being a ticket which entitles to power and records the title, whether such power avails otherwise than as it is exerted into act?

177. Whether it be not evidently the interest of every state, that its money should rather circulate than stagnate?

178. Whether the principal use of cash be not its ready passing from hand to hand to answer common occasions,[2] and whether common occasions of all sorts of people are not small ones?

179. Whether business at fairs and markets is not often at a stand, and often hindered, even though the seller hath his commodities at hand and the purchaser his gold, yet for want of change?

*180. Whether beside that value of money which is rated by weight, there be not also another value consisting in its aptness to circulate?

[1] "Five times that sum in gold" in second edition.

[2] "Common occasions of the common people" in second edition.

181. As wealth is really power, and coin a ticket conveying power, whether those tickets which are the fittest for that use ought not to be preferred?

182. Whether those tickets which singly transfer small shares of power, and being multiplied, large shares, are not fitter for common use than those which singly transfer large shares? *See Qu.* 178.

183. Whether the public is not more benefited by a shilling that circulates, than a pound that lies dead?

184. Whether sixpence twice paid, be not as good as a shilling once paid?

185. Whether the same shilling circulating in a village may not supply one man with bread, another with stockings, a third with a knife, a fourth with paper, a fifth with nails, and so answer many wants which must otherwise have remained unsatisfied?

186. Whether facilitating and quickening the circulation of power to supply wants, be not the promoting of wealth and industry among the lower people? And whether upon this the wealth of the great doth not depend?

187. Whether, without the proper means of circulation, it be not vain to hope for thriving manufactures and a busy people?

188. Whether four pounds in small cash may not circulate and enliven an Irish market, which many four pound pieces would permit to stagnate?[1]

189. Whether a man that could move nothing less than an hundred pound weight would not be much at a loss to supply his wants; and whether it would not be better for him to be less strong and more active?

190. Whether the natural body can be in a state of health and vigour, without a due circulation of the extremities, even in the fingers and toes? And whether the political body, any more than the natural, can thrive without a proportionable circulation through the minutest and most inconsiderable parts thereof?

191. If we had a mint for coining only shillings, sixpences, and copper money, whether the nation would not soon feel the good effects thereof?

192. Whether the greater waste by wearing of small coins would not be abundantly overbalanced by their usefulness?

193. Whether it be not the industry of common people that feeds the state, and whether it be possible to keep this industry alive without small money?

194. Whether the want of this be not a great bar to our employing the people in these manufactures which are open to us, and do not interfere with Great Britain?

[1] See p. 158 for a foot-note added to this query in the second edition.

195. Whether, therefore, such want doth not drive men into the lazy way of employing land under sheep walk?

196. Whether the running of wool from Ireland can so effectually be prevented, as by encouraging other business and manufactures among our people?

197. Whatever commodities Great Britain importeth, which we might supply, whether it be not her real interest to import them from us rather than from any other people?

198. Whether the apprehension of many among us (who for that very reason stick to their wool) that England may hereafter prohibit, limit, or discourage our linen trade, when it hath been once, with great pains and expense, thoroughly introduced and settled in this land, be not altogether groundless and unjust? *See Qu.* 99, *Part I., and Qu.* 155, *Part II.*

199. Whether it is possible for this country, which hath neither mines of gold nor a free trade, to support for any time the sending out of specie?

200. Whether, in fact, our payments are not made by bills? And whether our foreign credit doth not depend on our domestic industry, and our bills on that credit?

201. Whether, in order to mend it, we ought not first to know the peculiar wretchedness of our state? And whether there be any knowing of this but by comparison?

202. Whether there are not single market towns in England that turn more money in buying and selling than whole counties, perhaps provinces, with us?

203. Whether the small town of Birmingham alone doth not, upon an average, circulate every week one way or other, to the value of fifty thousand pounds? But whether the same crown may not be often paid?

*204. Whether there be any woollen manufacture in Birmingham?

*205. Whether bad management may not be worse than slavery? And whether any part of Christendom be in a more languishing condition than this kingdom?

206. But whether any kingdom in Europe be so good a customer at Bordeaux as Ireland?

207. Whether the police and economy of France be not governed by wise councils? And whether any one from this country, who sees their towns, and manufactures, and commerce, will not wonder what our senators have been doing?

208. What variety and number of excellent manufactures are to be met with throughout the whole kingdom of France?

209. Whether there are not every where some or other mills for many uses, forges and furnaces for iron-work, looms for tapestry, glass houses, and so forth?

210. What quantities of paper, stockings, hats, what manu-

factures of wool, silk, linen, hemp, leather, wax, earthenware, brass, lead, tin, &c.?

211. Whether the manufactures and commerce of the single town of Lyons do not amount to a greater value than all the manufactures and all the trade of this kingdom taken together?

*212. Whether it be not true, that within the compass of one year there flowed from the South Sea, when that commerce was open, into the single town of St. Malo's, a sum of gold and silver equal to four times the whole specie of this kingdom? And whether that same part of France doth not at present draw from Cadiz upwards of two hundred thousand pounds per annum?

213. Whether in the anniversary fair at the small town of Beaucair, upon the Rhone, there be not as much money laid out as the current cash of this kingdom amounts to?

*214. Whether it be true that the Dutch make ten millions of livres, every return of the flota and galleons, by their sales at the Indies and at Cadiz?

*215. Whether it be true that England makes at least one hundred thousand pounds per annum by the single article of hats sold in Spain?

216. Whether the very shreds shorn from woollen-cloth, which are thrown away in Ireland, do not make a beautiful tapestry in France?

*217. Whether the toys of Thiers do not employ five thousand families?

*218. Whether there be not a small town or two in France which supply all Spain with cards?

219. Whether there be not French towns subsisted merely by making pins?

220. Whether the coarse fingers of those very women, those same peasants, who one part of the year till the ground and dress the vineyards, are not another employed in making the finest French point?

221. Whether there is not a great number of idle fingers among the wives and daughters of our peasants?

*222. Whether, about twenty-five years ago, they did not first attempt to make porcelain in France; and whether, in a few years, they did not make it so well, as to rival that which comes from China?

223. Whether the French do not raise a trade from saffron, dyeing drugs and the like products, which may do with us as well as with them?

224. Whether we may not have materials of our own growth to supply all manufactures, as well as France, except silk; and whether the bulk of what silk, even they manufacture, be not imported?

225. Whether it be possible for this country to grow rich, so

long as what is made by domestic industry is spent in foreign luxury?

*226. Whether part of the profits of the bank should not be employed in erecting manufactures of several kinds, which are not likely to be set on foot and carried on to perfection without great stock, public encouragement, general regulations, and the concurrence of many hands? *See Qu.* 238.

227. Whether our natural Irish are not partly Spaniards and partly Tartars; and whether they do not bear signatures of their descent from both these nations, which is also confirmed by all their histories?

228. Whether the Tartar line[1] is not numerous in this land? And whether there is an idler occupation under the sun than to attend flocks and herds of cattle?

229. Whether the wisdom of the state should not wrestle with this hereditary disposition of our Tartars, and with a high hand introduce agriculture?

*230. Whether it were not to be wished that our people shewed their descent from Spain, rather by their honour and honesty than their pride, and if so, whether they might not easily insinuate themselves into a larger share of the Spanish trade?

231. Whether once upon a time France did not, by her linen alone, draw yearly from Spain about eight millions of livres?

232. Whether the French have not suffered in their linen trade with Spain, by not making their cloth of due breadth; and whether any other people have suffered, and are still likely to suffer, through the same prevarication?[2]

233. Whether the Spaniards are not rich and lazy, and whether they have not a particular inclination and favour for the inhabitants of this island? But whether a punctual people do not love punctual dealers?

234. Whether about fourteen years ago we had not come into a considerable share of the linen trade with Spain; and what put a stop to this?

*235. Whether we may not, with common industry and common honesty, undersell any nation in Europe?

236. Whether if the linen manufacture were carried on in the other provinces, as well as in the north, the merchants of Cork, Limerick, and Galway, would not soon find the way to Spain?

237. Whether the woollen manufacture of England is not divided into several parts or branches, appropriated to particular places, where they are only or principally manufactured; fine cloths in Somersetshire, coarse in Yorkshire, long ells at Exeter,

[1] "Progeny" in the second edition.

[2] See p. 160 for a foot-note added to this query in the second edition.

saies at Sudbury, crapes at Norwich, linseys at Kendal, blankets at Whitney, and so forth?

238. Whether the united skill, industry, and emulation of many together on the same work, be not the way to advance it? And whether it had been otherwise possible for England to have carried on her woollen-manufacture to so great perfection?

239. Whether it would not on many accounts be right, if we observed the same course with respect to our linen-manufacture; and that diapers were made in one town or district, damasks in another, sheeting in a third, fine wearing linen in a fourth, coarse in a fifth, in another cambrics, in another thread and stockings, in others stamped linen, or striped linen, or tickings, or dyed linen, of which last kinds there is so great a consumption among the seafaring men of all nations?

240. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves of the different sorts of linen which are in request among different people?

241. Whether we do not yearly consume of French wines about a thousand tun more than either Sweden or Denmark: and yet, whether those nations pay ready money as we do? *See Qu.* 169, *Part I.*

*242. Whether they are not the Swiss that make hay and gather in the harvest throughout Alsatia?

243. Whether it be not a custom for some thousands of Frenchmen to go about the beginning of March into Spain, and having tilled the lands and gathered the harvest of Spain, to return home with money in their pockets about the end of November?

244. Whether of late years our Irish labourers do not carry on the same business in England, to the great discontent of many there? But whether we have not much more reason than the people of England to be displeased at this commerce?

245. Whether, notwithstanding the cash supposed to be brought into it, any nation is, in truth, a gainer by such traffic?

246. Whether the industry of our people employed in foreign land, while our own is left uncultivated, be not a great loss to the country?

247. Whether it would not be much better for us, if, instead of sending our men abroad, we could draw men from the neighbouring countries to cultivate our own?

248. Whether, nevertheless, we are not apt to think the money imported by our labourers to be so much clear gains to this country; but whether a little reflection and a little political arithmetic, may not show us our mistake?

249. Whether our prejudices about gold and silver are not very apt to infect or misguide our judgments and reasonings about the public weal? *See Qu.* 291, *and Qu.* 13, 14, 15, *Part II.*

250. Whether it be not a good rule whereby to judge of the trade of any city, and its usefulness, to observe whether there is a circulation through the extremities, and whether the people round about are busy and warm?

251. Whether we had not, some years since, a manufacture of hats at Athlone, and of earthenware at Arklow; and what became of those manufactures?

252. Why do we not make tiles of our own, for flooring and roofing, rather than bring them from Holland?

253. What manufactures are there in France and Venice of gilt-leather, how cheap and how splendid a furniture?

254. Whether we may not for the same use, manufacture divers things at home, of more beauty and variety than wainscot, which is imported at such expense from Norway?

255. Whether the use and the fashion will not soon make a manufacture?

256. Whether if our gentry used to drink mead and cider, we should not soon have those liquors in the utmost perfection and plenty?

257. Whether it be not wonderful, that with such pastures, and so many black cattle, we do not find ourselves in cheese?

258. Whether great profits may not be made by fisheries; but whether those of our Irish who live by that business, do not contrive to be drunk and unemployed one half of the year?

259. Whether it be not folly to think, an inward commerce cannot enrich a state, because it doth not increase its quantity of gold and silver? And whether it is possible a country should not thrive, while wants are supplied, and business goes on?

260. Whether plenty of all the necessaries and comforts of life be not real wealth?

261. Whether Lyons, by the advantage of her midland situation and the rivers Rhone and Saone, be not a great magazine, or mart for inward commerce? And whether she doth not maintain a constant trade with most parts of France; with Provence for oils and dried fruits, for wines and cloth with Languedoc, for stuffs with Champaign, for linen with Picardy, Normandy, and Bretagne, for corn with Burgundy?

262. Whether she doth not receive and utter all those commodities, and raise a profit from the distribution thereof, as well as of her own manufactures, throughout the kingdom of France?

263. Whether the charge of making good roads and navigable rivers across the country, would not be really repaid by an inward commerce?

264. Whether as our trade and manufactures increased, magazines should not be established in proper places, fitted by their situation, near great roads and navigable rivers, lakes, or canals,

for the ready reception and distribution of all sorts of commodities, from and to the several parts of the kingdom; and whether the town of Athlone, for instance, may not be fitly situated for such a magazine, or centre of domestic commerce?

265. Whether an inward trade would not cause industry to flourish, and multiply the circulation of our coin, and whether this may not do as well as multiplying the coin itself?

266. Whether the benefits of a domestic commerce are sufficiently understood and attended to, and whether the cause thereof be not the prejudiced and narrow way of thinking about gold and silver? *See Qu.* 116 *and* 129, *Part I.*

267. Whether there be any other more easy and unenvied method of increasing the wealth of a people?

268. Whether we of this island are not from our peculiar circumstances determined to this very commerce above any other, from the number of necessaries and good things that we possess within ourselves, from the extent and variety of our soil, from the navigable rivers and good roads which we have or may have at a less expense than any people in Europe, from our great plenty of materials for manufactures, and particularly from the restraints we lie under with regard to our foreign trade?

*269. Whether commissioners of trade or other proper persons should not be appointed to draw up plans of our commerce both foreign and domestic, and lay them at the beginning of every session before the Parliament?

*270. Whether registers of industry should not be kept, and the public from time to time acquainted what new manufactures are introduced, what increase or decrease of old ones?

271. Whether annual inventories should not be published of the fairs throughout the kingdom, in order to judge of the growth of its commerce?

272. Whether there be not every year more cash circulated at the card-tables of Dublin, than at all the fairs of Ireland?

273. Whether the wealth of a country will not bear proportion to the skill and industry of its inhabitants?

274. Whether foreign imports that tend to promote industry should not be encouraged, and such as have a tendency to promote luxury should not be discouraged?

275. Whether the annual balance of trade between Italy and Lyons be not about four millions in favour of the former, and yet, whether Lyons be not a gainer by this trade?

276. Whether the general rule, of determining the profit of commerce by its balance, doth not, like other general rules, admit of exception?

277. Whether it would not be a monstrous folly to import nothing but gold and silver, supposing we might do it, from every foreign part to which we trade? And yet, whether

some men may not think this foolish circumstance a very happy one?

278. But whether we do not all see the ridicule of the Mogul's subjects, who take from us nothing but our silver, and bury it under ground, in order to make sure thereof against the resurrection?

279. Whether he must not be a wrongheaded patriot or politician, whose ultimate view was drawing money into a country, and keeping it there?

280. Whether it be not evident, that not gold but industry causeth a country to flourish?

281. Whether it would not be a silly project in any nation, to hope to grow rich by prohibiting the exportation of gold and silver?

282. Whether there can be a greater mistake in politics, than to measure the wealth of the nation by its gold and silver?

283. Whether gold and silver be not a drug, where they do not promote industry? Whether they be not even the bane and undoing of an idle people?

284. Whether gold will not cause either industry or vice to flourish? And whether a country, where it flowed in without labour, must not be wretched and dissolute like an island inhabited by buccaneers?

285. Whether arts and virtue are not likely to thrive, where money is made a means to industry? But whether money without this would be a blessing to any people?

*286. Whether therefore Mississippi, South Sea, and such like schemes were not calculated for public ruin?

287. Whether keeping cash at home, or sending it abroad, just as it most serves to promote industry, be not the real interest of every nation?

288. Whether commodities of all kinds do not naturally flow where there is the greatest demand? Whether the greatest demand for a thing be not where it is of most use? Whether money, like other things, hath not its proper use? Whether this use be not to circulate? Whether therefore there must not of course be money where there is a circulation of industry;[1] and where there is no industry, whether there will be a demand for money?

*289. Whether all such princes and statesmen are not greatly deceived who imagine that gold and silver, any way got, will enrich a country? *See Qu.* 45, *Part I., and Qu.* 15, *Part II.*

290. Whether it is not a great point to know what we would be at? And whether whole states, as well as private persons, do not often fluctuate for want of this knowledge?

[1] Query 288 ended here in the second edition.

for the ready reception and distribution of all sorts of commodities, from and to the several parts of the kingdom; and whether the town of Athlone, for instance, may not be fitly situated for such a magazine, or centre of domestic commerce?

265. Whether an inward trade would not cause industry to flourish, and multiply the circulation of our coin, and whether this may not do as well as multiplying the coin itself?

266. Whether the benefits of a domestic commerce are sufficiently understood and attended to, and whether the cause thereof be not the prejudiced and narrow way of thinking about gold and silver? *See Qu.* 116 *and* 129, *Part I.*

267. Whether there be any other more easy and unenvied method of increasing the wealth of a people?

268. Whether we of this island are not from our peculiar circumstances determined to this very commerce above any other, from the number of necessaries and good things that we possess within ourselves, from the extent and variety of our soil, from the navigable rivers and good roads which we have or may have at a less expense than any people in Europe, from our great plenty of materials for manufactures, and particularly from the restraints we lie under with regard to our foreign trade?

*269. Whether commissioners of trade or other proper persons should not be appointed to draw up plans of our commerce both foreign and domestic, and lay them at the beginning of every session before the Parliament?

*270. Whether registers of industry should not be kept, and the public from time to time acquainted what new manufactures are introduced, what increase or decrease of old ones?

271. Whether annual inventories should not be published of the fairs throughout the kingdom, in order to judge of the growth of its commerce?

272. Whether there be not every year more cash circulated at the card-tables of Dublin, than at all the fairs of Ireland?

273. Whether the wealth of a country will not bear proportion to the skill and industry of its inhabitants?

274. Whether foreign imports that tend to promote industry should not be encouraged, and such as have a tendency to promote luxury should not be discouraged?

275. Whether the annual balance of trade between Italy and Lyons be not about four millions in favour of the former, and yet, whether Lyons be not a gainer by this trade?

276. Whether the general rule, of determining the profit of commerce by its balance, doth not, like other general rules, admit of exception?

277. Whether it would not be a monstrous folly to import nothing but gold and silver, supposing we might do it, from every foreign part to which we trade? And yet, whether

some men may not think this foolish circumstance a very happy one?

278. But whether we do not all see the ridicule of the Mogul's subjects, who take from us nothing but our silver, and bury it under ground, in order to make sure thereof against the resurrection?

279. Whether he must not be a wrongheaded patriot or politician, whose ultimate view was drawing money into a country, and keeping it there?

280. Whether it be not evident, that not gold but industry causeth a country to flourish?

281. Whether it would not be a silly project in any nation, to hope to grow rich by prohibiting the exportation of gold and silver?

282. Whether there can be a greater mistake in politics, than to measure the wealth of the nation by its gold and silver?

283. Whether gold and silver be not a drug, where they do not promote industry? Whether they be not even the bane and undoing of an idle people?

284. Whether gold will not cause either industry or vice to flourish? And whether a country, where it flowed in without labour, must not be wretched and dissolute like an island inhabited by buccaneers?

285. Whether arts and virtue are not likely to thrive, where money is made a means to industry? But whether money without this would be a blessing to any people?

*286. Whether therefore Mississippi, South Sea, and such like schemes were not calculated for public ruin?

287. Whether keeping cash at home, or sending it abroad, just as it most serves to promote industry, be not the real interest of every nation?

288. Whether commodities of all kinds do not naturally flow where there is the greatest demand? Whether the greatest demand for a thing be not where it is of most use? Whether money, like other things, hath not its proper use? Whether this use be not to circulate? Whether therefore there must not of course be money where there is a circulation of industry;[1] and where there is no industry, whether there will be a demand for money?

*289. Whether all such princes and statesmen are not greatly deceived who imagine that gold and silver, any way got, will enrich a country? *See Qu.* 45, *Part I.*, *and Qu.* 15, *Part II.*

290. Whether it is not a great point to know what we would be at? And whether whole states, as well as private persons, do not often fluctuate for want of this knowledge?

[1] Query 288 ended here in the second edition.

291. Whether gold may not be compared to Sejanus's horse, if we consider its passage through the world, and the fate of those nations which have been successively possessed thereof?

*292. Whether the effect is not to be considered more than the kind or quantity of money?

293. Whether means are not so far useful as they answer the end? And whether, in different circumstances, the same ends are not obtained by different means?

294. If we are a poor nation, abounding with very poor people, will it not follow, that a far greater proportion of our stock should be in the smallest and lowest species, than would suit with England?

295. Whether, therefore, it would not be highly expedient, if our money were coined of peculiar values, best fitted to the circumstances and uses of our own country; and whether any other people could take umbrage at our consulting our own convenience in an affair entirely domestic, and that lies within ourselves?

296. Whether every man doth not know, and hath long known, that the want of a mint causeth many other wants in this kingdom?

297. What harm did England sustain about three centuries ago, when silver was coined in this kingdom? *See Qu.* 100. *Part I.*

298. What harm was it to Spain that her provinces of Naples and Sicily had all along mints of their own.

*299. Whether those who have the interests of this kingdom at heart, and are concerned in the councils thereof, ought not to make the most humble and earnest representations to his Majesty, that he may vouchsafe to grant us that favour, the want of which is ruinous to our domestic industry, and the having of which would interfere with no interest of our fellow-subjects?

300. Whether it may not be presumed, that our not having a privilege, which every other kingdom in the world enjoys, be not owing to our own want of diligence and unanimity in soliciting for it?

*301. Whether his most gracious Majesty hath ever been addressed on this head in a proper manner, and had the case fairly stated for his royal consideration, and if not, whether we may not blame ourselves?

*302. If his Majesty would be pleased to grant us a mint, whether the consequences thereof may not prove a valuable consideration to the crown?

303. Whether it be not the interest of England, that we should cultivate a domestic commerce among ourselves? And whether it would give them any possible jealousy, if our small sum of cash was contrived to go a little further, if there was a little more

life in our markets, a little more buying and selling in our shops, a little better provision for the backs and bellies of so many forlorn wretches throughout the towns and villages of this island?

304. Whether Great Britain ought not to promote the prosperity of her colonies, by all methods consistent with her own? And whether the colonies themselves ought to wish or aim at it by others?

305. Whether the remotest parts from the metropolis, and the lowest of the people, are not to be regarded as the extremities and capillaries of the political body?

306. Whether, although the capillary vessels are small, yet obstructions in them do not produce great chronical diseases?

307. Whether faculties are not enlarged and improved by exercise?

308. Whether the sum of the faculties put into act, or in other words the united action of a whole people doth not constitute the momentum of a state?

309. Whether such momentum be not the real stock or wealth of a state; and whether its credit be not proportional thereunto?

310. Whether in every wise state the faculties of the mind are not most considered?

*311. Whether every kind of employment or business, as it implies more skill and exercise of the higher powers, be not more valued?

312. Whether the momentum of a state doth not imply the whole exertion of its faculties, intellectual and corporeal; and whether the latter without the former could act in concert?

313. Whether the divided force of men, acting singly, and ununadvisedly,[1] would not be a rope of sand?

314. Whether the particular motions of the members of a state, in opposite directions, will not destroy each other, and lessen the momentum of the whole; but whether they must not conspire to produce a great effect?

315. Whether the ready means to put spirit into this state, to fortify and increase its momentum, would not be a national bank and plenty of small cash?

*316 Whether private endeavours without assistance from the public are likely to advance our manufactures and commerce to any great degree? But whether, as bills uttered from a national bank upon private mortgages would facilitate the purchases and projects of private men, even so the same bills uttered on the public security alone may not answer public ends in promoting new works and manufactures throughout the kingdom?

317. Whether that which employs and exerts the force of a

[1] "And unadvisedly" not in second edition.

community, deserves not to be well considered and well understood?

318. Whether the immediate mover, the blood and spirits, be not money, paper or metal, and whether the soul or will of the community, which is the prime mover that governs and directs the whole, be not the legislature?

319. Supposing the inhabitants of a country quite sunk in sloth, or even fast asleep, whether upon the gradual awakening and exertion, first, of the sensitive and locomotive faculties, next of reason and reflection, then of justice and piety, the momentum of such country or state, would not, in proportion thereunto become still more and more considerable?

320. Whether that which is last attained, and is the finishing perfection of a people, be not the first thing lost in their declension?

321. Whether force be not of consequence, only as it is exerted; and whether great force without great wisdom may not be a nuisance?

322. Whether the force of a child applied with art, may not produce greater effects than that of a giant? And whether a small stock in the hands of a wise state, may not go further, and produce more considerable effects, than immense sums in the hands of a foolish one?

*323. Whether as many as wish well to their country ought not to aim at increasing its momentum?

324. Whose fault is it if poor Ireland still continues poor?

APPENDIX B.

THE MISCELLANY OF 1752.

[THIS was published in London and Dublin in October, 1752. The title of the Dublin issue runs exactly as the London, excepting, of course, the names of place and publishers, which read: "Dublin/ Printed for George Faulkner, in Essex Street./ MDCCLII." The two issues differ in size, and, as will be seen on p. 191, in matter; though this last variation is certainly undesigned.

The volume opens with a lengthy Latin poem, entitled, "To the Author of Siris, an Ode, by the R. R. T. L. B. O. N." On the authority of the "Gent. Mag." (1752, p. 481), this may be interpreted, "The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Norwich." In the same volume of the "Gent. Mag." (p. 472), the poem is printed with a translation.]

A

MISCELLANY,

CONTAINING

SEVERAL TRACTS

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

By the BISHOP of *CLOYNE*.

Modò me Thebis, *modò ponit* Athenis.

LONDON:

Printed for J. and R. TONSON and S. DRAPER in the *Strand*.

MDCCLII.

CONTENTS.

To the author of "Siris;" an ode by the R. R. T. L. B. O. N.

1. Farther Thoughts on Tar Water. (III.)
2. Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain. (II.)
3. A Discourse addressed to Magistrates. (III.)
4. A Word to the Wise. (III.)
5. A Letter to the Roman Catholics. (III.)
6. Maxims Concerning Patriotism. (III.)
7. The Querist. (III.)
8. Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America. (II.)
9. A Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations. (II.)
10. A Sermon. (II.)
11. De Motu. (II.)

(The Roman numerals denote in which volumes of this edition the tracts may be found.)

APPENDIX C.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL EDITIONS AND CRITICISMS.

[A FEW words will explain the scope of this list. It does not profess to be a complete bibliography, and so no mention is made here of the various unedited issues of separate works. I have omitted also as of little real importance the many contemporary pamphlets of attack and defence occasioned by certain of Berkeley's works. "Alciphron," the "Analyst," and "Siris" were each the parent of a brood of tracts which have neither interest nor importance for the general student. I have also thought it unnecessary to mention the usual works of reference —Histories of Philosophy, Cyclopædias, and Biographical Dictionaries.

In preparing this list I have received valuable help from Professor M. Coit Tyler, of Cornell University, and Professor Campbell Fraser, to both of whom my thanks are due for many interesting additions. Professor Fraser's assistance has been especially valuable. Responsibility, however, for any defects remains with the editor.]

APPENDIX C.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL EDITIONS AND CRITICISMS.

I. COLLECTED WORKS.

(1) WORKS of G. B., to which is added a life by J. Stock and several of his letters to T. Prior, Dean Gervais, and Mr. Pope, etc. 2 vols. Lond. 1784.

(2) WORKS OF G. B. 1 vol. Lond. 1837.

(3) WORKS OF G. B., annotated by the Rev^{d}. G. N. Wright. 2 vols. Lond. 1843.

(The text of all the above is incomplete and inaccurate. The last two are practically reprints of (1). In (3) the Latin works are translated into English; the annotations consist of no more than headlines and variations of type in the "Prin. of H. K.")

(4) WORKS OF G. B., including many of his writings hitherto unpublished, with Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an account of his Philosophy; by Alexander Campbell Fraser, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 4 vols. Oxford, 1871.

(This is the standard edition. Attention of readers may be specially drawn to vol. iv., which contains not only a Life and Letters, and a study of Berkeley's Philosophy, but also a copy of his "Commonplace Book," kept when he was a student at T.C.D. During the years which have elapsed since the publication of this edition, fresh material has come to hand for the study of Berkeley's life and works. A revised edition of the four volumes would be very welcome.)

(5) WORKS OF G. B., edited by George Sampson, with a Biographical Introduction by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. 3 vols. Lond. 1897-8.

II. SEPARATE WORKS.

(1) The Principles of Human Knowledge.

BALLANTYNE, J. R. Prin. of H. K. Edited with explanations by J. R. B. (One of a series entitled "Reprints for the Pandits.") Allahabad, 1852.

UEBERWEG, F. Abhandlung über die Principien der menschlichen Erkenntniss. Berlin, 1869.

(Translated by Professor Ueberweg, with preface and notes.)

KRAUTH, C. P. The Prin. of H. K., with prolegomena and annotations by C. P. K. Philadelphia, 1874.

SIMON, T. COLLYNS. The Prin. of H. K., edited with explanations and introduction by T. C. S. London, 1878.

(Recently re-issued in Routledge's "Hundred Best Books" series.)

STRUVE, H., and JEZIERSKI, F. Rzecz o Zasadach Poznania. Translated into Polish by F. J., with an introduction by H. S. Warsaw, 1890.

(2) Other Works.

ESCHENBACH, J. C. A translation into German of the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," along with a translation of Collier's "Clavis Universalis," being the most distinguished writers who deny the reality of their own bodies and of the whole material world. Rostock, 1756.

COWELL, H. V. H. "The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained," with an introduction and notes by H. V. H. C. London and Camb. 1860.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Selections from Berkeley, with an introduction and notes, for the use of students in the Universities. Fourth edition. Oxford, 1891.

(The introduction and notes are very valuable.)

BEAUVALON, G., and PARODI, D. Œuvres choisies de G. B., translated with an introduction by G. B. and D. P. Paris, 1895.

(This contains the "Th. of Vision" and "Hylas and Philonous.")

III. LETTERS.

There is no complete published collection of Berkeley's letters. Besides those contained in the memoirs by Stock and Professor Fraser there are others in

BEARDSLEY, E. E. The Life of Samuel Johnson, D.D. New York, 1874.

Selections and extracts from unpublished letters will be found in

Historical Manuscripts Commission, Seventh Report.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley. (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.) Edinburgh, 1881.

IV. BIOGRAPHIES, CRITICISMS, ETC.

(1) REFERRING SPECIALLY TO THE THEORY OF VISION.

VOLTAIRE. Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton.

CONDILLAC. Essai sur l'origine des Connaissances Humaines. (This attacks the "Theory of Vision.")

—— Traité des Sensations.

(This is a recantation of the opinions of the "Essai.")

The above works may be considered to form the starting-point of French criticism of Berkeley.

PORTERFIELD, WILLIAM. Treatise on the Eye. 1759.

BAILEY, SAMUEL. Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation. London, 1842.

—— Letter to a philosopher in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision. London, 1842.

(Referring to the following.)

MILL, JOHN STUART. Bailey on Berkeley's Theory of Vision. Reprinted in "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. ii.

FERRIER, J. F. Bailey on Berkeley. (Two essays.) Works, vol. iii. Edinburgh, 1875.

(Mill and Ferrier each wrote an essay criticising Bailey's "Review." Bailey answered with his "Letter;" Ferrier replied to this in his second essay.)

ABBOTT, T. K. Sight and Touch; an attempt to disprove the received or Berkleian theory of vision. Lond. 1864.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley's Theory of Vision; (being a criticism of Mr. Abbott on Sight and Touch).
North British Review, Aug. 1864.

ABBOTT, T. K. Bishop Berkeley and Professor Fraser.
Hermathena, No. V., 1877.

SIMON T. COLLYNS. Can we see Distance? Berkeley's reply examined. 1864.

Bailey gives references in the preface to his "Review" to many other criticisms of the Theory of Vision. Among physiologists (and phrenologists) he names Gall, Bostock, Roget, Mayo, etc.; and among philosophers, Brown (Lectures, vol. ii.) and Young (Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy).

(2) REFERRING IN GENERAL TO BERKELEY'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

BAXTER, ANDREW. An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Lond. 1735.

(Sect. VII. criticises Berkeley.)

ANON. An account of the life of G. B., with notes containing strictures on his works. Lond. 1776.

ANON. An Essay on the Nature and Existence of the Material World. London, 1781.

FEARN, J. A review of the first principles of Berkeley, Stewart and Reid. Lond. 1813.

BOWEN, F. Critical essays on Speculative Philosophy.
Boston, 1842.

SIMON, T. COLLYNS. The nature and elements of the external world; or universal immaterialism demonstrated.
Lond. 1848. (Second ed. 1862.)

FOWLER, RICHARD. An attempt to solve some of the difficulties of the Berkleyan controversy. Salisbury, 1859.

—— A second attempt, etc. Salisbury, 1859.

NORTON, J. N. The Life of Bishop Berkeley.
New York, 1861.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. The Real World of Berkeley.
Macmillan's Mag., July, 1862.

BUTT, ISAAC. Berkeley, a discourse on his character and writings. Dublin, 1863.

HUGHES, THOMAS. The Ideal Theory of Berkeley. Lond. 1865.

STIRLING, J. HUTCHISON. Was Sir William Hamilton a Berkleian?

(Remarks on a passage in an article on Mill and Hamilton by Professor Fraser in the North British Review.) Fortnightly Rev., Sept. 1866.

SIMON, T. COLLYNS. Hegel and his connexion with British Thought. Contemp. Rev., Jan. and Mar. 1870.

—— Berkeley's doctrine in the nature of matter. Journal of Speculative Philosophy (St. Louis, Miss.), 1870.

DOUBLEDAY, THOMAS. Matter for Materialists (a series of letters vindicating Berkeley's principles). Lond. 1870.

HOPPE, R. Bergmann's Zeitschrift, v. Heft 2. 1870.

REICHLIN-MELDEGG, BARON C. A. v. Fichte's Zeitschrift, lvii. Heft 1.

ULRICI, HERMANN. Fichte's Zeitschrift, lvii. Heft 1. 1870.

FREDERICHS, F. Der Phænomenale Idealismus Berkeley's und Kant's. Berlin, 1871.

MILL, J. S. Berkeley's Life and Writings. 1871. (Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iv.)

MANSEL, H. L. On the Idealism of Berkeley. (An unfinished essay written in 1871, and published in Dean Mansel's "Letters, Lectures, and Reviews.") Lond. 1873.

NOEL, THE HON. RODEN. The Philosophy of Perception: Berkeley and Kant. Contemp. Rev., June, 1872.

STIRLING, J. HUTCHISON. Professor Fraser's Berkeley. Jour. Spec. Phil. 1873.

VAN DER WYCK. Een Monument voor Berkeley. Gronengen, 1873.

The above five, with one of Huxley's essays mentioned below, were occasioned by the publication of the Oxford edition of Berkeley's Works in 1871. Other critical articles on the same will be found in

Dublin Review, July, 1871.
British Quarterly Review, April, 1871.
Edinburgh Review, July, 1872.
Quarterly Review, Jan. 1872.
London Quarterly Review, Jan. 1872.

HUXLEY, THOMAS. Collected Essays, 1894, vol. vi. (consists of "Hume and Helps to the study of Berkeley.") A volume on Berkeley from the pen of Huxley was announced to appear in the "English Men of Letters" series. A study of the two valuable papers in this volume makes one regret that Huxley was unable to complete the promised book.

MAGUIRE, THOMAS. Berkeley's Notion of Substance. Dublin, 1872.

UEBERWEG, F. Ist Berkeley's Lehre wissenschaftlich unwiderlegbar? 1873.

SPICKER, GIDEON. Kant, Hume und Berkeley. Eine Kritik der Erkenntnisstheorie. Berlin, 1875.

PENJON, A. Etude sur la vie et les œuvres philosophiques de G. B. Paris, 1878.

JANITSCH, J. Kant's Urteile über Berkeley. Strassburg, 1879.

BALFOUR, A. J. A Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Lond. 1879.

BRADLEY. C. W. Berkeley's Idealism. Jour. Spec. Phil. 1881.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley. Blackwood's Philosophical Classics. Edinburgh, 1881.

(With the present volumes and this useful little book, the reader is sufficiently equipped to begin the study of Berkeley.)

MCCOSH, J. Locke's theory of knowledge with a notice of Berkeley. New York, 1884.

STEPHEN, LESLIE. English thought in the eighteenth century. Lond. 1884.

LOEWY, THEODOR. Die 'Common Sensibles' bei Berkeley. Leipzig, 1884.

GREEN, THOMAS HILL. Works. Vol. i. Lond. 1885.

PORTER, NOAH (the younger.) The two-hundredth birthday of George Berkeley. A discourse given at Yale College on the 12th of March, 1885. New York, 1885.

MURRAY, J. CLARK. The revived study of Berkeley. Macmillan's Mag., July, 1887.

LOEWY, THEODOR. Der Idealismus Berkeley's (In Bd. 124 of the Transactions of the Vienna Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1891.

FOSTER, W. E. Some Rhode Island contributions to the intellectual life of the last century. (Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society at Boston. 1892.)

MCLACHLAN, D. B. Reformed Logic; a system based on Berkeley's Philosophy. Lond. 1892.

MEYER, EUGEN. Hume's und Berkeley's Philosophie der Mathematick. Halle, 1894.

TYLER, M. COIT. Three Men of Letters. New York, 1895.

This contains a charming essay on Berkeley, especially noticing his influence on higher education in America. The best account of the Rhode Island episode in Berkeley's life will be found in this little work.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Philosophy of Theism. Edinburgh, 1896.

This refers to Berkeley's philosophy in its relation to modern religious thought.

General references will suffice to the very important criticisms by Hume, Reid, Stewart and Hamilton. Amongst general biographical notices, the article by Mr. Leslie Stephen in the "Dictionary of National Biography" may be specially mentioned.

INDEX.

ABSTRACT ideas, i. 163; existence denied, 165, 325, 355; Locke on, 168; iii. 85; unnecessary, i. 169; source of, 172; results of belief in, 181, 183, 184, 205, 245; ii. 475; of being, i. 186; in mathematics, 233-40; iii. 84; of colour, and triangle, 86.

Abstraction, frames ideas of colour exclusive of extension, i. 163; Locke on, 166; confusion through, 176, 223; how far possible, 181.

Academy, British, ii. 96; French, 97; for design, iii. 122.

Acid principle in life, iii. 248.

Addison, i. xx, xxiv; on atheism, iii. 60.

Agriculture, compulsory, iii. 160.

Air, functions of, iii. 251; a receptacle of germs, 252; its vital principle, 253; Newton on, 250; constituents of, 255.

Alciphron, allusiveness of, ii. v; scope of, 148, 476; style of, 148; character of Alciphron based on Shaftesbury, 245.

America, manners and morals in, ii. 107; use of tar-water in, iii. 198.

Amsterdam, its prosperity, iii. 142.

Analogy, Butler's, ii. 148; meaning of, 305; Bp. Browne and Archbp. King on, ii. 276, 299; God known by, 299; dangers of, i. 226; schoolmen and, ii. 303.

Analyst, the, present value of, iii. 2; controversy aroused by, 54, 300.

Anaxagoras, ii. 65.

Aquinas, ii. 303.

Arbuthnot, i. xix.

Archetypes, i. 183, 217, 223, 338, 382, 389.

Architecture, beauty in, ii. 258.

Ariosto and Tasso, ii. 343.

Aristotle, authority of, i. 174; *materia prima* of, 184; on virtue, ii. 220; on debauchees, 223, 231; on the good man, 267; on education, 479; on private judgment, iii. 190; on eternal motion, ii. 62; on motion, 64, 65, 70, 71; on beauty, 251; on divine life, 386; on arguments, 473; quoted, iii. 141; on religion in a state, 186; (pseud.) on the fifth essence, 261; on divine heat, 262; on the implicit divinity of things, 263; on divine energy, 284; on the soul of the world, 304; on distinctions of objects, 314; on absolute existence, 315; on matter, 318; (pseud.) on God in the world, 321.

Arithmetic, Berkeley's account of, i. 233; nature of, ii. 453.

Association, i. 84.

Atheism, material substance and, i. 154, 220, 344, 362, 397; evolution of, ii. 172; fashionable, 85, 141, 148, 298; insidious evil of, 236; of mathematicians, iii. 59; authoritative, 60, 290.

Atheists (*see also* Freethinkers), their affectation of martyrdom,

ii. 166; vice of, 196, 201, 205, 214, 230, 231; and rights of property, 209; their notions of virtue, 212; their admiration for brute beasts, 217, 219; small education of, 230; esteem for savages, 235; iii. 179; and suicide, ii. 225, 237; as agents of Jesuits, 242; and honour, 247; and ridicule, 270, 429; their mutual support, 293; their inconsistency in argument, 298; compared with hunters, 312; and the character of the clergy, 164, 319, 334, 353; and liberty, 354; their criticisms of the Scriptures, 361, 368; and the nature of the soul, 391; impressed by empty display, 392; their prejudice, 420; on miracles, 423; their view of resurrection, 426; their view of man, 459, 465; their ambiguity, sophistry, and shiftiness, 470; various species, 477; not misrepresented, 488; as blasphemers, iii. 170; ancient philosophers, not, 330.
Attraction, i. 225.
Aurea catena Homeri, note on, iii. 335.
Aurelius, M., ii. 193; on immortality, 269.
Authority and reason, ii. 468.

Bacon, on mathematics, i. 57.
Balfour, A. J., i. vi.
Balsams, iii. 212.
Banks, iii. 135, 141, 152.
Barrow, i. 85.
Beauty, nature of, ii. 256-265; and morals, 250; nature of moral beauty, 253; various views of, 256; and religious sense, 487.
Beggars, utilizing of, iii. 149.
Berkeley, G., place in English literature, i. x; his commonplace book, xiv-xvi; his patriotism, li-lv; iii. 112; his originality, i. xiii; marriage, xxxiii; and Clarke, xix; personal charm, xx, xxx; and America, xxxiv; humour of, l; and finance, li; in England, ii. 2; abroad, 56, his influence in America, 104; modification of his early nominalism, 436; as a writer, iii. 112; and Roman Catholics, 338, 384, 402.
Berkeley, Mrs., i. xxxiii; iii. 404.
Bermuda, i. xxviii-xxxv; ii. 112; officers of college, 122; subscribers, 123; verses on, 125; reference to, 159.
"Blasters," iii. 170, 192.
Blind, man born, i. 95, 113, 118, 119, 122, 125, 136; ii. 290, 297, 512.
Blount, Charles, ii. 225.
Boerhaave, on volatile oils, iii. 219; on prolonging life, 221.
Boyer, Abel, ii. 18, 30.
Bribery, ii. 98.
Brutes and mankind, ii. 217, 219.
Building, and circulation, iii. 150.
Burlington, 3rd earl of, i. xxix; ii. 220.

Caroline, Queen, i. xlvi.
Chain in nature, Jamblichus on, iii. 302; and Eternal Mind, 306; idea of, 312; *aurea catena Homeri*, 335.
"Characteristics." *See* Shaftesbury.
Charity, mismanagement of, ii. 87; injurious, iii. 388.
Child labour, iii. 148, 396.
Chimeras, i. 193, 215.
Chinese, their chronology, ii. 404; atheist admiration for, *ib.*; industry of, iii. 148.
Christianity, an enlarger of the mind, ii. 35; in the Colonies, 108; obligations of, 134; its tendency to do good, 315; compared with religion of the ancients, 323; and polemical theology, 331, 340, 449; and the advancement of art and learning, 341.

Chronology, fictitious, ii. 403; pre-scriptural, 409; Mosaic, 410.
Cicero quoted, ii. 272, 317.
Classical education, uses of, iii. 133.
Clergy, described by freethinkers, ii. 164, 319, 334.
Clarke, i. xix.
Collins, Anthony, i. xxxvii; ii. 3, 151, 181, 362; on Liberty, Berkeley's reply to, 458.
Colours, existence of, i. 314, 326; defined, 318; proper objects of sight, ii. 289, 501; abstract idea of, iii. 86.
Common sense, return to, i. 302, 378, 397; ii. 464.
Confucius, iii. 182.
Country life and industry, iii. 151.
Course of nature, iii. 294.
Cowper's "Task," origin of a phrase in, iii. 278.
Criminals, proposal for using, iii. 121.
Critics, ii. 38, 43.

Deists (*see also* Freethinkers), i. xiii, xxxv-xlvi; ii. 182, 345.
Descartes, i. xiii, 80; ii. 65; iii. 64.
Deslandes, M., ii. 10, 18.
Diemerbroeck on the plague, iii. 372.
Dionysius the Areopagite, ii. 301.
Dissenters, ii. 86.
Distance; invisible, not perceived immediately, i. 79, 81, 83, 85, 197, 333; ii. 285; near distance, i. 80; former explanations of, 80; ideas suggesting, 82, 83, 85; how perceived, 97, 98.
Drape, Captain, on tar water in small-pox, iii. 364, 415.
Druids, ii. 313.
Drunkenness, usefulness of, ii. 197, 202.
Duelling, ii. 324.

Ectypal state, i. 389.
England and Ireland, unity of, iii. 125; feeling between, iii. 144, 153.
English imports, iii. 122.
Epicureans and existence of God, ii. 298.
Esse is *percipi*, i. 180, 367.
Evil, out of good, ii. 356; source of various views of, 385.
Exhaustions, iii. 84.
Exist, meaning of to, i. 180.
Existence, absolute, meaningless, i. 189, 344, 380, 390; meaning of, 218; of God, evident, 247; proof of existence of God, ii. 485; consists in perception, i. 180, 367, 368; personal, signs of, ii. 283, 447; ancient notions of, iii. 298; absolute, not believed in by Plato and Aristotle, iii. 315.
Extension, visible and tangible, i. 100, 103, 123, 138; abstract, 131; iii. 44; has no existence without the mind, i. 185, 236, 321; absolute, 323.
External bodies, impossible to prove existence of, i. 187.

"Fable of the Bees." *See* Mandeville.
Fatalism and material substance, i. 221.
Fate, various writers on, iii. 300; nature of, 301.
Fenelon, ii. 30.
Ficinus on light, iii. 275.
Fire, benefits of the Great, ii. 204; effect of, iii. 257, 259, 269; Heraclitus on, 260; Plato on, *ib.*; Hippocrates on, 261, 263; Theophrastus on, 264; Hermetic books on, *ib.*; divine, 265; divine manifestations in, 267; kinds of, 272; Lemery, (the younger) on, 290; functions of, 303; vital, 304; the spirit of the world, 353.
Fire-worship, iii. 266; origin of, 268.
Fluxions, i. 241; nature of, iii.

10; Walton on, 90; Newton on, 2, 68, 70, 75.
Force, idea of, ii. 442.
Fowler, Prof., i. xliii.
Fraser, Prof., i. v, vi, x, xi, xviii, 154; ii. 162, 311; iii. 54, 112, 198.
Free-agent, man as, ii. 461.
Free-thinkers, rise of, ii. 3; "Pineal gland" of, 14; virtue of, 23; ignorance of, 24, 29, 49; narrowness of, 34; happiness of, 41; are so from fashion, 141; description of, 160; pose of, 166, 167; views of, 169; controversial methods of, 172; evolution of, 173; as minute philosophers, 176; education of, 177; varieties of, 180; on faith, 366; on bigots, 428; dangers of their tenets, iii. 188; their real desires, 191.

Galen on the soul, iii. 262.
Gaming, benefits from, ii. 199.
Garth on atheism, iii. 60.
General ideas admitted, i. 167.
Generalization, i. 164.
Geometry, in optics, i. 81, 143; ii. 496; objects of, i. 143; iii. 43.
God, existence of, evident, i. 247; atheist view of, ii. 276; allowable proofs of, 277; "Theory of Vision" as a proof of, ii. 485.
Gold, porosity of (Florentine experiment), iii. 280.
Good, and evil, i. 261; meaning of, 263; ends of individual good, 263; general good, how procured, 264.
Gosse, Edmund, i. 292.
Grace, notion of, ii. 435.
Greeks, compared with Christians, ii. 321, 329; public spirit of, 339.
Grew, Dr., on circulation, iii. 215; on light, 218.
Grotius on obedience, i. 287.
Haliday pamphlets, iii. 112.
Halley, his atheism, iii. 60.
Hearing and sight, i. 98, 336.
Heat, how perceived, i. 306; has no existence without the mind, 309.
Helmont, Van, on prolonging life, iii. 221.
Heraclitus, on fire, iii. 260.
Hermetic books, referred to, iii. 264, 300, 306, 320, 335.
Hippocrates, on fire, iii. 261, 263; on the soul, 274; on animal economy, 289.
Hobbes, ii. 298.
Homberg, on acids and alkalies, iii. 250; on light, 261; makes gold from mercury, 271.
Honour, atheists and, ii. 247.
L'Hôpital, Marquis de, iii. 82.
Houses, economical construction of, iii. 127.
Hume, i. ix, xviii.
Hunt, i. xii.
Hutcheson, i. xliv; ii. 245.
Hyde, Dr., on the Persians, iii. 267.

Ideas, none common to sight and touch, i. 133; ii. 492, 494; cause of, i. 190, 341; ii. 491; of spirit, i. 190; of sense, 191; ii. 490; ideas and things, connexion between, i. 195, 369, 383; ii. 494; and spirits, i. 217, 219, 242; without the mind, 338; analogy of, ii. 503; and signs, iii. 36.
Identity, personal, ii. 447.
Image, inverted, i. 128; ii. 504.
Immaterialism, and immortality, i. 244; as an argument, 394.
Industry, and wealth, ii. 87; iii. 117, 120, 141, 164; necessity for, 128; of Chinese, 148; and country life, 151; of Swiss, 152; of French, 159; arguments in nature for, 390; of Dutch, 393; general arguments for, 400.
Inspiration, of scriptures, ii. 370; humble vehicles of, 394.

Intelligence of unbodied spirit, i. 144.
Ireland, unpatriotic expenditure in, iii. 126, 131; remedies for distress in, 112; wine drinking in, 131; need for colleges in, 133; extravagance in 155; church of, 339; distress in, i. lv; iii. 391; harshness of landlords in, 396.
Irish, descent of, iii. 160, 389; laziness of, 387, 397; destitution of, 388; pride of, 389; political disabilities of, 392; dirt of, 395; beggary of, 397.
Irish trade and industry, restriction of, iii. 123, 124, 129; potential exports, 123; cultivation of hemp, 124; export of provisions, 129; wool trade reprehended, 158; possibilities of linen trade, 161.
Italy, works lost in, i. 154.

Jacobitism, Berkeley and, i. 254; iii. 341.
Jamblichus, on chain in nature, iii. 302.
Jesuits and atheism, ii. 242.
Josephus, ii. 414; his ignoring of Christ explained, 415.
Julian, Emperor, ii. 413.
Jurin, Dr., iii. 54.

Kingdom and family compared, ii. 207.
Knowledge, objects of, i. 179; "Principles of Human Knowledge" referred to, 298; defined, ii. 434; and opinion, iii. 313.

Language, imperfections of, i. 130; ambiguities of, 172; delusions of, 177.
Language, visual, i. 140, 142, 197, 209; ii. 275, 289, 500.
Laws of nature, i. 192, 265, 278, 364.
Laws, moral, necessary and accidental consequences of, i. 281; immutable and eternal, 289.
Legislature, knowledge needed for, iii. 132.
Leibnitz, on natural force, ii. 59; on effort and impetus, 61; on force, 443; on the calculus, iii. 21.
Lemery (the younger), on fire, iii. 290.
Liberty and atheism, ii. 354.
Life, intenseness of, iii. 242; the act of soul, 303.
Light, the object of vision, ii. 289, 501; Ficinus on, iii. 275; influence of solar, 218; in tar, 242; whether corporeal or incorporeal, 275; Plotinus on, 276.
Locke, Berkeley's predecessor, i. ix; studied in Dublin, xii; Berkeley opposed to, xiii; on mathematics, 58; on abstract ideas, 132; on the Eternal Mind, 154; problem of Locke and Molyneux, 136.
Loyalty, meaning of, i. 260, 267, 274.
Luxury, effects of, ii. 92.

Mackintosh, i. xliii, 68.
Magic theory of miracles, ii. 423.
Magnitude, how perceived, i. 100, 104; visible and tangible, 100, 101, 102, 123, 138; signs of, arbitrary, 102.
Man, as a puppet, ii. 459, 465; as a free agent, 461.
Mandeville, Berkeley's interpretation of, i. xxxviii; on moral virtue, ii. 190; iii. 189; his "Fable of the Bees," ii. 194; on good out of evil, 197; on the Great Fire, 204; on the Reformation, 210; on certainty in morals, 213; iii. 189.
Manetho, his dynasties, ii. 404.
Manichean heresy, i. 251.
Mankind, atheist classification of, ii. 351.

Manufactures, possibility of home, ii. 89; Irish, *see* Irish trade.
Marriage, selection in, iii. 134.
Material substratum, i. 212, 329, 371.
Mathematics, abstractions in, i. 233.
Mathematicians, inconsistency of, iii. 13; no judges of religion or philosophy, 33, 43; and mystery, 35; and faith, 50; their atheism, 59, 60; their authority in atheism, 60; their intolerance, 64.
Matter, or material substance, notion of, contradictory, i. 183; meaning of, 186, 348; philosophic view of, denied, 194, 209, 366; vulgar notion of, allowed, 194; belief in existence of, not universal, 202; a nonentity, 209, 355; an "occasion" of ideas, 210, 352; equals nothing, 214; and the Scriptures, 215, 385; non-existence of, and immortality, 244; implications of the word, 358, 396; and scepticism, 344, 362, 378, 397; Plato and Aristotle on, iii. 318.
Memory and reminiscence, iii. 317.
Mercury as a deobstruent, iii. 223.
Microscopes and microscopic eyes, i. 116.
Mind, all things exist in the mind, i. 180, 183, 347; the origin of motion, ii. 66; and land, an analogy, 163; acts by physical agents, iii. 258; universal, 263; clothed by soul, 265; source of all things, 309; effect of early impressions on, 311; as *tabula rasa*, or blank paper, 314, 315.
Mind, an Eternal, i. 154, 221, 344, 347, 364; iii. 256.
Minimum visibile, i. 101, 114, 150.
Mint, need for, iii. 161.
Miracles and matter, i. 216; reason for, 266; proof of, ii. 364; Josephus and, 415.
Molyneux, S., i. 40.
Molyneux, W., i. 40, 94; his problem, 136.
Momentum of a state, iii. 167.
Money, its value, iii. 118; circulation of, 119; paper money, its use and abuse, 136; uselessness of uncirculated, 137; prosperity without, 138; quick circulation of small, 156.
Moon, apparent size of, i. 105, 149; ii. 508.
Moral beauty, nature of, ii. 252; insufficient as motive, ii. 346.
Moral laws, consequences of, i. 281; eternal, 289.
Moral sense, ii. 253.
Mosaic history and chronology, ii. 410.
Motion, relative, i. 230; meaning of, 231; importance of treatise on, ii. 56; cause of, 58, 65, 69; nature of, 70; circular, 75; communication of, 78; prescinded from time and space, absurd, iii. 32, 37, 40, 46.
"Motu, De," referred to, iii. 44.
Myrrh in prolonging life, iii. 221.

Natural inclinations and faculties, ii. 185; arguments from, 187.
Natural religion, insufficient, ii. 347; tendency of, 486.
Nature, agency of, i. 248; simulated admiration for, ii. 184, 192; course of, iii. 294, 308.
Newton, i. xii; on tide, 45, 47; his "Principia" a grammar of science, 228; his doctrine of fluxions, iii. 2, 68, 70, 75; blind adoration of, 68, 67; on moments, 72, 77; on evanescence of augments, 76; certain works quoted, 79, 109; on acids, 250; on ether, 280; on light, 281, 288; on attraction and repulsion, 290.
Number, perception of, i. 125; a creature of the mind, 184; knowledge of, 233; and ideas, ii. 453.

Obedience, to earthly powers,

moral, i. 268; not conditional, 272; not contrary to nature, 273; incumbent on rulers, 283.
Object of sense, ii. 490, 493, 497; of sight, real, 493.
Oneness of things, iii. 305.
Outness, i. 133, 197, 333.

Pain, how perceived, i. 306.
Panaceas, iii. 228, 229.
Pascal quoted, i. 271.
Patriotism, Berkeley's and Swift's, i. lii-lv; Berkeley's, iii. 112; of Roman Catholics, iii. 131.
Perception, mediate and immediate, i. 81; ii. 287,
Perceval, Sir John, i. xviii, 71, 154.
Phenomena defined, i. 376.
Philosophy, its study ancient, iii. 310; derived from heaven, 312; necessity for its study, 327.
Physical agents, importance of, iii. 258.
Picus of Mirandula, ii. 303, 341.
Pineal gland, ii. 11.
Plato, on rebellion, i. 285; on judgment after death, ii. 8; on largeness of mind, 357 on moral beauty, 251; on inspiration, 380; on virtue, 386; on the mind, 455; on government, iii. 182; on religion in the state, 186; on emetics, 227; on fire, 260; on the soul, 263, 316; on Fate, 301; on knowledge and opinion, 313: (pseud.) on mind and knowledge, 315; on absolute existence, 315; on matter, 318; as a touchstone of mind, 323; and the creation, 325.
Platonic Trinity, nature of, iii. 329.
Platonists on evil spirits, ii. 385.
Pleasures, natural, ii. 19; kinds of, considered, 217; and pain, 222.
Pliny quoted on tar and balsams, iii. 209, 212, 214, 243.
Plotinus, on prevision, iii. 293; on alterity, 321; on the Trinity, 333.
Political influence of men of letters, i. xx-xxiii.
Porphyry, ii. 412.
Precepts, human, limitations of, i. 277.
Pretender and Church of Ireland, iii. 339.
Prevision, Plotinus on, iii. 293; grammar of, 293; Socrates on, 293.
Principia, meaning of, ii. 67.
"Principles of Human Knowledge," referred to, i. 298.
Prior, Thomas, iii. 344; his "Authentic Narrative," 347, 415.
Proclus on human potentiality, iii. 323.
Property, atheist notion of rights of, ii. 209.
Prophecies, obscurity of, ii. 400; fulfilment of, 401.
Public spirit, encouragement of, ii. 95.
Puffendorf on obedience, i. 287.
"Pumps," i. 56.

Qualities, primary and secondary, i. 154, 182, 319; have no existence without the mind, 185, 213, 310, 361.
Queries in the "Analyst," iii. 43, 112.
"Querist" the, i. xlix-lv; its style, iii. 112; first edition described, 112.

Rakes, Englishmen as, ii. 223.
Rays, parallel, diverging and converging, i. 91, 92.
Real things, i. 193.
Reality explained, i. 194.
Reason and authority, ii. 468.
Rebellion, meaning of, i. 260; immoral, 270; a crime against nature, 274.
Reformation, the, Mandeville on, ii. 210; Berkeley on, iii. 340.

Religion in the state, iii. 185; Plato, Aristotle, Machiavel, etc., on, 186.
Resurrection, atheist view of, ii. 426.
Revelation in Scriptures, ii. 377.
Rhode Island, i. x; ii. 138, 162, 196, 311.
Ridicule, only weapon of atheists, ii. 270, 429.
Robbery, advantages from practice of, ii. 199.
Roman Catholics, in Protestant colleges, iii. 133; real patriotism of, 139; dangers of Roman Catholic disabilities, 140; Berkeley on, 338; feeling between Berkeley and, 384, 402.
Romans, luxury of, ii. 207, 237; bravery of, 232; and suicide, 237; compared with Christians, 321; integrity of, 325.
Rome, Church of, and atheists, ii. 241; its advantages, iii. 139.
Roper, Abel, ii. 18.

Salt of the earth, iii. 248.
Sceptic, defined, i. 303.
Scepticism and matter, i. 344, 362, 378, 397.
Schoolmen's theology and Christianity, ii. 331, 340.
Scriptures, atheist criticism of, ii. 310; canon of, 368; style of, 371; obscurity of, 372; inexactness of, 375; poetry of, 379.
Scurvy, iii. 235, 423; Boerhaave on, 236.
Seeing in the dark, iii. 277.
Self-preservation, law of, i. 278.
Seneca, on immortality, ii. 269.
Sense, ideas of, i. 191; ii. 490.
Sensible things defined, i. 304, 311.
Shaftesbury, criticism of, i. xxxvi, xliii-xlvi; ii. 486; and character of Alciphron, 244; "Characteristics" quoted, 244, 274 (*notes*) 334, 342, 487; criticism of style of, 336-338; on faith, 367; his natural religion attacked, 487; on morals, iii. 189.
Sight, objects of, not without the mind, i. 96; and hearing, 98; mediate and immediate objects of, 99.
Sight and touch, distinction between ideas of, i. 97, 98, 119, 121, 124, 133, 137, 142, 144, 154, 197; ii. 297.
"Siris," Balfour on, i. xlv-lx; style of, iii. 198; value of, *ib.*; influence of, *ib.*
Slavery for beggars, iii. 149.
Small-pox, cured by tar-water, iii. 206, 233, 364, 370, 415; Boerhaave on, 233.
Soap, as a medicine, iii. 224; as a Panacea, 228.
Social life, tendency towards, i. 273.
Socrates, on rakes, ii. 226; on increased armaments, 330; on virtue, 386; as a freethinker, 388; on divine disposition, iii. 296.
Soul, atheist views of nature of, ii. 390; Plato on, iii. 263; Aristotle on, 262; Hippocrates on nourishment of, 274; various Platonists on, 305.
Sounds, their existence without the mind, i. 312.
South-Sea scheme, i. xxix; ii. 82, 96; iii. 136.
Space, absolute, in Newton, i. 229; ii. 73; a phantom, iii. 300.
Speculation, philosophical, dangers of, i. 161.
Spinoza, ii. 298; his definitions, 473.
Spirit, unbodied, i. 144; idea of, 190; and ideas, 217, 242; unimaginable, 243; intercourse of, 246; the cause of motion, iii. 257.
Spirit-drinking, iii. 241.
Spiritual exhalations, iii. 251.
Steele, i. xix, xx; ii. 2.
Stephen, Leslie, i. xlii.
Stock's life of Berkeley, iii. 60, 170.
Stoics, on immortality, ii. 193, 269; Zeller on, ii. 270.

Subject and mode, i. 200.
Submission, objection to, i. 284; limitations of, 288.
Substance, philosophic view of denied, vulgar notion admitted, i. 194, 195; without accidents, 209; or substratum, defined, 329, 349, 371.
Suicide, atheists and, ii. 225, 237.
Sulphur, power of, iii. 270.
Swift, i. xii, xx, xxii, xxv.

Tacquet, i. 4, 90.
Tangible extension, etc. *See* Sight and touch.
Tar, ancient use of, iii. 208; in embalming, 210.
Tar-water, in America, iii. 198; how prepared, 206, 347, 358, 379; in small-pox, 206, 233, 364, 370, 415; in scrofulous cases, 207, 238; in pectoral complaints, 207; as a cordial, 222, 227, 234, 240, 241; as a balsam, 223; in gout, 228; as a Panacea, 229, 352, 356; in fevers, 230, 349, 380; in epidemic of, (1740-41), 231; as a corroborant, 232; in scurvy, 235, 423; in cancer, 417; veterinary use of, 245, 380; for sedentary persons, 246; in gangrene, 355, 371; in the plague, 356, 369; in erysipelas, 371; as a mind tonic, 412, 415; in polypus, 420.
Terms, significance of Berkeley's, i. 68.
Teste di Ferro, ii. 348.
Theophrastus, on balsams, iii. 210, 211, 213, 218; on fire, 264.
Tindal, Matthew, referred to, or quoted, i. xxxvii, 254, 286; ii. 310, 322, 328; iii. 100.
Toland, J., referred to, or quoted, i. xii, xxxv; ii. 313, 362.
Torricelli on force, ii. 443.
Touch. *See* Sight and touch.
Trees and animals compared, iii. 215.
Trinity, doctrine of, ii. 445; Platonic, 329; Plotinus on, 333.
Truth, uniform, ii. 188; variety of opinions no argument against, 189.
Turpentine as a medicine, iii. 225.

Universality of belief no argument, i. 203.
Universe, morality of, i. 252; order and beauty in, 342; corpuscularian theory of, iii. 284; evolution of, 285.
Universities, criticism of, ii. 335.

Vegetable life, nature of, ii. 388; vital principle of, iii. 246.
Verses on America, ii. 125; probable date of, *ib.*
Vice, luxury and, ii. 91; benefits of, ii. 196, 211; glozing of, 200; ill effects of, 213.
Virtue, atheist view of, ii. 252; beauty of, insufficient as a motive, 273.
Visible extension. *See* Sight and touch.
Vision, difficulties of erect, i. 117; essay on, referred to, i. 197, 299; ii. 297.
Visual language, i. 140, 142, 197, 209; ii. 275, 289, 500.
Vitruvius, ii. 260.

Wallis, i. 9, 11; iii. 20, 64.
Walpole, Horace, i. xlvi, lvii.
Walpole, Robert, i. xxx, xxxiv; ii. 104.
Walton, on, Fluxions, iii. 90, 96.
Wealth, and industry, ii. 87; iii. 117, 120, 141, 164; land as, 120; growth of, 121.
Whiston on the Scriptures, ii. 362.
Woolstone, his discourses on miracles, ii. 362.

Words and ideas, ii. 433; significance of, 441.
World, scriptural account of, ii. 409; as an animal, iii. 256, 307.
Wright's edition of Berkeley, i. 2; iii. 60, 170.

Zeller, on the Stoics, ii. 270.

CHISWICK PRESS:—CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

P.328,9

38244

...keley, G.
...e works of George Berkeley.

DATE	NAME	DATE

SEP -9 1984

38244

159. Whether it would not be better for this island, if all our fine folk of both sexes were shipped off, to remain in foreign countries, rather than that they should spend their estates at home in foreign luxury, and spread the contagion thereof through their native land?

160. Whether our gentry understand or have a notion of magnificence, and whether for want thereof they do not affect very wretched distinctions?

161. Whether there be not an art or skill in governing human pride, so as to render it subservient to the public aim?

162. Whether the great and general aim of the public should not be to employ the people?

163. What right an eldest son hath to the worst education?

164. Whether men's counsels are not the result of their knowledge and their principles?

*165. Whether an assembly of freethinkers, *petit maitres*, and smart fellows, would not make an admirable Senate?

166. Whether there be not labour of the brains as well as of the hands, and whether the former is beneath a gentleman?

167. Whether the public be more interested to protect the property acquired by mere birth than that which is the immediate fruit of learning and virtue?

168. Whether it would not be a poor and ill-judged project to attempt to promote the good of the community, by invading the rights of one part thereof, or of one particular order of men?

169. Whether the public happiness be not proposed by the legislature, and whether such happiness doth not contain that of the individuals?

170. Whether, therefore, a legislator should be content with a vulgar share of knowledge? Whether he should not be a person of reflection and thought, who hath made it his study to understand the true nature and interest of mankind, how to guide men's humours and passions, how to incite their active powers, how to make their several talents co-operate to the mutual benefit of each other, and the general good of the whole? *See Qu.* 183 *and* 184, *Part I.*

171. Whether it doth not follow, that above all things a gentleman's care should be to keep his own faculties sound and entire?

172. Whether the natural phlegm of this island needs any additional stupifier?

173. Whether all spirituous liquors are not, in truth, opiates?

174. Whether our men of business are not generally very grave by fifty?

*175. Whether there be really among us any persons so silly, as to encourage drinking in their children?

*176. Whence it is, that our ladies are more alive, and bear age so much better than our gentlemen?

177. Whether all men have not faculties of mind or body which may be employed for the public benefit?

178. Whether the main point be not to multiply and employ our people?

179. Whether hearty food and warm clothing would not enable and encourage the lower sort to labour?

180. Whether, in such a soil as ours, if there was industry, there could be want?

181. Whether the way to make men industrious be not to let them taste the fruits of their industry? And whether the labouring ox should be muzzled? *See Qu.* 173, *Part I.*

182. Whether our landlords are to be told, that industry and numbers would raise the value of their lands, or that one acre about the Tholsel is worth ten thousand acres in Connaught?

183. Whether our old native Irish are not the most indolent and supine people in Christendom?

184. Whether they are yet civilized, and whether their habitations and furniture are not more sordid than those of the savage Americans?

*185. Whether this be altogether their own fault?

186. Whether it be not a sad circumstance to live among lazy beggars? And whether, on the other hand, it would not be delightful to live in a country swarming, like China, with busy people?

187. Whether we should not cast about, by all manner of means, to excite industry, and to remove whatever hinders it? And whether every one should not lend an helping hand? *See Qu.* 3, 4.

188. Whether vanity itself should not be engaged in this good work? And whether it is not to be wished, that the finding of employment for themselves and others, were a fashionable distinction among the ladies?

189. Whether idleness be the mother or the daughter of spleen?

190. Whether it may not be worth while to publish the conversation of Ischomachus and his wife, in Xenophon, for the use of our ladies?

191. Whether it is true, that there have been, upon a time, one hundred millions of people employed in China, without the woollen-trade, or any foreign commerce?

192. Whether the natural inducements to sloth are not greater in the Mogul's country than in Ireland, and yet whether in that suffocating and dispiriting climate, the Banyans are not all, men, women, and children, constantly employed?

193. Whether it be not true, that the Great Mogul's subjects

might undersell us even in our own markets, and clothe our people with their stuffs and calicoes, if they were imported duty free?

194. Whether there can be a greater reproach on the leading men and the patriots of a country, than that the people should want employment?[1]

195. Whether much may not be expected from a biennial consultation of so many wise men about the public good?

196. Whether a tax upon dirt would not be one way of encouraging industry?

*197. Whether it may not be right to appoint censors in every parish to observe and make returns of the idle hands?

*198. Whether a register or history of the idleness and industry of a people would be an useless thing?

*199. Whether we are apprized, of all the uses that may be made of political arithmetic?

200. Whether it would be a great hardship, if every parish were obliged to find work for their poor?

201. Whether children especially, should not be inured to labour betimes?

202. Whether there should not be erected, in each province, an hospital for orphans and foundlings at the expense of old bachelors?

203. Whether it be true, that in the Dutch workhouses, things are so managed, that a child four years old, may earn its own livelihood?

204. What a folly is it to build fine houses, or establish lucrative posts and large incomes, under the notion of providing for the poor?

205. Whether the poor grown up and in health need any other provision, but their own industry under public inspection?

206. Whether the poor-tax in England hath lessened or increased the number of the poor?

*207. Why the workhouse in Dublin, with so good an endowment, should yet be of so little use? and whether this may not be owing to that very endowment?

*208. Whether that income might not, by this time, have gone through the whole kingdom, and erected a dozen workhouses in every county?

209. Whether workhouses should not be made at the least expense, with clay-floors and walls of rough stone, without plastering, ceiling, or glazing.

*210. Whether the tax on chairs or hackney coaches be not paid, rather by the country gentlemen, than the citizens of Dublin?

[1] See Query 367 in the second edition for a passage added to this query. —ED.

211. Whether it be an impossible attempt to set our people at work, or whether industry be a habit which like other habits, may by time and skill be introduced among any people?

212. Whether all manner of means should not be employed to possess the nation in general, with an aversion and contempt for idleness and all idle folk? *See Qu.* 3, *Part I.*

213. Whether it would be a hardship on people destitute of all things, if the public furnished them with necessaries which they should be obliged to earn by their labour?

214. Whether other nations have not found great benefit from the use of slaves in repairing high roads, making rivers navigable, draining bogs, erecting public buildings, bridges and manufactures?

215. Whether temporary servitude would not be the best cure for idleness and beggary?

216. Whether the public hath not a right to employ those who cannot, or who will not find employment for themselves?

217. Whether all sturdy beggars should not be seized and made slaves to the public for a certain term of years?

218. Whether he who is chained in a jail or dungeon hath not for the time lost his liberty? And if so, whether temporary slavery be not already admitted among us?

219. Whether a state of servitude, wherein he should be well worked, fed and clothed, would not be a preferment to such a fellow?

220. Whether criminals in the freest country may not forfeit their liberty, and repair the damage they have done the public by hard labour?

221. What the word servant signifies in the New Testament?

222. Whether the view of criminals chained in pairs and kept at hard labour, would not be very edifying to the multitude? *See Qu.* 58, *Part I.*

223. Whether the want of such an institution be not plainly seen in England, where the disbelief of a future state hardeneth rogues against the fear of death, and where, through the great growth of robbers and house-breakers it becomes every day more necessary?

224. Whether it be not easier to prevent than to remedy, and whether we should not profit by the example of others?

225. Whether felons are not often spared, and therefore encouraged, by the compassion of those who should prosecute them?

226. Whether many that would not take away the life of a thief, may not nevertheless be willing to bring him to a more adequate punishment?

*227. Whether there should not be a difference between the treatment of criminals and that of other slaves?

228. Whether the most indolent would be fond of idleness, if they regarded it as the sure road to hard labour?

229. Whether the industry of the lower part of our people doth not much depend on the expense of the upper?

230. What would be the consequence, if our gentry affected to distinguish themselves by fine houses rather than fine clothes?

231. Whether any people in Europe are so meanly provided with houses and furniture in proportion to their incomes, as the men of estates in Ireland?

232. Whether building would not peculiarly encourage all other arts in this kingdom?

233. Whether smiths, masons, bricklayers, plasterers, carpenters, joiners, tilers, plumbers, and glaziers, would not all find employment if the humour of building prevailed?

234. Whether the ornaments and furniture of a good house do not employ a number of all sorts of artificers, in iron, wood, marble, brass, pewter, copper, wool, flax, and divers other materials?

235. Whether in buildings and gardens, a great number of day-labourers do not find employment?

236. Whether by these means much of that sustenance and wealth of this nation which now goes to foreigners would not be kept at home, and nourish and circulate among our own people?

237. Whether as industry produced good living, the number of hands and mouths would not be increased; and in proportion thereunto, whether there would not be every day more occasion for agriculture? And whether this article alone would not employ a world of people?

238. Whether such management would not equally provide for the magnificence of the rich, and the necessities of the poor? *See Qu.* 125, 126, *Part I.*

239. Whether an expense in building and improvements doth not remain at home, pass to the heir, and adorn the public? And whether any of these things can be said of claret?

240. Whether fools do not make fashions, and wise men follow them? *See Qu.* 13, *Part I.*

241. Whether, for one who hurts his fortune by improvements, twenty do not ruin themselves by foreign luxury?

242. Whether in proportion as Ireland was improved and beautified by fine seats, the number of absentees would not decrease?

243. Whether he who employs men in buildings and manufactures doth not put life in the country, and whether the neighbourhood round him be not observed to thrive?

244. Whether money circulated on the landlord's own lands, and among his own tenants, doth not return into his own pocket?

245. Whether every squire that made his domain swarm with busy hands, like a bee-hive or ant-hill, would not serve his own interest, as well as that of his country?

246. Whether a gentleman, who hath seen a little of the world and observed how men live elsewhere, can contentedly sit down in a cold, damp, sordid habitation, in the midst of a bleak country, inhabited by thieves and beggars?

247. Whether on the other hand, a handsome seat amidst well-improved lands, fair villages, and a thriving neighbourhood, may not invite a man to dwell on his own estate, and quit the life of an insignificant saunterer about town, for that of an useful country-gentleman?

248. Whether it would not be of use and ornament, if the towns throughout this kingdom were provided with decent churches, town-houses, workhouses, market-places and paved streets, with some order taken for cleanliness? *See Qu.* 196.

249. Whether if each of these towns were addicted to some peculiar manufacture, we should not find, that the employing many hands together on the same work was the way to perfect our workmen? And whether all these things might not soon be provided by a domestic industry, if money were not wanting?

250. Whether money could ever be wanting to the demands of industry, if we had a national bank?

*251. Whether when a motion was once upon a time to establish a private bank in this kingdom by public authority, divers gentlemen did not shew themselves forward to embark in that design?

*252. Whether it may not now be hoped that our patriots will be as forward to examine and consider the proposal of a public bank calculated only for the public good?

*253. Whether any people upon earth shew a more early zeal for the service of their country, greater eagerness to bear a part in the Legislature, or a more general parturiency with respect to politics and public counsels?

*254. Whether, nevertheless, a light and ludicrous vein be not the reigning humour; but whether there was ever greater cause to be serious?

THE

QUERIST,

CONTAINING

Several *QUERIES*,

Propoſed to the

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

PUBLIC.

PART III.

Conſult not with a Merchant concerning Exchange.
Eccluſ. c. xxxvii. v. 11.

DUBLIN:
Printed by R. Reilly, on Cork-Hill,
For Jos. Leathley, Bookſeller, in *Dames-Street*.
M, DCC, XXXVII.

THE QUERIST.

PART III.

Qu. 1.

WHETHER the fable of Hercules and the carter, ever suited any nation like this nation of Ireland?

2. Whether it be not a new spectacle under the sun, to behold in such a climate and such a soil, and under such a gentle government, so many roads untrodden, fields untilled, houses desolate and hands unemployed?

3. Whether there is any country in Christendom, either kingdom or republic, depending or independent, free or enslaved, which may not afford us an useful lesson?

4. Whether the frugal Swiss have any other commodities, but their butter and cheese and a few cattle, for exportation; whether, nevertheless, the single canton of Bern hath not in her public treasury two millions sterling?

5. Whether that small town of Bern, with its scanty, barren territory, in a mountainous corner, without sea-ports, without manufactures, without mines, be not rich by mere dint of frugality?

6. Whether the Swiss in general have not sumptuary laws, prohibiting the use of gold, jewels, silver, silk, and lace in their apparel, and indulging the women only to wear silk on festivals, weddings, and public solemnities?

7. Whether there be not two ways of growing rich, sparing and getting? But whether the lazy spendthrift must not be doubly poor?

8. Whether money circulating be not the life of industry; and whether the want thereof doth not render a state gouty and inactive?

9. But, whether if we had a national bank, and our present cash (small as it is) were put into the most convenient shape, men should hear any public complaints for want of money?

10. Whether all circulation be not alike a circulation of credit, whatsoever medium (metal or paper) is employed, and whether

gold be any more than credit for so much power? *See Qu.* 37, *Part I.*

11. Whether the wealth of the richest nations in Christendom doth not consist in paper, vastly more than in gold and silver.

12. Whether Lord Clarendon doth not aver of his own knowledge, that the Prince of Orange, with the best credit, and the assistance of the richest men in Amsterdam, was above ten days endeavouring to raise twenty thousand pounds in specie, without being able to raise half the sum in all that time? See Clarendon's History, b. 12.

*13. Whether the whole city of Amsterdam would not have been troubled to have brought together twenty thousand pounds in one room? *Ibid.*

*14. Whether it be not absolutely necessary that there must be a bank and must be a trust? And, if so, whether it be not the most safe and prudent course to have a national bank and trust the legislature? *See Qu.* 25 *and* 26, *Part II.*

*15. Whether objections against trust in general avail, when it is allowed there must be a trust, and the only question is where to place this trust, whether in the legislature or in private hands?

*16. Whether it can be expected that private persons should have more regard to the public than the public itself?

*17. Whether, if there be hazards from mismanagement, those may not be provided against in the framing of a public bank; but whether any provision can be made against the mismanagement of private banks that are under no check, control, or inspection?

*18. Whatever may be said for the sake of objecting, yet, whether it be not false in fact, that men would prefer a private security to a public security?

*19. Whether a national bank ought to be considered as a new experiment; and whether it be not a motive to try this scheme that it hath been already tried with success in other countries? *See Qu.* 200, *Part I., and Qu.* 52, *Part II.*

*20. If power followeth money, whether this can be anywhere more properly and securely placed, than in the same hands wherein the supreme power is already placed?

*21. Whether there be more danger of abuse in a private than in a public management?

*22. Whether the proper usual remedy for abuses of private banks be not to bring them before Parliament, and subject them to the inspection of a committee; and whether it be not more prudent to prevent than to redress an evil?

23. Supposing there had been hitherto no such thing as a bank, and the question were now first proposed, whether it would be safer to circulate unlimited bills in a private credit, or bills to

a limited value on the public credit of the community, what would men think?

*24. Whether experience and example be not the plainest proof; and whether any instance can be assigned where a national bank hath not been attended with great advantage to the public?

*25. Whether the evils apprehended from a national bank are not much more to be apprehended from private banks; but whether men by custom are not familiarized and reconciled to common dangers, which are therefore thought less than they really are?

*26. Whether it would not be very hard to suppose all sense, honesty, and public spirit were in the keeping of only a few private men, and the public was not fit to be trusted?

*27. Whether it be not ridiculous to suppose a legislature should be afraid to trust itself?

*28. But, whether a private interest be not generally supported and pursued with more zeal than a public?

29. Whether the maxim, "What is everybody's business is nobody's," prevails in any country under the sun more than in Ireland?

*30. Whether, nevertheless, the community of danger, which lulls private men asleep, ought not to awaken the public?

*31. Whether there be not less security where there are more temptations and fewer checks?

*32. If a man is to risk his fortune, whether it be more prudent to risk it on the credit of private men, or in that of the great assembly of the nation?

*33. Where is it most reasonable to expect wise and punctual dealing, whether in a secret impenetrable recess, where credit depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and inspected by Parliament?

*34. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not increase the danger?

*35. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed and inspected by the legislature?

*36. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as well feared without it?

*37. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become an instrument of oppression?

*38. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the demands upon it are unknown?

*39. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?

*40. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently practicable and useful to the public, yet, if conceived to interfere with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?

*41. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a bank would give them any new power?

*42. What should tempt the public to defraud itself?

*43. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would not be *felo de se;* and whether it be not reasonable to suppose it bent on its own destruction?

*44. Whether the objection to a public national bank, from want of secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?

*45. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that there could have been of late so many sufferers?

*46. Whether when all objections are answered it be still incumbent to answer surmises?

*47. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be against any proposal they could not turn into a job?

*48. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?

*49. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be trusted, what security can there be for trusting any one else?

*50. If it be not ridiculous to question whether the public can find cash to circulate bills of a limited value when private bankers are supposed to find enough to circulate them to an unlimited value?

51. Whether the united stock of a nation be not the best security? And whether anything but the ruin of the state can produce a national bankruptcy?

52. Whether the total sum of the public treasure, power and wisdom, all co-operating, be not most likely to establish a bank of credit, sufficient to answer the ends, relieve the wants, and satisfy the scruples of all people?

*53. Whether those hazards that in a greater degree attend private banks can be admitted as objections against a public one?

*54. Whether that which is an objection to everything be an objection to anything; and whether the possibility of an abuse be not of that kind?

*55. Whether, in fact, all things are not more or less abused, and yet notwithstanding such abuse, whether many things are not upon the whole expedient and useful?

*56. Whether those things that are subject to the most general inspection are not the less subject to abuse?

*57. Whether, for private ends, it may not be sometimes expedient to object novelty to things that have been often tried, difficulty to the plainest things, and hazard to the safest?

*58. Whether some men will not be apt to argue as if the question was between money and credit, and not (as in fact it is) which ought to be preferred, private credit or public credit? *See Qu.* 208 *and* 261, *Part I.*

*59. Whether they will not prudently overlook the evils felt, or to be feared, on one side?

*60. Whether, therefore, those that would make an impartial judgment ought not to be on their guard, keeping both prospects always in view, balancing the inconveniences on each side and considering neither absolutely?

*61. Whether wilful mistakes, examples without a likeness, and general addresses to the passions are not often more successful than arguments?

*62. Whether there be not an art to puzzle plain cases as well as to explain obscure ones?

*63. Whether private men are not often an over-match for the public; want of weight being made up for by activity?

*64. If we suppose neither sense nor honesty in our leaders or representatives, whether we are not already undone, and so have nothing further to fear?

*65. Suppose a power in the government to hurt the public by means of a national bank, yet what should give them the will to do this? Or supposing a will to do mischief, yet how could a national bank, modelled and administered by Parliament, put it in their power?

*66. Whether even a wicked will intrusted with power can be supposed to abuse it for no end?

*67. Whether it be not much more probable that those who maketh such objections do not believe them?

*68. Whether it be not vain to object that our fellow-subjects of Great Britain would malign or obstruct our industry when it is exerted in a way which cannot interfere with their own?

*69. Whether it is to be supposed they should take delight in the dirt and nakedness and famine of our people, or envy them shoes for their feet and beef for their bellies?

*70. What possible handle or inclination could our having a national bank give other people to distress us?

*71. Whether it be not ridiculous to conceive that a project for cloathing and feeding our natives should give any umbrage to England?

*72. Whether such unworthy surmises are not the pure effect of spleen?

73. Whether London is not to be considered as the metropolis of Ireland? And whether our wealth (such as it is) doth not circulate through London, and throughout all England, as freely as that of any part of his Majesty's dominions?

74. Whether, therefore, it be not evidently the interest of the people of England to encourage rather than to oppose a national bank in this kingdom, as well as every other means for advancing our wealth, which shall not impair their own?

75. Whether it is not our interest to be useful to them rather than rival them; and whether in that case we may not be sure of their good offices? *See Qu.* 95 *and* 99, *Part I.*

76. Whether we can propose to thrive, so long as we entertain a wrongheaded distrust of England?

77. Whether, as a national bank would increase our industry and that our wealth, England may not be a proportionable gainer; and whether we should not consider the gains of our mother-country as some accession to our own?

*78. Whether the Protestant colony in this kingdom can ever forget what they owe to England?

*79. Whether there ever was in any part of the world a country in such wretched circumstances, and which, at the same time could be so easily remedied, and nevertheless the remedy not applied?

*80. What must become of a people that can neither see the plainest things nor do the easiest?

*81. Be the money lodged in the bank what it will, yet whether an Act to make good deficiencies would not remove all scruples?

*82. If it be objected that a national bank must lower interest, and therefore hurt the monied man, whether the same objection would not hold as strong against multiplying our gold and silver?

*83. But whether a bank that utters bills, with the sole view of promoting the public weal, may not so proportion their quantity as to avoid several inconveniences which might attend private banks?

84. Whether there be any difficulty in comprehending that the whole wealth of the nation is in truth the stock of a national bank? And whether any more than the right comprehension of this be necessary to make all men easy with regard to its credit? *See Qu.* 51 *and* 52.

*85. Whether anything be more reasonable than that the public, which makes the whole profit of the bank, should engage to make good its credit?

86. Whether the prejudices about gold and silver are not strong, but whether they are not still prejudices?

87. Whether paper doth not, by its stamp and signature,

acquire a local value, and become as precious and as scarce as gold? And whether it be not much fitter to circulate large sums, and therefore preferable to gold?

*88. Whether, in order to make men see and feel, it be not often necessary to inculcate the same thing, and place it in different lights?

89. Whether it doth not much import to have a right conception of money? And whether its true and just idea be not that of a ticket, entitling to power and fitted to record and transfer such power?

*90. Whether the managers and officers of a national bank ought to be considered otherwise than as the cashiers and clerks of private banks? whether they are not in effect as little trusted, have as little power, are as much limited by rules, and as liable to inspection?

*91. Whether the mistaking this point may not create some prejudice against a national bank, as if it depended on the credit, or wisdom, or honesty, of private men, rather than on the public, which is really the sole proprietor and director thereof, and as such obliged to support it?

92. Whether though the bank of Amsterdam doth very rarely, if at all, pay out money, yet whether every man possessed of specie be not ready to convert it into paper, and act as cashier to the bank? And whether, from the same motive, every monied man throughout this kingdom would not be cashier to our national bank?

*93. Whether a national bank would not be the great means and motive for employing our poor in manufactures? *See Qu.* 212 *and* 250, *Part II.*

*94. Whether money, though lent out only to the rich, would not soon circulate among the poor? And whether any man borrows but with an intent to circulate?

*95. Whether both government and people would not in the event be gainers by a national bank? And whether anything but wrong conceptions of its nature can make those that wish well to either averse from it?

*96. Whether it may not be right to think, and to have it thought, that England and Ireland, prince and people, have one and the same interest?

*97. Whether, if we had more means to set on foot such manufactures and such commerce as consists with the interest of England, there would not of course be less sheep-walks and less wool exported to foreign countries? And whether a national bank would not supply such means? *See Qu.* 250, *Part II.*

98. Whether we may not obtain that as friends, which it is in vain to hope for as rivals?

99. Whether in every instance by which we prejudice Eng-

land, we do not, in a greater degree, prejudice ourselves? *See Qu.* 153 *and* 154, *Part II.*

100. Whether, in the rude original of society, the first step was not the exchanging of commodities, the next a substituting of metals by weight as the common medium of circulation, after this the making use of coin, lastly a further refinement by the use of paper with proper marks and signatures? And whether this, as it is the last, so it be not the greatest improvement?

101. Whether we are not in fact the only people who may be said to starve in the midst of plenty?

*102. Whether business in general doth not languish among us? Whether our land is not untilled? Whether its inhabitants are not upon the wing?

103. Whether there can be a worse sign than that people should quit their country for a livelihood? Though men often leave their country for health, or pleasure, or riches, yet to leave it merely for a livelihood? Whether this be not exceeding bad, and showeth some peculiar mismanagement?

*104. Whether our circumstances do not call aloud for some present remedy? And whether that remedy be not in our power?

105. Whether, in order to redress our evils, artificial helps are not most wanted in a land where industry is most against the natural grain of the people?

*106. Whether, of all the helps to industry that ever were invented, there be any more secure, more easy, and more effectual than a national bank?

*107. Whether medicines do not recommend themselves by experience, even though their reasons be obscure? But whether reason and fact are not equally clear in favour of this political medicine?

108. Whether, although the prepossessions about gold and silver have taken deep root, yet the example of our colonies in America doth not make it as plain as daylight, that they are not so necessary to the wealth of a nation as the vulgar of all ranks imagine? *See Qu.* 284, 285, *Part I.*

109. Whether it be not evident that we maintain a much greater inward and outward commerce, and be five times richer than we are; nay, and our bills abroad be of far greater credit, though we had not one ounce of gold or silver in the whole island?

110. Whether wrongheaded maxims, customs, and fashions, are not sufficient to destroy any people which hath so few resources as the inhabitants of Ireland?

111. Whether it would not be a horrible thing to see our matrons make dress and play their chief concern?

112. Whether our ladies might not as well endow monasteries

as wear Flanders lace? And whether it be not true that Popish nuns are maintained by Protestant contributions?

113. Whether England, which hath a free trade, whatever she remits for foreign luxury with one hand, doth not with the other receive much more from abroad? Whether, nevertheless, this nation would not be a gainer, if our women would content themselves with the same moderation in point of expense as the English ladies?

114. But whether it be not a notorious truth, that our Irish ladies are on a foot, as to dress, with those of three times [1] their fortune in England?

115. Whether it be not even certain, that the matrons of this forlorn country send out a greater proportion of its wealth for fine apparel, than any other females on the whole surface of this terraqueous globe?

116. Whether the expense, great as it is, be the greatest evil; but whether this folly may not produce many other follies, an entire derangement of domestic life, absurd manners, neglect of duties, bad mothers, a general corruption in both sexes?

*117. Whether therefore a tax on all gold and silver in apparel, on all foreign laces and silks, may not raise a fund for the bank, and at the same time have other salutary effects on the public?

*118. But, if gentlemen had rather tax themselves in another way, whether an additional tax of ten shillings the hogshead on wines may not supply a sufficient fund for the national bank, all defects to be made good by Parliament?

*119. Whether upon the whole it may not be right to appoint a national bank?

*120. Whether the stock and security of such bank would not be, in truth, the national stock, or the total sum of the wealth of this kingdom? *See Qu.* 84.

*121. Whether, nevertheless, there should not be a particular fund for present use in answering bills and circulating credit?

*122. Whether for this end any fund may not suffice, provided an Act be passed for making good deficiencies?

*123. Whether the sole proprietor of such bank should not be the public, and the sole director the legislature?

*124. Whether the managers, officers, and cashiers should not be servants of the public, acting by orders and limited by rules of the legislature?

*125. Whether there should not be a standing number of inspectors, one-third men in great office, the rest members of both houses, half whereof to go out, and half to come in every session?

[1] "Five times" in the second edition.

*126. Whether those inspectors should not, all in a body, visit twice a year, and three as often as they pleased?

*127. Whether the general bank should not be in Dublin, and subordinate banks or compters one in each province of Munster, Ulster, and Connaught?

*128. Whether there should not be such provisions of stamps, signatures, checks, strong boxes, and all other measures for securing the bank notes and cash, as are usual in other banks?

*129. Whether these ten or a dozen last queries may not easily be converted into heads of a bill? *See Parts I. and II.*

*130. Whether any one concerns himself about the security or funds of the bank of Venice or Amsterdam? And whether in a little time the case would not be the same as to our bank?

131. Whether nevertheless the first beginning of expedients do not always meet with prejudices? And whether even the prejudices of a people ought not to be respected?

132. Whether a national bank be not the true philosopher's stone in a state? *See Qu.* 23, *Part II.*

*133. Whether it be not the most obvious remedy for all the inconveniences we labour under with regard to our coin?

*134. Whether it be not agreed on all hands that our coin is on very bad foot, and calls for some present remedy?

*135. Whether the want of silver hath not introduced a sort of traffic for change, which is purchased at no inconsiderable discount to the great obstruction of our domestic commerce?

*136. Whether, though it be evident silver is wanted, it be yet so evident which is the best way of providing for this want? Whether by lowering the gold, or raising the silver, or partly one, partly the other?

*137. Whether a partial raising of one species be not, in truth, granting a premium to our bankers for importing such species? And what that species is which deserves most to be encouraged?

*138. Whether it be not just that all gold should be alike rated according to its weight and fineness?

*139. Whether this may be best done by lowering some certain species of gold, or by raising others, or by joining both methods together?

140. Whether all regulations of coin should not be made, with a view to encourage industry and a circulation of commerce, throughout the kingdom?

*141. Whether the North and the South have not, in truth, one and the same interest in this matter?

142. Whether to oil the wheel of commerce be not a common benefit? And whether this be not done by avoiding fractions and multiplying small silver?

*143. But, whether a public benefit ought to be obtained by

unjust methods, and therefore, whether any reduction of coin should be thought of which may hurt the properties of private men?

*144. Whether those parts of the kingdom where commerce doth most abound would not be the greatest gainers by having our coin placed on a right foot?

*145. Whether, in case a reduction of coin be thought expedient, the uttering of bank bills at the same time may not prevent the inconveniences of such a reduction?

*146. But, whether any public expediency could countervail a real pressure on those who are least able to bear it, tenants and debtors?

*147. Whether, nevertheless, the political body, as well as the natural, must not sometimes be worse in order to be better?

148. Whether, all things considered, a general raising the value of gold and silver be not so far from bringing greater quantities thereof into the kingdom, that it would produce a direct contrary effect, inasmuch as less, in that case, would serve, and therefore less be wanted? And whether men do not import a commodity, in proportion to the demand or want of it?

149. Whether the lowering of our gold would not create a fever in the state? And whether a fever be not sometimes a cure, but whether it be not the last cure a man would choose?

*150. What if our other gold were raised to a par with Portugal gold, and the value of silver in general raised with regard to that of gold?

*151. Whether the public ends may or may not be better answered by such argumentation, than by a reduction of our coin?

*152. Provided silver is multiplied, be it by raising or diminishing the value of our coin, whether the great end is not answered?

153. Whether raising the value of a particular species will not tend to multiply such species, and to lessen others in proportion thereunto? And whether a much less quantity of cash in silver would not, in reality, enrich the nation more than a much greater in gold?

*154. Whether, if a reduction be thought necessary, the obvious means to prevent all hardships and injustice be not a national bank?

*155. Upon supposition that the cash of this kingdom was five hundred thousand pounds, and by lowering the various species each one-fifth of its value the whole sum was reduced to four hundred thousand pounds, whether the difficulty of getting money, and consequently of paying rents, would not be increased in the proportion of five to four?

*156. Whether such difficulty would not be a great and unmerited distress on all the tenants in the nation? But if at the same time with the aforesaid reduction there were uttered one hundred thousand pounds additional to the former current stock, whether such difficulty or inconvenience would then be felt?

157. Whether, *cæteris paribus*, it be not true that the prices of things increase as the quantity of money increaseth, and are diminished as that is diminished? And whether, by the quantity of money, is not to be understood the amount of the denominations, all contracts being nominal for pounds, shillings, and pence, and not for weights of gold or silver?

*158. Whether in any foreign market, twopence advance in a kilderkin of corn could greatly affect our trade?

*159. Whether in regard of the far greater changes and fluctuations of price from the difference of seasons and other accidents, that small rise should seem considerable?

160. Whether our exports do not consist of such necessaries as other countries cannot well be without?

161. Whether upon the circulation of a national bank more land would not be tilled, more hands employed, and consequently more commodities exported?

*162. Whether, setting aside the assistance of a national bank, it will be easy to reduce or lower our coin without some hardship (at least for the present) on a great number of particular persons?

*163. Whether, nevertheless, the scheme of a national bank doth not entirely stand clear of this question; and whether such bank may not completely subsist and answer its ends, although there should be no alteration at all made in the value of our coin?

*164. Whether, if the ill state of our coin be not redressed, that scheme would not be still more necessary, inasmuch as a national bank, by putting new life and vigour into our commerce, may prevent our feeling the ill effects of the want of such redress?

*165. Whether men united by interest are not often divided by opinion; and whether such difference in opinion be not an effect of misapprehension?

*166. Whether two things are not manifest, first, that some alteration in the value of our coin is highly expedient, secondly, that whatever alteration is made, the tenderest care should be had of the properties of the people, and even a regard paid to their prejudices?

*167. Whether our taking the coin of another nation for more than it is worth be not, in reality and in event, a cheat upon ourselves?

*168. Whether a particular coin over-rated will not be sure to flow in upon us from other countries beside that where it is coined?

*169. Whether, in case the wisdom of the nation shall think fit to alter our coin, without erecting a national bank, the rule for lessening or avoiding present inconvenience should not be so to order matters, by raising the silver and depressing the gold, as that the total sum of coined cash within the kingdom shall, in denomination, remain the same, or amount to the same nominal value, after the change it did before?

*170. Whether all inconvenience ought not to be lessened as much as may be; but after, whether it would be prudent, for the sake of a small inconvenience, to obstruct a much greater good? And whether it may not sometimes happen that an inconvenience which in fancy and general discourse seems great shall, when accurately inspected and cast up, appear inconsiderable?

*171. Whether in public councils the sum of things, here and there, present and future, ought not to be regarded?

172. Whether silver and small money be not that which circulates the quickest, and passeth through all hands, on the road, in the market, at the shop?

173. Whether, all things considered, it would not be better for a kingdom that its cash consisted of half a million in small silver than of two millions in gold?[1] *See Qu.* 22, *Part I.*

174. Whether there be not every day five hundred lesser payments made for one that requires gold?

175. Whether Spain, where gold bears the highest value, be not the laziest; and China, where it bears the lowest, be not the most industrious country in the known world?

*176. Money being a ticket which entitles to power and records the title, whether such power avails otherwise than as it is exerted into act?

177. Whether it be not evidently the interest of every state, that its money should rather circulate than stagnate?

178. Whether the principal use of cash be not its ready passing from hand to hand to answer common occasions,[2] and whether common occasions of all sorts of people are not small ones?

179. Whether business at fairs and markets is not often at a stand, and often hindered, even though the seller hath his commodities at hand and the purchaser his gold, yet for want of change?

*180. Whether beside that value of money which is rated by weight, there be not also another value consisting in its aptness to circulate?

[1] "Five times that sum in gold" in second edition.

[2] "Common occasions of the common people" in second edition.

181. As wealth is really power, and coin a ticket conveying power, whether those tickets which are the fittest for that use ought not to be preferred?

182. Whether those tickets which singly transfer small shares of power, and being multiplied, large shares, are not fitter for common use than those which singly transfer large shares? *See Qu.* 178.

183. Whether the public is not more benefited by a shilling that circulates, than a pound that lies dead?

184. Whether sixpence twice paid, be not as good as a shilling once paid?

185. Whether the same shilling circulating in a village may not supply one man with bread, another with stockings, a third with a knife, a fourth with paper, a fifth with nails, and so answer many wants which must otherwise have remained unsatisfied?

186. Whether facilitating and quickening the circulation of power to supply wants, be not the promoting of wealth and industry among the lower people? And whether upon this the wealth of the great doth not depend?

187. Whether, without the proper means of circulation, it be not vain to hope for thriving manufactures and a busy people?

188. Whether four pounds in small cash may not circulate and enliven an Irish market, which many four pound pieces would permit to stagnate?[1]

189. Whether a man that could move nothing less than an hundred pound weight would not be much at a loss to supply his wants; and whether it would not be better for him to be less strong and more active?

190. Whether the natural body can be in a state of health and vigour, without a due circulation of the extremities, even in the fingers and toes? And whether the political body, any more than the natural, can thrive without a proportionable circulation through the minutest and most inconsiderable parts thereof?

191. If we had a mint for coining only shillings, sixpences, and copper money, whether the nation would not soon feel the good effects thereof?

192. Whether the greater waste by wearing of small coins would not be abundantly overbalanced by their usefulness?

193. Whether it be not the industry of common people that feeds the state, and whether it be possible to keep this industry alive without small money?

194. Whether the want of this be not a great bar to our employing the people in these manufactures which are open to us, and do not interfere with Great Britain?

[1] See p. 158 for a foot-note added to this query in the second edition.

195. Whether, therefore, such want doth not drive men into the lazy way of employing land under sheep walk?

196. Whether the running of wool from Ireland can so effectually be prevented, as by encouraging other business and manufactures among our people?

197. Whatever commodities Great Britain importeth, which we might supply, whether it be not her real interest to import them from us rather than from any other people?

198. Whether the apprehension of many among us (who for that very reason stick to their wool) that England may hereafter prohibit, limit, or discourage our linen trade, when it hath been once, with great pains and expense, thoroughly introduced and settled in this land, be not altogether groundless and unjust? *See Qu.* 99, *Part I., and Qu.* 155, *Part II.*

199. Whether it is possible for this country, which hath neither mines of gold nor a free trade, to support for any time the sending out of specie?

200. Whether, in fact, our payments are not made by bills? And whether our foreign credit doth not depend on our domestic industry, and our bills on that credit?

201. Whether, in order to mend it, we ought not first to know the peculiar wretchedness of our state? And whether there be any knowing of this but by comparison?

202. Whether there are not single market towns in England that turn more money in buying and selling than whole counties, perhaps provinces, with us?

203. Whether the small town of Birmingham alone doth not, upon an average, circulate every week one way or other, to the value of fifty thousand pounds? But whether the same crown may not be often paid?

*204. Whether there be any woollen manufacture in Birmingham?

*205. Whether bad management may not be worse than slavery? And whether any part of Christendom be in a more languishing condition than this kingdom?

206. But whether any kingdom in Europe be so good a customer at Bordeaux as Ireland?

207. Whether the police and economy of France be not governed by wise councils? And whether any one from this country, who sees their towns, and manufactures, and commerce, will not wonder what our senators have been doing?

208. What variety and number of excellent manufactures are to be met with throughout the whole kingdom of France?

209. Whether there are not every where some or other mills for many uses, forges and furnaces for iron-work, looms for tapestry, glass houses, and so forth?

210. What quantities of paper, stockings, hats, what manu-

factures of wool, silk, linen, hemp, leather, wax, earthenware, brass, lead, tin, &c.?

211. Whether the manufactures and commerce of the single town of Lyons do not amount to a greater value than all the manufactures and all the trade of this kingdom taken together.

*212. Whether it be not true, that within the compass of one year there flowed from the South Sea, when that commerce was open, into the single town of St. Malo's, a sum of gold and silver equal to four times the whole specie of this kingdom? And whether that same part of France doth not at present draw from Cadiz upwards of two hundred thousand pounds per annum?

213. Whether in the anniversary fair at the small town of Beaucair, upon the Rhone, there be not as much money laid out as the current cash of this kingdom amounts to?

*214. Whether it be true that the Dutch make ten millions of livres, every return of the flota and galleons, by their sales at the Indies and at Cadiz?

*215. Whether it be true that England makes at least one hundred thousand pounds per annum by the single article of hats sold in Spain?

216. Whether the very shreds shorn from woollen-cloth, which are thrown away in Ireland, do not make a beautiful tapestry in France?

*217. Whether the toys of Thiers do not employ five thousand families?

*218. Whether there be not a small town or two in France which supply all Spain with cards?

219. Whether there be not French towns subsisted merely by making pins?

220. Whether the coarse fingers of those very women, those same peasants, who one part of the year till the ground and dress the vineyards, are not another employed in making the finest French point?

221. Whether there is not a great number of idle fingers among the wives and daughters of our peasants?

*222. Whether, about twenty-five years ago, they did not first attempt to make porcelain in France; and whether, in a few years, they did not make it so well, as to rival that which comes from China?

223. Whether the French do not raise a trade from saffron, dyeing drugs and the like products, which may do with us as well as with them?

224. Whether we may not have materials of our own growth to supply all manufactures, as well as France, except silk; and whether the bulk of what silk, even they manufacture, be not imported?

225. Whether it be possible for this country to grow rich, so

long as what is made by domestic industry is spent in foreign luxury?

*226. Whether part of the profits of the bank should not be employed in erecting manufactures of several kinds, which are not likely to be set on foot and carried on to perfection without great stock, public encouragement, general regulations, and the concurrence of many hands? *See Qu.* 238.

227. Whether our natural Irish are not partly Spaniards and partly Tartars; and whether they do not bear signatures of their descent from both these nations, which is also confirmed by all their histories?

228. Whether the Tartar line[1] is not numerous in this land? And whether there is an idler occupation under the sun than to attend flocks and herds of cattle?

229. Whether the wisdom of the state should not wrestle with this hereditary disposition of our Tartars, and with a high hand introduce agriculture?

*230. Whether it were not to be wished that our people shewed their descent from Spain, rather by their honour and honesty than their pride, and if so, whether they might not easily insinuate themselves into a larger share of the Spanish trade?

231. Whether once upon a time France did not, by her linen alone, draw yearly from Spain about eight millions of livres?

232. Whether the French have not suffered in their linen trade with Spain, by not making their cloth of due breadth; and whether any other people have suffered, and are still likely to suffer, through the same prevarication?[2]

233. Whether the Spaniards are not rich and lazy, and whether they have not a particular inclination and favour for the inhabitants of this island? But whether a punctual people do not love punctual dealers?

234. Whether about fourteen years ago we had not come into a considerable share of the linen trade with Spain; and what put a stop to this?

*235. Whether we may not, with common industry and common honesty, undersell any nation in Europe?

236. Whether if the linen manufacture were carried on in the other provinces, as well as in the north, the merchants of Cork, Limerick, and Galway, would not soon find the way to Spain?

237. Whether the woollen manufacture of England is not divided into several parts or branches, appropriated to particular places, where they are only or principally manufactured; fine cloths in Somersetshire, coarse in Yorkshire, long ells at Exeter,

[1] "Progeny" in the second edition.

[2] See p. 160 for a foot-note added to this query in the second edition.

saies at Sudbury, crapes at Norwich, linseys at Kendal, blankets at Whitney, and so forth?

238. Whether the united skill, industry, and emulation of many together on the same work, be not the way to advance it? And whether it had been otherwise possible for England to have carried on her woollen-manufacture to so great perfection?

239. Whether it would not on many accounts be right, if we observed the same course with respect to our linen-manufacture: and that diapers were made in one town or district, damasks in another, sheeting in a third, fine wearing linen in a fourth, coarse in a fifth, in another cambrics, in another thread and stockings, in others stamped linen, or striped linen, or tickings, or dyed linen, of which last kinds there is so great a consumption among the seafaring men of all nations?

240. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves of the different sorts of linen which are in request among different people?

241. Whether we do not yearly consume of French wines about a thousand tun more than either Sweden or Denmark: and yet, whether those nations pay ready money as we do? *See Qu.* 169, *Part I.*

*242. Whether they are not the Swiss that make hay and gather in the harvest throughout Alsatia?

243. Whether it be not a custom for some thousands of Frenchmen to go about the beginning of March into Spain, and having tilled the lands and gathered the harvest of Spain, to return home with money in their pockets about the end of November?

244. Whether of late years our Irish labourers do not carry on the same business in England, to the great discontent of many there? But whether we have not much more reason than the people of England to be displeased at this commerce?

245. Whether, notwithstanding the cash supposed to be brought into it, any nation is, in truth, a gainer by such traffic?

246. Whether the industry of our people employed in foreign land, while our own is left uncultivated, be not a great loss to the country?

247. Whether it would not be much better for us, if, instead of sending our men abroad, we could draw men from the neighbouring countries to cultivate our own?

248. Whether, nevertheless, we are not apt to think the money imported by our labourers to be so much clear gains to this country; but whether a little reflection and a little political arithmetic, may not show us our mistake?

249. Whether our prejudices about gold and silver are not very apt to infect or misguide our judgments and reasonings about the public weal? *See Qu.* 291, *and Qu.* 13, 14, 15, *Part II.*

250. Whether it be not a good rule whereby to judge of the trade of any city, and its usefulness, to observe whether there is a circulation through the extremities, and whether the people round about are busy and warm?

251. Whether we had not, some years since, a manufacture of hats at Athlone, and of earthenware at Arklow; and what became of those manufactures?

252. Why do we not make tiles of our own, for flooring and roofing, rather than bring them from Holland?

253. What manufactures are there in France and Venice of gilt-leather, how cheap and how splendid a furniture?

254. Whether we may not for the same use, manufacture divers things at home, of more beauty and variety than wainscot, which is imported at such expense from Norway?

255. Whether the use and the fashion will not soon make a manufacture?

256. Whether if our gentry used to drink mead and cider, we should not soon have those liquors in the utmost perfection and plenty?

257. Whether it be not wonderful, that with such pastures, and so many black cattle, we do not find ourselves in cheese?

258. Whether great profits may not be made by fisheries; but whether those of our Irish who live by that business, do not contrive to be drunk and unemployed one half of the year?

259. Whether it be not folly to think, an inward commerce cannot enrich a state, because it doth not increase its quantity of gold and silver? And whether it is possible a country should not thrive, while wants are supplied, and business goes on?

260. Whether plenty of all the necessaries and comforts of life be not real wealth?

261. Whether Lyons, by the advantage of her midland situation and the rivers Rhone and Saone, be not a great magazine, or mart for inward commerce? And whether she doth not maintain a constant trade with most parts of France; with Provence for oils and dried fruits, for wines and cloth with Languedoc, for stuffs with Champaign, for linen with Picardy, Normandy, and Bretagne, for corn with Burgundy?

262. Whether she doth not receive and utter all those commodities, and raise a profit from the distribution thereof, as well as of her own manufactures, throughout the kingdom of France?

263. Whether the charge of making good roads and navigable rivers across the country, would not be really repaid by an inward commerce?

264. Whether as our trade and manufactures increased, magazines should not be established in proper places, fitted by their situation, near great roads and navigable rivers, lakes, or canals,

for the ready reception and distribution of all sorts of commodities, from and to the several parts of the kingdom; and whether the town of Athlone, for instance, may not be fitly situated for such a magazine, or centre of domestic commerce?

265. Whether an inward trade would not cause industry to flourish, and multiply the circulation of our coin, and whether this may not do as well as multiplying the coin itself?

266. Whether the benefits of a domestic commerce are sufficiently understood and attended to, and whether the cause thereof be not the prejudiced and narrow way of thinking about gold and silver? *See Qu.* 116 *and* 129, *Part I.*

267. Whether there be any other more easy and unenvied method of increasing the wealth of a people?

268. Whether we of this island are not from our peculiar circumstances determined to this very commerce above any other, from the number of necessaries and good things that we possess within ourselves, from the extent and variety of our soil, from the navigable rivers and good roads which we have or may have at a less expense than any people in Europe, from our great plenty of materials for manufactures, and particularly from the restraints we lie under with regard to our foreign trade?

*269. Whether commissioners of trade or other proper persons should not be appointed to draw up plans of our commerce both foreign and domestic, and lay them at the beginning of every session before the Parliament?

*270. Whether registers of industry should not be kept, and the public from time to time acquainted what new manufactures are introduced, what increase or decrease of old ones?

271. Whether annual inventories should not be published of the fairs throughout the kingdom, in order to judge of the growth of its commerce?

272. Whether there be not every year more cash circulated at the card-tables of Dublin, than at all the fairs of Ireland?

273. Whether the wealth of a country will not bear proportion to the skill and industry of its inhabitants?

274. Whether foreign imports that tend to promote industry should not be encouraged, and such as have a tendency to promote luxury should not be discouraged?

275. Whether the annual balance of trade between Italy and Lyons be not about four millions in favour of the former, and yet, whether Lyons be not a gainer by this trade?

276. Whether the general rule, of determining the profit of a commerce by its balance, doth not, like other general rules, admit of exception?

277. Whether it would not be a monstrous folly to import nothing but gold and silver, supposing we might do it, from every foreign part to which we trade? And yet, whether

some men may not think this foolish circumstance a very happy one?

278. But whether we do not all see the ridicule of the Mogul's subjects, who take from us nothing but our silver, and bury it under ground, in order to make sure thereof against the resurrection?

279. Whether he must not be a wrongheaded patriot or politician, whose ultimate view was drawing money into a country, and keeping it there?

280. Whether it be not evident, that not gold but industry causeth a country to flourish?

281. Whether it would not be a silly project in any nation, to hope to grow rich by prohibiting the exportation of gold and silver?

282. Whether there can be a greater mistake in politics, than to measure the wealth of the nation by its gold and silver?

283. Whether gold and silver be not a drug, where they do not promote industry? Whether they be not even the bane and undoing of an idle people?

284. Whether gold will not cause either industry or vice to flourish? And whether a country, where it flowed in without labour, must not be wretched and dissolute like an island inhabited by buccaneers?

285. Whether arts and virtue are not likely to thrive, where money is made a means to industry? But whether money without this would be a blessing to any people?

*286. Whether therefore Mississippi, South Sea, and such like schemes were not calculated for public ruin?

287. Whether keeping cash at home, or sending it abroad, just as it most serves to promote industry, be not the real interest of every nation?

288. Whether commodities of all kinds do not naturally flow where there is the greatest demand? Whether the greatest demand for a thing be not where it is of most use? Whether money, like other things, hath not its proper use? Whether this use be not to circulate? Whether therefore there must not of course be money where there is a circulation of industry;[1] and where there is no industry, whether there will be a demand for money?

*289. Whether all such princes and statesmen are not greatly deceived who imagine that gold and silver, any way got, will enrich a country? *See Qu.* 45, *Part I., and Qu.* 15, *Part II.*

290. Whether it is not a great point to know what we would be at? And whether whole states, as well as private persons, do not often fluctuate for want of this knowledge?

[1] Query 288 ended here in the second edition.

291. Whether gold may not be compared to Sejanus's horse, if we consider its passage through the world, and the fate of those nations which have been successively possessed thereof?

*292. Whether the effect is not to be considered more than the kind or quantity of money?

293. Whether means are not so far useful as they answer the end? And whether, in different circumstances, the same ends are not obtained by different means?

294. If we are a poor nation, abounding with very poor people, will it not follow, that a far greater proportion of our stock should be in the smallest and lowest species, than would suit with England?

295. Whether, therefore, it would not be highly expedient, if our money were coined of peculiar values, best fitted to the circumstances and uses of our own country; and whether any other people could take umbrage at our consulting our own convenience in an affair entirely domestic, and that lies within ourselves?

296. Whether every man doth not know, and hath long known, that the want of a mint causeth many other wants in this kingdom?

297. What harm did England sustain about three centuries ago, when silver was coined in this kingdom? *See Qu.* 100 *Part I.*

298. What harm was it to Spain that her provinces of Naples and Sicily had all along mints of their own.

*299. Whether those who have the interests of this kingdom at heart, and are concerned in the councils thereof, ought not to make the most humble and earnest representations to his Majesty, that he may vouchsafe to grant us that favour, the want of which is ruinous to our domestic industry, and the having of which would interfere with no interest of our fellow-subjects?

300. Whether it may not be presumed, that our not having a privilege, which every other kingdom in the world enjoys, be not owing to our own want of diligence and unanimity in soliciting for it?

*301. Whether his most gracious Majesty hath ever been addressed on this head in a proper manner, and had the case fairly stated for his royal consideration, and if not, whether we may not blame ourselves?

*302. If his Majesty would be pleased to grant us a mint, whether the consequences thereof may not prove a valuable consideration to the crown?

303. Whether it be not the interest of England, that we should cultivate a domestic commerce among ourselves? And whether it would give them any possible jealousy, if our small sum of cash was contrived to go a little further, if there was a little more

life in our markets, a little more buying and selling in our shops, a little better provision for the backs and bellies of so many forlorn wretches throughout the towns and villages of this island?

304. Whether Great Britain ought not to promote the prosperity of her colonies, by all methods consistent with her own? And whether the colonies themselves ought to wish or aim at it by others?

305. Whether the remotest parts from the metropolis, and the lowest of the people, are not to be regarded as the extremities and capillaries of the political body?

306. Whether, although the capillary vessels are small, yet obstructions in them do not produce great chronical diseases?

307. Whether faculties are not enlarged and improved by exercise?

308. Whether the sum of the faculties put into act, or in other words the united action of a whole people doth not constitute the momentum of a state?

309. Whether such momentum be not the real stock or wealth of a state; and whether its credit be not proportional thereunto?

310. Whether in every wise state the faculties of the mind are not most considered?

*311. Whether every kind of employment or business, as it implies more skill and exercise of the higher powers, be not more valued?

312. Whether the momentum of a state doth not imply the whole exertion of its faculties, intellectual and corporeal; and whether the latter without the former could act in concert?

313. Whether the divided force of men, acting singly, and unadvisedly,[1] would not be a rope of sand?

314. Whether the particular motions of the members of a state, in opposite directions, will not destroy each other, and lessen the momentum of the whole; but whether they must not conspire to produce a great effect?

315. Whether the ready means to put spirit into this state, to fortify and increase its momentum, would not be a national bank and plenty of small cash?

*316 Whether private endeavours without assistance from the public are likely to advance our manufactures and commerce to any great degree? But whether, as bills uttered from a national bank upon private mortgages would facilitate the purchases and projects of private men, even so the same bills uttered on the public security alone may not answer public ends in promoting new works and manufactures throughout the kingdom?

317. Whether that which employs and exerts the force of a

[1] "And unadvisedly" not in second edition.

community, deserves not to be well considered and well understood?

318. Whether the immediate mover, the blood and spirits, be not money, paper or metal, and whether the soul or will of the community, which is the prime mover that governs and directs the whole, be not the legislature?

319. Supposing the inhabitants of a country quite sunk in sloth, or even fast asleep, whether upon the gradual awakening and exertion, first, of the sensitive and locomotive faculties, next of reason and reflection, then of justice and piety, the momentum of such country or state, would not, in proportion thereunto, become still more and more considerable?

320. Whether that which is last attained, and is the finishing perfection of a people, be not the first thing lost in their declension?

321. Whether force be not of consequence, only as it is exerted; and whether great force without great wisdom may not be a nuisance?

322. Whether the force of a child applied with art, may not produce greater effects than that of a giant? And whether a small stock in the hands of a wise state, may not go further, and produce more considerable effects, than immense sums in the hands of a foolish one?

*323. Whether as many as wish well to their country ought not to aim at increasing its momentum?

324. Whose fault is it if poor Ireland still continues poor?

APPENDIX B.

THE MISCELLANY OF 1752.

[THIS was published in London and Dublin in October, 1752. The title of the Dublin issue runs exactly as the London, excepting, of course, the names of place and publishers, which read: "Dublin/ Printed for George Faulkner, in Essex Street./ MDCCLII." The two issues differ in size, and, as will be seen on p. 191, in matter; though this last variation is certainly undesigned.

The volume opens with a lengthy Latin poem, entitled, "To the Author of Siris, an Ode, by the R. R. T. L. B. O. N." On the authority of the "Gent. Mag." (1752, p. 481), this may be interpreted, "The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Norwich." In the same volume of the "Gent. Mag." (p. 472), the poem is printed with a translation.]

A

MISCELLANY,

CONTAINING

SEVERAL TRACTS

ON

VARIOUS SUBJECTS.

By the BISHOP of *CLOYNE*.

Modò me Thebis, *modò ponit* Athenis.

LONDON:

Printed for J. and R. TONSON and S. DRAPER
in the *Strand*.

MDCCLII.

CONTENTS.

To the author of "Siris;" an ode by the R. R. T. L. B. O. N.

1. Farther Thoughts on Tar Water. (III.)
2. Essay towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain. (II.)
3. A Discourse addressed to Magistrates. (III.)
4. A Word to the Wise. (III.)
5. A Letter to the Roman Catholics. (III.)
6. Maxims Concerning Patriotism. (III.)
7. The Querist. (III.)
8. Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America. (II.)
9. A Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our Foreign Plantations. (II.)
10. A Sermon. (II.)
11. De Motu. (II.)

(The Roman numerals denote in which volumes of this edition the tracts may be found.)

APPENDIX C.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL EDITIONS AND CRITICISMS.

[A FEW words will explain the scope of this list. It does not profess to be a complete bibliography, and so no mention is made here of the various unedited issues of separate works. I have omitted also as of little real importance the many contemporary pamphlets of attack and defence occasioned by certain of Berkeley's works. "Alciphron," the "Analyst," and "Siris" were each the parent of a brood of tracts which have neither interest nor importance for the general student. I have also thought it unnecessary to mention the usual works of reference —Histories of Philosophy, Cyclopædias, and Biographical Dictionaries.

In preparing this list I have received valuable help from Professor M. Coit Tyler, of Cornell University, and Professor Campbell Fraser, to both of whom my thanks are due for many interesting additions. Professor Fraser's assistance has been especially valuable. Responsibility, however, for any defects remains with the editor.]

APPENDIX C.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL EDITIONS AND CRITICISMS.

I. COLLECTED WORKS.

(1) WORKS of G. B., to which is added a life by J. Stock and several of his letters to T. Prior, Dean Gervais, and Mr. Pope, etc. 2 vols. Lond. 1784.

(2) WORKS OF G. B. 1 vol. Lond. 1837.

(3) WORKS OF G. B., annotated by the Rev^{d}. G. N. Wright. 2 vols. Lond. 1843.

(The text of all the above is incomplete and inaccurate. The last two are practically reprints of (1). In (3) the Latin works are translated into English; the annotations consist of no more than headlines and variations of type in the "Prin. of H. K.")

(4) WORKS OF G. B., including many of his writings hitherto unpublished, with Prefaces, Annotations, his Life and Letters, and an account of his Philosophy; by Alexander Campbell Fraser, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. 4 vols. Oxford, 1871.

(This is the standard edition. Attention of readers may be specially drawn to vol. iv., which contains not only a Life and Letters, and a study of Berkeley's Philosophy, but also a copy of his "Commonplace Book," kept when he was a student at T.C.D. During the years which have elapsed since the publication of this edition, fresh material has come to hand for the study of Berkeley's life and works. A revised edition of the four volumes would be very welcome.)

(5) WORKS OF G. B., edited by George Sampson, with a Biographical Introduction by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. 3 vols. Lond. 1897-8.

II. SEPARATE WORKS.

(1) The Principles of Human Knowledge.

Ballantyne, J. R. Prin. of H. K. Edited with explanations by J. R. B. (One of a series entitled "Reprints for the Pandits.") Allahabad, 1852.

Ueberweg, F. Abhandlung über die Principien der menschlichen Erkenntniss. Berlin, 1869.

(Translated by Professor Ueberweg, with preface and notes.)

Krauth, C. P. The Prin. of H. K., with prolegomena and annotations by C. P. K. Philadelphia, 1874.

Simon, T. Collyns. The Prin. of H. K., edited with explanations and introduction by T. C. S. London, 1878.

(Recently re-issued in Routledge's "Hundred Best Books" series.)

Struve, H., and Jezierski, F. Rzecz o Zasadach Poznania. Translated into Polish by F. J., with an introduction by H. S. Warsaw, 1890.

(2) Other Works.

Eschenbach, J. C. A translation into German of the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," along with a translation of Collier's "Clavis Universalis," being the most distinguished writers who deny the reality of their own bodies and of the whole material world. Rostock, 1756.

Cowell, H. V. H. "The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained," with an introduction and notes by H. V. H. C. London and Camb. 1860.

Fraser, A. Campbell. Selections from Berkeley, with an introduction and notes, for the use of students in the Universities. Fourth edition. Oxford, 1891.

(The introduction and notes are very valuable.)

Beauvalon, G., and Parodi, D. Œuvres choisies de G. B., translated with an introduction by G. B. and D. P. Paris, 1895.

(This contains the "Th. of Vision" and "Hylas and Philonous.")

III. LETTERS.

There is no complete published collection of Berkeley's letters. Besides those contained in the memoirs by Stock and Professor Fraser there are others in

BEARDSLEY, E. E. The Life of Samuel Johnson, D.D. New York, 1874.

Selections and extracts from unpublished letters will be found in

Historical Manuscripts Commission, Seventh Report.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley. (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics.) Edinburgh, 1881.

IV. BIOGRAPHIES, CRITICISMS, ETC.

(1) REFERRING SPECIALLY TO THE THEORY OF VISION.

VOLTAIRE. Elemens de la Philosophie de Newton.

CONDILLAC. Essai sur l'origine des Connaissances Humaines. (This attacks the "Theory of Vision.")

—— Traité des Sensations.

(This is a recantation of the opinions of the "Essai.")

The above works may be considered to form the starting-point of French criticism of Berkeley.

PORTERFIELD, WILLIAM. Treatise on the Eye. 1759.

BAILEY, SAMUEL. Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation. London, 1842.

—— Letter to a philosopher in reply to some recent attempts to vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision. London, 1842.

(Referring to the following.)

MILL, JOHN STUART. Bailey on Berkeley's Theory of Vision. Reprinted in "Dissertations and Discussions," vol. ii.

FERRIER, J. F. Bailey on Berkeley. (Two essays.) Works, vol. iii. Edinburgh, 1875.

(Mill and Ferrier each wrote an essay criticising Bailey's "Review." Bailey answered with his "Letter;" Ferrier replied to this in his second essay.)

ABBOTT, T. K. Sight and Touch; an attempt to disprove the received or Berkleian theory of vision. Lond. 1864.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley's Theory of Vision; (being a criticism of Mr. Abbott on Sight and Touch).
North British Review, Aug. 1864.

ABBOTT, T. K. Bishop Berkeley and Professor Fraser.
Hermathena, No. V., 1877.

SIMON T. COLLYNS. Can we see Distance? Berkeley's reply examined. 1864.

Bailey gives references in the preface to his "Review" to many other criticisms of the Theory of Vision. Among physiologists (and phrenologists) he names Gall, Bostock, Roget, Mayo, etc.; and among philosophers, Brown (Lectures, vol. ii.) and Young (Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy).

(2) REFERRING IN GENERAL TO BERKELEY'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

BAXTER, ANDREW. An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Lond. 1735.

(Sect. VII. criticises Berkeley.)

ANON. An account of the life of G. B., with notes containing strictures on his works. Lond. 1776.

ANON. An Essay on the Nature and Existence of the Material World. London, 1781.

FEARN, J. A review of the first principles of Berkeley, Stewart and Reid. Lond. 1813.

BOWEN, F. Critical essays on Speculative Philosophy.
Boston, 1842.

SIMON, T. COLLYNS. The nature and elements of the external world; or universal immaterialism demonstrated.
Lond. 1848. (Second ed. 1862.)

FOWLER, RICHARD. An attempt to solve some of the difficulties of the Berkleyan controversy. Salisbury, 1859.

—— A second attempt, etc. Salisbury, 1859.

NORTON, J. N. The Life of Bishop Berkeley.
New York, 1861.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. The Real World of Berkeley.
Macmillan's Mag., July, 1862.

BUTT, ISAAC. Berkeley, a discourse on his character and writings. Dublin, 1863.

HUGHES, THOMAS. The Ideal Theory of Berkeley. Lond. 1865.

STIRLING, J. HUTCHISON. Was Sir William Hamilton a Berkleian?

(Remarks on a passage in an article on Mill and Hamilton by Professor Fraser in the North British Review.) Fortnightly Rev., Sept. 1866.

SIMON, T. COLLYNS. Hegel and his connexion with British Thought. Contemp. Rev., Jan. and Mar. 1870.

—— Berkeley's doctrine in the nature of matter. Journal of Speculative Philosophy (St. Louis, Miss.), 1870.

DOUBLEDAY, THOMAS. Matter for Materialists (a series of letters vindicating Berkeley's principles). Lond. 1870.

HOPPE, R. Bergmann's Zeitschrift, v. Heft 2. 1870.

REICHLIN-MELDEGG, BARON C. A. v. Fichte's Zeitschrift, lvii. Heft 1.

ULRICI, HERMANN. Fichte's Zeitschrift, lvii. Heft 1. 1870.

FREDERICHS, F. Der Phænomenale Idealismus Berkeley's und Kant's. Berlin, 1871.

MILL, J. S. Berkeley's Life and Writings. 1871. (Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iv.)

MANSEL, H. L. On the Idealism of Berkeley. (An unfinished essay written in 1871, and published in Dean Mansel's "Letters, Lectures, and Reviews.") Lond. 1873.

NOEL, THE HON. RODEN. The Philosophy of Perception: Berkeley and Kant. Contemp. Rev., June, 1872.

STIRLING, J. HUTCHISON. Professor Fraser's Berkeley. Jour. Spec. Phil. 1873.

VAN DER WYCK. Een Monument voor Berkeley. Gronengen, 1873.

The above five, with one of Huxley's essays mentioned below, were occasioned by the publication of the Oxford edition of Berkeley's Works in 1871. Other critical articles on the same will be found in

Dublin Review, July, 1871.
British Quarterly Review, April, 1871.
Edinburgh Review, July, 1872.
Quarterly Review, Jan. 1872.
London Quarterly Review, Jan. 1872.

HUXLEY, THOMAS. Collected Essays, 1894, vol. vi. (consists of "Hume and Helps to the study of Berkeley.") A volume on Berkeley from the pen of Huxley was announced to appear in the "English Men of Letters" series. A study of the two valuable papers in this volume makes one regret that Huxley was unable to complete the promised book.

MAGUIRE, THOMAS. Berkeley's Notion of Substance. Dublin, 1872.

UEBERWEG, F. Ist Berkeley's Lehre wissenschaftlich unwiderlegbar? 1873.

SPICKER, GIDEON. Kant, Hume und Berkeley. Eine Kritik der Erkenntnisstheorie. Berlin, 1875.

PENJON, A. Etude sur la vie et les œuvres philosophiques de G. B. Paris, 1878.

JANITSCH, J. Kant's Urteile über Berkeley. Strassburg, 1879.

BALFOUR, A. J. A Defence of Philosophic Doubt. Lond. 1879.

BRADLEY. C. W. Berkeley's Idealism. Jour. Spec. Phil. 1881.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Berkeley. Blackwood's Philosophical Classics. Edinburgh, 1881.

(With the present volumes and this useful little book, the reader is sufficiently equipped to begin the study of Berkeley.)

MCCOSH, J. Locke's theory of knowledge with a notice of Berkeley. New York, 1884.

STEPHEN, LESLIE. English thought in the eighteenth century. Lond. 1884.

LOEWY, THEODOR. Die 'Common Sensibles' bei Berkeley. Leipzig, 1884.

GREEN, THOMAS HILL. Works. Vol. i. Lond. 1885.

PORTER, NOAH (the younger.) The two-hundredth birthday of George Berkeley. A discourse given at Yale College on the 12th of March, 1885. New York, 1885.

MURRAY, J. CLARK. The revived study of Berkeley. Macmillan's Mag., July, 1887.

LOEWY, THEODOR. Der Idealismus Berkeley's (In Bd. 124 of the Transactions of the Vienna Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1891.

FOSTER, W. E. Some Rhode Island contributions to the intellectual life of the last century. (Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society at Boston. 1892.)

MCLACHLAN, D. B. Reformed Logic; a system based on Berkeley's Philosophy. Lond. 1892.

MEYER, EUGEN. Hume's und Berkeley's Philosophie der Mathematick. Halle, 1894.

TYLER, M. COIT. Three Men of Letters. New York, 1895.

This contains a charming essay on Berkeley, especially noticing his influence on higher education in America. The best account of the Rhode Island episode in Berkeley's life will be found in this little work.

FRASER, A. CAMPBELL. Philosophy of Theism. Edinburgh, 1896.

This refers to Berkeley's philosophy in its relation to modern religious thought.

General references will suffice to the very important criticisms by Hume, Reid, Stewart and Hamilton. Amongst general biographical notices, the article by Mr. Leslie Stephen in the "Dictionary of National Biography" may be specially mentioned.

INDEX.

ABSTRACT ideas, i. 163; existence denied, 165, 325, 355; Locke on, 168; iii. 85; unnecessary, i. 169; source of, 172; results of belief in, 181, 183, 184, 205, 245; ii. 475; of being, i. 186; in mathematics, 233-40; iii. 84; of colour, and triangle, 86.

Abstraction, frames ideas of colour exclusive of extension, i. 163; Locke on, 166; confusion through, 176, 223; how far possible, 181.

Academy, British, ii. 96; French, 97; for design, iii. 122.

Acid principle in life, iii. 248.

Addison, i. xx, xxiv; on atheism, iii. 60.

Agriculture, compulsory, iii. 160.

Air, functions of, iii. 251; a receptacle of germs, 252; its vital principle, 253; Newton on, 250; constituents of, 255.

Alciphron, allusiveness of, ii. v; scope of, 148, 476; style of, 148; character of Alciphron based on Shaftesbury, 245.

America, manners and morals in, ii. 107; use of tar-water in, iii. 198.

Amsterdam, its prosperity, iii. 142.

Analogy, Butler's, ii. 148; meaning of, 305; Bp. Browne and Archbp. King on, ii. 276, 299; God known by, 299; dangers of, i. 226; schoolmen and, ii. 303.

Analyst, the, present value of, iii. 2; controversy aroused by, 54, 300.

Anaxagoras, ii. 65.

Aquinas, ii. 303.

Arbuthnot, i. xix.

Archetypes, i. 183, 217, 223, 338, 382, 389.

Architecture, beauty in, ii. 258.

Ariosto and Tasso, ii. 343.

Aristotle, authority of, i. 174; *materia prima* of, 184; on virtue, ii. 220; on debauchees, 223, 231; on the good man, 267; on education, 479; on private judgment, iii. 190; on eternal motion, ii. 62; on motion, 64, 65, 70, 71; on beauty, 251; on divine life, 386; on arguments, 473; quoted, iii. 141; on religion in a state, 186; (pseud.) on the fifth essence, 261; on divine heat, 262; on the implicit divinity of things, 263; on divine energy, 284; on the soul of the world, 304; on distinctions of objects, 314; on absolute existence, 315; on matter, 318; (pseud.) on God in the world, 321.

Arithmetic, Berkeley's account of, i. 233; nature of, ii. 453.

Association, i. 84.

Atheism, material substance and, i. 154, 220, 344, 362, 397; evolution of, ii. 172; fashionable, 85, 141, 148, 298; insidious evil of, 236; of mathematicians, iii. 59; authoritative, 60, 290.

Atheists (*see also* Freethinkers), their affectation of martyrdom,

ii. 166; vice of, 196, 201, 205, 214, 230, 231; and rights of property, 209; their notions of virtue, 212; their admiration for brute beasts, 217, 219; small education of, 230; esteem for savages, 235; iii. 179; and suicide, ii. 225, 237; as agents of Jesuits, 242; and honour, 247; and ridicule, 270, 429; their mutual support, 293; their inconsistency in argument, 298; compared with hunters, 312; and the character of the clergy, 164, 319, 334, 353; and liberty, 354; their criticisms of the Scriptures, 361, 368; and the nature of the soul, 391; impressed by empty display, 392; their prejudice, 420; on miracles, 423; their view of resurrection, 426; their view of man, 459, 465; their ambiguity, sophistry, and shiftiness, 470; various species, 477; not misrepresented, 488; as blasphemers, iii. 170; ancient philosophers, not, 330.

Attraction, i. 225.

Aurea catena Homeri, note on, iii. 335.

Aurelius, M., ii. 193; on immortality, 269.

Authority and reason, ii. 468.

Bacon, on mathematics, i. 57.

Balfour, A. J., i. vi.

Balsams, iii. 212.

Banks, iii. 135, 141, 152.

Barrow, i. 85.

Beauty, nature of, ii. 256-265; and morals, 250; nature of moral beauty, 253; various views of, 256; and religious sense, 487.

Beggars, utilizing of, iii. 149.

Berkeley, G., place in English literature, i. x; his commonplace book, xiv-xvi; his patriotism, li-lv; iii. 112; his originality, i. xiii; marriage, xxxiii; and Clarke, xix; personal charm, xx, xxx; and America, xxxiv; humour of, l; and finance, li: in England, ii. 2; abroad, 56, his influence in America, 104; modification of his early nominalism, 436; as a writer, iii. 112; and Roman Catholics, 338, 384, 402.

Berkeley, Mrs., i. xxxiii; iii. 404.

Bermuda, i. xxviii-xxxv; ii. 112; officers of college, 122; subscribers, 123; verses on, 125; reference to, 159.

"Blasters," iii. 170, 192.

Blind, man born, i. 95, 113, 118, 119, 122, 125, 136; ii. 290, 297, 512.

Blount, Charles, ii. 225.

Boerhaave, on volatile oils, iii. 219; on prolonging life, 221.

Boyer, Abel, ii. 18, 30.

Bribery, ii. 98.

Brutes and mankind, ii. 217, 219.

Building, and circulation, iii. 150.

Burlington, 3rd earl of, i. xxix; ii. 220.

Caroline, Queen, i. xlvi.

Chain in nature, Jamblichus on, iii. 302; and Eternal Mind, 306; idea of, 312; *aurea catena Homeri*, 335.

"Characteristics." *See* Shaftesbury.

Charity, mismanagement of, ii. 87; injurious, iii. 388.

Child labour, iii. 148, 396.

Chimeras, i. 193, 215.

Chinese, their chronology, ii. 404; atheist admiration for, *ib.*; industry of, iii. 148.

Christianity, an enlarger of the mind, ii. 35; in the Colonies, 108; obligations of, 134; its tendency to do good, 315; compared with religion of the ancients, 323; and polemical theology, 331, 340, 449; and the advancement of art and learning, 341.

Chronology, fictitious, ii. 403; pre-scriptural, 409; Mosaic, 410.
Cicero quoted, ii. 272, 317.
Classical education, uses of, iii. 133.
Clergy, described by freethinkers, ii. 164, 319, 334.
Clarke, i. xix.
Collins, Anthony, i. xxxvii; ii. 3, 151, 181, 362; on Liberty, Berkeley's reply to, 458.
Colours, existence of, i. 314, 326; defined, 318; proper objects of sight, ii. 289, 501; abstract idea of, iii. 86.
Common sense, return to, i. 302, 378, 397; ii. 464.
Confucius, iii. 182.
Country life and industry, iii. 151.
Course of nature, iii. 294.
Cowper's "Task," origin of a phrase in, iii. 278.
Criminals, proposal for using, iii. 121.
Critics, ii. 38, 43.

Deists (*see also* Freethinkers), i. xiii, xxxv-xlvi; ii. 182, 345.
Descartes, i. xiii, 80; ii. 65; iii. 64.
Deslandes, M., ii. 10, 18.
Diemerbroeck on the plague, iii. 372.
Dionysius the Areopagite, ii. 301.
Dissenters, ii. 86.
Distance; invisible, not perceived immediately, i. 79, 81, 83, 85, 197, 333; ii. 285; near distance, i. 80; former explanations of, 80; ideas suggesting, 82, 83, 85; how perceived, 97, 98.
Drape, Captain, on tar water in small-pox, iii. 364, 415.
Druids, ii. 313.
Drunkenness, usefulness of, ii. 197, 202.
Duelling, ii. 324.

Ectypal state, i. 389.
England and Ireland, unity of, iii. 125; feeling between, iii. 144, 153.
English imports, iii. 122.
Epicureans and existence of God, ii. 298.
Esse is *percipi*, i. 180, 367.
Evil, out of good, ii. 356; source of various views of, 385.
Exhaustions, iii. 84.
Exist, meaning of to, i. 180.
Existence, absolute, meaningless, i. 189, 344, 380, 390; meaning of, 218; of God, evident, 247; proof of existence of God, ii. 485; consists in perception, i. 180, 367, 368; personal, signs of, ii. 283, 447; ancient notions of, iii. 298; absolute, not believed in by Plato and Aristotle, iii. 315.
Extension, visible and tangible, i. 100, 103, 123, 138; abstract, 131; iii. 44; has no existence without the mind, i. 185, 236, 321; absolute, 323.
External bodies, impossible to prove existence of, i. 187.

"Fable of the Bees." *See* Mandeville.
Fatalism and material substance, i. 221.
Fate, various writers on, iii. 300; nature of, 301.
Fenelon, ii. 30.
Ficinus on light, iii. 275.
Fire, benefits of the Great, ii. 204; effect of, iii. 257, 259, 269; Heraclitus on, 260; Plato on, *ib.*; Hippocrates on, 261, 263; Theophrastus on, 264; Hermetic books on, *ib.*; divine, 265; divine manifestations in, 267; kinds of, 272; Lemery, (the younger) on, 290; functions of, 303; vital, 304; the spirit of the world, 353.
Fire-worship, iii. 266; origin of, 268.
Fluxions, i. 241; nature of, iii.

10; Walton on, 90; Newton on, 2, 68, 70, 75.
Force, idea of, ii. 442.
Fowler, Prof., i. xliii.
Fraser, Prof., i. v, vi, x, xi, xviii, 154; ii. 162, 311; iii. 54, 112, 198.
Free-agent, man as, ii. 461.
Free-thinkers, rise of, ii. 3; "Pineal gland" of, 14; virtue of, 23; ignorance of, 24, 29, 49; narrowness of, 34; happiness of, 41; are so from fashion, 141; description of, 160; pose of, 166, 167; views of, 169; controversial methods of, 172; evolution of, 173; as minute philosophers, 176; education of, 177; varieties of, 180; on faith, 366; on bigots, 428; dangers of their tenets, iii. 188; their real desires, 191.

Galen on the soul, iii. 262.
Gaming, benefits from, ii. 199.
Garth on atheism, iii. 60.
General ideas admitted, i. 167.
Generalization, i. 164.
Geometry, in optics, i. 81, 143; ii. 496; objects of, i. 143; iii. 43.
God, existence of, evident, i. 247; atheist view of, ii. 276; allowable proofs of, 277; "Theory of Vision" as a proof of, ii. 485.
Gold, porosity of (Florentine experiment), iii. 280.
Good, and evil, i. 261; meaning of, 263; ends of individual good, 263; general good, how procured, 264.
Gosse, Edmund, i. 292.
Grace, notion of, ii. 435.
Greeks, compared with Christians, ii. 321, 329; public spirit of, 339.
Grew, Dr., on circulation, iii. 215; on light, 218.
Grotius on obedience, i. 287.

Haliday pamphlets, iii. 112.
Halley, his atheism, iii. 60.
Hearing and sight, i. 98, 336.
Heat, how perceived, i. 306; has no existence without the mind, 309.
Helmont, Van, on prolonging life, iii. 221.
Heraclitus, on fire, iii. 260.
Hermetic books, referred to, iii. 264, 300, 306, 320, 335.
Hippocrates, on fire, iii. 261, 263; on the soul, 274; on animal economy, 289.
Hobbes, ii. 298.
Homberg, on acids and alkalies, iii. 250; on light, 261; makes gold from mercury, 271.
Honour, atheists and, ii. 247.
L'Hôpital, Marquis de, iii. 82.
Houses, economical construction of, iii. 127.
Hume, i. ix, xviii.
Hunt, i. xii.
Hutcheson, i. xliv; ii. 245.
Hyde, Dr., on the Persians, iii. 267.

Ideas, none common to sight and touch, i. 133; ii. 492, 494; cause of, i. 190, 341; ii. 491; of spirit, i. 190; of sense, 191; ii. 490; ideas and things, connexion between, i. 195, 369, 383; ii. 494; and spirits, i. 217, 219, 242; without the mind, 338; analogy of, ii. 503; and signs, iii. 36.
Identity, personal, ii. 447.
Image, inverted, i. 128; ii. 504.
Immaterialism, and immortality, i. 244; as an argument, 394.
Industry, and wealth, ii. 87; iii. 117, 120, 141, 164; necessity for, 128; of Chinese, 148; and country life, 151; of Swiss, 152; of French, 159; arguments in nature for, 390; of Dutch, 393; general arguments for, 400.
Inspiration, of scriptures, ii. 370; humble vehicles of, 394.

Intelligence of unbodied spirit, i. 144.
Ireland, unpatriotic expenditure in, iii. 126, 131; remedies for distress in, 112; wine drinking in, 131; need for colleges in, 133; extravagance in 155; church of, 339; distress in, i. lv; iii. 391; harshness of landlords in, 396.
Irish, descent of, iii. 160, 389; laziness of, 387, 397; destitution of, 388; pride of, 389; political disabilities of, 392; dirt of, 395; beggary of, 397.
Irish trade and industry, restriction of, iii. 123, 124, 129; potential exports, 123; cultivation of hemp, 124; export of provisions, 129; wool trade reprehended, 158; possibilities of linen trade, 161.
Italy, works lost in, i. 154.

Jacobitism, Berkeley and, i. 254; iii. 341.
Jamblichus, on chain in nature, iii. 302.
Jesuits and atheism, ii. 242.
Josephus, ii. 414; his ignoring of Christ explained, 415.
Julian, Emperor, ii. 413.
Jurin, Dr., iii. 54.

Kingdom and family compared, ii. 207.
Knowledge, objects of, i. 179; "Principles of Human Knowledge" referred to, 298; defined, ii. 434; and opinion, iii. 313.

Language, imperfections of, i. 130; ambiguities of, 172; delusions of, 177.
Language, visual, i. 140, 142, 197, 209; ii. 275, 289, 500.
Laws of nature, i. 192, 265, 278, 364.
Laws, moral, necessary and accidental consequences of, i. 281; immutable and eternal, 289.
Legislature, knowledge needed for, iii. 132.
Leibnitz, on natural force, ii. 59; on effort and impetus, 61; on force, 443; on the calculus, iii. 21.
Lemery (the younger), on fire, iii. 290.
Liberty and atheism, ii. 354.
Life, intenseness of, iii. 242; the act of soul, 303.
Light, the object of vision, ii. 289, 501; Ficinus on, iii. 275; influence of solar, 218; in tar, 242; whether corporeal or incorporeal, 275; Plotinus on, 276.
Locke, Berkeley's predecessor, i. ix; studied in Dublin, xii; Berkeley opposed to, xiii; on mathematics, 58; on abstract ideas, 132; on the Eternal Mind, 154; problem of Locke and Molyneux, 136.
Loyalty, meaning of, i. 260, 267, 274.
Luxury, effects of, ii. 92.

Mackintosh, i. xliii, 68.
Magic theory of miracles, ii. 423.
Magnitude, how perceived, i. 100, 104; visible and tangible, 100, 101, 102, 123, 138; signs of, arbitrary, 102.
Man, as a puppet, ii. 459, 465; as a free agent, 461.
Mandeville, Berkeley's interpretation of, i. xxxviii; on moral virtue, ii. 190; iii. 189; his "Fable of the Bees," ii. 194; on good out of evil, 197; on the Great Fire, 204; on the Reformation, 210; on certainty in morals, 213; iii. 189.
Manetho, his dynasties, ii. 404.
Manichean heresy, i. 251.
Mankind, atheist classification of, ii. 351.

Manufactures, possibility of home, ii. 89; Irish, *see* Irish trade.
Marriage, selection in, iii. 134.
Material substratum, i. 212, 329, 371.
Mathematics, abstractions in, i. 233.
Mathematicians, inconsistency of, iii. 13; no judges of religion or philosophy, 33, 43; and mystery, 35; and faith, 50; their atheism, 59, 60; their authority in atheism, 60; their intolerance, 64.
Matter, or material substance, notion of, contradictory, i. 183; meaning of, 186, 348; philosophic view of, denied, 194, 209, 366; vulgar notion of, allowed, 194; belief in existence of, not universal, 202; a nonentity, 209, 355; an "occasion" of ideas, 210, 352; equals nothing, 214; and the Scriptures, 215, 385; non-existence of, and immortality, 244; implications of the word, 358, 396; and scepticism, 344, 362, 378, 397; Plato and Aristotle on, iii. 318.
Memory and reminiscence, iii. 317.
Mercury as a deobstruent, iii. 223.
Microscopes and microscopic eyes, i. 116.
Mind, all things exist in the mind, i. 180, 183, 347; the origin of motion, ii. 66; and land, an analogy, 163; acts by physical agents, iii. 258; universal, 263; clothed by soul, 265; source of all things, 309; effect of early impressions on, 311; as *tabula rasa*, or blank paper, 314, 315.
Mind, an Eternal, i. 154, 221, 344, 347, 364; iii. 256.
Minimum visibile, i. 101, 114, 150.
Mint, need for, iii. 161.
Miracles and matter, i. 216; reason for, 266; proof of, ii. 364; Josephus and, 415.
Molyneux, S., i. 40.
Molyneux, W., i. 40, 94; his problem, 136.
Momentum of a state, iii. 167.
Money, its value, iii. 118; circulation of, 119; paper money, its use and abuse, 136; uselessness of uncirculated, 137; prosperity without, 138; quick circulation of small, 156.
Moon, apparent size of, i. 105, 149; ii. 508.
Moral beauty, nature of, ii. 252; insufficient as motive, ii. 346.
Moral laws, consequences of, i. 281; eternal, 289.
Moral sense, ii. 253.
Mosaic history and chronology, ii. 410.
Motion, relative, i. 230; meaning of, 231; importance of treatise on, ii. 56; cause of, 58, 65, 69; nature of, 70; circular, 75; communication of, 78; prescinded from time and space, absurd, iii. 32, 37, 40, 46.
"Motu, De," referred to, iii. 44.
Myrrh in prolonging life, iii. 221.

Natural inclinations and faculties, ii. 185; arguments from, 187.
Natural religion, insufficient, ii. 347; tendency of, 486.
Nature, agency of, i. 248; simulated admiration for, ii. 184, 192; course of, iii. 294, 308.
Newton, i. xii; on tide, 45, 47; his "Principia" a grammar of science, 228; his doctrine of fluxions, iii. 2, 68, 70, 75; blind adoration of, 68, 67; on moments, 72, 77; on evanescence of augments, 76; certain works quoted, 79, 109; on acids, 250; on ether, 280; on light, 281, 288; on attraction and repulsion, 290.
Number, perception of, i. 125; a creature of the mind, 184; knowledge of, 233; and ideas, ii. 453.

Obedience, to earthly powers,

moral, i. 268; not conditional, 272; not contrary to nature, 273; incumbent on rulers, 283.
Object of sense, ii. 490, 493, 497; of sight, real, 493.
Oneness of things, iii. 305.
Outness, i. 133, 197, 333.

Pain, how perceived, i. 306.
Panaceas, iii. 228, 229.
Pascal quoted, i. 271.
Patriotism, Berkeley's and Swift's, i. liii-lv; Berkeley's, iii. 112; of Roman Catholics, iii. 131.
Perception, mediate and immediate, i. 81; ii. 287,
Perceval, Sir John, i. xviii, 71, 154.
Phenomena defined, i. 376.
Philosophy, its study ancient, iii. 310; derived from heaven, 312; necessity for its study, 327.
Physical agents, importance of, iii. 258.
Picus of Mirandula, ii. 303, 341.
Pineal gland, ii. 11.
Plato, on rebellion, i. 285; on judgment after death, ii. 8; on largeness of mind, 357 on moral beauty, 251; on inspiration, 380; on virtue, 386; on the mind, 455; on government, iii. 182; on religion in the state, 186; on emetics, 227; on fire, 260; on the soul, 263, 316; on Fate, 301; on knowledge and opinion, 313: (pseud.) on mind and knowledge, 315; on absolute existence, 315; on matter, 318; as a touchstone of mind, 323; and the creation, 325.
Platonic Trinity, nature of, iii. 329.
Platonists on evil spirits, ii. 385.
Pleasures, natural, ii. 19; kinds of, considered, 217; and pain, 222.
Pliny quoted on tar and balsams, iii. 209, 212, 214, 243.
Plotinus, on prevision, iii. 293; on alterity, 321; on the Trinity, 333.
Political influence of men of letters, i. xx-xxiii.
Porphyry, ii. 412.
Precepts, human, limitations of, i. 277.
Pretender and Church of Ireland, iii. 339.
Prevision, Plotinus on, iii. 293; grammar of, 293; Socrates on, 293.
Principia, meaning of, ii. 67.
"Principles of Human Knowledge," referred to, i. 298.
Prior, Thomas, iii. 344; his "Authentic Narrative," 347, 415.
Proclus on human potentiality, iii. 323.
Property, atheist notion of rights of, ii. 209.
Prophecies, obscurity of, ii. 400; fulfilment of, 401.
Public spirit, encouragement of, ii. 95.
Puffendorf on obedience, i. 287.
"Pumps," i. 56.

Qualities, primary and secondary, i. 154, 182, 319; have no existence without the mind, 185, 213, 310, 361.
Queries in the "Analyst," iii. 43, 112.
"Querist" the, i. xlix-lv; its style, iii. 112; first edition described, 112.

Rakes, Englishmen as, ii. 223.
Rays, parallel, diverging and converging, i. 91, 92.
Real things, i. 193.
Reality explained, i. 194.
Reason and authority, ii. 468.
Rebellion, meaning of, i. 260; immoral, 270; a crime against nature, 274.
Reformation, the, Mandeville on, ii. 210; Berkeley on, iii. 340.

Religion in the state, iii. 185; Plato, Aristotle, Machiavel, etc., on, 186.
Resurrection, atheist view of, ii. 426.
Revelation in Scriptures, ii. 377.
Rhode Island, i. x; ii. 138, 162, 196, 311.
Ridicule, only weapon of atheists, ii. 270, 429.
Robbery, advantages from practice of, ii. 199.
Roman Catholics, in Protestant colleges, iii. 133; real patriotism of, 139; dangers of Roman Catholic disabilities, 140; Berkeley on, 338; feeling between Berkeley and, 384, 402.
Romans, luxury of, ii. 207, 237; bravery of, 232; and suicide, 237; compared with Christians, 321; integrity of, 325.
Rome, Church of, and atheists, ii. 241; its advantages, iii. 139.
Roper, Abel, ii. 18.

Salt of the earth, iii. 248.
Sceptic, defined, i. 303.
Scepticism and matter, i. 344, 362, 378, 397.
Schoolmen's theology and Christianity, ii. 331, 340.
Scriptures, atheist criticism of, ii. 310; canon of, 368; style of, 371; obscurity of, 372; inexactness of, 375; poetry of, 379.
Scurvy, iii. 235, 423; Boerhaave on, 236.
Seeing in the dark, iii. 277.
Self-preservation, law of, i. 278.
Seneca, on immortality, ii. 269.
Sense, ideas of, i. 191; ii. 490.
Sensible things defined, i. 304, 311.
Shaftesbury, criticism of, i. xxxvi, xliii-xlvi; ii. 486; and character of Alciphron, 244; "Characteristics" quoted, 244, 274 (*notes*) 334, 342, 487; criticism of style of, 336-338; on faith, 367; his natural religion attacked, 487; on morals, iii. 189.
Sight, objects of, not without the mind, i. 96; and hearing, 98; mediate and immediate objects of, 99.
Sight and touch, distinction between ideas of, i. 97, 98, 119, 121, 124, 133, 137, 142, 144, 154, 197; ii. 297.
"Siris," Balfour on, i. xlv-lx; style of, iii. 198; value of, *ib.*; influence of, *ib.*
Slavery for beggars, iii. 149.
Small-pox, cured by tar-water, iii. 206, 233, 364, 370, 415; Boerhaave on, 233.
Soap, as a medicine, iii. 224; as a Panacea, 228.
Social life, tendency towards, i. 273.
Socrates, on rakes, ii. 226; on increased armaments, 330; on virtue, 386; as a freethinker, 388; on divine disposition, iii. 296.
Soul, atheist views of nature of, ii. 390; Plato on, iii. 263; Aristotle on, 262; Hippocrates on nourishment of, 274; various Platonists on, 305.
Sounds, their existence without the mind, i. 312.
South-Sea scheme, i. xxix; ii. 82, 96; iii. 136.
Space, absolute, in Newton, i. 229; ii. 73; a phantom, iii. 300.
Speculation, philosophical, dangers of, i. 161.
Spinoza, ii. 298; his definitions, 473.
Spirit, unbodied, i. 144; idea of, 190; and ideas, 217, 242; unimaginable, 243; intercourse of, 246; the cause of motion, iii. 257.
Spirit-drinking, iii. 241.
Spiritual exhalations, iii. 251.
Steele, i. xix, xx; ii. 2.
Stephen, Leslie, i. xlii.
Stock's life of Berkeley, iii. 60, 170.
Stoics, on immortality, ii. 193, 269; Zeller on, ii. 270.

Subject and mode, i. 200.
Submission, objection to, i. 284; limitations of, 288.
Substance, philosophic view of denied, vulgar notion admitted, i. 194, 195; without accidents, 209; or substratum, defined, 329, 349, 371.
Suicide, atheists and, ii. 225, 237.
Sulphur, power of, iii. 270.
Swift, i. xii, xx, xxii, xxv.

Tacquet, i. 4, 90.
Tangible extension, etc. *See* Sight and touch.
Tar, ancient use of, iii. 208; in embalming, 210.
Tar-water, in America, iii. 198; how prepared, 206, 347, 358, 379; in small-pox, 206, 233, 364, 370, 415; in scrofulous cases, 207, 238; in pectoral complaints, 207; as a cordial, 222, 227, 234, 240, 241; as a balsam, 223; in gout, 228; as a Panacea, 229, 352, 356; in fevers, 230, 349, 380; in epidemic of, (1740-41), 231; as a corroborant, 232; in scurvy, 235, 423; in cancer, 417; veterinary use of, 245, 380; for sedentary persons, 246; in gangrene, 355, 371; in the plague, 356, 369; in erysipelas, 371; as a mind tonic, 412, 415; in polypus, 420.
Terms, significance of Berkeley's, i. 68.
Teste di Ferro, ii. 348.
Theophrastus, on balsams, iii. 210, 211, 213, 218; on fire, 264.
Tindal, Matthew, referred to, or quoted, i. xxxvii, 254, 286; ii. 310, 322, 328; iii. 100.
Toland, J., referred to, or quoted, i. xii, xxxv; ii. 313, 362.
Torricelli on force, ii. 443.
Touch. *See* Sight and touch.
Trees and animals compared, iii. 215.
Trinity, doctrine of, ii. 445; Platonic, 329; Plotinus on, 333.
Truth, uniform, ii. 188; variety of opinions no argument against, 189.
Turpentine as a medicine, iii. 225.

Universality of belief no argument, i. 203.
Universe, morality of, i. 252; order and beauty in, 342; corpuscularian theory of, iii. 284; evolution of, 285.
Universities, criticism of, ii. 335.

Vegetable life, nature of, ii. 388; vital principle of, iii. 246.
Verses on America, ii. 125; probable date of, *ib.*
Vice, luxury and, ii. 91; benefits of, ii. 196, 211; glozing of, 200; ill effects of, 213.
Virtue, atheist view of, ii. 252; beauty of, insufficient as a motive, 273.
Visible extension. *See* Sight and touch.
Vision, difficulties of erect, i. 117; essay on, referred to, i. 197, 299; ii. 297.
Visual language, i. 140, 142, 197, 209; ii. 275, 289, 500.
Vitruvius, ii. 260.

Wallis, i. 9, 11; iii. 20, 64.
Walpole, Horace, i. xlvi, lvii.
Walpole, Robert, i. xxx, xxxiv; ii. 104.
Walton, on, Fluxions, iii. 90, 96.
Wealth, and industry, ii. 87; iii. 117, 120, 141, 164; land as, 120; growth of, 121.
Whiston on the Scriptures, ii. 362.
Woolstone, his discourses on miracles, ii. 362.

Words and ideas, ii. 433; significance of, 441.
World, scriptural account of, ii. 409; as an animal, iii. 256, 307.
Wright's edition of Berkeley, ii. 2; iii. 60, 170.

Zeller, on the Stoics, ii. 270.

CHISWICK PRESS:—CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

P.328.9

38244

rkeley, G.
e works of George Berkeley.

DATE	NAME	DATE

SEP - 9 1984

38244